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Abstract 
The prolonged decline of the Umayyads is among the most intriguing episodes in Muslim history, 
and has generated a lasting impact on subsequent Muslim socio-political and religious thinking. 
The early sources for the Umayyad period comprise various conflicting reports, and problems of 
reconstruction become more complex since most sources were composed during cAbbāsid times, 
meaning they were generally hostile towards the Umayyads. The time frame of the study covers 
the last eight years of the Umayyad empire; more precisely the period from the death of Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik (d. 125¦743) to the end of the Umayyad era 132¦750.  
Meticulous and careful examination of the pre-modern sources, combined with modern research 
approaches has helped in identifying the objectives of various early historiographers in their 
descriptions of Umayyad decline. The study focuses primarily on analysing the pre-modern 
sources (specifically al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\, al-Mas<]d\, Ibn Ath\r and Ibn Khald]n) and applies a 
thematic approach to the source materials, through which the various strands that defined and 
illustrated that decline can be followed. This makes it possible to evaluate how extensively each 
of three themes (the role of religious movements, the maw[l\, and a~ab\ya) was dealt with in the 
early historiographies and to what extent they differ from one another.  
The development of religious ideas and how they contributed to the fall of the Umayyads and the 
rise of oppositional forces is also central in this regard and three religious movements (the 
<Abbasids, Khaw[rij, and Qadar\ya) are explored. On the basis of the information gleaned from 
comparing the writings of the early historiographers, the study has also adopted a comparative 
study of modern historiography and approaches in assessing the Umayyad fall. Gramsci’s theory 
of cultural hegemony is used to explain and interpret aspects of the formation and development of 
the Umayyad period; it can also be used to assess the viability of the ideology, organisation and 
strategy of the early oppositional movements as a counter-hegemonic ideological force. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The present study endeavours to catch echoes of the fall of the Umayyads through an analysis of 
both traditional and modern historical sources. In particular it seeks to answer the following two 
questions: What were the aims and objectives of traditional or pre-Modern historiographers in 
describing the fall of the Umayyads? and what are the modern approaches to understanding the 
causes of that fall? Through these questions it may be possible to identify the various approaches 
and methodologies that were used by the historiographers in interpreting the factors at play during 
the last eight years of Umayyad rule and more specifically, the aspects that contributed to Umayyad 
decline. Another key research question asked in the study is whether application of Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony can somehow explain the fall of the Umayyads? The thesis 
will apply aspects of Gramsci’s theory with the intention of possibly establishing an alternative 
interpretation of the reasons for the fall of the Umayyads. 
 Gramsci, an important twentieth century post-modern Marxist Italian thinker, departs 
significantly from the Marxist tradition in one key aspect. Whereas for classical Marxists, objective 
material conditions are considered a core element for all economic and socio-political processes, 
with a society’s historical development interpreted on the basis of its production of material 
objects, for Gramsci, by contrast, human subjectivity is central, signifying that any thorough 
analysis of social development cannot overlook the cultural or the spiritual.  Therefore the study 
aims to comprehend the socio-political development of the Umayyad period in the light of 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.   
This initial chapter illustrates the fundamental discourses of the thesis. It introduces the subject 
matter, its scope and the research questions, and examines a number of pertinent primary and 
secondary sources on the subject, which will lead to the formulation of a core hypothesis, research 
design and methodology.  An outline of the thesis and its chapters is also provided. 
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1.2 Historical Overview  
The fall of the Umayyads is one of the most intriguing and significant episodes in Muslim history, 
since it generated a lasting impact on subsequent Muslim socio-political and religious thought. 
The early sources of the period under study offer various conflicting reports, but the problem of 
historical reconstruction becomes even more complex, since many of the early sources on the 
Umayyads were composed during cAbbāsid times, and were mostly anti-Umayyad in their 
approach. Furthermore, during the medieval period scholars did not properly evaluate the sources 
of Umayyad history, with the exception of Ibn Khald]n who argued against the traditional view 
of the dynasty. His critical understanding of the philosophy of history led him to read Umayyad 
history with a more objective eye.1 
Historians are of course products of their own time. They evaluate history under the influence of 
their current intellectual environments and then explain it through the lenses of their contemporary 
dominant paradigms in order to comprehend the past through present-day idioms. During the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many orientalists endeavoured to examine the Umayyad period 
by applying specific theories, and most of these historiographers analysed the historical data 
according to various prior suppositions and hypotheses. Umayyad rule has also been examined 
through the lens of modern nationalistic approaches in the context of Arab-Persian conflicts. 
Unsurprisingly, socialist orientalists interpreted historical events of Umayyad rule in economic 
terms,2 constructing internal and external conflicts as class struggles during the first and second 
centuries of Islam. Although the history of the Umayyad received less attention in the period after 
the Second World War, the problem of Israel and Palestine, as Hawting argues, “fostered an 
                                                 
1 Ibn Khald]n argued that Ban] <Abd Mun[f had held the most prestigious and respectable position in Quraysh in 
the pre-Islamic period, while its sub-clans Banū Umayyah and Banū H[shim had religious and political authority. 
However, Ban] Umayyah held a high position and authority because of their superior  numbers. After the arrival of 
Islam, when the Prophet, who was a H[shimite, migrated to Medina, the Umayyads gained exclusive authority in 
Mecca, and for a time tribal vanities diminished under Islam. However, within the next forty years, Ban] Umayyah 
had once more reasserted high authority over all the Arab tribes, under the leadership of Mu<[wiyyah who 
established a robust administrative system  with lasting impact on subsequent periods. Ibn Khald]n, T[r\kh Ibn 
Khald]n, Dawla bani-Umayya, (Beirut: D[r I+y[> al-Tur[th al-<Arab\, 2010), 5¦3.           
2 For instance, in evaluating the history of Islam the Russian scholar, E. A. Belyaev, applied a Marxist approach to 
class and social relationships in his book Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages (1969).    
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interest in Umayyad policies in the region and especially in the importance of Jerusalem of the 
Umayyads.”3 Three relevant historical viewpoints are briefly identified: traditional understanding; 
Arab-Persian conflict; and internal conflict of Arab tribes in the decline of the Umayyads.  
Many Muslim scholars have endorsed the traditional understanding that the cAbbāsid and cAlid 
movements played a decisive role in the disintegration of the authority of the Umayyads. 
According to this view, Umayyad decline occurred due to the ascendance of another Arab family. 
Contemporary Arab scholars such as A+mad Am\n Mi~r\ in $u+[ al-Isl[m, al-Khudr\ in al-Dawla 
al-<Abb[s\ya and Jurj\ Zayd[n in T[r\kh al-Tamadun al-Isl[m\ support this traditional perspective, 
and much literature is available to validate  their opinion.4 Over time, this internal Arab conflict 
found expression as Islam’s sectarian division, and compared to their Sunnī counterparts, the Shīcī 
sources displayed an even greater antagonism towards the Umayyads. Of note is the fact that the 
Salafīs, rather than the Syrians, systematically claimed their heritage as Umayyad, probably 
locating the Umayyads in the sphere of Sunn\ Islam. Moreover, they were more concerned with 
the role of Mu<[w\ya and other Umayyads in the polemic between Sunn\s and Shi<\s. This situation 
remained more intense in predominately Shi<\ Iraq under the Sunn\s.  
With regard to Arab-Persian (Iranian) conflict, Arab and western scholars alike have, during the 
last two centuries, regarded the fall of the Umayyads as a consequence of the historical Arab-
Iranian conflict. According to this interpretation, the Iranians, being very proud of their civilization 
and intellectualism, were not satisfied with Arab domination. Although they did accept Islam, they 
did not accept Arab hegemony, and Umayyad repression and marginalisation of the Iranian 
population exacerbated their anti-Arab sentiment.  Writing about the fall of the Arab kingdom 
Julius Wellhausen remarks: “What has been said...about the relationship between Arabs and 
                                                 
3 G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate A.D. 661-750, (Worcester UK: Croom Helm 
Ltd., 1986), 127. 
4 Zayd[n devoted one third of his book, or about a hundred pages, to the study of the Umayyads, evaluating the 
Umayyad period in the context of pre-Islamic rivalries between the Umayyads and H[shimites, and framing 
Umayyad ascendancy in the following terms: “During the time of Mu<[w\ya, they regained their pre-Islamic 
hegemony while the exclusive recovery of sovereignty was achieved during the reign of <Abd al-Malik and al-
Wal\d.” The Umayyads acquired autocracy through “the clan-feeling of the Kurashites, and pressing into their 
service the other clan-feelings.” Cf. Zayd[n, History of Islamic Civilisation, tr. D. S. Margoliouth, (Kit[b Bhavan, 
Fine Press: Delhi,1978), 63.  
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Iranians refers essentially to the two Marches... There the two parties were still in a state of conflict 
with each other, and while Islam had gained some firm positions, it had not completely prevailed.”5 
Wellhausen’s theory was followed by others proposed by noted orientalists and Arabs.6  
More recent Arab scholars have also focused on another dimension of the issue, and their 
consideration of the Umayyads is derived from their own contemporary need for an historic 
identity in the modern world through which to strengthen their sense of nationalism. They paid 
special attention to the reconstruction of Umayyad history, particularly after the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire, since Umayyad governance was perceived as the model par excellence of 
Arab rule.   Indeed many modern scholars concentrate on this topic in their attempt to ground the 
modern Arab nationalist project in historical fact. Contemporary scholarly discourses of identity, 
religion, and nationalism create the conceptual framework they have sought in order to address 
contemporary challenges. The “Arab nationalism” of the Umayyads proved to be inspiring for 
many modern Arabs, while to the pan-Islamists, whose ideological foundations lay in the Islamic 
identity and brotherhood of the Muslims, this over-enthusiastic portrayal of the Umayyads may 
have proved less appealing. Criticising the Umayyads for their hegemonic rule over the non-Arab 
Muslims, both Islamic revivalists and pan-Islamists argue that the Umayyads undermined the basic 
Islamic concepts of equality and equity and that their rule represented the pinnacle of Arab 
chauvinism. Meanwhile, among pro-Umayyad scholars, the Salaf\s held a particularly favourable 
view of the dynasty due to the role of the Mu<[w\ya. In contrast to the Shi<\s, Salaf\s greatly respect 
the Mu<[w\ya, whom they consider the continuation of the Rashid]n period, and therefore focus 
on developing a favourable image of the Umayyads. Indeed, as Hawting correctly notes, “the 
possible tension between Islam and Arab nationalism could affect views of the Umayyads”.7 
Scholars such as Dennett have argued that the factors leading to the fall of the Umayyads included 
the internal conflicts among the ruling class and the fact that the dynasty did not have the best 
claims for legitimacy. According to this interpretation, such problems worsened in the provinces 
                                                 
5 J. Wellhausen,  Arab Kingdom and its Fall, (London: Curzon Press, 1927), 492. 
6 Cf. Theodor Nöldeke, “Zur Geschichte der Omayaden” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 
Vol. LV, 1901, 683-691; William Muir,  The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall, ed. T. H. Weir (Edinburgh, 
1924); Philip K. Hitti,  History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present, (London: Macmillan, 1970).  
7  Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam,  126. 
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(the centre of Umayyad rule being Syria) and culminated in the fall of the Umayyads.8 Contrary 
to Wellhausen’s theory, which constructs the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n as having played a central role 
in the disintegration of Umayyad rule, the revisionists such as Shaban argue that after Khur[s[n 
was conquered during the reign of <Uthm[n b. <Aff[n, the Arabs had established harmonious 
relations with the native population.9 Al-^abar\10  and al-Bal[dhur\11  reported many traditions 
regarding the Arabs’ settlement in Khur[s[n and their assimilation into Persian society, including 
their frequent adoption of Persian names and titles. 12  Modern scholars appear to have 
misinterpreted this assimilation, regarding this group as part of the Persian elites who revolted 
against Umayyad rule, when in fact it is more likely that they were Arabs who, while holding 
grievances against the Umayyads, had nothing to do with the anti-Arab movement or Arab-Iranian 
conflict. For example, Jadi< b. <Al\ al-Kirm[n\, Kh[zim b. Khaz\mah al-Marwaz\, al-Fa#l b. 
Sulaym[n al-^]s\, Am\r b. <Umayrah al-Samarqand\, and <Umar b. |af~ al-Mu+allab\ known as 
Haz[rmard, were all Arabs with Persian names or titles. Given the assumptions of Wellhausen and 
his followers, re-evaluation of the sources in order to identify the causes of Umayyad decline is 
both appropriate and necessary. 
1.3 Scope of the Work, Methodology and Hypothesis 
Pre-Modern historiographers usually present an anti-Umayyad narrative of the events surrounding 
the fall of the Umayyads. This uniformity of approach appears to be due to their heavy reliance on 
the reports of Ab]-|asan <Al\ b. Mu+ammad al-Mad[>in\ (d. 225¦839). A client of the Quraysh, 
al-Mad[>in\ was considered to be an authority on the early history of the Arabs in Khur[s[n and 
Basra, and his work constitutes a major source for many historiographers, with the most complete 
                                                 
8 D. C. Dennett, Marw[n ibn Muhammad: The Passing of the Umayyad Caliphate, PhD dissertation, Harvard 
University, USA, (1939),  vii. 
9 Shaban, M. A., The <Abb[sid Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 33.   
10 Al-^abar\, Ab] Ja<far Mu+ammad b. Jar\r (d. 310∕923), T[r\kh al-Umam wa-al-Mul]k, (Beirut: D[r al-Kutub al-
<Arab\yah, 1971), 81, 155, 156¦2.  
11 Al-Bal[dhur\, Fut]+,  507,  Al-Bal[dhur\ notes that Ziy[d dispatched the settlers to Khur[s[n with their families.  
12 Shaban notes that “50,000 Arab families came to Khur[s[n. They were settled in the different villages of the oasis 
of Marv.” Shaban, The <Abb[sid Revolution, 33-34.   
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version of his writings being that preserved by al-^abar\.13 The other important source of al-
Mad[>in\’s reports is the Kit[b al-fut]+ of Abu Mu+ammad A+mad b. A<tham al-K]f\ al-Kind\. 
Both al-Bal[dhur\ (d. 279¦892) and al-^abar\ (d. 310¦923) derived substantial material from al-
Mad[>in\, and also structured their work around his information on events of that period and their 
chronology.14  However, they drew additional information from other sources in order to fill 
obvious lacunae and create a coherent narrative of the period. Most of the later historiographers, 
like al-Azd\ (d. 334¦945)15 and Ibn Ath\r (d. 630¦1234), either abridged the narratives of al-
Bal[dhur\ and al-^abar\ or constructed their own historiographies, largely based on the earlier 
historiographies that had been composed during the early 3rd¦9th century. 16  
Further complexities are present in the interpretation of the narratives of the late Umayyad period. 
The issue of causality is not easy to address, since the alternative narratives of these events are not 
coherent. Scholars have to rely on the interpretive comments of al-Bal[dhur\, al-^abar\ and others 
on the reports of al-Mad[>in\ and other earlier sources, even though such narrow interpretations 
are insufficient for a holistic comprehension of the reasons behind the events. Moreover, the 
narratives are in many cases fragmented, and do not define the most significant causes of the 
incidents. Steven Judd highlights this obscurity, noting that:  
their sources sometime explain events as manifestations of struggles between the great tribal blocs 
of Qays and Yemen. In other instances, they focus on the complexities of Umayyad family politics 
and the clashing egos of ambitious princes. In still other instances, their sources emphasize the 
struggle between pious protagonists and libertine, sometime heretical opponents. Unfortunately, it 
is not always possible to determine whose voice offers which narrative and at times the narratives 
meld into a complex melange of tribe, family and religion.17 
                                                 
13 Judd, Steven Clark, The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad History (PhD thesis, 
Near Eastern Studies, The University of Michigan, 1997), 56. 
14 Duri, A. H, The Rise of Historical Writings among the Arabs, tr. Lawrence Conrad, (Preston: Preston University 
Press, 1983), 70. 
15 cf. al-Azd\ Yaz\d, b. Mu+ammad Ab] Zakar\ya, T[r\kh Maw~il, ed. <Al\ |ab\ba, (Cairo, 1967). 
16 cf. Ibn Ath\r, <Izz al-D\n <Al\, al-K[mil f\ al-T[r\kh, (Beirut: D[r S[dir, and D[r al-Beirut, 1965-67).   
17 Judd, The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, 57. 
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Al-Bal[dhur\ and al-^abar\ became principal sources for later historians. For instance, Ab] 
Zakar\ya Yaz\d b. Mu+ammad al-Azd\ (d. 334¦945) derived most of his information from al-^abar\ 
in his T[r\kh al-Maw~il. He abridged al-^abar\’s accounts and presented a concise history of the 
city, describing its significance to the rule of the Umayyads. In contrast to his predecessors al-
Bal[dhur\ and al-^abar\, al-Azd\ gave greater prominence to tribal identities. Similarly, <Izz al-
D\n b. al-Ath\r (d. 630¦1234) extracted both the structure and material of his al-K[mil f\ al-t[r\kh 
from al-^abar\. He also relied heavily on the reports of al-Bal[dhur\. However, his treatment of 
the Umayyads resembles Azd\’s work, in its characterisation of tribal struggles for authority during 
the Umayyad period. Interpretations of the fall of the Umayyads vary in different historiographies. 
Al-Bal[dhur\, for instance, gives more importance to the ideological differences and their impact 
on a religious milieu in which the Qadar\s and their opponents played a crucial role in the events 
that precipitated Umayyad decline, whereas al-^abar\’s accounts and his interpretations present a 
mélange of tribal, ideological and family concerns. His treatment of the subject influenced most 
of the historiographers who came after him, as the work of al-Azd\ and Ibn Ath\r makes clear. In 
view of such differing approaches, it is often argued that the conception of late Umayyad history 
transformed significantly over time. Judd traces this evolution, drawing an important distinction: 
“early historians, such as al-Bal[dhur\, perceived events in religious terms while later sources 
progressively subordinated issues of religion to the tribal narrative.”18 
The present research focuses primarily on an analysis of the classical sources in order to identify 
the aims and objectives of the various early historiographers in describing Umayyad decline.  
Several themes are used to describe this decline, and the study will try to assess the extent to which 
each theme was developed in early historiographies, while also identifying the degree to which 
each differs from the others. More specifically, a comparison is made based on the works of five 
well-known pre-modern historians of the classical and middle periods: one from the 3rd¦9th 
century, two from the 4th¦10th century, one from the 7th¦13th and one from the 9th¦15th century:  
1. Al-Ya<q]b\, A+mad b. Ya<q]b (d. 284¦897): T[r\kh al-Ya<q]b\ 
2. Al-^abar\, Ab] Ja<far Mu+ammad b. Jar\r (d. 310¦923): T[r\kh al-Rusul wa-al-Mul]k  
                                                 
18 Judd, The Third Fitna, 59, 60. 
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3. Al-Mas<]d\, Ab] al-|asan <Al\ b. Husayn (d. 345¦956): Mur]j al-Dhahab and Tanb\h 
wa-al-Ishr[f 
4. Ibn Ath\r, <Izz al-D\n,<Al\ b. Mu+ammad (d. 630∕1233), al-K[mil f\ al-T[r\kh 
5.  Ibn Khald]n, Ab] Zayd <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Mu+ammad b. Mu+ammad (808¦1406): 
Kit[b al-<Ibar wa-D\w[n al-Mubtad>i wa-al-Khabar 
In order to answer my two research questions, a primary task within this thesis is to compare and 
contrast the aims and objectives of these historiographers and to understand the extent to which 
these historical sources display an anti-Umayyad stance. In doing so, a comparative research 
method will be qualitatively applied in order to identify the aims and objective in both the pre-
Modern and Modern sources, with comparisons among pre-Modern sources and among Modern 
sources respectively.  
The study will also analyse the degree to which the sources differ in the depiction and interpretation 
of the fall of the Umayyads, with the aim of examining the decline of the Umayyads in a more 
objective and comprehensive manner. Its chronological focus is that of the last eight years of the 
Umayyad empire, more precisely, from the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik (r. 105¦724-125¦743) 
to the end of the Umayyad era 132¦750. In addition it will examine modern historiographies in 
order to assess their aims and objectives in interpreting the fall of the Umayyads, as well as to 
identify the ways in which modern scholars explain the Umayyad fall according to various themes.  
As noted above, most of the modern historiographers studying the Umayyad period have attempted 
to reconstruct the history of the dynasty in the light of certain prior suppositions. The decline of 
the Umayyads has been evaluated according to different objectives and variously presented as the 
result of conflicts between Umayyads and H[shimids, Arab and non-Arab maw[l\, or Yemen\s 
and Qays\s. On the other hand, some view the collapse of the Umayyads as the result of the ruling 
family’s own internal conflict. Scholars such as Blankinship argue that, with a weakened Umayyad 
army on the external front, jih[d19 could not be sustained: consequently the Umayyads lost an 
important source of their legitimacy in internal politics.20 Van Vloten views the role of socio-
                                                 
19 Jih[d’s literal meaning is ‘struggle’. In Islamic terms, it is employed for holy war against non-Muslims in order to 
defend or extend the Muslim rule. 
20 Blankinship, Khalid Yahya, The End of the Jih[d State, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1-4. 
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religious movements as an important factor in the fall of the Umayyads, when rebellious 
movements initiated their political struggle against the Umayyads by declaring them anti-
Islamic.21  
The third and key research question, as noted earlier, is ‘how can an application of Gramsci’s 
theory of cultural hegemony explain the fall of the Umayyads? The practicability of the application 
of Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony to the study of events leading to the Umayyad decline, 
and the extent to which this theory can contribute to more nuanced understandings of the dynasty’s 
final demise will be examined in the course of the study.    
Antonio Gramsci was an important post-modern Marxist Italian thinker of the twentieth century. 
In classical Marxism, the objective material conditions are considered a core element for all 
economic and socio-political processes. According to this view, the historical development of 
society is interpreted on the basis of the production of material objects. Contrary to this approach, 
Gramsci argues that human subjectivity is central to such processes, and that the role of cultural 
and spiritual factors in a society’s evolution cannot be ignored, and values socio-cultural and 
intellectual movements in the construction of human society. In his Notebook, he explains his 
theory of hegemony and certain guiding themes around which it revolves.  Joseph V. Femia 
describes Gramsci’s guiding themes as follows: (a) the nature of power in advanced capitalist 
regimes; (b) the methods whereby this power can be undermined; (c) the character of the new 
proletarian civilization; and (d) the relationship between the material and spiritual sides of 
existence, further noting that Gramsci centres each of them around his unifying concept of 
hegemony.22     
This thesis seeks to evaluate social development during the period of Umayyad rule according to 
some guiding themes, mentioned in the outline below, in the light of Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony. Gramsci’s idealism leads him to reject the mechanical determinism of positivist 
                                                 
21 According to Dennett: “The revolt in Khorasan, which was due only in part to the social and religious factors so 
exaggerated by Van Vloten, was certainly the occasion, but not the cause, for the final victory of the <Abbasid.” 
(Dennett, Marw[n ibn Muhammad, vi).     
22 Femia, Joseph, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 1-4.  
18 
 
Marxism. The central point of his theory is that objective material interests are not mechanically 
translated into class consciousness. Rather, the dominant class controls society by presenting 
values that are acceptable to the masses. The Umayyads had failed to sustain their cultural, moral 
and intellectual values by the end of their rule, whereas the <Abb[sids successfully presented 
religious ideology and moral values that were acceptable to the people of Khur[s[n. On this basis, 
they effectively organised a revolutionary anti-Umayyad movement.  
The study therefore seeks to apply Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony to an analysis of the 
<Abb[sid revolution and Umayyad decline. Gramsci argues that the supremacy of a class or group 
over the society is established through two methods: (i) domination and coercion, and (ii) 
intellectual and moral leadership. The latter in fact constitutes hegemony, and in this way, the 
society accepts the supremacy of the dominant class, apparently by choice, while the dominant 
class rules the society by the consent of the ruled class rather than by force or coercion. Gramsci 
constructs the state as establishing its supremacy through coercive machinery, while intellectual 
and moral leadership provides supremacy to the state. The educational and religious institutions 
of ‘civil society’ play a significant role in attaining supremacy for the dominant class. Here the 
focus is on the role of religious institutions and religious movements during the Umayyad period, 
and specifically the ways in which the Umayyads successfully mobilised a moral and intellectual 
leadership for the construction of their hegemony. The study also seeks answers for the failure of 
anti-Umayyad forces to initiate any effective revolutionary movements until the death of Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik.  
Gramsci recognises the dichotomy of political and civil society. He views political society as the 
state, while civil society is composed of intellectuals, scholars, and public opinion-making 
institutions. Accordingly, whenever the State seeks to introduce or implement unpopular policy, it 
mobilises civil society to manipulate the state’s policy in a manner interpreted as acceptable by 
the wider society. Thus civil society, whether or not it is controlled by the state, acquires the 
consent of the ruled class for the realising of state policy. In Gramsci’s analysis, “the State is the 
entire complex of political and theoretical activity by which the ruling classes not only justify and 
maintain their domination but also succeed in obtaining the active consent of the governed”,  while 
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civil society is the essential centre of radiation.23 This hypothesis is used to analyse the Umayyads’ 
attempt to mobilise civil society in order to consolidate their power, as well as to evaluate the ways 
in which socio-cultural and religious institutions and individual intellectuals provided them with 
sustainable strength to rule. Quite apart from its indisputable contemporary intellectual, political 
and philosophical influence, Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony has been selected for this task 
because of his comprehensive approach to the study of human development.  In my view, an 
application of this theory to pertinent cultural, social and spiritual-religious factors may provide a 
new and more nuanced understanding of the reasons for Umayyad decline.  
1.4 Outline of the Study  
In order to answer the central questions of this thesis, the study is divided into seven chapters 
including this introductory chapter, and the second chapter which constitutes a literature review 
which concurrently develops some of the hypothetical aspects already outlined above. The four 
main chapters (Three to Six) focus on four different themes considered important for analysing the 
fall of the Umayyads, and are followed by an overall summary of the research and its conclusions.  
Each chapter has been divided into three sections: 
1. A study of modern narratives of the fall of the Umayyads 
2. A study of pre-modern sources identifying their aims and objectives in depicting the 
fall of the Umayyads.  
3. A critical study of the factors contributing to the fall of the Umayyads, achieved 
through application of Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony to the same factors.  
A more detailed outline follows. 
Chapter One: Introduction  
Having introduced and defined the subject for analysis, the introductory chapter provides a brief 
historical overview and establishes the conceptual framework for the study. 
  
                                                 
23 Gramsci, Antonio, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971), 28. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review: Themes, Genres and Hypothesis 
A comprehensive review of the scholarly literature evaluates the nature of the differences and 
agreements between Muslim historiographers writing on the decline of the Umayyads. It also helps 
to define the limitations of the research and to construct a potential hypothesis for the study. 
Several important pre-Modern and modern sources of Muslim historiography that chronicle and 
comment on the decline of the Umayyads are considered, in particular works by well-known 
classical historiographers who analysed the early Islamic sources and derived  certain substantial 
and distinctive conclusions from them. Attention is also given to modern approaches to the study 
of the Umayyads. Several Orientalists as well as modern Muslim historians have devised new 
research methods aimed at providing a better understanding of the Umayyads and their decline. 
The study identifies the aims and objectives of their interpretations by examining their arguments 
and evaluating their hypotheses. The literature review will also contribute to the design of a new, 
objective, and thorough research methodology through which to assess the subject under study 
with meticulous examination and careful analysis, and will also explore the application of various 
methods for testing the eventual hypothesis.    
For a better understanding and definition of Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony and its various 
dimensions, the study examines the works of a number of eminent scholars who also applied his 
theory, albeit with the intention of analysing socio-political phenomena in a Western, non-Islamic 
domain. In addition, it reviews several works focused on the study of Muslim society in historical 
perspective in the light of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony; these include Thomas J. Butko’s 
Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam, Ahmed Afzaal’s 
The Origin of Islam as a Social Movement, and Robert Fatton’s Gramsci and Legitimization of 
the State: The Case of the Senegalese Passive Revolution.24  
                                                 
24 Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam”, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, May 2004, vol. 31 (1), . 41-62; Ahmed Afzaal, “The Origin of Islam as a Social 
Movement”, in Islamic Studies (Islamic Research Institute Islamabad), Vol. 42, Summer 2003, 203-243; Fatton, 
Robert Jr,. “Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State: the Case of the Senegalese Passive Revolution”, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science¦Revue canadienne de science politique (Canadian Political Science Association), Vol. 
19,  No. 4, Dec., 1986, 729-750.  
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This introductory chapter offers a systematic outline of the structure of the thesis, which consists 
of four main elements: a) the introduction of the subject matter with research questions and a 
potential hypothesis; b) the scope of the work and its limitations; c) a methodology that will enable 
the hypothesis to be tested; and d) a literature review and survey of important primary and 
secondary sources. 
Chapter Three: Historical Background to the Umayyads   
When considering the foundational issues of, and general background to Umayyad rule, the chapter 
looks first at the formation and establishment of the Umayyad caliphate, and examines the ways 
in which the Umayyads took control of the Muslim state and consolidated their power. It also aims 
to trace the nature of various socio-political dynamics in Muslim society that shaped its political 
structure, and explores the way in which the early sources presented the historical background of 
the Umayyads and the extent to which the modern interpretations are at variance with the pre-
modern sources. Most importantly, it applies Gramsci’s cultural theory to the study of the historical 
background of the Umayyads, seeking specifically to evaluate social development during 
Umayyad rule in light of Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.  
According to Gramsci, political thinking should be evaluated as an historical phenomenon through 
critical examination of historical conditions. Thus, revisionists interpreting historical development 
through the application of modern tools and existing techniques may be considered inaccurate in 
their approach. Interpretations of modern historiographers will therefore be evaluated in light of 
Gramsci’s understanding, and revisionist interpretations, e.g., that of Shaban regarding tribal 
conflict, will need to be re-examined. In Shaban’s view, tribal tensions during the Umayyad period 
were in fact a conflict between two political parties, one favouring expansion and the other 
preferring assimilation.  However, such revisionist interpretations of political motivation have 
taken no account of the subjects’ historical context. For the Gramscian approach, ahistorical 
methodologies are insufficient for a proper understanding of historical development, since 
contextual and textual analyses are both prerequisites for the accurate presentation of political 
thought. Thus the fall of the Umayyads is evaluated by revisiting the historical context of their 
rule.  
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More specifically, this chapter is devoted to evaluating social development under Umayyad rule, 
an approach that considers cultural as well as intellectual factors, and departs significantly from 
previous economically-oriented explanations for Umayyad decline.  Scholars subscribing to the 
latter view include Blankinship, whose The End of Jihad views economic factors as the central force 
behind the dynasty’s demise.25 I would argue that, consistent with the theory of cultural hegemony, 
the early Umayyads established their own moral, intellectual, and socio-cultural values which 
helped to consolidate their rule over the society. 
Chapter Four: The Role of Religious Movements in the Fall of the Umayyads   
Narratives of the Umayyad fall recounted in both modern and pre-modern historiographies are 
many and varied. A prominent feature of that era was the growing number of religious movements; 
these, together with religion as a general phenomenon, are commonly acknowledged to have 
played a vital role both in the fall of the Umayyads and the rise of oppositional forces. Chapter 
Four aims to analyse the role of religion in the Umayyad decline. To provide greater analytical 
depth, it focuses on religious perceptions of the Umayyads, along with three important religious 
movements that were significantly opposed to this ruling dynasty: the <Abb[sid movement, the 
Khaw[rij, and the Qadar\ya. It also considers the interpretations of modern scholars and offers a 
comparison, naming five pre-modern sources in order to identify the various early historiographic 
narratives on the role and importance of such religious movements.  
In addition this chapter assists with an understanding of the narratives of modern historiographers 
and their arguments, and in order to achieve a more nuanced evaluation, applies an analytical 
framework derived from a radically different intellectual tradition, cultural identity and historical 
context, i.e., the twentieth century Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci.  To reach a better 
understanding of the religious movements of the time, as well as why and how they contributed to 
the fall of the Umayyads, the study uses the Gramscian theory of hegemony. In demonstrating the 
ways in which these movements challenged the established authority of the Umayyads, the chapter 
aims, in Gramscian terms, to assess the viability of the ideology, organization and strategy of the 
                                                 
25 Blankinship, Khalid Yahya, The End of the Jih[d State: The Reign of Hish[m Ibn <Abd al-Malik and the Collapse 
of the Umayyads, (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1994).  
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oppositional movements as a counter-hegemonic ideological force. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
asserts that the rule of one class or group over the rest of society is not based solely on material 
power. Rather, the dominant class or group necessarily establishes its own cultural, political, and 
moral values as conventional norms of practical behaviour. Thus, the dominant class legitimises 
its political rule on the basis of moral and cultural values.  In light of hegemony theory, it is clear 
that the Umayyads had lost their moral legitimacy by the end of their rule, whereas the <Abb[sids 
had successfully devised an alternative intellectual and moral authority through which they 
validated their political rule.  
Chapter Five: Arab versus non-Arab and Perception of the Maw[l\  
During the Umayyad period, a kind of multi-cultural society emerged, in which social changes 
were characterised by Arab interaction with people of different regions and ethnicities. Some 
scholars argue that Umayyad rule is typified by Arab hegemony and domination over the subject 
peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe, with the Umayyads’ socio-economic policies promoting 
feudal relations among the people of the state. This view is worth analysing in order to understand 
the extent to which the Umayyad policies were justified. Chapter Five also evaluates the impact 
of these policies on society, and assesses the nature of the relations between Arabs and maw[l\,  
looking specifically at how the maw[l\ emerged as a social group, how this in turn influenced 
society and contributed to the fall of Umayyad rule, and how both the phenomenon and the 
causality are presented in  pre-Modern and Modern sources. Further it attempt s to demonstrate 
the potential for a careful re-examination of the primary sources to add new insights to previous 
investigations in this field. Significantly, modern historiographers have also analysed the role of 
the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n and draw conclusions that are contrary to those offered by traditional 
narratives. For instance, Agha Said Saleh, on the basis of his demographic computations, argues 
that the decisive part in the revolution was played by old Arab warriors who resided in the 
Khur[s[n region. The maw[l\ meanwhile appeared during the <Abb[sid period during the process 
of Islamization.26 On the basis of such historical sources, it would therefore seem more likely that 
the maw[l\’s role in the downfall of the Umayyads was marginal.  
                                                 
26 Agha, Saleh Said, The Revolution which toppled the Umayyads Neither Arab nor <Abb[sid, (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 
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Applying Gramsci’s theory to the study of the maw[l\ yields interesting results. Gramsci argues 
that the dominant class controls the society by presenting values that are acceptable to the masses. 
The early Umayyads successfully maintained their power through devising moral values 
acceptable to the maw[l\ while also using coercive power when necessary. By contrast, the later 
Umayyads failed to sustain or promote their cultural, moral and intellectual values by the end of 
their rule. In the early period, a great number of scholars were from the maw[l\ who, in Gramscian 
terms, played the role of ‘deputies’ of the ruling class. However, with the emergence of class 
consciousness within the maw[l\, a new group identity emerged and with it debates on equal rights 
and rebellious tendencies. The oppositional forces highlighted the discrimination while presenting 
an alternative ideology. Unlike other oppositional forces, the <Abb[sids successfully presented 
religious ideology and moral values that were acceptable to the maw[l\, particularly those living 
in Khur[s[n. On this basis they organised an effective revolutionary movement against the 
Umayyads. Analysis of the <Abb[sid revolution and the fall of the Umayyads is therefore carried 
out using Gramsci’s theory of revolutionary process.   
Chapter Six: <A~ab\ya, Tribalism and the Decline of the Umayyads  
Chapter six assesses the early sources on the issue of <a~ab\ya (group feeling on the basis of 
common genealogy; Ibn Khald\n considered <a~ab\ya as a key factor in establishing authority in a 
tribal society), and its role in the fall of the Umayyads. Similarly, the internal conflict within the 
royal family of the later Umayyad period is also seen as contributing to the fall of the dynasty. The 
theme of <a~ab\ya is presented through three pairs of competing groups: 
1. Internal conflict among  the royal family 
2. Yaman\s versus  Qays\s 
3. H[shimids versus Umayyads  
Early sources on the issue of <a~ab\ya and its role in the fall of the Umayyads are evaluated.  In 
these sources, it is assumed that the later Umayyads could not maintain their <a~ab\ya, and that 
conflict therefore emerged among Umayyad family members. Similarly, at a national level, the 
Arabs could not preserve their <a~ab\ya, which eventually causing the outbreak of conflict among 
the Arab tribes. Consequently, the Arab Umayyad kingdom was replaced by the <Abb[sids who 
were mainly supported by the non-Arabs of Khur[s[n. Pre-Modern sources appear mostly to 
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validate Ibn Khald]n’s <a~ab\ya theory, by constructing the following narrative: the conflict among 
the members of the Umayyad family generated inter-tribal enmities among the Arabs, resulting in 
the decline of the Arab kingdom of the Umayyads. The conflict within the Umayyad royal family 
provoked the tribal conflict of Yemen and Mu#ar. Pre-Modern historians also examine Hish[m’s 
unfriendly relations with his would-be successor al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. When al-Wal\d came to 
power, this discord led him to dismiss all Hish[m’s governors and deputies whom he punished 
mercilessly (with the exception of the governor of Iraq, Y]suf b. <Umar). The subsequent tribal 
conflict influenced all aspects of socio-political and religious life. Meanwhile, the <Abb[sid 
movement took advantage of the internal conflict and came into power with the assistance of their 
Khur[s[nian allies, having engineered religious feeling to achieve their political target. In this 
context, Ibn Khald]n’s <a~ab\ya theory is convincing, even logical. The Umayyads, having lost 
their power when conflict emerged within the members of their royal family, were replaced by the 
<Abb[sids who came into power with the help of non-Arabs. Thus, this authority had to be shared 
with their non-Arabs supporters. Ironically, in contrast to the Umayyads, the <Abb[sids could not 
enjoy absolute authority. The chapter weighs the viability of Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya as 
apposite to the interpretation of the Umayyad decline. 
The second section of the chapter focuses on the study of modern sources. Most modern scholars, 
such as Wellhausen, Kennedy and Hawting, have argued that the internal family conflict and the 
tribal conflict were inextricably linked.27 They agreed that the role of various members of the 
Umayyad royal family was decisive in shaping events in a particular direction, and viewed most 
of the tribal conflicts as having emerged because of the backing of important Umayyad family 
figures. Hawting supposes that al-Wal\d II nursed a personal animosity towards Khalid al-Qasr\. 
However, the Umayyad princes and Yaman\ elites considered al-Wal\d’s policies as part of his 
pro-Qays\ politics. The major divisions of the Syrian armed forces therefore refrained from 
accepting the authority of al-Wal\d, and instead gathered around other members of the royal family 
                                                 
27 Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh 
Century, (A History of the Near East.) (London and New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 116, 112, 113;  Hawting, The 
First Dynasty of Islam, 90. 
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who were considered suitable to rule.28 Interpretations such as these demonstrate the continuous 
and important impact of Ibn Khald]n’s theory on modern interpretations of the fall of the 
Umayyads.   
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony significantly facilitates a deeper understanding of the real causes 
of Umayyad decline. The <a~ab\ya’ corresponds in Gramscian terms to political society (i.e., the 
State), while civil society consists of intellectuals, scholars, and public opinion-making 
institutions. His model shows that whenever the State wants to introduce or implement unpopular 
policy, it mobilises civil society to manipulate state policy in a manner judged by the general 
population to be more acceptable. Civil society, whether under state control or not, thereby 
acquires the consent of the ruled class for the state’s policy. Gramsci explains that “the State is the 
entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies 
and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules.”29 
In his theory of hegemony, civil society is the essential centre of radiation. Transposing this theory 
to the Umayyads’ historical and cultural context, political society is represented by the Syrian 
Army and Yemen tribes. In losing the allegiance of the political society, civil society also failed 
in mobilising the masses to accept the hegemony of the rulers. The Umayyads organised political 
society on a tribal basis, but when conflict emerged within the house of Umayyad and between the 
Yemen and Mu#ar, the strength of their political society (or coercive power) also disappeared. 
Consequently, political society also became irreparably fractured. Ibn Khald]n’s theory of 
<a~ab\ya and Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony are both agreed on the importance of political 
society in order to enable the state to assert its power, a situation only possible where unity prevails. 
In the absence of coercive power, resistance movements have the undeniable potential to mobilise 
civil society against hegemony, as indeed the <Abb[sids achieved by presenting a new ideology 
based on religious equality rather than tribalism.  
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
  
                                                 
28 Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, 93. 
29 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, 504. 
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2 Chapter Two: Literature Review According to Genres and Research Themes 
2.1 Introduction 
The historiography of the Umayyads has been compiled in a variety of literary genres, and it is not 
possible to present this literature under a single rubric. It may, however, be divided into several 
categories according to methodology, style, and titles. The most important category is that of fully-
fledged histories and chronicles. Arguably, the most important and detailed history for the study 
of the Umayyads is al-^abar\’s T[r\kh al-rusul wa-al-mul]k, the most comprehensive historical 
work remaining from the <Abb[sid period. Many modern historians studying the Umayyad era, 
such as Wellhausen, find their own work particularly well-informed by the rich detail in al-^abar\’s 
work. Al-Ya<q]b\’s historiography also contains highly valuable information for the study of the 
period, despite of the fact that his pro-cAl\d tendencies led him to apply an anti-Umayyad approach 
to his study. In addition, works by Al-Mas<]d\, Ibn Ath\r and Ibn Khald]n were selected for this 
study. Each of these works is reviewed in the following discussion.30    
Modern historiographies are of course equally necessary when seeking to gain a detailed picture 
of Umayyad rule.  Moreover, they provide invaluable orientation on the methodologies    applied 
to evaluate and interpret the primary sources. German Semiticist Julius Wellhausen, in his The 
Arab Kingdom and its Fall, and Hungarian Jewish scholar, Ignaz Goldziher in his 
Muhammedanische Studien (‘Muslim Studies’ in the English tradition) attempted to devise a 
                                                 
30 The second most important category among the sources consists of biographical dictionaries and geographical 
surveys. Treatment of the subject is not directly undertaken in these works; rather, they are organised according to 
the principles of their particular genre. The ^abaq[t of Ibn Sa<d (d. 845 AD),  and al-Bal[dhur\’s Ans[b al-Ashr[f 
are considered the most valuable biographical dictionaries for the study of the Umayyad period. As far as the fut]+ 
genre is concerned, Ibn <As[kir’s T[r\kh Mad\nat Dimashq is worth noting. Ibn <As[kir not only recounts the history 
of Damascus, but also reveals considerable information about individuals and their roles and achievements.  
The third important source of Umayyad history is poetry. Poetry is considered an essential information source for 
the study of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula, and its vitality remains equally important in the period of the 
Umayyads. Ab] al-Faraj al-I~fah[n\’s Kit[b al-Agh[n\ is one of the major collections of Arabic poetry. Farazdaq 
and Jar\r (both d. circa 730 AD) were two important poets of the Umayyad era, and their poetry is the best depiction 
of their socio-political environment. Similarly the heresiographical literature that describes the sectarian conflicts in 
the early Muslim tradition is an important source for the study of religious development during the Umayyad period. 
For instance the Maq[l[t al-Isl[m\y\n of Ab] al-|asan al-Ash<ar\ (d. 935 AD) offers rich material for evaluating the 
religious and theological developments of the Umayyad period.  
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methodology for the study of earlier sources, undertaking critical analysis for this task. Employing 
such an approach, they examined the material, developing a hypothesis at variance with the 
traditional understandings of the Umayyads. Wellhausen for example admired Umayyad 
administration. His work was particularly followed by Belgian Jesuit Henri Lammens in his 
elaborate writings. In the late 1940s, Dennett criticised some of Wellhausen’s interpretations of 
the Umayyads’ fiscal system,31  while Shaban was similarly dissatisfied with Wellhausen for 
overstressing the importance and role of the Persian maw[l\ in the collapse of the Umayyads.32 
Nevertheless, the essential structure of Wellhausen’s study remains valid and offers great potential 
for the understanding of the Umayyads rule. Dennett’s (1939) Harvard doctoral thesis Marw[n b. 
Muhammad: the Passing of the Umayyad Caliphate is one of the most important modern works of 
its kind.  
Dennett attempted a comprehensive analysis of the legal principles of the Umayyad system of 
taxation, and also analysed the military and political institutions of the later Umayyads, focusing 
particularly on the period of Marw[n b. Mu+ammad and the events of his day. He argued that the 
Umayyads attempted to preserve pre-Islamic Arab social institutions, since the Arabs did not 
perceive that the <Abb[sids were aiming to undermine these bodies. However, many of those who 
participated in the revolution realised their mistake after the fact, including Sulaym[n b. Kath\r 
(leader of the <Abb[sid movement in Marw and head naq\b) who proclaimed: “May God curse 
Ab] Muslim and make his face as this cluster of grapes. We dug the river with our hands and 
another let the water in it.”33 Dennett brought many other novel insights to the subject, which will 
be considered later.     
The key task of this study is to pursue the application of Gramsci’s cultural theory to an analysis 
of the events leading to the decline of the Umayyads. Several scholarly works that have also 
applied Gramsci’s cultural hegemony model have been selected for an analysis of socio-cultural 
and religious movements. Thus the literature review for this study includes three categories: 
                                                 
31 Dennett, Marw[n ibn Muhammad,  preface iii, 5.  
32 Shaban, The <Abb[sid Revolution, 155, 156. 
33 Maqriz\, Kit[b al-Naza< wa-al-Takha~im, ed. Gerhardus Vos, (Leiden, 1888), 52. The translation of the words of 
Sulaym[n b. Kath\r was carried out by Dennett, Marw[n ibn Muhammad, 328.  
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1. A review of (six) selected works which apply  Gramsci’s theories; 
2. A review of (five) traditional sources on the fall of the Umayyads;  
3. A review of (eleven books and two research articles) of the modern sources on the 
fall of the Umayyads.   
2.2 Detailed Review of Some Works in which Gramscian Theory is Applied  
2.2.1 Revelation or Revolution: Gramsci and the Rise of Political Islam 
The concept of ‘Political Islam’ emerged from the work of twentieth century religious scholars. 
Thomas Butko, who attempts to analyse this contemporary phenomenon according to Gramscian 
understanding, argues that Islamic movements utilising the ideology of political Islam are less 
concerned with Islamic doctrine and faith, and more focused on using Islam to de-legitimise the 
power structure of the ruling elite. Since political Islam, particularly in the context of twentieth 
(and twenty-first) century Middle Eastern authoritarian states, provides a ‘revolutionary’ ideology, 
Islamic ideology can therefore provide the basis for initiating a solid counter-hegemonic 
movement. The presentation of Islam as a revolutionary ideology attracts and unites the 
marginalised ruled class against an authoritarian regime. Butko views this using a Gramscian 
approach: “the consummate aim is to construct an active counter-hegemonic force with the sole 
and ultimate objective of overthrowing the current elites and the present political, economic and 
social structure.”34 Clearly Political Islam can fulfil the role of an active counter-hegemonic force. 
Gramsci asserts that such a counter-hegemonic force can only achieve its objectives by creating a 
revolutionary movement featuring a consistent ideology, well-organised organism, and viable 
strategy. Regarding his study of works by leading twentieth century Islamic theorists, particularly 
|asan al-Bann[> (d. 1949), Sayyad Qu%b (d. 1966), Ab] al-<Al[> Mawd]d\ (d. 1979), and 
Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989), Butko’s analysis uses a Gramscian approach to the practical and 
theoretical elements of the contemporary phenomenon of political Islam. These scholars were 
attempting to challenge the existing secularised regimes (i.e., hegemonic forces) with the aim of 
replacing the ruling elites and dominant powers with a new class, based on a viable ideology (i.e., 
                                                 
34 Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam”, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, May 2004, vol. 31 (1), 41-62.  
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religion). Butko’s work highlights a key similarity in the desired aims and objectives of Gramsci 
and the Islamic theorists, both of whom value the necessity of constructing a revolutionary 
organisation to function as a counter-hegemonic force, thereby challenging the authority of the 
ruling elites and eventually overthrowing them. The counter-hegemonic forces shatter the structure 
of the ruling elites on which their authority and legitimacy is predicated.35 
Gramsci rejects the ‘universal truth’ of common sense, claiming “that common sense is an 
ambiguous, contradictory, and multiform concept, and that to refer to common sense as a 
conformation of truth is nonsense.”36 Through this refutation of ‘universal truth’, he wishes to 
inspire the individual to reject the worldview produced by the hegemon or ruling elite while 
enabling the individual to create an alternative hegemon, and an innovative worldview separate 
from that which the ruling class has established. Islamic theorists also acknowledge the 
significance of the individual in the solid foundation of a revolutionary organization which may 
present an alternative ‘common sense’. They believe that an individual is always in a state of flux, 
changing himself according to current requirements. Rather than following the ‘common sense’ of 
the hegemon, he devises his own worldview. Such a change in the individual represents his 
personal liberation and is also a first step towards forming larger groups of individuals who unite 
through an innovative and alternative worldview.  
Gramsci’s model emphasises the formation of a group of individuals disenchanted by the current 
socio-economic structure and aiming to rebel against the hegemon. These individuals may come 
from various segments of society but their shared experience of marginalisation, exclusion and 
repression gives them common ground through which to form a counter-hegemonic group playing 
                                                 
35 Butko cites Youssef Choueiri who writes: “Qutb, al-Mawdudi, and Khomeini articulated a new Islamic theory and 
established the contemporary discourse of a variety of Islamic political organizations. To them, change had to be 
total, comprehensive and revolutionary. They saw no possibility of coexistence between Islam and other political 
and social systems.” See Youssef M. Choueiri, “The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements”, in 
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushirvan Ehteshami, (eds.) Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 
32. According to Muhammad Faksh, the Islamists’ primary aim “is to create an active revolutionary force, inciting 
Jih[d to establish an Islamic order.” Muhammad Faksh, The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in 
Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 15; Butko, ‘Revelation or Revolution’, 43 f.n.        
36 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks,  423.  
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a significant role in the organisation of revolutionary force.37 Islamic theorists also agree with 
Gramsci on the irrelevance of defining these groups in economic (i.e., class) terms. Instead, the 
counter-hegemonic bloc unites on the basis of similar ideas and common beliefs. Butko argues 
that the discourse of political Islam brings various individuals together to a common worldview.38 
The Islamic movements are intended to fill both economic and spiritual gaps. Islamists also believe 
that a revolutionary movement must gain the support of a significant segment of society in order 
to achieve their goal.   
Gramsci’s concept of state is no monolithic entity; rather it is composed of two interdependent 
components: “the State = political society ± civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by 
the armour of coercion.”39 Thus hegemony is based on ideas that construct goodwill and acquire 
consent within civil society, which is itself based on private organizations or groups that 
manufacture the consent of the masses to accept the authority and legitimacy of the hegemon. 
Political society, on the other hand, is a kind of dictatorship that utilises force and coercion in order 
to establish rule; i.e., the hegemon maintains authority by establishing a relationship between the 
structure (economic base) and superstructure (ideology of the ruling class). Traditional Marxists 
argue that the structure (economics) is everything: nor does Gramsci ignore the importance of 
superstructure in determining the context of hegemon’s legitimization and authority.40  
Similarly the Islamic theorists understand the modern state’s ability “to construct an organic link 
between the state apparatus and civil society.”41 Qu%b (d. 1966), an Islamist thinker in Egypt’s 
Ikhw[n movement, also appreciated the state’s ability to control and construct an ideology by 
which to acquire the consent of the masses. The hegemon would utilise coercive instruments (e.g., 
army and police), while simultaneously mobilizing the intellectual elite to present ideas that might 
strengthen hegemonic authority, for instance by changing the content of public education. Qu%b’s 
model par excellence in this regard was the Nasserist State, which extended Nasser’s authority by 
                                                 
37 ibid., 349.  
38  Butko, “Revelation or Revolution”, 45. 
39 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, 263. 
40 ibid., 407. 
41 Butko, “Revelation or Revolution”,  46. 
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controlling the core institutions of civil society, namely the family, education, and media.42 Thus, 
Nasser successfully shaped the consciousness of Egyptians to accept his authority. Qu%b fully 
recognised the hegemonic potential of such a state structure and rejected it outright, exhorting 
Islamists to comprehend ideology and evaluate its political foundations for the construction of an 
alternative and viable ideology through which to destroy the existing regime.  
Butko analyses the Islamist’s ideology, organisation and strategy from various dimensions in the 
light of Gramscian understanding and concludes that the phenomenon of political Islam should be 
understood as counter-hegemonic movement. He believes the Muslim theorists, are not concerned 
simply with morality, doctrine, or faith; rather their primary objective is to acquire political 
power.43 His application of Gramsci’s theories to the analysis of political Islam is undoubtedly a 
valuable contribution to this field, and as such, is also beneficial for the present study of the 
religious movements characterising the Umayyad period.  
2.2.2 The Origin of Islam as a Social Movement  
Ahmed Afzaal attempts to interpret the rise of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula during the life of the 
Prophet Mu+ammad in terms of social movement. Through applying modern social theories, 
including Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, he aims to assess certain dynamics within the rise of 
Islam in a historical context, and argues that the contemporary Islamic movements have used the 
career of Prophet Mu+ammad in order to legitimize their own policies, strategies and targets. There 
are various contemporary Islamic movements, ranging from the more conservative Tabl\gh\ 
Jam[>at to the ultra-violent Islamist al-Q[<ida, and although they have different and diverse 
political positions and frameworks they seek authority and authenticity, basing their arguments 
and methodologies on the life and career of the Prophet Mu+ammad. Great confusion is evident 
                                                 
42 Butko notes: “A good example in the case of the Muslim world is Egypt and the discrediting of Nasser's ideology 
of National Socialism in the aftermath of their crushing defeat at the hands of Israel during the Six-Day War of June 
1967. Of course, in this case, Nasser had crushed all opposition to his regime, especially in the form of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Thus, no potential counter-hegemonic force was present to take advantage of the breakdown in the 
regime’s superstructure” (Butko, “Revelation or Revolution”, 48 f.n.) 
43 ibid., 60. 
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among the Islamists in relation to the interpretation of the historical data on the Prophet’s life and 
work.44  
Contemporary sociological research often differentiates between religious and social movements. 
Contrary to this approach, Afzaal argues that Prophet Mu+ammad’s aim was to reform Arabian 
society from religio-ethical as well as socio-political perspectives.45 On the basis of this argument, 
he regards the division between the socio-political and religio-ethical in Islam as artificial, and to 
support this view refers to Fazlur Rahman, a modernist scholar who considers Islam’s social aspect 
to be a logical consequence of its religious aspect, with the life and career of Prophet Mu+ammad 
providing the best example. Rahman argues that from an Islamic perspective, ‘state’ and ‘religion’ 
are neither united nor conflicting. The state has no separate identity, but instead is the reflex of 
Islamic principles and moral values, and as such constitutes an instrument of Islam. Rahman 
reminds his readers of the all-encompassing nature of the faith: “in Islam there no separation 
between religion and state.”46 
2.2.3 The Role of Religion in Social Change  
Max Weber, the German founding father of modern sociology, examined the role of religion in 
social change. According to his analysis, prophets incidentally played a vital role at the margins 
of a society in crisis. To Weber, prophecy was “a special form of organizational leadership that 
arises at the margins of society in times of crisis as a politically revolutionary force.”47 In other 
words, prophets and their initial function were firmly located within the religious domain. 
Theodore Long, a modern sociologist and expert on Weber, notes that the basic task of the prophet, 
according to Weber, is to convey a divine message to humankind. If the divine message is accepted 
                                                 
44 Ahmed Afzaal, “The Origin of Islam as a Social Movement”, in Islamic Studies (Islamic Research Institute 
Islamabad), Vol. 42, Summer 2003, 203-243 at  203, 204. 
45 ibid., 205. 
46 Fazlur Rahman, “Islam and Political Action: Politics in the Service of Religion” in Nigel Biggar, Jamie S. Scott, 
and William Schweiker, eds., Cities of Gods: Faith, Politics, and Pluralism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 154. 
47 Theodore E. Long, “A Theory of Prophetic Religion and Politics” in Anson Shupe and Jeffrey K. Hadden, eds., 
The Politics of Religion and Social Change (New York: Paragon House, 1988),  4. See also, Max Weber, “The 
Prophet” in his The Sociology of Religion (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1993), 46-59; Idem, The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947),  358-363. 
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then usually the prophet’s religious authority is established, whilst the impact of his divine message 
is most often manifested in the culture rather than the political system of that society.48 Afzaal 
does not accept Weber’s argument that religion appears in its role as a politically revolutionary 
force in times of crisis, and maintains that the Prophet Muhammad’s role in socio-political activism 
was not incidental; it can be considered as ”a natural consequence of his religio-ethical 
understanding which brought a great social change in his time.”49 
2.2.4 Gramsci and Social Change 
Afzaal identifies three requirements for initiating any reformative social movement: (i) an active 
group of individuals who have prepared themselves to initiate a social movement for change. They 
must possess certain characteristics that help them to stand against the status quo and enable them 
to act as an oppositional force; (ii) the movement must have a strong intellectual engagement with 
its hostile environment, and the capacity to challenge the prevailing status quo on intellectual 
grounds. The legitimacy of any socio-political and economic structures is considered a hindrance 
for a social movement; thus, any reformative movement must become involved in an intellectual 
activity that can provide acceptable alternatives to the current legitimacy. The movement must 
also engage in intellectual activity so as to produce innovative solutions to any prevailing social 
crisis or unrest; (iii) the movement must have an organisational structure in order to execute its 
plan according to a systemic strategy. This three-fold scheme similarly applies to religious 
movements.    
Afzaal views Gramsci’s ideas as relevant to the second and third areas of social transformation 
noted above. Gramsci distinguishes between notions of coercion (denoting domination by force) 
and hegemony (signifying the acquisition of popular consent). Coercion operates through political 
society and hegemony through civil society. The intellectuals and institutions of civil society work 
to assure the masses that the prevailing status quo, structure, and distribution of power among 
different sections of society are beneficial and advantageous for all. Consequently, most of the 
ruled masses extend their consent to the ruling class, either actively or passively. Gramsci 
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49 Afzaal, ‘The Origin of Islam as a Social Movement’, 207. 
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highlights the constant threat of revolts against the ruling state, and the state’s consequent need to 
maintain coercive power in order to prevent popular rebellion.50 The modern status quo is upheld 
through maintaining hegemony sustained by coercion. Moreover, the role of intellectual 
institutions is central to the construction of hegemony. It is necessary for any social movement to 
devise a counter-hegemony in order to challenge the moral authority and cultural receptivity upon 
which the existing ruling class has established its authority. It is also necessary to acquire the 
consent of the masses before challenging the political authority of the ruling class and its coercive 
machinery.51 
To Afzaal, Gramsci’s idea of counter-hegemony and transformation of subjective consciousness 
revolves around the notion of intellectual engagement. Preparing subjective consciousness among 
individuals provides the basis for concrete structural transformation. In Afzaal’s view, the life of 
Muhammad in Makka can be evaluated from a Gramscian perspective. The Prophet spent all of 
his time in Makka educating and training early converts to Islam, and Qur[nic revelation played a 
significant role in forming an alternative ideology through which the religio-ethical and socio-
political authority of the pagans and their worldview might have been challenged. He specifically 
trained a group of individuals who could form an alternative intellectual and political leadership. 
However, subverting Makkan authority at this juncture proved impossible, and the Quraysh, due 
to their ability to mobilise the masses, successfully sustained their hegemony as well as their 
coercive power. For this reason, the Prophet Mu+ammad decided to migrate to Medina where he 
could initiate his political struggle by making alliances with various Bedouin tribes. Through this 
strategy, he triumphed over the Makkans. As Afzaal notes: “In this context, the Gramscian 
recognition of the role of hegemony and coercion provides yet another way of conceptualizing the 
intimate relationship between the religio-ethical and socio-political spheres of activity in the career 
of Prophet Mu+ammad.”52 
                                                 
50Afzaal, “The Origin of Islam as a Social Movement”, 241-242. Note: For a better appreciation of Gramsci’s 
thought, cf., Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trs. and eds., Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Joseph Femia, “Hegemony and 
Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci” in Political Studies, Vol. 23 (1975), 29-48. 
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52ibid., 242. 
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Afzaal’s work focuses on the study of the origins of Islam as a social movement. He uses modern 
tools of analysis to study the rise of Islam, and argues that Islam’s contemporary social movements 
always attempt to legitimise their ideology, action, and strategy through judicious interpretation 
of the life and career of Prophet Muhammad, which the movement members then try to emulate. 
In such a context, apparently far-removed from the political, cultural and spiritual realities of 
Gramsci’s milieu, the application of his ideas seems both innovative and promising.     
In fact, the <Abb[sids, too, used precisely the strategy identified by Gramsci. Presenting their plan 
secretly in Iraq and Khur[s[n without entering into the arena of political conflict to challenge the 
coercive machinery of the Umayyads, they showed their ideology to be alternative and counter-
hegemonic. After invoking dissident feeling among the masses against the ruling class, they set 
about challenging the political authority of the Umayyads, who at this point attempted in vain to 
utilize their coercive power against the <Abb[sids. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad marched with a strong 
army but, having lost the consent of the masses, was  defeated. While the Umayyads had lost 
popular support, the <Abb[sids presented their alternative counter-hegemonic ideology. They 
successfully challenged the religious legitimacy and political authority of the Umayyads, 
integrated all anti-Umayyad forces under their banner, and thus created a movement that was both 
religio-ethical and socio-political. With an active group of individuals and intellectuals and a 
strong organizational structure the <Abb[sids clearly met the criteria for a revolutionary force.  
Indeed, the three-fold scheme identified by Afzaal was undoubtedly a key to their success. 
2.2.5 Legitimizing the State: Gramsci, Passive Revolution, and the Case of Senegal 
Fatton attempted to analyse the process of liberalization by applying Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony and passive revolution to the West African state of Senegal, a peripheral capitalistic 
country where liberalisation occurred under the presidential rule of Leopold Sedar Senghor and 
his successor Abdou Diouf from 1974 to 1981. Many political reforms were introduced during this 
period; as Fatton notes, “the authoritarian structures of Senegal’s political system were gradually 
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changed to accommodate the introduction of a rigid tripartite system of governance.” 53  The 
intention was to legitimise all political parties in order to defuse an organic crisis (i.e., crisis of the 
total structure) and to cope with the threat from the left. The process of liberalisation halted the 
growth of revolutionary forces, while reforms assisted the ruling class to reorganise and restructure 
without ceding command. Fatton notes that Senegal’s revolution represents what Gramsci called 
a passive revolution in which the ruling class successfully maintained its hegemony with the help 
of its organic intellectuals.54 In Gramscian terms, passive revolution is a defensive move by the 
ruling class in response to the vital revolutionary demands of the ruled classes. Thus, in a passive 
revolution, the ruling class successfully reforms the existing structure of governance and 
presentation without introducing change in its own authority.55 
The ruling class of Senegal consisted of three traditional dominant groups: (i) the bourgeoisie 
which had had capital and was engaged in its accumulation; (ii) the traditional religious aristocracy 
or Marabouts who enjoyed the authority of their sacred dominance over the peasant class; and (iii) 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controlled the state as an apparatus of repression and capital 
accumulation. They ruled Senegal by acquiring the ‘spontaneous consent’ of the masses. Because 
of their material lack, an organic crisis emerged, although this alone could not bring revolution, 
since the ruling class successfully reorganised the state structure by maintaining its previous 
power. A democratic government extracted power from authoritarian rulers using the politics of 
hegemony, but the ruling class remained in power, just as they had during authoritarian regimes. 
The democratisation of Senegal provides a striking example of passive revolution,56  in which the 
organic intellectuals (i.e., those who spoke for the interests of a particular class) played a vital role 
                                                 
53 Fatton, Robert Jr,. “Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State: the Case of the Senegalese Passive Revolution”, 
Canadian Journal of Political Science¦Revue canadienne de science politique (Canadian Political Science 
Association), Vol. 19, No. 4, Dec., 1986, pp. 729-750 at  729. 
54 Fatton, “Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State”, 730. 
55 Fatton, ‘Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State’, 731. 
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in the formation of a new hegemony. To Gramsci, such intellectuals were the architects of 
legitimisation; they were basically ‘deputies’ of the ruling group and worked for their hegemony.57  
Fatton observes that although the organic intellectuals of Senegal presented an ideology fit for the 
purpose of elites and focused towards introducing significant politico-economic change, they did 
not challenge the traditional authority patterns of ruling and ruled classes. Instead, reforms were 
presented to address the socio-economic problems of the society in such a way that the state 
continued to be directed by its traditional authorities. However, the proposed method of 
democratisation facilitated the transformation of the traditional ruling class into a democratic 
ruling class.  
Fatton suggests that in such circumstances the elite will identify its own interests and aspirations 
as well as those of the subaltern groups to bring about “not only a unison of economic and political 
aims, but also intellectual and moral unity.”58 He concludes that a Gramscian conceptualisation of 
politics greatly assists an understanding of socio-political change in developing-country contexts. 
The reform process in Senegal can be interpreted and examined using Gramsci’s concept of 
passive revolution, organic crisis and organic intellectuals. The latter played a vital role in the 
formation of a new system where the traditional authority of the ruling class remained intact while 
an attempt was made to address the needs of masses without coming into conflict with the ruling 
class. 
Fatton’s insights extend to the present study. Senegal’s democratisation process was undertaken 
to preserve the authority of the traditional ruling class. In the Umayyad era, <Umar b. <Abd al-Az\z 
also attempted to pacify revolutionaries by introducing tax reforms and portraying himself as the 
custodian of religion. In so doing, he successfully maintained the authority of the Umayyads 
without changing the ruling class, and achieved this objective with the help of intellectuals who 
prepared the ground for the establishment of Umayyad legitimacy. Evidently, the reforms of <Umar 
b. <Abd al-<Az\z also lend themselves to Gramscian analysis, with particular reference to the notion 
of passive revolution.  
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2.2.6 Religion and Politics in Gramsci 
In questioning the role of religion in politics and society in light of Gramscian theory, John Fulton 
presents Gramsci’s assessment of the historical development of human society and the relationship 
between religion and social structure, an approach that he regards as vital for understanding the 
relation between religion and politics. Gramsci values the role of religion in his theory of politics 
and also considers religion an important political force, directly related to the process of socialist 
revolution. Here, his term ‘intellectual and moral reformation’ is useful in understanding the 
dynamics of power in society.59 As Fulton notes: “...religion is seen by Gramsci to have a direct 
relationship to the socialist revolution and to revolutionary forms in general. In any event, religion 
is always a political force.”60 Gramsci also gives importance to cultural life in all socio-economic 
processes and economic production, regarding production as mental as well as physical. In Marxist 
terms, ‘material infrastructure’ and ‘cultural superstructure’ are closely linked.61 In Gramsci’s 
view, both concepts “co-determine the socio-political and ethical values in a dialectical rather than 
a linear or causal sense”, which is particularly relevant for the study and analysis of Western 
democracies.62 He recognises the coercive role of the state in a Western Capitalist democracy 
capable of acquiring the cultural power of civil society, a combination that provides a solid 
foundation for consolidating power in a Western democratic context, and asserts that socialism 
cannot prevail in Western countries through coercive power. Such a dramatic change can only 
occur through an ‘intellectual and moral reformation’. This concept derives from his understanding 
of historical Christianity which has experienced its own particular reformation in both areas.63 
Fulton details Gramsci’s description of the power relationship between historical religions and 
social structure according to five categories: folklore, religion of the people or popular religion, 
common sense, the religion of intellectuals, and philosophy. The last two are particularly related 
to his concept of hegemony, while all five can be broadly divided into two groups: (i) religion of 
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the people and religion of the intellectuals (or the domain of religion); and (ii) common sense and 
philosophy (or the domain of culture). Folklore is placed within both groups. The term ‘religion 
of people’ denotes the belief, morals and experiences of various groups of people such as the 
subaltern or dependent classes: workers, peasants, etc. Their beliefs determine their actions and 
relationships.64  
Gramsci argues that popular religion and common sense are closely linked with each other. Neither 
concept is logically consistent or coherent; rather they exist with contradictions. According to this 
view, people live with their popular religion which includes such contradictions and their common 
sense helps them to live with these contradictions without realising their intensity.  Meanwhile, 
philosophy and the religion of intellectuals are both related to the process of power and control, 
i.e., hegemony and coercion, while the state and civil society are structures designed and oriented 
to assist the dominant ruling classes to extend their power over the people of the state as a whole. 
‘Organic intellectuals’ are defined as a group of people who construct and develop hegemonic 
values and administer the state’s coercive modus operandi, and consist of various ranks and 
professions, including judges, civil servants, politicians, religious leaders, teachers and 
philosophers.65 Gramsci studied religion in the context of Christianity, which maintained a passive 
revolutionary character in the Roman Empire. However, during the Europe’s Middle Ages the 
church became part of the hegemonic alliance, as many senior clerics belonged to the aristocracy 
and played important roles in the establishment of the monastic system and feudalism. Gramsci 
viewed the medieval hegemony of high-ranking clerics as combining both social and cultural 
structures, with the clergy as the ‘collective intellectual’ for the medieval structure.66   
In response to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation movements, the papacy had changed its 
power structure and the church’s role as organic intellectual also changed. Gramsci refers to this 
situation as “the point of breakdown between democracy and the church”.67 Unable to make an 
alliance with the emerging secular ruling class, the church lost its traditional authority and instead 
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allied itself with superseded Royalist factions and the peasantry, eventually becoming a centre for 
the ‘traditional intellectual’.68 Fulton gives prominence to Gramsci’s  sociological interpretations 
of religion, and his special attention to the relationship between religion and power in society. 
Similarly, this thesis seeks to contribute to a scholarly understanding of the role of intellectuals in 
the Umayyads’ rise and ultimate decline.  
2.3 Description of the Classical Sources 
2.3.1 Al-Ya<q]b\’s T[r\kh Al-Ya<q]b\ 
A+mad b. Ya<q]b al-Ya<q]b\ (d. 284¦897) was a well-known historian and geographer famed for 
his pro-cAlid ideology and hostility toward the Umayyad reign. His treatment of <Abd al-Malik’s 
period reflected his own views. For instance, when reporting how <Abd al-Malik ascended to the 
throne, he gave his genealogy, commenting that his grandfathers had been expelled from Medina 
by the Prophet,69 and similarly revealed many reports depicting <Abd al-Malik as a tyrant and 
oppressor.70 So strong were Al-Ya<q]b\’s pro-cAlid feelings that his historiography displayed a 
marked antagonism towards all who had opposed the cAlids. For instance, he narrated many 
unflattering episodes featuring Ibn Zubayr, particularly regarding his unstable relations with Ibn 
Hanaf\ya and Ibn <Abb[s, and also criticised Ibn Zubayr and his brother Mu~<ab for suppressing 
the Shi<\ supporters of al-Mukht[r,71 while describing Ibn Zubayr’s successful garnering of support 
from the people of Medina.72 
Although such bias suggests a hostile temperament and aggressive manner, al-Ya<q]b\’s T[r\kh 
does contain valuable information about the social structure of the society, and gives a detailed 
description of the Umayyad administration, ending the account of each caliph with a list of the 
officiating governors and theologians. Nevertheless the bias in his reports can hardly be overstated, 
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and it is therefore advisable to study his historiography alongside a contrastive revision of the 
context of each report.  
2.3.2 Al-^abar\’s T[r\kh al-Rusul wa-al-Mul]k 
T[r\kh al-rusul wa-al-mul]k by al-^abar\ is considered the best anthology of historical records of 
the early Muslim era. Ab] Ja<far Mu+ammad b. Jar\r al-^abar\ (d. 310¦923) collected detailed 
accounts of the Muslim Caliphate, its expansion and organizational structure and also reported the 
events that led to its collapse. His treatment of the Umayyads is particularly comprehensive 
because of its focus on Iraq and the eastern provinces, where the Umayyads faced harsh opposition 
and revolts. He compiled his work on a chronological basis, illustrating the events of each year. 
Although al-^abar\’s early training in the methodology of Prophetic tradition led him to maintain 
this method as well in his historical collections, he was not strict about following and applying 
traditionalist rules as a means of verifying the text and chain of authority.73 Indeed, Tarif Khalidi 
characterises him as the “imam of had\th historiography”.74 
Al-^abar\ devotes a reasonable portion of his history to the Umayyads. The sources for his 
historiography of this period consist mainly of the reports of Ab] Mikhnaf, <Aw[na ibn al-|akam, 
Mad[>in\, and al-W[qid\, and he relies upon these four authorities for the relevance of  their 
individual expertise in the regions. Thus he followed Ab] Mikhnaf when considering the affairs 
of the eastern provinces, Iraq, and K]fa, but on Syrian affairs derived most of his narratives from 
<Aw[na b. al-|akam. Similarly, he depended upon Mad[>in\’s reports regarding the Khur[s[n and 
Basra, whereas he accepted al-W[qid\’s reports about the divergent affairs of <Abd al-Malik, <Abd 
All[h Ibn Zubayr and his brother Mu~<ab b. Zubayr, and al-Mukht[r and the late Umayyads. 
The authority and credibility of these four sources are not equal. Ab] Mikhnaf is usually 
considered to be an unbiased narrator, albeit sympathising with the cAlids and inclined towards 
Azd, his own tribe. Similarly, al-Mad[>in\ is regarded as a reliable source, a status also confirmed 
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by modern scholarship.75 <Aw[na, on the other hand, views the Umayyads more favourably, a 
obvious predisposition that can be seen, for instance, in his treatment of the Umayyad propagation 
of a theological doctrine of predestination (jabr) in public affairs; as a result, predestination 
features prominently in <Aw[na’s accounts. Meanwhile W[qid\ does not appear to have favoured 
any particular party, even though a distinctly positive view of Ibn Zubayr can be detected without 
much difficulty. Ibn Nad\m also accused him of being a partisan of the cAlids,76 a claim which 
could not be substantiated by documents.77 
Al-^abar\’s historiographical accounts of the Umayyad period are generally considered reliable 
and authentic, and his T[r\kh provides relatively comprehensive information on the late Umayyad 
period. By contrast, most reports written by Al-Mad[>in\, one of the earliest sources of the 
Umayyad period, have been lost. Fortunately, however, al-^abar\ has preserved al-Mad[>in\’s 
work in his T[r\kh, which now represents the principal source of al-Mad[>in\’s work. Long 
established as the most important historiographer of early Islamic history, al-^abar\ has had a 
tremendous impact on subsequent historiography, and his presentation of historical accounts is 
usually considered objective and unbiased, but although A. H. Duri regards him as even-handed 
and impartial in the presentation of his sources, such praise does not signify al-^abar\’s complete 
lack of agenda. His endeavour to construct Muslim historiography sought to illustrate the oneness 
of the prophetic mission and the continuity of the umma, in which history was presented as the 
“expression of divine will”.78  Khalidi concedes that al-^abar\ was involved in theological disputes 
with the Qadarites of his own time, but denies that his presentation of history reflected his own 
views on such matters.79 Franz Rosenthal also suggests that a certain bias is reflected in al-^abar\’s 
omission of some anti- cAbbāsid materials.80 
In relation to the late Umayyads, however, al-^abar\’s representation appears less than completely 
authentic. He relied almost exclusively on Iraqi sources for his description of the Umayyads 
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period, reflecting his regional bias and partiality, while his information about Damascus, the centre 
of Syria, arrived via Iraq\ reporters who had not personally witnessed events. Donner criticises al-
^abar\, claiming that around eighty percent of his narratives concerning Syria were derived from 
Iraq\ sources, and that he had ignored the more readily available Syrian sources,81 while Judd notes 
that “the history of Umayyad Syria is presented almost exclusively through Iraq\ sources. While 
these sources may not have been overtly hostile to the Umayyads regime, they do offer a rather 
limited perspective.”82 Regardless of all these deficiencies, al-^abar\ had a tremendous impact on 
later and modern works about the Umayyad decline, as this thesis discusses later.               
2.3.3 Al-Mas<]d\’s Mur]j al-Dhahab and Tanb\h wa-al-Ishr[f 
Among more than thirty-five books written by the famous historian, Ab] al-|asan <Al\ b. |usayn 
Al-Mas<]d\ (d. 345¦956), only the two titles mentioned above have survived. Renowned for his 
pro-<Alid and anti-Umayyad assessment, al-Mas<]d\ depended mostly on the Sh\<\ reports, while 
his judgement of <Abd  al-Malik simply repeated al-Ya<q]b\’s understanding. Most of his themes 
are derived from al-Ya<q]b\’s Mush[kal[t al-n[s li-zam[nihim, though without proper 
acknowledgement.83 Similarly, he portrays al-|ajj[j as the biggest tyrant of his time on the basis 
of the reports coming to him from Sh\<\ sources such as al-Minqar\ and Ibn A<isha.84 
In his attempts to depict the social and intellectual conduct of society, al-Mas<]d\’s elaboration of 
history in Mur]j al-Dhahab is anecdotal. Mur]j is also an important source for the study of the 
relationship of al-Mukht[r and Ibn Zubayr with both Ibn al-|anf\ya and Ibn <Abb[s and with <Al\ 
b. Husayn. These accounts are vital for establishing an authentic and reliable understanding of the 
nature of their relationships. Al-Mas<]d\’s reports on internal tribal conflicts are useful for 
evaluating the context of the battle of Marj R[hi% (in 684 AD) and how Marw[n secured the 
southern Arabs in that encounter. Such narratives assist greatly in understanding the nature of 
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internal conflicts among Arab tribes, and the formation of political development under the reign 
of Marw[n and <Abd al-Malik.85 
Al-Mas<]d\ criticised almost all the Umayyad rulers except <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, whom he 
dignified with the title of Caliph, while the periods of rule of all the other Umayyad rulers were 
referred to as “the kingdom” (mulk) or simply “the days” (ayy[m). This reflects Mas<]d\’s low 
regard for their claims to legitimacy and his dismissal of their authority to rule. In his view, they 
established their hegemony through tyranny and a gullible wider society. He portrays most of the 
Umayyads as despicable: <Abd al-Malik (r. 65-86¦687-705) is shown as a tyrant and blood-thirsty; 
Sulaym[n (r. 96-99¦714-717) had immersed himself in pleasures and amusement; Hish[m (r. 105-
125¦723-742) was ferocious and ingenuous; and Wal\d II (r. 125-126¦742-743) was an infidel.86 
He also notes the verdict of an Umayyad family member regarding the collapse of Umayyad rule:  
We were diverted by pleasures from devoting ourselves to what needed our attention. So we were 
unjust to our subjects and they despaired of our justice and wished to be rid of us. Taxpayers, 
overburdened with taxation, abandoned us. Our domains fell into decay, our treasuries were empty. 
We trusted our ministers but they preferred their own interests to ours and conducted the affairs of 
state independently of us and without our knowledge. We were late in paying our soldiers so they 
overthrew their allegiance. When our enemies called them, they made common cause with them 
and warred against us. We sought out our enemies but could not apprehend them because our 
followers were few. The fact that the news was hidden from us was one of the most important 
reasons for the overthrow of our kingdom.87 
Injustice thus emerges as a key reason for the ending of the Umayyads’ reign. Al-Mas<]d\ also 
points out that injustice led to unrest and socio-economic decay, culminating in disintegration. The 
Niz[r\-Yemen\ rivalries were also a cause of the Umayyad decline. On the basis of this discussion, 
al-Mas<]d\’s consciously pro-cAlid stance regarding Umayyad rule and their fall may be inferred 
without difficulty.  
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However, al-Mas<]d\’s Tanb\h is an attempt to deliver advanced knowledge and fresh thinking to 
the evaluation and assessment of early Muslim history. He presents a detailed list of Kutt[b, |[jibs 
and Qa#\s at the end of each caliph’s account.88 and in contrast to Mur]j, it seems that in Tanb\h 
he had paid attention to the Umayyad sources, since, after meticulous analysis and criticism, he 
challenges the reliability of these sources as being hostile to the cAlids. 
2.3.4 Ibn Ath\r’s al-K[mil f\ al-T[r\kh  
<Izz al-D\n Ab] al-|asan <Al\ b. Ab\ al-Karam Mu+ammad b. Mu+ammad al-Shayb[n\, known as 
Ibn Ath\r, was born in Iraq in 555¦1160. He migrated with his family from Jaz\ra to Musul before 
574¦1178, and having settled there in 576¦1180, became a leading scholar in +ad\th, history, and 
genealogy.  His book al-K[mil, which is regarded as one of the important chronicles of medieval 
Muslim history,89 contains significant information about Umayyad rule. The process of Arab 
historiography had reached its pinnacle during the third and fourth century AH, and historians of 
this era had compiled comprehensive chronicles on the basis of available information. As a 
consequence, Ibn al-Ath\r broadened the scope of historiography. By compiling his history in a 
chronological manner, he could give details of important personalities and information about 
various events at the end of each year’s account.  
Ibn Ath\r’s work is particularly distinguished by its clarity. He utilised various early historical 
sources for the compilation of al-K[mil: however, most of his information was derived from Ibn 
Jar\r al-^abar\’s history, with much  data added from other historical sources. Mahmood ul-Hassan 
asserts that al-^abar\ was a primary source for Ibn Ath\r’s history but that he utilised many other 
sources wherever the authenticity of ^abar\’s information was doubtful or incomplete.90      
Ibn Ath\r presents a consistent narrative of the Umayyads, chronicling how their reign came into 
existence on the basis of reconciliation and agreement between Mu<[wiya and |asan b. <Al\ in the 
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year 41¦611.91 He presents Mu<[wiya as a ruler who consistently and vigorously engaged in civil 
wars, particularly with the Khaw[rij, and reports the details of Yaz\d’s succession in the year 
60¦679 after Mu<[wiya’s death, and also illustrated the tragedy of Hussayn in detail.92 He recounts 
the events of Marw[n and <Abd al-Malik and the manner in which they established their rule by 
defeating Ibn Zubayr and the Khaw[rij, and eulogizes al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik for his great 
achievements, narrating many reports in this regard. 93  Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik damaged 
Umayyad rule by killing key commanders such as Qutayba b. Muslim and Mu+ammad b. Q[sim.94 
However, Ibn Ath\r reported that the Syrians praised <Abd al-Malik for his generosity and 
kindness, describing him as “the key of good and accomplishment”.95 
Certainly Ibn Ath\r appears impartial and unprejudiced in his treatment of the Umayyads. He 
narrates many prophetic traditions in favour of the Mu<[w\ya,96 and similarly praises al-Wal\d b 
<Abd al-Malik for his exceptional services, such as construction of mosques and expansion of 
empire towards Andalusia, India and Kashghar.97 He acknowledges <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z as a 
pious and faithful man who forbade the Umayyads to curse <Al\ b. <Ab\ Talib,98 and played a vital 
role in preaching Islam in the newly-conquered regions such as Sind.99 The <Abbasid   movement, 
perhaps because of his tolerance, thrived across Umayyad rule under the leadership of Mu+ammad 
b. <Al\ b. <Abd All[h b. <Abb[s.100  
Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik who came to power in 101¦719 continued to fight the Khaw[rij and 
succeeded in suppressing them. Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik (d. 125¦ 742) had to face many 
challenges, the most significant being the growing <Abb[sid movement which was advancing 
across the caliphate. In his twenty-year rule, he attempted to save the Umayyad dynasty; however 
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their authority was usurped within seven years of his death. Ibn Ath\r records the reports that 
criticised al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d but also gives space to reports portraying his resilience, political 
acumen, and literary flair.101 Ibn Ath\r’s history suggests that the conflict within the house of the 
Umayyads after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik led to their fall. He chooses to record the 
fall and general massacre of the Umayyad family, whereas al-^abar\ makes no mention of this. 
Curiously, However, Ibn Ath\r relied heavily upon al-^abar\’s history while compiling his own 
account.102  
2.3.5 Ibn Khald]n’s Diw[n al-Mubtad[>  known as T[r\kh Ibn Khald]n    
<Abd al-Ra+man Ibn Khald]n (d. 808¦1405) was a historian who presented a much-celebrated 
philosophy of history.103 He lived a life of rich and diverse experiences and was closely associated 
with elites and ruling classes, enabling him to understand the practicalities of politics and to 
analyse history in a broader perspective. He began his political career by attaching himself in 
754¦1353 to al-Sul%[n Ab\ <In[n (d. 759¦1358), a Marinid ruler, in Tilims[n,104 working at the royal 
court until the ruler’s death. Ibn Khald]n was also appointed ambassador for Sultan Ab] S[lim 
Ibr[h\m al-Mar\n\105 and stayed with Sul%an <Abd Allah al-Th[lith Ibn A+mar and his minister Ibn 
Kha%\b in Cordoba in 764¦1362.106  Appointed as justice in M[lik\ jurisprudence in Cairo in 
782¦1384,107 he came to Alexandria during the reign of Sultan Barq]q (d. 801¦1398). Ibn Khald]n 
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also met the Central Asian conqueror, Taym]r Lang (also known as Timur), for whom he wrote a 
book.108  
He studied Muslim civilisation as the continuity of human civilization and presented various 
parameters for the study of socio-political and religious development, in addition to studying the 
rise and fall of different civilizations and regimes, which he analysed objectively by devising 
specific regulations based on reason and logic. His history, which contains important information 
about the rise and fall of the Umayyads, provides extensive information about their socio-political 
and religious life, and his analysis of the main factors that contributed to their demise is of 
considerable significance for this thesis . 
Ibn Khald]n analyses Umayyad rule from various dimensions. He presents his theory of <a~ab\ya  
as central to the rise and fall of tribal-based societies. In his view, the Umayyads came to power 
because of their greater <a~ab\ya, larger tribe, and superior financial resources compared with other 
tribes of Quraysh. They established their authority over all the Arab tribes because of their 
genealogical connection to <Abd Mun[f.109 Certainly, <a~ab\ya appears to have played a central 
role in establishing Umayyad rule. Ibn Khald]n describes the reasons for the weakening of 
<a~ab\ya among the tribes that eventually led a ruler to fall, emphasizing the internal conflict within 
the Umayyad family as the basic reason for their fall, and analysing the causes of conflict between 
Umayyad family members.  
He evaluates the reports of early historians on a rational basis and rejects all those found lacking 
in logic, e.g., the reports that illustrated the immorality of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. According to Ibn 
Khald]n, such reports were biased and motivated by jealousy. He reports the <Abb[sid caliph al-
Mahd\’s comment that al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was the focus of jealousy, particularly from his cousins 
who fought him.110 Ibn Khald]n characterises the fall of the Umayyads as the fall of the Arab 
people, since the <Abbasids came to power with the aid of non-Arabs with whom power had to be 
shared, thereby making autonomy impossible. Ibn Khald]n’s historiography is rich not only in 
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important historical information but also  in his dedication to presenting a philosophy and rationale 
for the events chronicled.  
2.4 Description of the Modern Sources     
2.4.1 Jurj\ Zayd[n’s History of Islamic Civilisation 
Jurj\ Zayd[n (1861–1914) was a prolific Lebanese writer, whose History of Islamic Civilization 
was translated by D. S. Margoliouth. Though the book does not focus specifically on the study of 
the Umayyad period, its three main sections cover the Pious Caliphs, the Umayyads and the 
cAbbāsids. Zayd[n argued that the period of the pious caliphs was dominated by Arab elements 
and Islamic values in the affairs of their rule, while the Umayyad period was a manifestation of 
Arab chauvinism, during which Islamic principles were not a matter of concern.111 He views 
elements such as hegemony, sovereignty and autocracy as the fundamentals of Umayyad politics. 
Zayd[n also evaluates the ways in which the pre-Islamic internal conflicts of the Yemenites and 
Mu#arites contributed to <Al\-Mu<[w\ya’s relations and its later manifestation in the multiple 
revolts of Ibn Zubayr, al-Mukht[r and Kh[rijites during the period of <Abd al-Malik,112  referring 
to al-Mas<]d\, famed for his pro-<Alid thinking, to validate his argument.113 His early investigation 
of the sources inspired later scholars, such as Julius Wellhausen, Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, 
who sought to evaluate Umayyad history more systematically along these lines.    
Zayd[n argues that in Umayyad times the Quraysh gained a central position among the Arab tribes, 
while the Arabs on the whole became supreme over the subject nations. The people of the dynasty 
were divided by the relationship of the Arabs and the Clients, under which Arab chauvinism 
flourished.114 On this basis, Zayd[n criticises the Umayyads whom he considers the usurpers of 
the Caliphate which should rightfully have been led by the Ahl al-bayt (the Prophet’s family). In 
order to prove his argument, he derived many sources from the books of pro-<Alid historians such 
as al-Mas<]d\ and Ibn <Abd Rabbih’s al-<Iqd al-Far\d. He analyses the violence and brutality of 
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the Umayyads in the eastern provinces, particularly in Iraq during the reign of <Abd al-Malik who 
encouraged al-|ajj[j ruthlessly to suppress rebellions and revolts, and concludes that the Umayyad 
dynasty was an Arab dynasty based on the clan-patriotism of the Quraysh and on winning 
partisans, a policy that resulted in fragmentation and division of the society and in turn produced 
the potential for further revolts and rebellions.115 
For Zayd[n, each of the pre-Islamic conflicts (Qays\s versus Kalb\s, Mu#ar\s versus Yemen\s, and  
Nizar versus Qa+%[n) constituted an important factor in the Umayyad collapse,116 and in his view, 
factionalism was a dominant feature of the administrative and political structure of the Umayyads, 
where every tribal group supported his own group.117 Zaydan further comments that the traditional 
power structure of the early Umayyads shifted in the reign of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, who 
favoured the Qays\s. During his rule, the Qays\s were the dominant party. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, 
last of the Umayyad rulers, also attempted to secure the support of Qays\s to avenge the death of 
al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, whose mother was from the Qays tribe. Marw[n successfully won their support, 
but on the other hand, the Yemen\s favoured the cAbbāsids in their struggle against the Umayyads. 
In this context, Zaydan considers factionalism a key contributor to the fall of the Umayyads, and 
highlights a situation where the later Umayyad rulers could not maintain the equilibrium between 
the power structure of the Qays\s and Yemen\s. Moreover, they tormented the Yemen\s, who were 
the primary source of their power against their traditional opponents.118  Zayd[n’s work can be 
considered a good presentation of the pro-<Alid standpoint, which is used for comparative studies 
of modern sources.  
  
                                                 
115 ibid., 138-141. 
116 Ban] Kalb were Yemen\s from Southern Arabia who had migrated to Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine almost 
three centuries before Islam emergedin Hij[z. The Umayyads were from Ban] Qays, but had established close 
connections with the Yemenites in order to win their favour against the Qays\s. As Mu<[w\ya had married a Kalbite 
woman, who became the mother of his son, Yaz\d, the Kalb\s supported Yaz\d after Mu<[wiya’s death . The battle 
of Marj R[hi% (in 684 CE) further reflected the tribes’ mutual antagonism: thus, where Ibn Zubair relied on the 
Qays\s, Marw[n’s army consisted of Yemenite soldiers. 
117 ibid., 66-67. 
118 ibid., 69. 
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2.4.2 Julius Wellhausen’s The Arab Kingdom and its Fall 
Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918) is one of the most interesting personalities in the field of modern 
Umayyad historiography, and his book, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, has greatly influenced the 
subsequent literature produced on the subject. He had introduced a specific method of source 
analysis for studying the books of the Bible, which he then employed in reconstructing Umayyad 
history. The early sources on the Umayyads were generally composed during the <Abb[sid period, 
and display a consistently anti-Umayyad stance. To analyse the plethora of early Muslim histories, 
Wellhausen applied his source analysis method, according to which every report was assessed 
through analysis of the narrator, his special religious affiliation, and adherence to his particular 
school of thought. By using this method, Wellhausen’s history became much less hostile towards 
the Umayyads, emphasising instead their organisational and administrative structures.    
The intellectual insights and wisdom of Wellhausen’s book were important for the present research 
and are still valuable for further investigation. His introduction describes the Arabs’ tribal and 
political context and the rise of the Arab caliphate from the inception of Islam. Examining the 
internal conflicts and uprisings during <Uthm[n’s reign, and between <Al\ and Mu<[w\ya, and then 
among Ibn Zubayr, al-Mukht[r and the Marw[nids, Wellhausen also evaluates the degree to which 
violence was instigated and intensified through intra-tribal conflicts. According to his research, 
pre-Islamic conflict between the Qays\s and Kalb\s incited the rebellions that occurred during the 
early history of the Muslims, and he traces their origins from the historic conflict of Marj R[hi% in 
the <Abd al-Malik period.119 He also evaluates the maw[l\ movement from a socio-economic 
perspective, highlighting their humiliation and unjust treatment under the repressive rule of the 
early Marw[nids, when Al-|ajj[j imposed a poll tax on the numerous maw[l\s who had embraced 
Islam. Implementation of this policy caused a dramatic and bloody rebellion among the maw[l\s, 
but although al-|ajj[j suppressed these revolts with military rule, they continued to re-emerge in 
different forms.  
                                                 
119 Wellhausen, Julius. Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin, 1902, tr. M. G. Weir as Arab Kingdom and its 
Fall (London: Curzon Press, 1927), 201. 
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Wellhausen emphasises <Abd al-Malik’s integrity and commanding abilities, arguing that his 
economic reforms, such as introducing Arab coinage, were highly instrumental in attaining 
freedom from the supremacy of Byzantine currency. Similarly, his construction of the Dome of 
the Rock in Jerusalem was an innovative approach to creating a tremendous cultural and religious 
impact in the Syrian-Byzantine milieu. Moreover, in Wellhausen’s view, introducing Arabic as an 
official language was an important strategic shift towards Arab domination. Wellhausen strives to 
be comprehensive in his analysis of the events resulting in the decline of the Umayyads, which he 
interprets in the context of Arab-Persian conflicts, as noted above.  
2.4.3 Daniel C. Dennett: Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam  & Marw[n b. Muhammad: 
the Passing of the Umayyads Caliphate.  
Dennett’s book includes the major portions of his 1939 doctoral dissertation: “Marw[n b. 
Muhammad: The Passing of the Umayyads Caliphate”. He evaluated the origin and development 
of the taxation system of the late Umayyad period, studied the effects of this system on the imperial 
government, and analysed administrative institutions, particularly the Umayyad army, along with 
a biography of Marw[n b. Mu+ammad and a critique of his rule.120 
He shows the diversity of conditions prevailing across the Arab Caliphate, evaluating the 
development of tax systems in the Saw[d, in Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt, and Khur[s[n, in 
which respect he challenged the theories of German orientalists such as C. F. Becker and 
Wellhausen (the latter’s work, while undeniably impressive, features a number of generalisations 
and Dennett’s robust critique of these is justified).121 Indeed, he rejected the view that khar[j and 
jizya were synonymous in all cases and declined Becker’s statement on the original taxation 
                                                 
120 Dennett, Marw[n b. Muhammad, xiii. 
121 Frye admires Dennett’s criticism of German orientalists who had argued that Muslim Arabs did not differentiate 
between the land and poll tax in the early period of Islam; that the conversion to Islam freed the converts from all 
tributes; and that Nasr b. Sayy[r, the governor of Khur[s[n, reformed the taxation system so that all people, 
regardless of their religious identity, had to pay the land tax, while the poll tax was implemented only on non-
Muslims. See Richard N. Frye, Review on “Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam by Daniel C. Dennett”, 
Speculum, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April, 1952), 214-215      
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implemented by <Amr in Egypt, arguing instead that <Amr had also reinstated the Byzantine system 
of assessment.122   
Dennett criticised Hish[m’s failure to remove al-Wal\d II from succession in favour of his own 
sons,123 but blamed Yaz\d III for the demise of the Umayyad caliphate, arguing that in challenging 
the authority of al-Wal\d II, Yaz\d undermined the foundation of the regime, further asserting that 
Yaz\d II’s political stance was based on “almost pure Kh[rijism”. Yaz\d II had attempted to 
establish his rule on the basis of an elective system which restricted the caliph from exercising his 
authority independently, and ultimately led to internal disputes and rebellions.124 Dennett saw the 
decentralised structure of the Umayyad administration as a prominent element in the collapse of 
their rule. Under this system, the provinces were semi-autonomous entities and contributed little 
financially to the central government treasury. In this context, the caliph had to rely exclusively 
upon the Syrian military.125 The assassination of al-Wal\d II not only undermined the authority of 
the caliphate institution, but also led to the Syrian army’s disintegration, since it could not remain 
united during dissension in the royal family and lost much of its power.  
Ultimately, Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, assisted by his army in al-Jaz\ra, destroyed the Syrian army 
whose traditional authority collapsed; political power then shifted from Damascus to Jaz\ra. 
Dennett argued that the <Abb[sid movement succeeded not because of its achievement in the 
Khur[s[n, but because destruction of the Syrian army gave the <Abb[sids an opportunity to fill the 
power vacuum.126 He described Yaz\d III as a villain and scoundrel who had sworn allegiance to 
al-Wal\d II and then violated it, and this violation of the rule of succession led to the ultimate 
disintegration of the dynasty. Dennett also researched the life and role of Marw[n b. Muhammad, 
                                                 
122 Daniel Dennett, Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 
1-2, 45, 88, 256.  Dennett also discards the notion that the early financial deficits occurred because the converts to 
Islam were exempted from all poll-tax, suggesting that it was precisely the mass migrations of peasantry to the cities 
that confirmed their non-exemption from the land tax, a hypothesis borne out by the number of conversions reported 
when the first cAbbāsid caliph promised relief from the poll tax. 
123 Dennett, Conversion, 201. 
124 ibid., 220. 
125 Kennedy, Hugh, “The Financing of the Military in the Early Islamic State”, in The Byzantine and Early Islamic 
Near East, III: States, Resources and Armies, ed. Averill Cameron, (Princeton NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 361-378.  
126 Dennett, Marw[n,  276. 
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describing him as a great leader and general who confronted many inherited complexities and 
difficulties. Both Dennett's works provide invaluable information and frameworks for the study of 
the late Umayyad period.  
2.4.4 M.A. Shaban’s Islamic History, A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132) A New Interpretation  
Shaban’s new interpretation of Islamic history is regarded as one of the most credible additions to 
the modern historiography of the Umayyad rule. His methodology and treatment of the subject are 
useful for readers of the Umayyad period since he evaluates a wide range of Umayyad policies 
and their military and administrative institutions. In particular, he searches for the roots of the 
internal conflicts, revolts and conflicting forces of Arab tribalism, Khaw[rij and maw[l\.  
The early Arab settlements in the conquered lands, Shaban argues, caused the intra-Arab wars and 
anti-caliphal rebellions in Islam’s early history. The early wars of ridda (apostasy campaigns after 
the death of the Prophet Mu+ammad) divided the Arabs into supporters and enemies of the 
Medinian regime, which subsequently influenced caliphal policies. He analyses the non-ridda 
tribes who, after conquering Syria and Egypt, successfully liaised with local Kalb tribes. A strict 
policy of land distribution, limited exclusively to new settlers and already resident Arabs, brought 
political stability and harmony to the province. Meanwhile, Iraq had been conquered by a great 
miscellany of pre-Medinian Arab forces called ‘qura>.127 The influx of ridda tribes controlled the 
most power, while internal power struggles between ridda and qura> for power intensified, 
subsequently manifesting themselves in conflict during the time of <Uthm[n and <Al\. Kh[rijism 
also emerged from the same power struggle, as did  the revolts during <Abd al-Malik’s time. Unlike 
Wellhausen, who evaluated the events of this period in the context of pre-Islamic tribal conflicts, 
Shaban argues that economic and political interests played a significant role in the conflicts: “the 
events of this period have too often been explained on the basis of imaginary tribal jealousies or 
                                                 
127 These were the people of the villages, i.e. the settled communities from the surrounding tribes of Mecca, Madina, 
T[<if, but were later followed by the ridda tribes called ‘radifa, i.e., those who follow or come after. See Shaban, 
Islamic History, 23, 45.  
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irrational personal conflicts. Such explanations completely neglect the logical interests of the 
Arabs and severely underrate their normal human capability to adjust to new circumstances.”128 
Shaban divided the Umayyad caliphate into two vital regimes: the Sufy[nid (from Mu<[wiya to 
Mu<[wiya II) and the Marw[nids (from Marw[n to the end of the Umayyads in 132¦750), and 
identifies not only a difference involving a genealogical quibble, but also a significant difference 
“between the cautious rule of the Sufy[nids and the authoritarianism of the Marw[nids”.129 He 
evaluates the political reforms and strategies of <Abd al-Malik and al-Hajj[j in order to resolve 
their internal and external conflicts, and examines <Abd al-Malik’s policies for establishing a 
centralised government. He also illustrates the manner in which al-|ajj[j gained a central position 
during the time of <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d, particularly in the affairs of the eastern part of the 
Caliphate, as well as his introduction of  social reforms after establishing peace and security in the 
region.  
Although Shaban’s attempt to understand the nature of the activism characterising early Islamic 
history is insightful and productive, his historical focus does not correspond with that selected for 
the present study. He evaluates the policies of <Abd al-Malik and al-|ajj[j and regards the reign 
of al-Wal\d as no more than the extension of <Abd al-Malik’s policies, while focusing on al-|ajj[j 
as the most important character during the early time of the Marw[nids. In describing and 
analysing the collapse of the Marw[nids, he argues that the disagreement of the royal family on 
the question of Wal\d’s succession heralded the collapse of the most important element of the 
regime, the unity of the Marw[nid family itself.130 Marw[n II attempted to establish his rule after 
the defeat of Ibr[him, but had to face opposition from many directions: Sulaym[n b. Hish[m with 
his private maw[l\s army joined the Khaw[rij against Marw[n. Secondly, the Sh\<ite movement 
sprang up there under the leadership of <Abd Allah b. Mu<[wiya, a grandson of Ja<far b. ^ayy[r. 
Shaban notes that Marw[n II defeated both of these opponents: even then the latter’s appeal to the 
local maw[l\s seems to have been considerable.131 
                                                 
128 Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom and its Fall, viii. 
129 Shaban, Islamic History, 116.  
130 ibid., 153. 
131 ibid., 161. 
57 
 
The social dissatisfaction of the maw[l\s over the issue of equal rights and assimilation and the 
discontent of the Arab settlers over the war policy of the later Umayyads provoked the 
Khur[s[nians to revolt. Shaban also claims that the economic interests of the Arab immigrants 
were not compatible with the expansionist policy of the later Umayyads. Thus, socio-economic 
interests made opponents of the rule more receptive to the Khurasanians. The H[shimid- <Abb[sid 
movement was initiated largely as a way of assimilating all members of the Muslim community 
under an equal system, an idea which inspired the successful overthrow of Marw[nid rule. It is 
interesting that Shaban, unlike Wellhausen who included Yemenite-Qaysite rivalries, gives more 
importance to the socio-economic elements that played a decisive role in the fall of the Umayyads. 
2.4.5 E.A.Belyaev’s Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages 
Translated from Russian, E. A. Belyaev’s book does not focus exclusively on the Umayyad period, 
but covers Muslim history from the beginning to the middle of the ninth century. He analyses the 
early Arab conquest through a review of Byzantine and Sassanid historical perspectives, explains 
the geographical and socio-cultural milieu of the Arabs prior to the Prophet Mu+ammad’s 
establishment of a new religion, and gives an account of the subsequent maintenance of Muslim 
rule during the Rashid]n, Umayyad, and cAbbāsid reigns. The most novel element of this book is 
its methodology, whereby Belyaev applies Marxist approaches of class and social relationships in 
order to evaluate the history of Islam. The Marxist approach observes how society evolves through 
the relationship of different classes in stages from primitive to communal, to slavery, to a feudal 
society. Belyaev claims that Byzantine society at the time of Islam’s arrival was a slave society 
moving towards the formation of a proto-feudal society, while Arab society was at the primitive 
communal stage moving to a slave society during the same period. He observes another shift in 
the social order, that of a tribal Arab aristocracy becoming a class of feudal landlords. He also 
interprets internal Arab tribal conflicts and revolts from the ridda to Khaw[rij movements through 
a Marxist lens, emphasising the oppression of the weak by the strong. Presenting the Umayyads 
as oppressors, he views the Khaw[rij as the militant working class dissatisfied with their social 
and economic status. He devotes a chapter to the study of the Umayyad caliphate, outlines the 
ancient and modern sources for the Umayyad period and their implications, and describes the 
formation of the Umayyad dynasty, which in his view was founded at the time of the third caliph 
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<Uthm[n. He further maintains that Mu<[w\ya was considered to be its founder due to the orthodox 
status of <Al\ in this context. <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d’s reigns are considered highly significant, 
not least because of their control over the rule and successful construction of an entire hegemony 
over their internal and external opposition. <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d introduced many reforms 
such as the coining of money and the status of Arabic as the official language of the caliphate, 
giving further protection to their hegemonic ambitions. 132  Significantly, Belyaev observes a 
strategic shift in the policies of control, “from military occupation to orderly administration of 
subject countries, which direct control of the economic and political life.”133 
From the eighth century, the ruling aristocracy was evolving into a dominant Arab feudal class, 
albeit one removed from direct contact (due to their conquering past) with their subject countries. 
Matters became more complicated when Hish[m, who also idealized the Sass[nid state structure 
and administration, initiated economic-political reforms on the pattern of the later Sass[nids’ rule. 
Belyaev notes that increasing fiscal exploitation, harsh punishment and executions of defaulters 
caused unrest and hostility among the masses who protested vigorously in most of the caliphate 
provinces. The 25,000-strong Syrian army was defeated in North Africa and in 742 CE uprisings 
engulfed the entire Maghrib. Similarly, Khaw[rij movements rose in Afriq\ya (Tunisia) and 
Kairouan, but were ruthlessly suppressed by the caliphal army. Damascus was forced to make new 
alliances in Syria and Iraq, and Hish[m attempted to secure support from the Qays\s, a policy that 
offended and antagonised the Kalb\s, and ultimately culminated in factionalism and a loss of 
confidence in the regimes by the Kalb\s. For Belyaev the reason behind this unrest was  
the active discontent of the working masses in all the lands of the Caliphate resulted in the downfall 
of the Umayyads dynasty for it had lost all social support. The vast resources accumulated by 
Hish[m in the state treasury were dissipated under his politically inept and inactive successors, 
and his fiscal administration, considered excellent and his well-organised army were soon out of 
order.134 
                                                 
132 ibid., 174, 175. 
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134 Dennett, Marw[n, 187. 
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The ruling family’s internal conflicts and the feuds of Qays\s and Kalb\s were significant in the 
fall of the Umayyads. Despite his military and governing abilities, Marw[n b. Mu+ammad could 
not deliver results, having failed to integrate the opposing tribes of Qays\s and Kalb\s; instead he 
attached himself completely to the Qays\s, and consequently had to face great opposition, even in 
Syria, while the Khaw[rij revolted against him in Mesopotamia and Iraq. Belyaev argues that the 
Shi<\ movement took advantage of the general dissatisfaction with the Umayyads and won the 
favour of the local dihq[n (feudal lords) of Khur[s[n and Ma-War[> al-Nahr. Ab] Muslim 
Khur[s[n\ attracted the peasant troops and other factions of the caliphate’s deprived working 
class.135 
Belyaev explains the difficulties of the maw[l\s, including Umayyad aggression even after they 
had accepted Islam. He analyses the Kalb\-Qays\ conflict, the Khaw[rij rebellion, and the 
H[shimid movement and their contribution to the shifting of the paradigm and collapse of the 
Umayyads. To Belyaev this social activism was a manifestation of economic unrest, and the 
struggle of the working class against the ruling elites. Undoubtedly, the application of a Marxist 
methodology is a novel idea for the study of Muslim history. Despite considerable objections to 
portraying the Khaw[rij as a working class,136 Belyaev’s book still  contributes to the historical 
period chosen for the present study.     
2.4.6 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds: God's Caliph:  Religious Authority in the First Centuries 
of Islam. 
 In their brief but valuable monograph, Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds attempt to evaluate the 
well-established image of early Muslim history, according to which, the first three caliphs of the 
R[shid]n period successfully maintained the unity of both political and religious leadership, which 
began to collapse during the reign of <Al\ and then disintegrated completely during the Umayyad 
era. They argue that this image is the product of later Muslim historians and scholars, and instead 
depict the caliphs of the Umayyads and cAbbāsids as political leaders who appointed the 
                                                 
135 ibid., 188-190. 
136 It is an over-estimation to consider the Khaw[rij as working class. The historical sources reveal that they 
belonged to various social strata within the tribal society.     
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commanders, governors and bureaucrats, indicating that religious affairs were run separately by 
the Islamic scholars. The same Islamic scholars condemned the Umayyads as anti-Islamic thus 
acquired a perceived legitimacy and consolidated their power over Islamic law-giving to the 
complete exclusion of the Caliph.  
God’s Caliph explores the concept of khil[fat and attempts its definition. Crucially, the work 
differentiates between Khal\fat Allah and Khal\fat ras]l Allah. The authors argue that the Khal\fat 
ras]l Allah inherits his power from the Prophet while the former claims to be the deputy of God. 
They assembled a wide collection of references ranging from inscriptions on coins to Arabic poetry 
and literature which proved that the Umayyad and the cAbbāsid caliphates employed the title of 
Khal\fat Allah and considered themselves as representatives of God in order to implement and 
observe God’s commandments, practice, decree, restrictive statutes, ordinances and rights.137 They 
also provide much evidence that the Umayyad Caliphs not only established their political 
leadership but also gave their legal verdicts and interpreted the sunna in order to exercise their 
powers as the deputies of God. They further claim that the conflict between the ulam[> and caliphs 
over the control of religious matters remained a permanent feature of the Umayyads and cAbbāsids, 
culminating in the success of the ulam[> after the failure of al-M[m]n’s mi+na movement. The 
caliph was thus deprived of religious legitimacy, and secular monarchy emerged in the Sunn\ 
world. Crone and Hinds’ contribution proves especially pertinent to the present research as they 
establish an Umayyad religious identity that offers understanding of the nature of the Umayyads’ 
rule and their legitimacy in the light of Qur[nic texts and prophetic traditions.  
2.4.7 G. R. Hawting’s The First Dynasty of Islam: the Umayyad Caliphate A.D. 661-750  
Wellhausen’s methodology in The Arab Kingdom and its Fall attracted the attention of many 
scholars of early Muslim history, although his source analysis method was challenged by Noth, 
and many of his assumptions had been called into question by the end of the twentieth century (M. 
A. Shaban’s work is a prime example in this regard). G. R. Hawting’s work, as his preface admits, 
is an effort to validate Wellhausen’s critique of the Umayyads.  Hawting attempts to present a 
                                                 
137 Crone, Patricia and Hinds, Martin, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the first centuries of Islam, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 27. 
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plausible justification for Wellhausen’s thesis as well as much original thinking on the topic, while 
material on the interpretation of primary and modern sources is devoted to examining the 
methodological complexities of evaluating the Umayyad sources. 138  He also briefly analyses 
modern methods formulated for the study of the Umayyads following the introduction of 
Wellhausen’s methodology.  
The First Dynasty of Islam is focused more on methodological discourses than on explanations, 
details and illustrations of the Umayyads. It underlines the importance of the Umayyad period and 
its place in Islamic history through its presentation of the Umayyads’ political and governmental 
organisation and their functioning through the power of Caliphs and their governors. As a 
beginner’s guide to the topic, Hawting’s overview of the social and religious fragmentation is 
undeniably valid, but his interpretation of the Umayyads’ rise and fall is somewhat simplistic. In 
his opinion, Umayyad rule was based on successful management of tribal alignment, while their 
fall was due to sectarian conflicts. Nevertheless for the present study his book provides substantial 
information, particularly regarding the civil war during the time of <Abd al-Malik, the policies and 
strategies of <Abd al-Malik and al-Hajj[j, and the issue of factionalism and the problems of 
Islamisation. However there is no evaluation of al-Wal\d’s rule, which Hawting sees as an 
extension of <Abd al-Malik’s polices under the governorship of al-|ajj[j.  On the decline of the 
Umayyads, Hawting offers an extensive analysis of the third civil war and the caliphate of Marw[n 
II, and describes the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate. He views internal conflict in the 
Umayyad family to be causally linked to their decadence and ultimate fall.  
                                                 
138 Hawting notes that the most important source for the reconstruction of their history is the small number of 
existing texts produced by the Umayyads, such as government accords and documents. Most of these texts are 
generally regarded as reliable and authentic. Some were produced in non-Arab languages such as Syriac and 
Armenian. Similarly, archaeological evidence, art and architecture, inscriptions on buildings and coins, and 
administrative documents on papyrus are the primary sources of the study of the period.  Hawting recommends 
several sources for the study of literature produced by the non-Arabs in Syriac and Armenian. For general 
information see the “Index of sources” in  M. A. Cook and P. Crone’s Hagarism. On Syriac sources, S. P. Brock’s 
Syriac sources for the seventh century; for coins and inscriptions, J. Walker’s A Catalogue of the Arab-Byzantine 
and post-reform Umayyad Coins, and A Catalogue of the Arab-Sasanian coins; for art and architecture, K. A. C. 
Cresswell’s Early Muslim Architecture and O. Grabar’s The formation of Islamic art; and for an introduction to the 
literature on papyrology, J. Sauvaget’s Introduction to the history of the Muslim East. Chapter 16 is particularly 
relevant for the study of the Umayyads. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, 121, 122. 
62 
 
The third fitna or civil war broke out after the death of Hish[m’s successor al-Wal\d II in 744 and 
ended with the establishment of Marw[n II’s authority over the provinces. As governor of the 
northern frontier region of Mesopotamia, Marw[n II had assembled a well-organised army 
consisting largely of Qays\ soldiers engaged in wars with Byzantines and Khazars. After the death 
of Yaz\d III, Marw[n refused to accept Ibr[h\m’s rule and attacked Damascus with the help of the 
Qays\ military, also gathering support from the Qaysites of Qinnasrin and Hims. Ibr[h\m was 
defeated; however, Marw[n had to face the opposition of Sulaym[n b. Hish[m, who had his own 
private army of maw[l\s (known as the Dhakw[n\ya after their commander), and  was also 
supported by the Kalb\s of southern Syria. Sulaym[n’s army was defeated, even though the Kalb\s 
continued to struggle against the regime with its opposing cAbbāsid forces.139 Hawting argues that 
internal conflict and the fragile government of Marw[n II gave the Khaw[rij and Shi<\ movement 
an opportunity to expand their influence across the Umayyad caliphate. However, Hawting’s view 
that the Khur[s[nian and Khaw[rij movements played a decisive role in the collapse of the 
Umayyads era is of course deserving of further investigation.140   
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2.4.8 <Abd al-Ameer <Abd Dixon’s The Umayyads Caliphate 65-86¦684-705 
<Abd al-Ameer <Abd Dixon undertook a political study of the Umayyads focused on the reign of 
<Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n (65-86¦684-705). A brief description of the socio-political and religious 
context of <Abd al-Malik is followed by descriptions of the conflict and revolt that occurred during 
his reign, including the <Alid opposition, the nature of al-Mukht[r b. <Ubayd al-Thaqaf\’s revolt, 
ways in which factionalism was suppressed by <Abd al-Malik,  the conflict between Ibn Zubayr 
and <Abd al-Malik, the revolts of Ibn J[r]d and of the Zang, the role of <Abd al-Ra+m[n Ibn al-
Ash<ath in the policies of al-Hajj[j, and the Kh[rijite revolts.  
Dixon, who extols <Abd al-Malik’s deep devotion to Islamic learning and the way Jerusalem’s 
Dome of the Rock was constructed to impress the Syrian subjects with the glory of Islam, regards 
<Abd al-Malik’s foreign policy as profoundly informed by his religious proclivity, since, after 
successfully maintaining internal peace and security, his devotion would motivate him to wage 
jih[d against the Byzantine infidels. Many accounts are cited to confirm <Abd al-Malik’s strong 
religious adherence, his reverence for Islamic scholars and his efforts to pass on his faith to his 
children.141 
In Dixon’s view, revolt and the internal conflicts of early Islam contributed considerably to the 
development of the Sh\<\s as a sect, and in turn, significantly influenced the Umyyads’ socio-
political landscape: he considers <a~ab\ya (tribal feuds) one of the most important causes of conflict 
during the Umayyads era. Many historians link this to the historic antagonism of the Qays and the 
Kalb (i.e., the Northern and Southern Arabs). Goldziher sees this as the consequence of rivalry 
between the Quraysh and An~[r, while Wellhausen argues that the tribal feuds “between the Qays 
and the Kalb did not exist before the capture of Syria by the Muslims and the immigration thither 
of the Qays.”142   However, Dixon concludes that the development of the tribal feuds in the 
Umayyad period resulted from economic and social factors. His treatment of <Abd al-Malik 
portrays him as a successful administrator who not only suppressed internal conflicts and revolts 
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but who also “laid a solid foundation for the more spectacular achievements of his son, al-Wal\d, 
in the expansion of the Islamic Empire.”143 In terms of its value to the present study, Dixon’s book 
provides valuable insights regarding the politics of <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d, but does not offer 
any analysis relating to the fall of the Umayyads. 
2.4.9 Hugh Kennedy's The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic Near East from 
the Sixth to the Eleventh Century, (A History of the Near East)  
This is the first of a seven-volume History of the Near East, which appeared under the general 
editorship of P. M. Holt. Providing a political history of the Islamic Near East, it covers the period 
from the early Islamic era to the Seljuq occupation of Baghdad in 1055. Kennedy presents a 
comprehensive overview of political development and its socio-economic background, and 
regards the political events of the period as the product of social and economic forces, explaining 
that the emergence of political elite groups, based on their conversion to Islam, was due to “the 
experimental nature of early Islamic politics”144 He further argues that the Muslims in the Near 
East were in a tiny minority under the R[shid]n and Umayyad caliphs and that the Muslim 
leadership of that period was a highly mobilised elite class, categorised in Islamic terms and 
responsible for a vast territory. Thus, the caliphate was not a centralized institution, but “almost a 
confederation of different leaderships acknowledging one overall authority.”145  
The caliphate had not been based on centralized institutions and the caliphs received little financial 
support from the provinces. From the time of <Abd al-Malik in particular, the Umayyads attempted 
to centralize their institutions in particular, but this was only achieved during the reign of the 
cAbbāsid caliph al-Mu<tasim, who effectively asserted his authority in all state and particularly 
fiscal affairs.146 However, mass conversion to Islam changed the socio-political scenario, since all 
institutions, from the military to the bureaucracy and the judiciary courts, expanded enormously, 
while regional leaders manoeuvred for greater autonomy. Kennedy argues that the real trouble was 
economic, i.e., “the long term decline in the prosperity of the Saw[d”. With the wars of conquest 
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ending, and revenues lost from the provinces because of internal provincial autonomy and other 
factors, the central government faced serious economic problems. By then it had lost its resources, 
and the result was an economic collapse that left the Islamic world with what Kennedy calls a 
dangerously “hollow centre”.147 
Kennedy argues that the death of al-Wal\d II was the immediate cause of the demise of Umayyad 
rule since the tribal feuds among the Qaysites and Yemenites, suppressed during the reign of 
Hish[m, re-emerged and resulted in its destruction. 148  Kennedy confirms the controversial 
personality of Yaz\d III (who has been described either as a virtuous reformer or a barefaced 
opportunist), and considers tribal factionalism as one of the most important factors in the demise 
of the Umayyads. His discussion of the third civil war is framed in terms of tribal animosities, with 
the Qays-Yemen conflict featuring prominently (Marw[n suppressed the Yemenites with the help 
of his Qaysite alliance),149 while also arguing that a lack of religious authority led to the Umayyad 
dynasty’s decline.150 In addition, he sees sound and rigorous education as having played a central 
role in the rise and success of Thaqafis under the Umayyads.151 
Kennedy successfully illustrates “a basic framework of chronological narrative” of the caliphate 
in the history of the Near East and appears eager to devote space to long-term social and economic 
changes and to the positive aspects of Muslim government and the immense achievement of the 
period.152 For Kennedy, the Qays-Yemen conflict, economic deficit and the deficit in religious 
authority during the late Umayyad period were the most significant elements in the final 
disintegration of the Umayyad caliphate.  
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2.4.10 Khalid Yahya Blankinship’s The End of the Jih[d State: The Reign of Hish[m Ibn <Abd 
al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads.   
Modern scholarship has evaluated the event of the fall of the Umayyad state with a variety of 
paradigm-setting studies. Mostly it has analysed the caliphate’s internal problems: rebellions, 
dynastic squabbles, social and economic change, the maw[l\ movement, and conflict within the 
royal family over the right of succession and legitimacy to rule the state. Interestingly Blankinship 
considers the external problems that remained unsettled and ultimately led the state to collapse, 
arguing that the early Islamic polity was a jih[d state and that military expansion was necessary 
even for the existence of the caliphate, because holy war against the unbelievers conferred 
legitimacy to the rule. 
The reign of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik (r. 105-25¦724-43) has been seen as one of the most 
significant periods of Umayyad history in terms both of the flourishing and successes of the 
Umayyad caliphate, and of Hish[m’s personality. However, Blankinship argues that Hish[m was 
responsible for the demise of the caliphate because of his expansionist policies, claiming that 
Hish[m’s aggressive policy of jih[d brought the state to a dangerous end. Hish[m’s expansionist 
policy continued throughout his regime on almost all frontiers, whereas the state was in no position 
to meet either the military expenditures or economic needs. Elite Syrian troops were deployed 
throughout the frontiers of the caliphate, and because of this policy, a power vacuum emerged in 
Syria, leading to the events of the third civil war and the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. Cobb 
commends Blankinship for his meticulous approach to the military records which, though 
prominent in the sources, had not  been viewed as a popular or fashionable research topic before 
the 1970s, and even calls their contents “dull reports of obscure events” to emphasise his 
appreciation for Blankinship’s scholarly efforts and imaginative use of available data to uncover 
possible reasons for Umayyad decline.153 
Blankinship identifies four expansionist waves and four interruptions in early Islamic history: first, 
the Medina State and the First Expansion during 2-35¦623-56, which was interrupted during the 
First Civil War 35-40¦5¦6-61; second, The Sufy[nid Umayyad State and the Second Expansion 
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during 40-63¦661-83, which was interrupted by the Second Civil War 63-76¦683-93; third, the 
Marw[nid Umayyad State and the Third Expansion during 73-99¦692-718, which was interrupted 
by the reign of <Umar II (r. 99-101¦718-20); fourth, the  Expansion made during 101-22¦720-40 
which ended with the start of the Third Civil war, culminating in the demise of the Umayyads 
caliphate. The expansionist war policy remained in focus during the reigns of Yaz\d b. <Abd al-
Malik and Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik on the Byzantine front and in the Caucasus, Transoxiana, 
Sijistan, India, the eastern desert in Egypt, North Africa, Spain and France. The war policy failed 
heavily in 112-14¦730-2, when Umayyad forces were defeated on almost all frontiers. Hish[m 
failed to cope with the emerging situation and continued the traditional strategy of ‘perpetual 
advance until victory’.154  
Although the Umayyads military had achieved some success by 122¦740, even then the Umayyads 
caliphate was, according to Blankinship’s depiction, “a hollow shell, ruined by the expense its 
military excesses claimed in lives and wealth”.155 Blankinship argues that many unproductive and 
unsuccessful campaigns were initiated, causing enormous fiscal burdens on the state. In order to 
fund the military’s war requirements, new taxes had to be imposed, which in turn agitated the 
masses. The continuous war weakened the Syrian army which was already posted in places far 
from its strategic centre. This situation gave opportunities to other elements, particularly Mu#ar\ 
tribal forces of the Jaz\ra who had been deprived of power about sixty years earlier in the battle of 
Marj R[hit in 684 AD.  
Blankinship also examines the maw[l\ movement and inter-Arab factionalism, a phenomenon he 
does not consider novel. However, the failure of jih[d\ expansionist policies on the external front 
had given rise to internal regime problems,156 and Blankinship claims that although Hish[m’s 
successors attempted to reform the jih[d policy by introducing numerous programmes intended to 
overcome the losses, all was in vain and the caliphate could not be saved. Blankinship’s study is 
based on a variety of Muslim and non-Islamic literary traditions. Having collected and synthesised  
a great deal of information from divergent sources, he draws  conclusions regarding the demise of 
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the Umayyad caliphate through painstaking analysis and reinterpretation of Hish[m’s military 
policy a subject sometimes perceived as less immediately exciting.  
2.4.11 Steven Clark Judd’s The Third Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad 
History 
The Umayyad regime was shaken by the third fitna or civil war (126¦744-130¦747). In his doctoral 
dissertation Steven Judd analyses the third civil war, its root causes and impact, and the role of 
religious factors in the demise of the Umayyad caliphate. Regarding the third fitna period as 
relevant to the study of religious factors and their role in the decline of the Umayyad regime, Judd 
examines, in particular, the political endeavours of religious scholars and sectarian groups, and the 
involvement of political figures in religious debates, in order to determine “whether religious 
disagreements created conflicts between political actors or whether more cynically, religion 
merely provided an ideological crutch in pure power politics.”157 Hish[m was a successful ruler, 
having suppressed Kh[rij\ and <Alid movements while maintaining a balance among competing 
tribal and religious and political groups. With the ending of his long and stable reign, religious 
movements re-emerged as a contributing factor to declining rule. In Judd’s view, “the regime’s 
religious foundation was destructed as well, raising questions about the nature of the caliphate and 
its relationship to the development of Islam.” He hopes his research will provide “a better 
understanding of the political and religious forces mobilised during the third fitna [and]will lead 
to a clearer explanation of the successful balancing of forces achieved by Hish[m in the preceding 
years.”158 
Regarding modern scholarship on the subject, Judd thinks that conflicts in early Islamic history 
were both political and religious, and that early Islamic social and political movements had 
important doctrinal aspects.159 He asserts that both the political elites and religious figures were 
highly concerned with the issue of the emergence of heresy, since allegations of heresy were 
widespread during the heated polemics of the late Umayyad period and the period preceding the 
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cAbbāsid revolution, with pejorative labels and religious doctrine being employed to propagate 
particular ideological ideas.160 Judd cites many cases where <Abd al-Malik, <Umar b. <Abd al-
<Az\z and Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik interrogated numbers of suspected heretics. 161  Having 
examined the heresiographical literature (such as al-Ash<ar\'s Maq[l[t al-Isl[miy]n), he argues 
that the debate over heresy was highly advanced by that time,162 and claims that the persecutions 
during the Umayyad period had not been carried out haphazardly: rather, the treatment of heretics 
was well-defined and consistent.163 Any assumption that the Umayyad caliphs did not participate 
in religious disputes on the issue of orthodoxy and heresy would be unrealistic. In fact, Judd 
maintains that the debate over heresy was political. Doctrinal disputes were very much politicised 
in the early Islamic history; although the Umayyads primarily sought secular goals, they attempted 
to attain the authority to define orthodoxy and doctrine for the community.164 Judd highlights this 
in the context of the third fitna, when the Umayyad regime sought to extend its control over 
religious affairs.  
On the other hand, the opponents of the regime seemed anxious to ascertain the foundation of their 
legitimacy. The doctrinal stance of the <Alid on the conception of im[mah and the Kh[rij\ call for 
reliance on a sh]r[ were presented to justify their religious right to authority. From this perspective, 
it was logical for the late Umayyads to acquire religious legitimisation and to challenge religious 
opponents to establish their authority over doctrinal and religious affairs. This period, as Judd 
comments, “was not riddled with sectarian schisms and religious disputes because of the regime’s 
decline, but rather because the regime increased its efforts to consolidate its religious authority and 
met resistance from dissenters whom the Umayyads had previously tolerated or ignored.”165 
Judd evaluates the late Umayyad period and third fitna with reference to the role of religious groups 
and how they contributed to the construction of socio-political events of the period. He gives 
particular attention to the increasing prominence of heresy in the late Umayyad period and 
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Hish[m's discursive behaviour towards heresy and orthodoxy. Hish[m, who had previously been  
more pluralist and tolerant of diversity, became more rigid and attempted to impose state 
orthodoxy. Of notable significance in Judd's work is its study of the role of the state as a religious 
actor, which enables us to understand the historical complexities of the third fitna and the role of 
religious factors in eventual Umayyad decline.     
2.5 Selected Research Articles  
2.5.1 Athamina’s “Taxation Reforms in Early Islamic Khur[s[n: A Reassessment” 
Athamina attempts to reassess taxation reform during the early Islamic period until the end of the 
Umayyad rule. He also analyses taxation reforms and their role in the process of Islamisation and 
the maw[l\ movements. According to his assessment, conversion to Islam was modest until the 
end of the first century AH, when a delegation from Khur[s[n came to <Umar b. <Abd al-Az\z 
complaining that about twenty thousand Muslims still paid the jizya (poll tax).166 Athamina, who 
concludes on the basis of this report that so far, conversion to Islam was not guaranteed to exempt 
the new convert from paying the poll tax,167 and views the state as lacking any well-defined policy 
regarding the preaching and spreading of Islam. This situation remained unchanged until the 
arrival of Ashras al-Sulam\ in Khur[s[n, who sent his officials from Marv to the Sughdian people 
in Transoxania to preach Islam with a promise to exempt those who embraced Islam from paying 
jizya. Athamina describes Ashras “as acting under the pressure of political circumstances which 
prevailed in the area.”168 Ashras also asked Ab] @ayd[>, a well-known maw[l\ and God-fearing 
Muslim, to preach Islam. The latter accepted this task on condition that all those who embraced 
Islam would be exempt from the jizya.  
Dennett has argued that taxation reforms in Khur[s[n were carried out before Ashras became 
governor of the province and the status of land was changed from <ahd (lands given up to the 
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Muslims under a peace treaty)169 to khar[j (lands surrendered to the Muslims under force).170 
According to this reasoning, if the native subjects embraced Islam, they would be free from paying 
jizya. Ab] al-@ayd[>’s demand that Ashras should apply the same measures in Transoxania as 
applied in Khur[s[n appears logical in this context.171 Athamina reveals a report, on the authority 
of al-Bal[dhur\, that Ashras invited the people of Transoxania to Islam and ordered that all who 
accepted Isl[m should be exempt from paying the poll-tax, whereupon a great number of people 
embraced Islam. 172  Athamina believes that Ashras understood perfectly well that with the 
exemption policy, there would be a reduction in the total sum of tribute, and therefore increased 
the amount of the tribute in order to balance the treasury’s total income.173 He concludes from this 
that the ruler had the authority to increase or reduce the tribute (al-wa&ifa) according to necessity, 
a type of agreement also practised in Egypt. Athamina gives a detailed elaboration of Ashras’ 
taxation reforms and the ways in which these reforms affected the lives of the people of Khur[s[n 
and Transoxania. He also evaluates the taxation reforms of Na~r b. Sayy[r, the last governor of 
Khur[s[n during the reign of the Umayyad caliphate, and acknowledges the differing opinions in 
modern scholarship regarding Na~r's reforms. 
Wellhausen had argued that Na~r reformed the whole system of tax, which Dennett contradicts, 
suggesting that he was no more than an organiser, essentially employed to eliminate misconduct 
and injustice and develop an accurate tax system. Na~r exempted converts from paying the jizya 
in order to give relief to people and abolish this humiliating symbol. Athamina argues that Na~r 
not only reformed Khur[s[n’s taxation system but also ordered the re-writing of all Khur[s[n’s 
official records in Arabic, to ensure his reforms were implemented.174 In all probability, such 
reforms were too late to win the hearts and minds of ahl-Khur[s[n.  
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2.5.2 Saleh Said Agha’s “The Arab Population in |ur[s[n during the Umayyads Period: Some 
Demographic Computations” 
Agha attempts to evaluate the size of the segment of Khur[s[n’s ethnic Arab population. There is 
a serious difference of opinion in modern scholarship regarding this issue, divided, according to 
Agha into two schools. The classical school of thought views the role of the ethnic Arabs in 
Khur[s[n as minimal, compared to that played by the ethnic Iranian population and believe in the 
predominantly Iranian identity of the Revolution. Agha considers the best representatives of the 
classical school of thought to be J. Wellhausen,175 and G. van Vloten.176 Scholars of the second, 
or ‘revisionist’, school of thought consider the predominantly Arab identity of the <Abb[sid 
revolution, and include Dennett,177 Farouk Omer,178 Shab[n,179 and Moshe Sharon.180 
Agha appears allied to the revisionist school of thought, arguing that the <Abb[sid revolution had 
deep roots in the masses of Khuras[n where it was incubated, “nurtured and conducted on the 
grass-roots level.”181 Khur[s[n provided the base for a decisive encounter with the regime. Agha 
stresses three key meanings for the term ‘ahl Khur[s[n’, denoting respectively the indigenous 
people of Khur[s[n (Khur[s[n province-at-large including Transoxania); the Arab population in 
the province (both military and civilian); and both sections of Khur[s[nian society. Agha attempts 
to conduct a demographic computation of the Arab population of Khur[s[n by applying 
quantitative research methods to ascertain the ratio. The main sources of his numerical data are 
those of Arabic history, particularly al-Bal[dhur\ and the anonymous Akhb[r al-Dawla al-
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<Abb[s\ya.182 Similarly he consults d\w[n literature to collect numerical information on army 
personnel and the number of their dependents.  
With the help of principles of modern demography, Agha interpreted the ancient figures, and with 
reference to ^abar\, asserts that “a total d\w[n enrolment was of 54,000 (7,000 of whom were 
maw[l\). Of the 47,000 were from the A+m[s of Basra, and 7,000 from the mostly Yamanite tribes 
of Kufa.”183 He maintains that “on the basis of above figures and a ratio of 4 family members to 
each warrior”, Wellhausen computed that “the total number of the Arabs in |ur[s[n can hardly 
have amounted to more than 200,000.” Similarly, Sharon asserts, “with great reservations, that the 
total Arab population in |ur[s[n at the zenith of the Umayyads period could not have exceeded a 
quarter of a million.” 184  Through a contrastive study of modern and ancient sources, Agha 
concludes that by and large the Arab population in Khur[s[n during the last eight decades of the 
Umayyad rule could not have been less than 115,000, nor could it have exceeded 175,000.185 His 
article is innovative, providing new dimensions through which to understand more objectively the 
elements that contributed to the fall of the Umayyads.  
2.5.3 Patricia Crone’s “Were The Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?”   
Patricia Crone, one of the most celebrated writers in the field, wrote extensively on the Umayyads. 
This article is a critique of Shaban’s thesis on the tribal rivalries and confrontations of Qays and 
Yemen.186 She dismisses his theory as obsolete and faulty and terms her own work an endeavour 
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to refute his thesis once and for all,187 arguing that Shaban attempted to address the relationship 
between two apparently hostile tribal groups engaged in <a~ab\ya or “partisan behaviour” during 
the Umayyad period.188 She also gives a detailed historical elaboration of the terms ‘Qays’ and 
‘Yaman’, according to which genealogists divide the Arabs into sons of Ism[<\l, and sons of 
Qa+%[n, who are northern and southern respectively.189 
Crone acknowledges such a thesis to have been dismissed by Wellhausen, who indicated that there 
was no evidence of conflict between the northern and southern tribes before the Second Civil War 
and the battle of Marj R[hi% (684 AD).190 She criticises Shaban’s lack of any historical evidence 
for the tribal rivalries between Qays¦Mu#ar and Yaman throughout the Umayyad period, and 
judges Shaban to have resolved the problem regarding the tribal labels of Qays¦Mu#ar and Yaman 
by declaring them political parties in the Marw[nid period (684-750 A.D.). She argues that, 
according to the Shaban thesis, those committed to military expansion on the one hand and the 
segregation of Arab and non-Arab on the other were those who pledged their allegiance to Qays. 
Meanwhile, those against the expansionist approach and desiring assimilation of non-Arab 
converts to Islam in Muslim society while also calling for equal rights, belonged to the Yaman\ 
group. Al-|ajj[j was the leading representative of Qays during the reigns of <Abd al-Malik and al-
Wal\d. According to Shaban, the majority of the Umayyad caliphs, with the exception of Sulaym[n 
and <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, opted for Qays\ governors: as Crone elaborates:  
There was also a Yaman\ interlude under Hish[m. Eventually the conflict engendered civil war, 
for the Yamanis staged a coup against al-Wal\d II in 744 and raised Yaz\d III to the throne; and 
though they were defeated by Marw[n II, the last exponent of Qaysism, they won again at the 
                                                 
187 Crone, ‘Were The Qays and Yemen’,  1. 
188  ibid.,  2. 
189 The southerners are called (ahl) al-Yaman or al-Yaman\ya, and also Kalb; while the northerners are the 
descendants of <Adn[n, known as Niz[r (descendants of <Adn[n), Niz[r\ya; as Mu#ar (son of Niz[r) or Mu#ar\ya; or 
as Qays (a descendent of Mu#ar) or Qays\ya. However, Rabi<a, a tribe of eastern Arabia, “is a special case in that 
their allegiances went now to the northern and now to the southerners.” ibid.,  2 
190 ibid.,  3. 
75 
 
hands of the <Abb[sids, whose revolution brought about the complete assimilation of Arab and 
non-Arab in Islam.’191 
Perhaps Crone damns Shaban with faint praise when highlighting the value of his analysis for 
undergraduate students. She argues that in Shaban’s view, the Qays\s supported imperialism and 
racist policies while the Yamanis vowed to adhere to liberal ideas and equality. However, having 
collected data on all of the governors during the Umayyad caliphate and demonstrated that no 
antagonism was observed during the entire period of the caliphate, with the exception of the time 
of the third fitna or civil war (when Yaz\d III's power was exclusively based on Yaman\yah and 
while Marw[n was completely dependent on the Qays\ forces), the reality was contrary to that 
previously theorised.192 Crone also decries Shaban’s portrayal of Sulaym[n as non-expansionist, 
asserting that Sulaym[n’s foreign and expansionist policies were a continuation of previous 
policies. Yaz\d b. Muhallab pursued an expansionist policy in Khur[s[n and |ajj[j but policies of 
conquering western India remained unchanged.193 In analysing the events of the third civil war and 
the allegiances of Yaman\ya to Yaz\d III and Qays\yah to Marw[n II respectively, Crone also 
emphasises that Yaz\d II’s reform policy was “more likely to reflect Yaz\d III's Qadarite 
convictions than his Yemen\ associations and this is the one and only occasion on which a 
convergence between Qadarism and Yemenism is attested.”194 Crone's criticism provides a new 
dimension towards addressing the issue more holistically, though there are still many ambiguities 
to be resolved in order to assess the relationship between Yaman\s with Yaz\d III and the H[shimid 
revolution.   
We have seen that modern scholarship has applied a variety of methods and different techniques 
to evaluate the Umayyad period. However, little has still been done to study the aims and objectives 
of Muslim historiographers in their writings on Umayyad rule. The present study aims to fill this 
gap systematically, and the limitations, research methodology, and plan of research have been set 
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out accordingly (Chapter One). In order properly to understand and evaluate the phenomenon of 
the fall of the Umayyads, Chapter Three presents a historical perspective on Umayyad rule.   
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3 Chapter Three: The Umayyads - a Historical Background  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the foundational issues and general background of Umayyad rule. It 
concentrates on (a) the formation of the Umayyad caliphate through an historical analysis of its 
initiation and establishment; (b) the way in which power transferred to Syria, and how the Sufy[nid 
branch of the Umayyads assumed control of Muslim rule; (c) how authority shifted from the 
Sufy[nid branch to the Marw[nid branch of the Umayyads; (d) the impact of the Umayyads on 
Muslim socio-political spheres, the various dynamics of Muslim society at a crucial time in the 
shaping of  its future political structure, and how opposition to the Umayyads emerged during the 
Umayyad era; and (e) how Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony contributes to explanations of 
the formation and development of the Umayyad period. 
3.2 Formation of the Umayyad Caliphate   
The Umayyad caliphate marked a shift from traditional Arab authority patterns to a cosmopolitan 
Byzantine-oriented Syrian system. Islam’s first audiences were Arabs living in a tribal society.195 
Consequently, when Mu+ammad died there was no agreed political process by which his successor 
could be elected or selected to fill the vacuum. To select a successor able to perform both religious 
and political obligations was a huge task. 196  The period from Ab] Bakr’s succession to the 
assassination of <Al\, is known as the time of the ‘pious caliphate’ (khil[phat r[shidah). During 
this time, four persons were recognised as caliphs through a variety of methods but without any 
particular criteria or systematic process for selection or nomination being adopted. This resulted 
                                                 
195 Islam does have rules and regulations for its socio-political values. According to Islamic teachings, it is an 
obligation upon Muslims and the responsibility of the Muslim community to devise their own socio-political system, 
incorporating Islamic rules and regulations to fulfil the demands and requirements of their own time and space.  
196 After the death of the Prophet Mu+ammad, Ab] Bakr was acclaimed by <Umar, after which the Muslim 
community took the oath of allegiance to Ab] Bakr. The latter, on his deathbed, nominated <Umar, who formed a 
committee of six elites to select one among themselves; they chose <Uthm[n who, after a long rule of about 12 
years, was killed following a conspiracy. He had not proposed anyone for his succession. Most of the Muslim 
community recognised <Al\, but Mu<[wiya, the governor of Syria, defied his authority. After <Al\’s assassination, his 
son |asan became caliph. He remained in power for about six months before withdrawing from office in favour of 
Mu<[wiya who was then recognised as universal caliph across the Muslim caliphate. al-Mas<]d\, Mur]j, 1¦2. 
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in conflict over issues of succession, and the selection of a caliph became increasingly difficult as 
Muslims extended their rule beyond the boundaries of Hij[z and the Arabian Peninsula. Socio-
political development during this period formed a distinctive culture as a racially-diverse society 
emerged, characterised by interaction between Arabs of various genealogies, but also between 
Arabs and non-Arabs. Cultural conflict and cultural assimilation thus emerged concurrently, with 
the Arabs adopting and reformulating many non-Arab traits. 
The thesis aims to understand the formation of the Umayyad period while pertinent historical 
events were unfolding. Pre-Islamic political authority had collapsed with the triumph of Islam, 
which in turn meant that the Umayyad dynasty could not continue their traditional political role in 
Arabia. However, they regained their traditional authority when <Uthm[n b. <Aff[n, of Umayyad 
descent, was elected to power in 23¦645.197 <Uthm[n had not nominated a successor, so that after 
his death, a civil war, the first fitna, erupted between <Al\ and the Umayyad family. Mu<[wiya b. 
Ab\ Sufy[n contested power on the grounds of blood revenge and was eventually successful.198 
Mu<[wiya’s lengthy rule actually saw the restoration of the traditional authority of the Umayyads, 
whose tribal eminence, their pre-Islamic relations with the Syrians, and their capacity to make 
agreements with conflicting tribal forces, helped them to consolidate their authority. Generally 
Mu<[wiya is not portrayed as the founder of the Umayyads; he may perhaps be viewed more 
usefully as the founder because he established political authority in the Umayyad family, and 
nominated his son as his successor.199 Altogether, the dynasty comprised thirteen caliphs, and 
spanned three civil wars, details of which are found throughout this chapter. 
  
                                                 
197 Al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 584¦2. 
198 ibid., 167¦3.  
199 Al-^abar\ reported that he was selected by the Shura (Council of the Elders), (al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 260-269¦3) and 
al-Mas<]d\ also considered Mu<[wiya as Khal\fa. Al-Mas<]d\ employed the word khal\fah for the era of <Uthm[n 
and Mu<[wiya while using the word ayy[m (days) for other Umayyad rulers, meaning that he considered the 
authority of <Uthm[n and Mu<[wiya to be legitimate but not the others (al-Mas<]d\, Mur]j, 181, 445-447).  
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3.3 The Sufy[nid Caliphate of the Umayyads  
Mu<[wiya, the founder of the Umayyad caliphate, successfully presented an acceptable alternative 
to traditional Arab mores in order to address the socio-political issues of a cosmopolitan society. 
His administrative and political organisation represented a milestone for the Umayyad caliphate. 
Receiving his early training in the best tradition of the Quraysh, he had accepted Islam at the time 
of the conquest of Mecca and joined Mu+ammad as one of his secretaries. In the year 13¦635, 
during the reign of the first caliph, Ab] Bakr, he was sent to Syria as second-in-command to his 
elder brother Yaz\d b. Ab\ Sufy[n in various expeditions against the Byzantines.200 The Sufy[nid 
family had pre-Islamic trade links in Syria where they also owned property, and after the death of 
his elder brother Yaz\d in the plague of <Amaw[s in the year 18¦640, Mu<[wiya became  head of 
the Sufy[nid family.201 He was appointed by the second caliph, <Umar, as governor of Syria in 
Yaz\d’s place,202 serving for twenty years, uninterrupted, as governor,203 which enabled him to 
extend his relationships and establish a strong power base.  
He successfully utilised these connections during the conflict with <Al\ after <Uthm[n’s 
assassination. Muslim sources, even those generally hostile to Mu<[wiya, eulogised him for his 
quality of +ilm, or shrewdness and moderation. He exercised his will in order to act according to 
the demands of time and space; for example, <Al\ had been wary of Mu<[wiya during the first fitna 
when <Uthm[n was murdered without having nominated any successor. Prominent members of 
the Umayyad family, including Sa<\d b. al-<{~, al-Wal\d b. <Uqba, <Abd Allah b. <{mir b. Kurayz, 
Ya<l[ b. Umayya, and Marw[n b. al-|akam, gathered around <{>isha to revolt against <Al\, and 
^al+a and Zubayr also joined <{>isha in the Battle of the Camel.204 In this battle, fought outside 
Basra, ^al+a and Zubayr were both killed.205 Mu<[wiya’s behaviour throughout this episode is 
particularly noteworthy. Carefully observing all the events, he waited for a suitable opportunity to 
gain a strategic position against <Al\, and avoided being involved until he was sure that he could 
                                                 
200  al-^abar\, T[r\kh,  341¦2. 
201  ibid., 509¦2. 
202 ibid., 511, 618¦2, 265¦3. 
203 ibid., 166¦3. 
204 ibid., 11-59¦3. 
205 ibid., 55¦3.  
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play a decisive role in the conflict. After <{>isha’s defeat and the death of  the leading opposition 
leaders ^al+a and Zubayr, all the important members of the Umayyad family including <Utba b. 
Ab\ Sufy[n, two sons of al-|akam, <Abd al-Ra+m[n and Ya+ya, <Abd Allah b. <{mir, and <Abd 
Allah b. Sa<d b. Ab\ Sar+ took refuge with Mu<[wiya in Damascus.206 Mu<[wiya was an extremely 
powerful man who could deliver and protect the interests of those opposed to <Al\. The perpetual 
conflict between <Al\’s Iraq\ Army and Mu<[wiya’s Syrian Aram was a significant feature of that 
period.  
Mu<[wiya was tireless in his efforts to establish a strong Syrian military force, and spent enormous 
amounts of money to ensure the efficiency and loyalty of the Syrian troops. The Syrian army was 
usually deployed on the Byzantine frontiers to keep watch and to attack if necessary. He also 
developed garrison towns along the Byzantine coast, and during <Uthm[n’s rule instituted Arab 
maritime warfare in the Mediterranean to deter the Byzantines.207 Mu<[wiya attempted to establish 
and organise an army for each province recruited from the people of that province,208 while the 
Syrian army was there as a reserve force, albeit unused after |asan had revoked his  right to  the 
caliphate. From a Gramscian perspective the Syrian Army may credibly represent the Umayyads’ 
vanguard party. On a provincial level, |asan’s withdrawal might also be seen as the defeat of the 
Ir[q\ army, which had surrendered in front of the rival Syrian army.  
Mu<[w\ya adopted the characteristics of a king, declaring that he was the first of the kings.209 
Without sacrificing Syrian pre-eminence, he consolidated his authority by presenting an alternative 
model system for government and administration. Kennedy argues that in order to consolidate his 
political power, Mu<[w\ya tried to institute a politically and administratively decentralised 
government in which all provinces could enjoy maximum liberty. He did not introduce a uniform 
administrative system for all provinces; instead each province was administered according to its 
                                                 
206 ibid., 67-70¦3. 
207 ibid., 619¦2. 
208 Kennedy notes: “From his provincial governors the caliph demanded that they accept his authority, that they keep 
order and that, in some cases, they forward revenues to the central government; it is recorded, for example, that of 
60 million dirhams collected in the province of Ba~ra, only four million were sent to Damascus, all the rest being 
spent in the province, mostly on paying the local military” (Kennedy, The Prophet, 83). 
209 Dennett, Marw[n ibn Mu+ammad, 163. 
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local traditions, 210  a policy of moderation that brought various conflicting sections of the 
community under his leadership. He successfully achieved widespread support from all the 
provinces although his centre of power was Syria, where he established a strong military base for 
his expeditions to the Byzantine borders.  
Mu<[wiya also integrated the various tribes of Syrian society into his cabinet. Amongst these were 
the Qays and Yemen tribes, two major tribes of Syrian society who extended their loyalty and 
allegiance to Mu<[wiya.  His cabinet included, in addition, several powerful figures from Quraysh 
and Qays including <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Kh[lid b. al-Wal\d who was influential in Homs, and 
$a++[k b. Qays from the Fihris tribe who was very powerful in al-Jaz\ra. Among the many Yemen\ 
leaders included in this cabinet were Shura+b\l b. al-Sim% al-Kind\ from Homs, and |ass[n b. 
M[lik b. Ba+dal, chief of the Kalb tribe.  
Kennedy notes that Mu<[w\ya established his authority by devising a policy of reconciliation with 
powerful political leaders from various provinces. He did not have absolute central authority, but 
in modern terms, he set up a confederation in which the provincial socio-political forces 
acknowledged his authority.211 In addition, Kennedy points out that Mu<[wiya appointed a group 
of his loyal adherents in important political and military positions. The members of this inner circle 
were not appointed beyond the borders of Syria and al-Jaz\ra, and the Syrian army was consistently 
deployed on the Byzantine borders and Mediterranean islands.212 He also implemented a decisive 
change in the traditional power structure by shifting authority from Hijaz and Iraq to Syria. His 
government was established through force and power, but the consent of civil society was acquired 
through strategic alliance and agreement with important socio-political parties.   
As Gramsci indicates, the state is not a monolithic entity but is comprised of two interdependent 
components, i.e., political society and civil society.213 According to this model, hegemony is 
                                                 
210 Kennedy, The Prophet, 87, 88.  
211 ibid., 83. 
212 ibid., 86, 87. 
213 Antonio Gramsci, “Prison Notebooks, the Intellectuals”, in An Anthology of Western Marxism; From Lukacs 
and Gramsci to Socialist-Feminism, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 263.  
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maintained by dictatorship.214 Civil society, composed of private institutions, organisations and 
individual intellectuals, presents and manufactures ideas through which the hegemon can acquire 
the consent of the ruled class.  Political society, consisting essentially of the police and military, 
uses force when necessary to establish order. Civil and political societies are however inextricably 
linked due to their shared interests and common beliefs. Gramsci argues that the hegemon can only 
establish rule over the masses after successfully winning society’s consent.215 Mu<[wiya’s success 
in making agreements with both political and civil society is therefore pertinent in this context. In 
Gramscian terms, Mu<[wiya came into power aided by Syrians who worked for him as a vanguard 
party. Establishing a decentralised administrative structure and providing for maximum provincial 
autonomy were the aspects of his strategy that made him acceptable to the masses, while his ability 
to formulate successful agreements with his opponents was also effective when consolidating 
authority.  A Gramscian interpretation would identify such a strategy as an appropriate response 
to the prevailing crisis. 
 Mu<]wiya consolidated his authority by introducing suitable reforms through which he acquired 
mass consent. He also used coercive power to eliminate rebellious elements. However, the latter 
years of his reign were more problematic, particularly in relation to his attempts to devise a 
mechanism for succession.  Incorporating a system akin to the traditional hereditary system of 
succession, he nominated his son Yaz\d as successor.216 To ensure a smooth transition, he wanted 
ashr[f and the elite of the Muslim community to acknowledge Yaz\d as his heir during his lifetime. 
The Syrians agreed unanimously to give their allegiance to Yaz\d, as did the people of Basra and 
                                                 
214 Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, 239. 
215 Gramsci notes elsewhere: “A social group can, and indeed must, already ‘lead’ (i.e., be hegemonic) before 
winning government power”; Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks,  47.  
216 According to al-^abar\, Mugh\ra b. Shu<ba (d. 50¦671) ardently supported the idea that Yaz\d should succeed 
Mu<[wiya. He met Yaz\d and persuaded him to discuss the matter of succession with his father. Ibn Ath\r also 
reports a detailed conversation between Mugh\ra and Yaz\d on the issue of succession. Mugh\ra argued that after the 
leading companions of the Prophet had died their progeny had taken their places, and therefore urged Mu<[wiya to  
nominate Yaz\d as his successor in a similar fashion, otherwise the Muslim community might have to face internal 
conflict like the fitna (civil war) they had confronted following the death of <Uthm[n. Mugh\ra, as governor of K]fa, 
assured Mu<[wiya of his support in respect of the people of Kufa (al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 247¦3; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, p. 
249¦3). It seems that Mu<[wiya was convinced by Mugh\ra’s argument since he ordered him to return to K]fa and 
make the necessary arrangements for the succession (al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 247¦3.) 
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K]fa. At this stage, Mu<[wiya wrote letters to his governors ordering them to send delegations of 
nobles from the garrison towns to the capital, Damascus. Mu<[wiya communicated his views to 
them, and praised Yaz\d’s merits, by which diplomatic method he managed to obtain the 
delegation’s loyalty to Yaz\d.217 Al-^abar\ reports that in the year 56¦675,  Mu<[wiya made the 
official document of Yaz\d’s nomination public,218 and all ashr[f and the elites across Syria and 
Iraq duly swore allegiance to Yaz\d. Mu<[wiya then embarked for |ij[z, and having performing 
the +ajj, he addressed the people of Medina, reminding them of their close mutual relationship, 
and declaring that Yaz\d was their cousin, adding that: “The best leaders have already taken the 
oath of allegiance to Yaz\d and I want you to select him as caliph as well.”219 The people of |ij[z 
extended their allegiance to Yaz\d, but with five notable exceptions: |usayn b. <Al\, <Abd Allah 
b.  Zubayr, <Abd Allah b. <Umar, <Abd Allah b. Abb[s and <Abd al-Ra+man b. Ab\ Bakr.220  
On the issue of Yaz\d’s appointment, the oppositional forces started their mobilisation under the 
leadership of these five individuasls. The opposition was composed largely of pro-<Alid K]fans, 
Quraysh\s of the |ij[z including An~[r, and those Umayyads who were kept out of government. 
They considered that the appointment of Yaz\d signified the extension of the Syrian regime, and 
accused Mu<[wiya of wanting to establish a hereditary monarchy, arguing that he should call for 
a sh]ra that would decide on a suitable candidate for caliph. However, they were unable to stand 
against Mu<[wiya who, as noted above, had extraordinary negotiating ability so that a great 
majority of people across the caliphate consented to his hegemony. Through his considerable 
coercive power Mu<[wiya was able to eliminate all such opposing forces but always preferred to 
seek agreement with negotiation. He also advised Yaz\d not to use coercive power against the 
opposition.221  
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221 Mu<[wiya advised Yaz\d that the Iraq\s would attempt to involve |usayn b. <Al\ against him: “If he revolts 
against you, defeat him and forgive him because of his close relationship. <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Ab] Bakr does not 
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fight against you. So be careful and if you capture him, tear him into little pieces” (al-^abar\, T[r\kh, p. 260¦3). 
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Due to his father’s strategising, Yaz\d (b. 22¦642) became caliph in the year 60¦679 in Damascus 
after Mu<[wiya’s death.222 According to al-^abar\, Yaz\d was at that time thirty-five or thirty-six 
years old.223 The Syrian army served as his coercive force, and, contrary to his father’s advice, 
Yaz\d used the army against opposition from Iraq and |ij[z. Meanwhile |usayn had left the |ij[z 
to gather support in K]fa. <Ubayd Allah b. Ziy[d took speedy action, killing |usayn and his small 
group at Karbala on 10 Mu+arram 61¦10 October 680. With the death of |usayn, Damascus 
effectively consolidated its position in Iraq. However, the situation in |ij[z was deteriorating. Ibn 
Zubayr refused to accept Yaz\d’s authority, and established himself in Mecca where the anti-
Umayyad forces began to gather around him.  
In Medina, the Medinese, especially the An~[r, were disappointed with Mu<[wiya’s agricultural 
activities. Al-Ya<q]b\ records that Yaz\d had appointed <Uthm[n b. Mu+ammad b. Ab\ <Uthm[n 
as governor of Medina. When Ibn Man\y[, an <amil (manager) of Mu<[wiya’s land in Medina, 
complained to <Uthm[n that the people of Medina were preventing him from taking the wheat and 
date crops harvested from Mu<[wiya’s land away from the city, <Uthm[n sent a group of soldiers 
to control the situation; this group were strong resistance from the local population, who  also 
assaulted the Umayyad administration in Medina, compelling them to leave the city.224 Yaz\d and 
his governors tried but failed to weaken their resistance, and eventually the battle of the |arra took 
place in Dh] al-|ijja 63¦ August 683, during which Medina was sacked by Syrian forces. Although 
the Syrian troops were ready to march towards Mecca to end Ibn Zubayr’s game, the news of 
Yaz\d’s death (in Rab\< al-Awwal 64¦November 683) changed the course of the Syrian army as 
well as Muslim history. Soon after the death of his father, Mu<[wiya b. Yaz\d became caliph, but 
according to reports, only reigned for either forty days or three months. Yaz\d’s other sons were 
too young to take responsibility,225 thus the Sufy[nid branch of  the Umayyads ceased, while  the 
Marw[nid branch emerged.   
3.4 The Shift from the Sufy[nid to the Marw[nid Caliphate  
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To secure power for his own family’s lineage, Mu<[wiya had nominated his son Yaz\d for the 
succession ,226 but his efforts were not sustainable for very long. His grandson Mu<[wiya b. Yaz\d 
died without nominating a successor, 227  and since no male of majority age remained in the 
Sufy[nid family following Mu<[w\ya’s death, the Umayyads temporarily lost their control of 
political affairs. Marw[n b. al-|akam, one of the most senior members of the Umayyad family,  
strove  to ensure the survival of Umayyad authority in Syria. but died in 685 C.E. having failed in 
his attempt to restore the dignity and rule of the Umayyad family. After his death, his son <Abd al-
Malik became caliph. From that moment, the Arab dynasty remained under the family of Marw[n 
to the end of Umayyad rule. The Marw[nid period also saw the continuation of Mu<[wiya’s 
policies. Althugh the Syrians worked as a vanguard party of the Marw[nid till the period of the 
third fitna during the final eight years of the Umayyad era, significantly they were removed from 
their traditional position during Marw[n b. Mu+ammad’s rule. This change is also regarded as an 
important strategic element in the Umayyads’ eventual decline.   
<Abd al-Malik and his son al-Wal\d, who ruled the Arab Caliphate during 685-715, consolidated 
their authority and made significant conquests. During his first ten years of rule,<Abd al-Malik 
settled the internal conflicts and revolts, and then attempted to consolidate control the dynasty’s 
frontiers. Their well-trained Syrian troops marched into North Africa, defeating the Berbers and 
advancing the Arab front to Tangier, where the military campaign was so successful that many 
Berbers converted to Islam and subsequently played a crucial role in the conquest of Andalusia.228 
During the first half of <Abd al-Malik’s reign there were no uniform centralised policies; in 
practice, his policies varied depending upon prevailing circumstances in the region and the nature 
of the conflicts. For example, <Abd al-Malik’s policies towards |ij[z, Iraq and Khur[s[n were 
aggressive since there was rebellion and unrest, whereas the situation in the provinces of Syria, 
Egypt, and North Africa was relatively peaceful and the government was consequently able to 
introduce productive and favourable reforms for regional development. During the more stable 
second half of <Abd al-Malik’s reign, the caliph introduced numerous socio-political reforms in an 
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attempt to establish a distinctive, centralised administrative structure. He maintained law and order 
while also promoting a more encouraging environment for the development and flourishing of 
Arab culture.    
Al-Wal\d continued his father’s policies. However, both <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d were 
unfortunate in that all their achievements in the fields of art, architecture and culture were either 
disregarded or else studied on the basis of harsh sectarian theological sentiments by the 
historiographers of that period, such as al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\, and al-Mas<]d\. The next four 
caliphs, namely Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik, <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik and 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, all attempted to follow the model of <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d, and 
implemented very few  modifications.  
Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik (d. 105¦723) nominated his brother Hish[m for the succession and took 
the oath that al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d would become his successor.229 In fact, Yaz\d was very keen to 
nominate his own son, al-Wal\d, but the latter was only fifteen years old when Yaz\d died.230 Thus, 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik succeeded his brother Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik as caliph in the year 
105¦723 at the age of  thirty four and during the lifetime of many leading Umayyad family 
members.231 
Hish[m made many considered changes in his administrative team in order to accelerate the 
expansionist policy of the previous regime. He dismissed <Umar b. Hubayra, the governor of Iraq 
and Muslim b. Sa<\d, governor of Khur[s[n, appointed Kh[lid b. <Abd All[h al-Qasr\ as governor 
of Iraq, and placed his brother Asad b. <Abd All[h al-Qasr\ in charge of Khur[s[n.232 Al-^abar\  
highlights the nepotism influencing Asad’s appointment via  his brother Kh[lid b. <Abd All[h al-
Qasr\.233  Hish[m undertook fiscal reforms to revive the economy and to continue his expansionist 
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policy. Al-^abar\ revealed on the authority of <Abd Allah b. <Al\ that Hish[m was the most 
financially prudent of the Umayyad rulers, and that  both the accuracy of the accounts and the 
correct level of fiscal consumption under his rule were exemplary.234 
According to Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik’s will, his son al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was wal\ al-<ahd235 of 
Hish[m. However, Hish[m’s confidence in  al-Wal\d was minimal, due to the younger man’s 
reckless nature and involvement in illegal and irreligious activities.236 In addition, he presumably 
wanted to nominate his own elder son Maslama.237 However, he did not alter the document of his 
brother’s will, and al-Wal\d therefore succeeded him in 125¦742.238  H[shim b. <Abd al-Malik 
attempted to preserve pre-existing Umayyad authority patterns, but hostility emerged among 
members of the Umayyad house. The Umayyads, particularly the family members of al-Wal\d b. 
<Abd al-Malik, were hostile towards the policies of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, particularly on account of 
his aggression against Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s family. Further, they believed his policies would 
lead the Umayyad dynasty towards total destruction and collapse. Thus, the third fitna (civil war) 
began with Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d playing a vital role in the whole plan to remove al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d 
from power. In the year 126¦743 al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was brutally killed by Yaz\d’s adherents,239 
although when Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d came to power he attempted to involve many members of the 
Umayyad family in government.240  
Yaz\d was apparently successful in incorporating various hostile groups in the nexus of the 
political system. However, his rebellious movement against a legitimate caliph had a grave impact 
on the future. His challenge to the authority of a legitimate caliph was certainly contrary to 
Umayyad tradition, since the legitimate position of a caliph had, for the first time, been challenged 
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from within the royal Umayyad family; this led ultimately the Marw[nid family to internal conflict. 
Although Yaz\d remained successful in deposing al-Wal\d II, he became ill and died in Dh] al-
|ajj of the year 126¦743, having ruled for about six months.241 He had nominated his brother, 
Ibr[h\m as well as <Abd al-<Az\z b. |ajj[j b. <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n as his successors in turn.242 
However, the precedent had been set for a challenge to the legitimate ruler or his nominee. Marw[n 
b. Mu+ammad, the governor of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Jaz\ra, did not accept Ibr[h\m’s 
legitimacy and initiated a vigorous campaign to end his  rule.243 Marw[n b. Mu+ammad became 
caliph by deposing Ibr[h\m and killing his nominated successor <Abd al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j b. <Abd 
al-Malik.244  In essence Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d failed both to establish his authority and to legitimise 
his rulership. 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad,  grandson of Marw[n I, was the last formidable Umayyad ruler to strive 
for the survival of Umayyad rule. Marw[n had been governor of Azerbaijan and Armenia during 
the rules of Hish[m, al-Wal\d II and Yaz\d III.245 He attempted to restore Umayyad authority and 
successfully suppressed anti-Umayyad resistance movements, particularly the Khaw[rij. 
However, the whirlwind of internal and external conflicts weakened Umayyad rule by rupturing 
the traditional structure of their authority while enabling the resistance movements to challenge 
their governing system by presenting alternatives. A brief examination of the nature of Umayyad’s 
opposition is presented below.  
3.5 The Umayyads’ Opposition: The Struggle for Authority 
Three main elements comprised the Umayyads’ most significant opposition.  These were the 
political ambitions of the various tribal groups, the Shi<\s, and the Khaw[rij.  
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3.5.1 Tribal Politics: The Qays and Yemen 
The politics of the Yemen and Qays or tribal a~ab\ya is a significant and pervasive feature of the 
politics of the Umayyad era politics, as these tribal groups played a significant role in the rise and 
fall of the Umayyads. <Abb[s Ma+m]d al-<Aqq[d believes that the rivalry between the Mu#ar and 
Yam[n\ya had been inescapable from the time of the Umayyad establishment during the reign of 
Mu<[w\ya,246 since all Umayyad caliphs had to rely on one or another tribal group. Traditionally, 
Mu<[wiya, the founder of the Umayyad caliphate, relied on the Yemen as did his son Yaz\d. 
However, inter-tribal hostility was more evident in the battle of Marj Rahi%. The Yemen, 
particularly its Kalb branch, supported Marw[n b. al-|akam, whereas the Qays gathered under the 
leadership of al-$a++[k b. Qays. The Yemen won the battle, thereby securing a central position in 
the Damascus political scene. The early Umayyads based their power on these Yemen groups 
while successfully maintaining equilibrium between the Yemen and Qays groups. 
The Qays attempted to gain more power during Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s era, but because of his 
cautious political strategy, Hish[m prevented both parties from falling into any conflict which 
might have damaged the survival of the caliphate.247 Al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d meanwhile could not 
maintain the traditional authority patterns. Counter to the dynasty’s traditional political strategy, 
he strengthened the Qays and broke the traditional hegemony of the Yemen over the politics of 
Damascus, due to the latter’s alliance with the previous regime and perceived questionable 
loyalty.248 This political power shift exacerbated Yemen\ hostility, a situation beneficial to Yaz\d 
b. al-Wal\d who successfully managed to utilise the Yemen force to depose of al-Wal\d and his 
allies.249 The Yemenis then asserted their power and supported Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d who, with their 
considerable backing, deposed and killed al-Wal\d. Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d suppressed the Qays in the 
short period of his reign by killing al-Wal\d and depriving his associates of power. However, tribal 
divisions came to dominate politics. With the change of rule, the Yemen was again able to maintain 
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their central position,250 but this was short-lived since they lost power again with the arrival of 
Marw[n. After Yaz\d’s death, when Marw[n led a revolt against Ibrah\m b. al-Wal\d to take 
revenge for al-Wal\d and to restore the legitimacy of his heirs, the Qays extended their services 
and cooperation.  
Marw[n, who gathered considerable strength from the Qays since his centre of power was al-
Jaz\ra, where they were in the majority, took revenge for al-Wal\d’s assassination against Yaz\d 
with the help of the dominant Qays\ army of al-Jaz\ra.251 He attempted to re-establish the balance 
of power between the two groups but the situation was complex and reform came too late. Yemen 
did not accept Marw[n II’s legitimacy; they constantly conspired against him, as well as many of 
those gathered under Sulaym[n b. Hish[m who finally attached themselves to the Abbasid 
movement.252 This sort of tribal conflict played a decisive role in the demise of the Umayyad 
caliphate. According to Al-Mas<]d\, the rivalry between the Naz[r (Qays) and Yemen caused a 
transfer of rule from the Umayyads to the H[shimids.253 Chapter Six of this study considers 
modern and pre-modern scholarship on the Yemen-Qays tribal conflict through the lens of 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.   
3.5.2 The Shi<\ Movement  
After the conflict between <Al\ and Mu<[wiya the Umayyad period saw many Shi<\ movements. 
Patricia Crone argues that according to the Shi<\ claim, <Al\ had inherited both the religious and 
political authority of the Prophet. Yet in practice <Al\ was denied political power, being instead a 
head of state who possessed ultimate authority over the interpretation of Islamic law and 
doctrine.254 After <Al\’s death, |asan b. <Al\’s agreement with Mu<[wiya eased hostilities between 
the Shi<\s and the Umayyad house, until the event of Karbala rekindled Shi<\ opposition to the 
Umayyads. The suffering of Husayn and his family always increased the torment and agony of the 
oppressed classes. Mukht[r b. Ab\ <Ubayd’s movement was an attempt to overthrow the Umayyad 
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regime and to put a suitable candidate from the House of the Prophet on the throne, and was 
regarded as a particular hindrance to the consolidation of <Abd al-M[lik’s authority. Having 
strengthened his rule in Kufa, he appointed Ibr[h\m b. M[lik b. al-Ashtar as commander-in-chief 
against <Ubayd Allah b. Ziy[d in Mu+arram 67¦August 686. At the battle of Mosul on the river 
Kh[zir, Ibr[h\m b. M[lik b. al-Ashtar’s army defeated the opponents, while <Ubayd Allah was 
killed on the battlefield.255 This was a great blow for <Abd al-Mal\k who made no further attempt 
to take control in Iraq for the next five years, by which time Mukht[r and his rival forces had 
destroyed themselves through internal conflicts.256 For a time <Abd al-Malik left Iraqi and |ij[zi 
territory to confront the forces of Ibn Zubayr, Mukht[r, and Khaw[rij, and to focus on 
strengthening his power in Syria and Egypt.    
Mukht[r espoused the cause of the <Alid family. Having been expelled by Ibn Zubayr’s governors, 
he was now in search of an appropriate leader from the House of the Prophet. <Al\ b. Husyan and 
Mu+ammad b. |anf\ya, who were |usayn’s half brothers were both living in |ij[z under the eye 
of Ibn Zubayr, and as such were both reluctant to get involved in politics. <Al\ clearly refused to 
accept Mukht[r’s call, whereas Mu+ammad b. |anf\ya forwarded his silent consent. Mukht[r duly 
proclaimed that Mu+ammad b. |anf\ya was not only a caliph but also a mahd\, who possessed 
both religious and political authority to guide the people. 257  Mukht[r gathered support from 
various Arab tribes and notably, and in great number, among the maw[l\s. He disseminated his 
claim to be working on behalf of the weak and the maw[l\s,258 and defeated <Ubayd Allah b. 
Ziy[d’s army, before refusing to accept a Quraysh\ governor of Ibn Zubayr in K]fa. His relation 
with Ibn Zubayr became complicated, culminating in the collapse of Mukht[r’s authority and his 
murder in 67¦687.259  
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The end of Mukht[r in K]fa represented a great success for Ibn Zubayr, since it brought both Iraq 
and |ij[z under his control. However, the Khaw[rij were still there to challenge his authority in 
the Arabian peninsula and Iraq, and the failure of Zubayrid rule was the result of underestimating 
Khaw[rij strength and their intransigent attitude towards this important constituency.  On the other 
hand, the socio-political affairs of Syria and Egypt remained stable, with <Abd Malik consolidating 
his rule through the introduction of  economic and administrative reforms. When <Abd al-Malik 
observed the weakened strength of both Ibn Zubyar and the Khaw[rij, he marched towards Kufa, 
killing Mu~<ab in 72¦691 and <Abd Allah b. Zubayr in 73¦692. In so doing, he achieved a certain 
level of stability since, as Kennedy notes: 
the unity of the community had been restored. Once again the dissentions in Iraq 
had allowed the Umayyads and their Syrian supporters to dominate the richer and 
more populous areas to the east. It now remained for <Abd al-Malik to consolidate 
his gains and make his rule effective.260 
Meanwhile Montgomery Watt argues that the Shi<\ remained quiet in the traumatic aftermath of 
Karbal[. However, after the death of Yaz\d in 684 under the leadership of Sulaym[n b. @ura# al-
Khuz[<\, the Shi<\s of Kufa prepared themselves for military action against the Umayyad. Their 
movement was based on two concepts: first they wished to show their repentance for al-|usayn’s 
betrayal (resulting in their much-used collective label of taww[b]n or Penitents), and secondly 
they sought revenge for the Martyr’s blood. The taww[b]n forces of 4,000 troops duly marched 
against <Ubayd Allah b. Ziy[d who was in Syria with his army, but in 685 were defeated and most 
of their leaders killed.261  
Following their defeat there was a long period of quiescence during which there were no significant 
Shi<\ revolts until the later Umayyad era. However, the Kays[n\ya, who followed Mu+ammad b. 
|anaf\ya, a son of <Al\ b. Ab] ^[lib by his wife from the |anaf\ya tribe, played an active 
oppositional role during the rule of the Umayyads.  Mu+ammad al-B[qir’s brother, Zayd b. <Al\, 
also took arms against the Umayyads and led a rebellion but was killed in in 121¦740.262 Later, 
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several non-F[%mid descendants of <Al\ and Ban] H[shim launched various successful uprisings 
against the Umayyads; they included <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya and the <Abb[sids, who attracted a 
significant number of people on the basis of their claim that the people of the Prophetic family 
possessed the legitimate right to rule.       
3.5.3 The Khaw[rij 
The Khaw[rij movement arose when conflict emerged between <Al\ and Mu<[wiya on the issue of 
ta+k\m.263 The movement remained constantly hostile towards <Al\ and the Umayyad rejection of 
their authority and claim to legitimacy. Even though their strength was significantly crushed by 
<Al\, Zubayr, and the Umayyads it was not altogether eliminated, and their role as an anti-Umayyad 
movement was an important one. Historically, there were many Khaw[rij guerrilla groups during 
the early Marw[nid period, the most influential of which were the Najd\ya and Az[riqa,  devotees 
of Najda b. <{mir al-|anaf\ from the |anaf\ya tribe.264 The |an\fa tribe had a long history of 
conflict with the Muslim rule of Medina; they refused to pay zakat tax to Muslims and participated 
in the war of ridda (apostasy) during the period of Ab] Bakr, the first Muslim caliph. They fought 
Muslims and supported Musaylma, who claimed the Prophecy. Such tribes, to which most of the 
Khaw[rij originally belonged, were termed ridda (apostate). The Najd\ya were based in Yam[ma 
– on the eastern side of the Arabian peninsula – among the |an\fa and Bakr tribes, while their field 
of activity included Yam[ma, |a#ram]t, Yemen, Ba+rain, ^[>if, and <Um[n.  Their control 
extended from Yam[ma to <Um[n and Yemen. The second branch of the Khaw[rij was the 
Az[riqa. Active and strong in the Ahw[z and F[rs, with influence extending towards I~bah[n and 
Kirm[n, they were so called because of their allegiance to  N[f\< b. al-Azraq, a prominent Khaw[rij 
leader whose own tribe was Ban\ @ar\m b. Maq[<is and who was killed in 65 AH.265  
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Najda was declared caliph of the Khaw[rij by his sect in 66¦685. He marched on Bahrain, attacking 
the Ka<b b. Rab\<a tribe and defeating them at Dhu al-Maj[z. Najda went again to Bahrain the 
following year, targeting the tribe of <Abd al-Qays and crushing their forces.266 This worried <Abd 
Allah b. Zubayr. Meanwhile, in 67¦686 |amza b. <Abd Allah, governor of Ba~ra, sent a fourteen 
thousand-strong army, commanded by <Abd Allah b. <Umayr al-Laith\, against Najda but it was 
defeated.267 Najda now organised his forces for a great offensive, sending his troops, commanded 
by <A%%\ya b. al-Aswad al-|anaf\, to <Um[n, which was successfully conquered. However, a 
conflict emerged between A%%\ya and Najda over distribution of the spoils of war.  According to 
al-Bal[dhur\, <A%%\ya accused Najda of distributing the loot money (<a%[>) unequally. At this stage, 
<A%%\ya left Najda’s army and went to Kirm[n where he achieved great success. He even initiated 
economic reforms by introducing his own coins, called al-dar[him al-<a%%w\ya.  However, such 
dominance did not prove sustainable. Al-Muhallab’s army defeated <A%%\ya in Kirm[n, obliging 
him to retreat to Sist[n and then to Sind. Finally, he was assassinated in Qind[b\l. 
Najda, on the other hand, continued to triumph in the Arabian Peninsula. In about 68¦687, he took 
control of the northern parts of Bahrain, @an<[>, and |a#ram]t and collected taxes from the tribes 
of these regions.268 In the same year, he performed the +ajj with his 680 supporters, independently 
of both Ibn Zubayr and <Abd al-Malik.269 This symbolic show of strength was well received, and, 
for example, inspired tributes on his way back to Bahrain from ^[>if, Tab[la, and al-Sur[t and 
enabled him to collect taxes from the Hil[l tribe in Najr[n. In a show of strength, Najda also 
ordered the cessation of the m\ra (food provisions) for Mecca and Medina.270 Ironically, Najda 
was deposed and killed in 72¦691 by his own followers, who accused him of drinking wine, 
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distributing loot money unevenly,271 and corresponding with <Abd al-Malik to whom he handed 
over the daughter of <Amr b. <Uthm[n b. <Aff[n.272  
As their new leader the Najd\ya chose Th[bit al-Tamm[r, who was a maw[l\. After this, in 72AH, 
they chose Ab] Fudayk as their leader.273 Abd Ameer Abd Dixon asserts that the Khaw[rij had 
quickly realised they were at fault by selecting a mawl[ to lead them. They therefore asked Th[bit 
to choose an Arab leader for them, which shows that  tribal feelings, for the Khaw[rij, were 
stronger than doctrine.274 
Najda’s murder and internal conflicts among the Khaw[rij were detrimental to its unity in the 
Arabian Peninsula. On the other hand, the same events reinvigorated the Zubayrid camp. Mu~<ab 
b. Zubayr, who governed Ba~ra for his brother, perceived the internal conflict of the Khaw[rij as 
an opportunity to crush their strength in the region once and for all. He therefore dispatched Ba~ran 
troops, commanded by Mu+ammad b. <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Iskaf, against <Abd Allah b. Thawr Ab] 
Fudayk al-Kh[rij\ of Ban] Qays b. Tha<laba in 72¦691, but the Basran army was defeated in the 
battle.275 Mu~<ab b. Zubayr then sent a larger army against Ab] Fudayk. The latter’s army again 
defeated the Basran army. Mu~<ab b. Zubayr’s desire to eliminate the power of the Khaw[rij from 
Yam[ma and Bahrain was thus achieved. Meanwhile, <Abd al-Malik marched to Basra, where the 
public was largely dissatisfied with Mu~<ab, with the exception of Ibr[h\m b. al-Ashtar, who had 
come to a secret agreement with <Abd al-Malik against Mus<ab.  In this situation Mu~<ab, having 
already dispatched his best troops under the leadership of al-Muhallab b. Ab\ @ufra against the 
Az[riqa, proved easy prey.  
Ibn Zubayr then formed an alliance against the Az[riqa with Al-Muhallab b. Ab\ @ufra, the chief 
of the Azad tribe who had migrated from <Um[n to Basra in the late fifties of the hijra during 
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Mu<[wiya’s rule. He held a significant position in Ba~ra and had solid relations with his relatives 
in <Um[n. The Az[riqa had consolidated their position in Iraq and its surroundings, and Al-
Muhallab managed to wage successful wars against them. Even so, and despite numerous defeats, 
they were still a constant threat to Zubayrid authority, and even after the end of Zubayrid rule, they 
survived as a guerrilla force, retaining the potential to challenge the authority of the Umayyads in 
the region. By contrast, Mu~<ab b. Zubayr was defeated by <Abd al-Malik at Dayr al-J[thal\q. Both 
Mu~<ab and his son <Is[ were killed on the battlefield in 72¦691.276 
Kennedy observes that while the Zubayrid army was busy curtailing al-Mukht[r and the Khaw[rij, 
<Abd al-Malik took the opportunity to consolidate his political and military position in Syria. 
Attempting to minimise the hostility between the Yemen and Qays and to reconcile them in a 
manner that would enhance his authority in Syria and al-Jaz\ra, he tried by all means possible to 
win the support of tribal chiefs (ashr[f), for example through bribery or by offering them high 
positions in the court or army. For instance, an agreement was signed between the Syrian 
government and Zufar b. |[rith al- Kil[b\ and his Qays\ adherents. According to which the latter 
agreed to withdraw Ibn Zubayr’s support in exchange for a high position at court and in the 
Umayyad army. This agreement fulfilled two important objectives for <Abd al-Malik. First, he 
integrated the unhappy Qays\s with the mainstream Syrian administration. Secondly, he destroyed 
Zubayrid strength in the region. A similar policy was then applied in Iraq and the Arabian 
Peninsula when, for example, <Abd al-Malik successfully integrated al-Muhallab into his armed 
forces. Moreover, he isolated Ibn Zubayr from the rest of his army, leading to his defeat by a small 
force under the command of |ajj[j b. Y]suf. The latter attacked Mecca without considering the 
sanctity of the Ka<ba, an act that in Jum[d[ al-Awwal 73¦October 692 precipitated the end of 
Zubayr and his rule.277 In this way <Abd al-Malik consolidated his power and eliminated his 
enemies. However, the Khaw[rij still remained to challenge the authority of Damascus, which is 
why <Abd al-Malik dispatched armed forces to eliminate this threat. It appears that the Khaw[rij 
also attached themselves to the Najda and Az[riqa, in order to combat efficient Damascus  policy. 
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Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah b. As\d, governor of Basra, fought several campaigns against Ab] Fudayk 
and Az[riqa, but was defeated and suffered heavy losses.278 <Abd al-Malik then appointed <Umar 
b. <Abd Allah b. Ma<mmr to campaign against the Najda Khaw[rij. <Umar went to Bahrain and in 
al-Mashshaqar attacked and killed Ab] Fudayk, whose followers were defeated so decisively that 
they never again stood in the Arabian Peninsula with such zeal.279 
By this time the Az[riqa had extended their influence from Basra to Khuzit[n, Karman and F[rs. 
<Abd al-Malik confirmed the position of al-Muhallab, who had already fought against the Khaw[rij 
during Zubayrid rule. <Abd al-Malik restored Muhallab’s position, directing the governor of Ba~ra, 
Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah, and the governor of Kufa, Bishar b. Marw[n, to take whatever steps were 
needed to crush the Az[riqa in Iraq and beyond.280 After the death of Bishr b. Marw[n in Basra, 
<Abd al-Malik appointed al-|ajj[j b. Y]suf as governor of Iraq in 75¦694.281 Al-|ajj[j accelerated 
the attacks on the Khaw[rij by conferring more authority, arms and equipment to al-Muhallab and 
the other commanders. In this way, they crushed the source of the Az[riqa’s strength. Discord 
among the Az[riqa enabled Al-Muhallab to defeat them by capitalising on internal divisions 
related to preferred styles of governance and legal interpretation.  The conflict caused them to 
splinter into several factions, the two most important being the Qa%r\ b. al-Fuj[>a group and the 
<Abd Rabbih al-Kab\r group.282  Qa%r\’s followers were mostly Arabs, while <Abd Rabbih al-Kab\r 
was supported by eight thousand maw[l\s. <Abd Rabbih al-Kab\r compelled Qa%r\ and his 
adherents to leave the city of Jiruft for ^abarist[n.283 This further weakened the Az[riqa, and in 
this situation, Al-Muhallab attacked <Abd Rabbih al-Kab\r, killed him, and then marched towards 
^abrist[n to attack Qa%r\ with the military assistance of |all[j’s other commanders.284 As a result, 
the Az[riqa lost their prominent leaders. Although the military strength of the Khaw[rij  had 
dissolved, they managed to survive and were to remain a constant thorn in the side of the Umayyad 
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caliphate, prompting <Abd al-Malik to apply a ‘carrot and stick ’ policy until their strength finally 
ebbed away. 
The Khaw[rij\ threat was strongest during the period of <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n, who had to 
confront their formidable strength on various fronts and in different ways. Among their various 
groups were the Najdiyya, who held a dominant position in Yam[m[, |a#ram]t, part of Yemen, 
Bahrain, ^[>if, and <Um[n, while the Az[riqa were more influential in Ahw[z, F[rs, Isbah[n and 
Kirm[n. Mu~al and the Jaz\ra, on the other hand, were considered strongholds of the @ufr\ya. 
Nevertheless, and even with their distinctive stance on political issues, K]fa was the centre of the 
Ib[#\ya, who, despite the united front presented by their collective forces, were eventually defeated 
by <Abd al-Malik.  Mukh[r, Ibn Zubayr, and other notable leaders of the Khaw[rij such as Qa%r\ 
b. al-Fuj[>a and <Abd Rabbih al-Kab\r, were all killed, although this did not signify the end of the 
oppositional forces, whose influence was reduced but not eliminated.  
The Khaw[rij and Shi<\s, as adherents of the Household of the Prophet, were quiescent during the 
period of <Abd al-Malik’s sons, from the reign of al-Wal\d to the end of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s 
period in Rab\< II 125 AH¦ February 743 CE.  At that point conflict broke out among the house of 
the Umayyads. The manner and circumstances of the third fitna and its subsequent link to 
Umayyad decline have already been noted here. In the depiction and interpretation of Umayyad 
historiography, both Pre-modern and Modern sources focus more on these themes, which are 
analysed more systematically in the following chapters.  
3.6 Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural Hegemony and the Background to the Umayyad 
caliphate  
This section looks at formation of the Umayyad caliphate, and at the broader context and the 
manner in which it assumed control of the Muslim state. To do so, Gramsci’s theory of cultural 
hegemony is applied. Gramsci argues that political thoughts must be evaluated as historical 
phenomena through a critical examination of historical conditions, and that text can only be 
adequately understood through a systematic evaluation of its historical context.  
The tribal rivalry between the Umayyads and the H[shimids is well documented in the sources. 
The pre-Islamic political authority of the Umayyads in the tribal structure of Mecca was challenged 
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by a H[shimid, the Prophet Mu+ammad. Until the conquest of Makka, the vast majority of 
Umayyads did not accept the Prophet, who presented the sh]ra system as a viable alternative to 
the traditional ruling structure.285 Perhaps it is this, above all, that inspires certain scholars, among 
them Afzaal, to interpret the origin of Islam as a social movement in the Arabian Peninsula during 
the life of the Prophet Mu+ammad.  
According to Afzaal, who applies Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to evaluate the rise of Islam in a 
historical context, Islam addressed the socio-religious crisis of the Prophet’s time; thus his role in 
socio-political activism was a natural consequence of his religio-ethical understanding.286 Afzaal 
also notes that Gramsci’s three-fold scheme (i.e., alternative ideology, organisation, and strategy 
for a reformative movement) can be applied to Islam. Mu+ammad provided strong intellectual 
grounds for challenging the status quo by presenting acceptable alternatives to the existing 
legitimacy, and established a group of dedicated people as a vanguard party in order to execute his 
plan with an organized strategy.287 The Prophet’s Companions were the efficient individuals who 
stood up to prevailing conditions and addressed socio-political issues by referring to the prophetic 
tradition. The Umayyads, too, formed part of the Muslim community. During <Uthm[n b. <Aff[n’s 
rule they had almost regained their leading pre-Islamic political position, but by virtue of Islam, 
their domain of authority widened, and with the conquest of Iran and Syria, a multi-cultural society 
emerged. In this context, the Umayyads consolidated their authority based on their tribal 
supremacy and Arab identity, and introduced their own moral, intellectual, and socio-cultural 
values which helped them to promote and consolidate their rule.  
Mu<[wiya, as noted, introduced reforms according to traditional patterns. He made agreements 
with various conflicting groups, and empowered the tribal leaders (ashr[f) by forging alliances 
with them. These ashr[f played the role of intellectuals for the Umayyads, a role which, in its 
capacity of presenting the worldview of the ruling class, constitutes one of the most significant 
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aspects of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony; i.e., that the working classes and the peasantry cannot 
be ruled merely on the basis of physical force; the domination of the ruling class can only be 
established on the basis of cultural and ideological acquiescence. He tries to define the link 
between intellectuals and methods of production more clearly, arguing that the former are 
indirectly connected with fundamental social groups, and identifying their chief role as one of 
mediation between the ruling and ruled classes: “the intellectuals are the dominant group’s 
‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.”288  
By virtue of his position as a Companion of the Prophet, Mu<[wiya attached to himself the leading 
companions of the Prophet. He faced less criticism particularly after |asan b. <Al\ had accepted 
his authority, and was left with only the Khaw[rij as opponents. His struggle against the Khaw[rij 
made him acceptable even in the <Alids camp. In this way he constructed a suitable image, even 
in the eyes of his enemies, with effecting significant administrative and economic reforms, such 
as establishing a decentralised governmental structure in which the provinces were given the 
utmost autonomy. In Gramscian terms, Mu<[wiya successfully established his hegemony by 
presenting an acceptable structure (economic base) along with a superstructure (the ideology of 
the ruling class). Marxist theory constructs the hegemony of the ruling class as predicated on the 
dialectical relationship between structure and superstructure. An ‘organic relationship’ develops 
between the economic base and cultural ideas, and as a result, an ‘historic bloc’ comes into 
existence that assists the hegemon to strengthen its authority over the masses.289 Contrary to 
traditional Marxist theory, however, is Gramsci’s assertion that the role of superstructure is central 
in establishing the authority of the hegemon. He rejects the claim concerning the centrality of 
structure, around which ideology and culture revolve, affirming instead the supremacy of 
superstructure.290 
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Mu<[wiya successfully  constructed a plausible image of his character. He restored peace in Arab 
society by forging agreements with various hostile tribes that had, since the assassination of 
<Uthm[n b. <Aff[n, been constantly involved in internal wars and tribal conflicts. The house of the 
Umayyads proved their supremacy by delivering peace and maintaining law and order throughout 
the caliphate. Knowing of Mu<[wiya’s ruling ability, the majority of oppositional forces accepted 
his authority; therefore, the masses consented to extend their allegiance to him.  Once his authority 
had been realised by the majority, he used coercive force against those still resisting his rule, while 
the Syrians played a role as his vanguard party. Mu<[wiya did not revolutionise the previous 
system through his reforms, but rather, by reorienting and reorganising the administrative 
structure, created a space that could support the establishment of his own authority.  However, the 
act of appointing Yaz\d as his successor marked an innovative step in the Muslim caliphal system, 
since he adopted a system of succession similar to the Roman model by electing his elder son as 
his successor, and by virtue of his authority, convinced the ruling elites (the ashr[f) to take the 
oath of Yaz\d’s succession after him.  
After Mu<[w\ya, Yaz\d consolidated his power through coercion. He resented the people of Hij]z 
and Iraq and rebellious movements began to appear. Since these counter-hegemonic movements 
were not well-organised, and could not present any suitable alternative ideology, Yaz\d was able 
to control them by force. However, they gained momentum after Yaz\d’s death when the caliphate 
shifted from the Sufy[nid to the Marw[nid line of the Umayyads.     
This precise moment proved opportune for the counter-hegemonic forces to destroy the authority 
of a hegemon already in crisis. The Zubayrid, Shi<\s and the Khaw[rij initiated aggressive 
movements in Hij[z and Iraq against the Marw[nids who, however,  in the subsequent Sufy[nid 
period, regained their authority with the help of the Syrian army. <Abd al-Malik may be considered 
the real founder of the Marw[nid branch’s rule of the Umayyads. Not only did he successfully 
suppress revolts and uprisings but he also strengthened his authority through creating a space in 
which the ruled class extended its consent to the ruling class. Indeed, <Abd al-Malik’s strategy 
greatly resembles that of Mu<[wiya. Like Mu<[wiya, he consolidated his power in Syria with the 
help of the Syrian army. Understanding the impossibility of resisting the anti-Umayyad forces in 
Hij[z and Iraq, he therefore he left Iraq and Hij[z for a period of time in the hands of the anti-
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Umayyad forces, a strategy that remained successful, since the anti-Umayyad forces were unable 
to unite against the Umayyads, and instead competed with each other for power. Similarly he also 
took advantage of the internal conflicts of anti-Umayyad forces in Iraq and Hij[z, and strengthened 
his authority in Syria. He began campaigning towards Iraq and Syria only when the anti-Umayyad 
forces had significantly exhausted their energies in internal conflicts, and then marched to Iraq and 
|ij[z. He faced furious retaliation from the Khaw[rij, whom he nevertheless defeated, and restored 
law and order in the region.  
The Marw[nids, unlike the Sufy[nids, had much a weaker claim to legitimacy. Mu<[wiya’s 
political authority had been firmly recognised because he was the head of the Sufy[nid family, 
while his religious position was also established by virtue of being related to the Prophet 
Mu+ammad. <Abd al-Malik had meanwhile to build up his political and religious image in order 
to secure religio-political authority. He attracted a number of scholars and intellectuals who argued 
for his legitimacy, and presented a plausible image aimed at influencing public opinion in his 
favour. The active support of the intellectuals and religious scholars was thus crucial to his power 
and legitimacy.  
The role of such intellectuals in influencing socio-political processes throughout history has been 
considered in some detail by Gramsci who considers that “all men are intellectuals but not all men 
have in society the function of intellectuals.”291 This means that while all men are intellectuals, 
only those who play an active role in their professional and socio-political functions are considered 
intellectuals in a true sense, with two types particularly emphasised by Gramsci, i.e., (i) organic 
intellectuals, and (ii) essential intellectuals. The first group is created with every new socio-
economic class to perpetuate its own legitimacy. These intellectuals provide the basis for the 
authority of social groups. The second category denotes those intellectuals who have played a 
specific role in history and have acquired a specific position in the social structure, with one of the 
most important categories being occupied by religious scholars. Gramsci analyses the religious 
phenomenon from a Christian and European historical perspective, constructing ecclesiastic 
intellectuals as organically bound to the aristocracy, with whom they share equal status and state 
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privileges connected with property. Their uninterrupted social role provides them with a power 
monopoly and they consider themselves autonomous and independent of the dominant social 
group. As Gramsci notes, ecclesiastical intellectuals are the most influential in the society because 
they hold strong control over important services such as defining religious ideology and morals, 
educating in schools, and working for charity.292 
<Abd Malik attempted to acquire the support of intellectuals who could satisfy the masses and 
convince them to extend their allegiance with consent. The Marw[nid had to face strong criticism 
from their enemies, i.e., the <Al\d and the Khaw[rij. Judd argues that “the urge to systemize and 
bureaucratize that characterized much of <Abd al-Malik’s reign (r. 65¦685-86¦705) extended to 
intellectual and religious issues as well. It is no coincidence that <Alids, Kharijites, and other 
sectarian movement became threats during the Marw[nid period.”293 The majority of scholars 
criticised the Umayyads for their secular image;294 however, modern scholars, such as Crone and 
Hinds in God’s Caliph, and Steven Judd in Religious Scholars and the Umayyads, attempt to 
portray Umayyad participation in the religious life of the Muslim community. Judd investigates 
the Umayyads’ scholarly community, i.e., those who supported their rule. He also illustrates the 
ways in which the Marw[nid caliphs encouraged and patronised particular scholars and their 
students.295 In particular, he provides detailed accounts of five piously-minded, pro-Umayyad 
scholars, explaining that they had been chosen “because their loyalty to the Umayyad caliphate is 
obvious, as is their reputation for scholarly acumen and general piety.  
These five continued to be recognized as pious, respectable scholars long after the end of the 
Umayyad era.”296  They were: al-Sha<b\ (d. 103¦721 or 109¦727); al-Zuhr\ (d. 124¦742); <Abd 
Allah b. <Awn (d. 151¦768); al-Awz[<\ (d. 157¦774); and Sufy[n al-Tawr\ (d. 161¦778). The close 
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association of these leading scholars with the Marw[nid courts helped the Umayyads to establish 
their religious authority. Moreover, the Umayyad-era q[#\s (judges) were important officials who 
served along with the governors and aristocracy.297 In Gramscian terms, they played the role of 
ecclesiastical intellectuals who constructed the religious image of the Umayyads and acquired the 
consent of the masses for Umayyad hegemony and authority.   
The Marw[nids actually inherited most elements pertaining to the q[#\s of the judicial system, 
administrative officials, and the Syrian army as a legacy of their Sufy[nid predecessors. These 
officials and intellectuals created a space in which the Marw[nids could successfully establish 
their hegemony. The anti-Umayyad forces did not have the support of intellectuals and skilled 
officials. The Khaw[rij in particular, initiated a struggle against the dominance of the Quraysh 
ruling class, but were unable to attract intellectuals who could present an appropriate alternative 
ideology. Gramsci highlights the difficulty of creating a new stratum of intellectuals, explaining 
that such a group will have to develop and present novel intellectual activity in order to establish 
its position vis-à-vis the traditional intellectuals. Since, as Gramsci argues, the traditional 
intellectuals are firmly connected with all social groups and have strong ties with dominant social 
classes, the new intellectuals have the onerous task of conquering the traditional intellectuals 
ideologically before successfully persuading the ruled class of their validity:  
One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its 
struggle to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals, but this 
assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question 
succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.298  
The Umayyads had to face the opposition of several pious scholars but nevertheless succeeded in 
attracting notable scholars and traditional intellectuals to their court. Unlike the R[shid]n caliphs, 
the Umayyads did not simply base their authority on religious grounds, but instead mobilised a 
variety of socio-political and religious actors to enhance their legitimacy. The early Umayyads 
used other propaganda tools to promote their legitimacy, including the poetry of pre-Islamic 
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Arabia, the introduction of new coinage, construction of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock and an 
interest in architecture and pre-Islamic Arab vanities (ayy[m al-<arab). In contrast to their 
opposition movements, they were not eager to propagate stories from the early Islamic period and 
the struggles of the Prophet, Muh[jir]n, and An~[r against the Quraysh of Mecca. For instance, 
al-Mas<]d\ records that Mu<[wiya used to listen every night to stories of the Arabs and Persians.299   
The Marw[nid also followed the tradition of their Sufy[nid predecessors. Propaganda through pre-
Islamic poetry, coinage and architecture was effective, particularly in the newly-conquered Syrian 
regions. The Syrian people played a significant role in Umayyad legitimacy. They brought 
Mu<[wiya to power and they rescued the Umayyad state from decline through their active role at 
J[b\ya. The Syrians did not have much interest in the affairs of |ij[z and the early development 
of Islam. One of the reasons for their preference for the Umayyads over the H[shimids was their 
maternal connections with Yaz\d. It would thus appear that the Marw[nids attracted the people of 
|ij[z and Iraq by attaching the leading scholars to their court, while they won the hearts and minds 
of the Syrian people and of the newly-conquered regions through judicious deployment of other 
propaganda tools. Umayyad success, in Gramcsian terms, was based on the ability to mobilise both 
religious and secular socio-political intellectuals to construct a suitable image of the Umayyads 
among the masses. As a result, the people extended their consent to the Umayyads, while those 
who were in opposition were pacified either by making agreements or through using coercive 
means. The Umayyads consolidated their hegemony by devising a suitable strategy and 
implementing it with the assistance of the Syrians. In the following chapters this contextual study 
will determine and examine the actual factors for eventual Umayyad decline.   
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4 Chapter Four: The Role of Religious Movements in the Fall of the Umayyads 
4.1 Introduction  
Narratives on the fall of the Umayyads are many and varied, in both modern and pre-modern 
historiographies. A prominent feature of that era was the growing number of religious movements, 
and these, together with religion as a general phenomenon, are commonly acknowledged to have 
played a vital role both in the fall of the Umayyads and the rise of oppositional forces. In order to 
analyse the role of religion in the Umayyad decline and to provide greater analytical depth, this 
chapter focuses on important religious movements which significantly opposed the ruling 
Umayyads, namely the <Abb[sid  movement, the Khaw[rij and the Qadar\ya. It considers the 
interpretations of modern scholars as well as comparing five pre-modern sources in order to 
identify the various early historiographic accounts of the role of such religious movements.  
This will help in understanding the perspective of modern historiographers and their arguments, 
but in order to achieve a more nuanced evaluation the study applies an analytical framework 
derived from the twentieth century Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci, a scholar who 
belonged to a radically different intellectual tradition, cultural identity, and historical context. 
Specifically, it will apply the Gramscian theory of hegemony to the subject in order to arrive at a 
better understanding the religious movements of the later Umayyad period, and why and how these 
contributed to the fall of the Umayyads. By demonstrating the ways in which such movements 
challenged the established authority of the Umayyads, the chapter aims ultimately to assess the 
viability, in Gramscian terms, of the ideology, organisation and strategy of the oppositional 
movements as a counterhegemonic ideological force.   
Various religious movements opposed the Umayyads. However, three are given greater 
prominence in the works of the early historiographers as well as modern scholars. These were the 
H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement, the Khaw[rij, and the Qadar\ya, which collectively encompassed  
a wide range of socio-political and religious aspects. The focus is on studying them as a religious 
movement viewed through the lens of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. The chapter considers the 
basic reasons for the failure of the Khaw[rij and Qadar\ya in contrast to the <Abb[sid movement, 
and analyses the ideology, strategy, and organisational structure of the <Abb[sids, the Khaw[rij 
and Qadar\ya, evaluating their political struggle according to a  Gramscian understanding. To 
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maintain a coherent and systematic approach, it will analyse these three religious movements using  
the following format: a consideration of the role of each religious movement as presented in i) pre-
modern, and ii) modern sources, and  iii)  a thematic study of these movements according to 
Gramscian theory.  
4.2 Religion and Religious Movements in Modern Sources  
This section aims to evaluate the interpretations of modern historiographers regarding the role 
played by religion and religious movements in the fall of the Umayyads. Modern historiographers 
have analysed the events of the Umayyad period, and have indicated possible contributing factors, 
notably how religion increasingly provided the means to oppose and finally to overthrow Umayyad 
rule.  
The Umayyad period was crucial to the development of Islamic thought. With the expansion of 
Islamic rule, new centres for the Muslim population came into being, such as K]fa and Basra; 
Damascus too gained a central position when the Umayyads came to power. Differently from 
Arabia, a multicultural, multidimensional and complex society emerged, and as a result, a fresh 
intellectual and social discourse began to respond to the complexities and questions of that period. 
Because the political opposition to the Umayyads, such as the H[shimid, Khaw[rij, and Qadar\ya 
tended to devise their own narratives on various legal, doctrinal, social and administrative issues 
in accordance with their particular understanding of Islam, the intellectual debates during that 
period provided the foundation for subsequent Muslim ideals. An archaeological investigation of 
Muslim thought would be incomplete without examining the socio-religious narratives informing 
this crucial and formative period of Muslim ideas. The main intellectual movements to challenge 
the authority established by Umayyads were the H[shimid-<Abb[sid, Khaw[rij, and Qadar\s, who 
attracted sizeable followings, and whose teachings played a vital role in the shaping of Arab 
political history.  
Most modern scholarship presents the Umayyads as a secular phenomenon. Notable adherents to 
this view include Ignaz Goldziher and Wellhausen. Certainly the +ad\th scholars considered them 
a threat to the ideologies and didactic content of their own religious canon, and in response began 
compiling the Prophetic traditions. With regard to Umayyad efforts to compile +ad\th, Goldziher 
suggests that in fact they preserved those +ad\th which they believed justified their own theological 
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and ideological stance. In particular, he criticises Ibn Shih[b al-Zuhr\ and other supporters of the 
Umayyads for their alleged forgery of +ad\th literature.300 According to Goldziher, the Umayyads 
were secular and unsupported by religious scholars of the time, whereas the <Abbasid were 
religious.301 Wellhausen, appears to hold a similar opinion, pointing out that the fuqah[> (legal 
scholars) and qurr[> were the opponents of the Umayyads. The Umayyads, he claims, were not 
religious; nevertheless, they had taken religious measures to subdue the religious opposition.302 
Joseph Schacht, on the other hand, considered the Umayyads to be religious actors and views their 
anti-Islamic reputation as a later <Abb[sid historiographic construct.303 He further claims that 
Umayyad attempts to establish administrative practice in accordance with Islamic tenets 
encouraged their opponents from the traditionist movement to form their own administrative and 
legal practice based on prophetic tradition.304 
Meanwhile Marshall Hodgson’s criticism of Marw[nid’s religious policy is even more pronounced 
than that of Wellhausen. Coining the term “piety minded opposition”305 to describe the religious 
identity of the anti-Marw[nid opposition, he identifies divergent religious groups (i.e. the Sh\<\, 
the Khaw[rij, the Zubayrid, and  the <Abb[sid), and, like Goldziher,  argues that the +ad\th and 
s\ra were preserved out of profound scholastic disillusionment with the secular Marw[nids. 
Moreover, he asserts that the fuqah[>, the qurr[>  and the mu+addith\n  participated in the ‘piety-
minded’ opposition as a consequence of their connections with active political groups. Hodgson 
acknowledges that some religious scholars offered their services and support to the Umayyads, 
most notably <Abd al-Ra+m[n al-Awz[<\ who represented the ‘Syrian Legists’, but is disparaging 
of these scholars, for associating themselves with the impious Marw[nid and for their lack of social 
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influence; 306 the piety-minded scholars meanwhile were anti-Umayyad and had more influence in 
society.  
Montgomery Watt’s view parallels that of Hodgson, presenting the pious members of society as 
staunch resisters of the godless Umayyads. Watt describes the emergence of a “general religious 
movement” which opposed the Umayyads, with various religious anti-Umayyad movements being 
initiated despite an overall climate of favour towards the ruling dynasties.307 Hawting, another 
important orientalist, provides valuable analysis of the role of the <ulam[> in the Umayyad period, 
and argues that that the Sunni religious tradition was formulated by a largely anti-Umayyad 
scholarly community.308 Tarif Khalidi, on the other hand, argues that there was a battle of fuqah[> 
during the Umayyad period, during which the religious scholars, both supporters and opponents, 
were involved in the fabrication of +ad\th for the purposes of authenticating their arguments. 
Defending al-<Awz[\<\ and al-Zuhr\ and other supporters of the Umayyads, Khalidi  argues that 
these groups did not actively support the Umayyad regime, but instead maintained peaceful 
relations with them in a manner similar to that of many other influential Quraysh\s.309 
Some modern scholars, such as Shaban and Kennedy did not focus on the religious identity of the 
Umayyads in their interpretation of Umayyad history,310 although modern scholarship on the 
period also includes the work of Crone and Hinds who used a variety of sources other than the 
narrowly historical, and incorporated poetry and Greek and Syriac texts, to prove their hypothesis 
that the Umayyads were both religious and fulfilled the role of “God’s Caliph”.311 However, the 
use of poetry to reconstruct historical realities is a controversial and largely unreliable method, due 
to the expressively dramatic, frequently embellished, and fictional nature of the genre, while Greek 
and Syriac sources have similar limitations because of their historic and inherently antagonistic 
stance towards Muslim religious thought. Even so, despite this caveat, the works of Crone and 
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Hinds are considered important for their attempts to provide evidence regarding the religiosity of 
the Umayyads.   
Crone and Hinds also attempted to reconstruct the religious image of the Umayyads. Critical of 
what they perceived as the overly negative and anti-Islamic portrayal of the Umayyads, they 
instead argued that religious and political authority was united during the period of the first three 
R[shid]n caliphs, reaching its zenith during the Umayyad period, before beginning its irreparable 
fragmentation. They maintain that the early scholars were critical of the Umayyads and attempted 
to challenge their religious and legal legitimacy, since by doing so, they created a space in which 
to exercise their authority as custodians of the religion and assert their legitimacy as a law-giving 
authority.  
<Ulam[>–ruler conflict became a permanent feature during the Umayyad and <Abb[sid periods, 
with their respective rulers claiming to be the deputy of God (khal\fat ras]l Allah). Crone and 
Hinds claimed that there was substantial evidence in the historical sources and in Arabic literature, 
as well as in material culture such as inscriptions on coins, all of which supported the idea that the 
Umayyads and <Abb[sids called themselves khal\fat All[h in order to assert their authority as 
representatives of God. In their account, both Umayyad and <Abbasid rulers, in an attempt to 
observe God’s commandments, interpreted the sunna according to their own understanding as the 
deputies of God, although a conflict emerged between the rulers and the <ulam[> on the issue of 
the interpretation of Divine commandments. The <ulam[< ultimately remained successful in 
establishing their authority in religious matters and the rulers were finally deprived of religious 
authority after the failure of al-M[m]n’s mi+na movement.312 
Judd supports the view of Crone and Hinds. Admiring Umayyad contributions to the development 
of religious and theological spheres, he states that “Islam as we know it today, including both its 
agreed doctrines and its deepest schisms, is the fruit of the labors of Marw[nid-era thinkers 
addressing Marw[nid-era questions and conflicts.”313 He notes further that “certain aspects of 
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Islamic thought were coalescing and that particular theological and legal topics, such as human 
free will and caliphal authority, were the focus of significant, increasingly sophisticated, 
debate”,314 though observing that a lack of reliable sources makes it difficult to investigate this 
formative period.  
Whereas the focus of Crone and Hinds is somewhat broader, Judd focuses more closely on the 
Umayyads, asserting that the Umayyads were regarded as secular while the <Abb[sid were 
represented as religious. 315  In fact, early and medieval Muslim historiographers contributed 
considerably to this secular Umayyad image, a fact which is perhaps not surprising given that their 
work was completed during <Abb[sid rule. Most notable amongst these was the history of al-^abar\ 
who depicted the Marw[n\d rule as imperial. With few exceptions, according to this version, the 
caliphs wielded little religious influence in Islamic religious doctrinal, legal, and juristic spheres. 
Modern scholars meanwhile based their work on <Abb[sid era sources particularly on al-^abar\; 
consequently, the majority of modern scholars tend to view the Umayyad dynasty as a secular 
institution.  
Judd further highlights the suggestion by modern scholars that the systematic formulation of a 
legal system began during the <Abb[sid period. He comments that modern scholars either neglect 
or marginalise the Umayyad role in legal development, as for example with Schacht, who values 
the Umayyad contributions to legal development but argues that their approaches were undermined 
by the Traditionists.316 Similarly, while Wael Hallaq acknowledges the Umayyads’ importance to 
the development of the Islamic legal system, he nonetheless disregards their arguably crucial role 
in the formation of such a system, arguing instead that this process was led by a “group of private 
individuals whose motivation to engage in the study of law was largely a matter of piety.”317 Judd 
criticises such marginalising views, and attempts instead to re-evaluate the role of the Umayyads 
in the formation of +ad\th and legal systems, arguing that a substantial community of religious 
scholars was associated with the Umayyads, a connection that assisted significantly in the 
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formation of legal practices and theological beliefs.318 Crucially, he asserts that “the association of 
pious, influential scholars with the Umayyads caliphs would undermine the dichotomy of pious 
opposition versus godless authoritarian rule”,319 and documents the details of all pro-Umayyad 
scholars, who themselves played a vital role in the formation of religion under the dynastic 
patronage.   
Judd also analyses the origins and impact of the third civil war (126¦744—130¦747), as well as the 
role of religious factors in the demise of the Umayyad caliphate in his doctoral thesis: The Third 
Fitna: Orthodoxy, Heresy and Coercion in Late Umayyad History. Special consideration is given 
to the nature of the relationship between the religious scholars and Umayyad rulers. In addition he 
tries to determine “whether religious disagreements created conflicts between political actors or 
whether more cynically, religion merely provided an ideological crutch in pure power politics.”320 
According to Judd, religion assumed a critical importance in relation to the Umayyad demise. He 
views Hish[m as a successful ruler who not only asserted his own religious authority as a custodian 
of religion but also challenged the religious position of groups such as the Khaw[rij and <Alids. 
Hish[m, like his predecessors <Abd al-Malik and <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, punished many people 
for their perceived heretical associations; heresy thus became a prevalent trope in the polemics of 
the various religious sects.321 Nevertheless, his successor could not control the competing religious 
and political groups, which in turn reorganised themselves to challenge the Umayyads’ religious 
authority. Consequently, Judd concludes, “the regime’s religious foundation was destroyed as 
well, raising questions about the nature of the caliphate and its relationship to the development of 
Islam.”322 The Khaw[rij presented their concept of sh]ra and the Shi<\ called for their concept of 
imamah. This was the backdrop against which the Umayyads strove both to uphold their religious 
authority and to challenge their opponents.323 
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Judd’s particular focus is the study of religious factors and their influence in the movement that 
led to the destruction of the Umayyads’ Caliphal system. Religion undoubtedly played an 
important role in the power politics of the period, and as well as constructing religion as a key 
motivating force in power politics,324 he analyses the role of the Qadar\ya in the third fitna and 
how they influenced Yaz\d III and his successors. This view contrasts sharply with that of Dennet 
who argues that Yaz\d III was highly impressed with the Kh[rij\ doctrine and that his political 
reforms were “almost pure Kh[rijism”.325 
Historical sources record the piety of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and his close association with the 
Qadar\ya. Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, on the basis of his Qadar\ doctrine, challenged the authority and 
legitimacy of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. In so doing, he rejected the authoritarian tradition of the 
Umayyads, and instead devised a revolutionary ideology where the ruler was also publicly 
accountable. This new ideology weakened the authority and powers of the ruler, who was no longer 
able to impose new taxes on the people. Thus, when Yaz\d b. Wal\d reduced his subjects’ stipends 
he faced strong criticism from a public who labelled him al-N[qi~, i.e., ‘the inadequate’ or 
‘reducer’. Judd rightly notes that Yaz\d and his successor Ibr[h\m “attempted to rule while 
adhering to an ideology which in turn prevented either ruler from actually wielding power over 
the people.” This failure illustrates the inadequacy of the new ideology to support the caliphs’ 
legitimacy and also indicates, as Judd observes, that “piety without coercive power was not 
sufficient to rule an empire.”326 
Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d successfully used the Qadar\ ideology to overthrow al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. In doing 
so, he shattered the foundation of the Umayyads’ traditional power institutions. Once the 
traditional pattern of authority had been challenged all the ambitious members of the Umayyad 
family attempted to acquire authority, as seen in the struggle of Sulaym[n and Marw[n b. 
Mu+ammad. Although the latter successfully consolidated his authority, the new ideology was not 
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robust enough to sustain it. Thus, the traditional authority of the Umayyads became dysfunctional 
while their revolutionary authority could not provide them with a strong basis to rule.  
Judd considers that the involvement of the Umayyads in religious debates and persecution of 
heretics indicates their high level of engagement in religious affairs and desire to establish their 
religious authority,327 noting that they were consistent in demanding their right to define orthodoxy 
and heresy.328 As the above discussion illustrates, the Umayyads were painted as secular in the 
works of modern scholars before the mid-twentieth century. However, the revisionists of the latter 
half of the twentieth century, particularly Crone, Hinds, Hakim and Judd reject most of the 
assertions regarding the putative secularism of the Umayyads.  They base their argument on the 
fact that the secular portrayal of the Umayyads in modern scholarship derives largely from an over-
dependence on the work of al-^abar\; whereas the availability of new sources enables more 
nuanced and holistic exploration and revisiting of the subject. Attempting to reconstruct the 
Umayyads’ role in religious development, their investigations suggest that the Umayyads, rather 
than secular, were indeed religious, and enjoyed the support of a large number of prominent 
scholars of that time.     
Kennedy also analyses the nature of the Umayyads’ religious authority.  Crucially, along with 
other revisionists, he maintains that their decline could also be ideologically explained.  He also 
notes the prevalent view of the time which cast the Umayyads in a broadly secular light, while 
Crone and Hinds sought to prove the religious authority of the Umayyads on the basis of historical 
documents. Kennedy, however, argues that the people of Iraq did not accept the religious authority 
of the Umayyads, but continued to insist on the rule of the Qur>[n and Sunna, having gradually 
come to believe that only the Family of the Prophet could provide such authority on an Islamic 
basis.329 It is perhaps more realistic that the Umayyads were not secular as presented in modern 
sources but were religious as the revisionists claimed. However, while Umayyad religious 
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authority appears to have been accepted in Iraq and Khur[s[n at the start of their rule, at the 
moment of their decline,  this same religious authority was openly challenged and rejected.  
4.3 Religion and Religious Movements in Pre-Modern Sources 
The role of religion and religious movements, as manifested in pre-Modern sources, is examined 
to enhance understanding of the ideological factors contributing to the decline and fall of the 
Umayyads, and to help in assessing the narratives invoked by modern scholars of the Umayyad 
period. Historiographies of five pre-modern Muslim historians were selected for the study: al-
Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\, al-Mas<]d\, Ibn Ath\r and Ibn Khald]n. Detailed consideration reveals that 
debates on religion were presented in these chronicles according to the perspectives of the most 
prominent socio-religious and political movements; i.e., the H[shimids-<Abb[sids, the Khaw[rij, 
and the Qadar\ya. While acknowledging their socio-political aspects, here the study focuses to a 
greater degree on analysing their religious role, looking at each of the movements separately.    
4.3.1 The H[shimids-<Abb[sids in Pre-Modern Sources  
Most of the pre-modern sources that chronicled the Umayyad dynasty were compiled during the 
period of <Abb[sid rule, which is why modern historiographers usually highlight the hostility of 
their pre-modern fore-runners towards the Umayyads. The intention here is to explore and assess 
the ways in which pre-modern historians recorded the events leading to the fall of the Umayyads, 
to identify their perspectives on the development of the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement during the 
later Umayyad era, and to examine the extent to which these pre-modern sources considered the 
H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement to be at the root of that fall. This bias can be observed particularly 
in the case of the Khur[s[n episode and its role in the decline of Arab rule. Emerging in Khur[s[n, 
the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement was significantly assisted and supported by non-Arabs. The 
H[shimid-Umayyad conflict was historically rooted in their past tribal conflict, echoes of which 
can be heard in the accounts from pre-modern sources. However, the <Abb[sids gradually 
established their movement on an ideological basis. Having considered the conflict between the 
H[shimids-<Abbasids and Umayyads from a tribal perspective, it can now be argued that this 
struggle contributed to the weakening of a~ab\ya in the Arab tribes, a situation that then enabled 
the non-Arabs to assert and extend their own power. Here, however, we examine how the 
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H[shimids-<Abb[sids established their movement on a religious basis and how this religiously-
grounded institution is recorded in pre-modern sources.  
4.3.1.1 Al-Ya<q]b\ and the H[shimids-<Abb[sid Movement   
Al-Ya<q]b\ observed Umayyad decline in the rise of the H[shimid movement in Iraq and Khur[s[n 
following the period of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. Nevertheless, Hish[m’s shrewdness and political 
wisdom had ensured the Umayyads’ temporary survival. Al-Ya<q]b\ notes that Hish[m b. <Abd 
al-Malik b. Marw[n was a cautious but close-fisted, jealous, unsympathetic and cruel ruler,330and 
clearly believes that the decline of the Umayyads occurred due to the ascendancy of the H[shimid 
and Abbasid movements in Iraq and Khur[s[n. He records that in 111 AH, Sulaym[n b. Kath\r al-
Khaz[<\, Bukayr b. H[m[n, and Ab] Salma |af~ b. Sulaym[n al-Khall[l initiated and organized a 
movement to overthrow the Umayyads and bring the H[shimids to power. Al-Khall[l wrote a letter 
to Mu+ammd b. <Al\ b. <Abd Allah asking him for support and guidance. As the movement 
expanded its network, Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\, governor of Ir[q, appointed his brother Asad 
b. <Abd Allah as his deputy in Khur[s[n. The latter suppressed the movement, cutting off the hands 
and legs of the H[shimid adherents and hanging many of them. He terrorized the H[shimid and 
their supporters until his death in 120 AH.331 
Ya<q]b\ also recorded that Kh[lid al-Qasr\ was accused of being closely associated with the 
donation of a sum of six hundered thousand dirhams to the H[shimid cause. Hish[m investigated 
the matter with the involvement of |ass[n al-Nib%\, who produced evidence of Kh[lid’s 
involvement in donating public money to the H[shimids. This act infuriated Hish[m, who 
condemned Kh[lid and dismissed him from his post. Further, Hish[m wrote a letter to Y]suf b. 
<Umar, governor of Yemen, asking him to control the administrative affairs of Iraq. In 120 AH, 
Y]suf detained Kh[lid and his deputies imprisoning him and his fellows and punishing them 
ruthlessly. He tortured many of Kh[lid’s deputies so harshly that many of them died.332 
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Al-Ya<q]b\ also records the meeting between Zayd b. <Al\ b. al-|ussayn and Hish[m. Hish[m 
questioned Zayd about Y]suf b. <Umar’s letter in which he revealed that Kh[lid al-Qasr\ had given 
six  hundred thousand dirhams to Zayd, which Zayd denied. Al-Ya<q]b\’s notes on their talk 
clearly identify the hostility between Zayd and Hish[m. For instance, Hish[m reportedly taunted 
Zayd over his aspiration to the caliphate as follows:  
Did you not know that you were the son of a slave woman? Zayd replied: Alas! You are criticizing 
my family lineage. By God, Is+[q was the son of an independent and autonomous lady (+urra) and 
Ism[<\l was the son of a slave women. God had chosen Ism[<\l and Arabs were from his lineage 
and the Prophet of Allah (Mu+ammad) was also one of his descendants.333 
According to this version of events, Hish[m’s policy of challenging the ascendant H[shimids 
appears to have prompted him to remove his trustworthy, pro-H[shimid governor, Kh[lid al-Qasr\, 
who was of Yemen\ origin. Hish[m ordered Y]suf b <Umar to probe the matter by listening to the 
arguments of both Zayd and Kh[lid al-Qasr\. Y]suf duly arranged a meeting between Zayd and 
Kh[lid, and asked Kh[lid about the money which he believed had been given to Zayd. Kh[lid 
replied, “by God, he did not give him any money”. Y]suf then ordered Zayd to leave Kufa 
immediately by order of the commander of the faithful people, whereupon the Shi<\s of Kufa 
gathered around to give him their allegiance. When Y]suf b. <Umar became aware of the situation 
in 121 AH, he attacked Zayd and killed him.334  
Al-Ya<q]b\ emphasises Zayd’s central role in the initiation of the Shi<\ movement in Khur[s[n. 
The movement’s members publicised the tyranny of the Umayyads as well as their torture of the 
Prophet’s family, disseminating the news of Zayd’s assassination across Khur[s[n. He also 
narrates Ya+y[ b. Zayd’s flight to Khur[s[n and his hiding in Balkh, as well as Y]suf’s subsequent 
orders for his arrest. We also learn that Na~r b. Sayy[r captured and imprisoned Ya+y[ b. Zayd in 
Khur[s[n,335 where, Al-Ya<q]b informs us, the assassination of Ya+y[ b. Zayd took place, thereby 
giving further impulse to the H[shimid movement.  
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In Al-Ya<q]b\’s view this proved a crucial turning point in the development of the H[shimid 
movement, whose leading adherents, such as Sulaym[n b. Kath\r, M[lik b. al-|aytham, and 
Qa+%aba b. Shab\b, met Mu+ammad b. <Al\ b. <Abd Allah b. <Abb[s. Al-Ya<q]b\ records that Ab] 
Muslim was also present at the meeting at which Mu+ammad b. <Al\ predicted his own imminent 
death, nominating Ibr[h\m as his successor. He also advised them to follow Ab] Muslim who 
would establish the rule of the Prophet’s family. Mu+ammad died at the end of 125 AH.336 
According to al-Ya<q]b\, the chief grounds for the fall of the Umayyads were understood up to 
this time to be the rise of the H[shimid movement and the conflicts within the royal family. 
Meanwhile, the role of tribal conflict is somewhat marginal in his account.  Similarly, al-Ya<q]b\ 
records that the conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf b. <Umar was not tribal but was due 
to Hish[m’s desire to remove Kh[lid from the governorship of Iraq. Y]suf b. <Umar was perhaps 
a suitable choice to suppress the H[shimid movement completely, since he had crushed the 
rebellion and killed Zayd b. <Al\ and his supporters. Al-Ya<q]b\ portrays the Umayyads as unable 
to suppress the H[shimid movement which flourished across Iraq and Khur[s[n, and which played 
a central role in the fall of Umayyad rule.  
4.3.1.2 Al-^abar\ and the H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement  
In contrast to al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\ illustrates the development of the H[shimid movement in a 
more comprehensive historical perspective. He reveals that the <Abbasid movement started in 
Khur[s[n during Asad’s rule, with Ziy[d Ab] Mu+ammad their first preacher in the region. Al-
^abar\’s account relates that Mu+ammad b. <Al\ b. <Abd Allah b. al-<Abb[s dispatched Ziy[d to 
invite people to their cause, to stay with the Yemenites, and treat Mu#ar gently. He also advised 
Ziy[d to stay away from Gh[lib, the H[shimid preacher who was overcome love for the progeny 
of F[%ima. Al-^abar\ notes that, as Mu+ammad b. <Al\ had predicted, conflict soon emerged 
between Ziy[d Ab] Mu+ammad and Gh[lib, with both preachers criticising the Umayyads and 
emphasising accounts of their tyranny and oppression. However, while the former adhered to the 
<Abbasids, the latter adhered to the F[%imids, prompting dissension between the two groups.337 
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The H[shimid movement continued secretly during the next ten years, becoming more visible in 
117 AH. In order to control the situation, Hish[m dismissed <A~im b. <Abd Allah from Khur[s[n, 
attaching that province instead to Iraq, under the governorship of Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\. 
He further advised Kh[lid to appoint Asad b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ as his deputy in Khur[s[n in 117 
AH to ensure law and order in the region.338 Along with other measures taken for the restoration 
of peace, Asad arrested a group of preachers belonging to the <Abb[sids, killing some and 
imprisoning others.339 
Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ was governor of Iraq from the accession of Hish[m and ruled until 
120 AH. A Yemen\, he is considered to have been moderate and enlightened, and to have attempted 
to maintain a balance between the various hostile social factions; certainly no significant tribal 
clashes appear to have occurred during his long period of administration. Although tribal hostilities 
between the Mu#ar and Yemen had emerged in Khur[s[n during the early period of Hish[m,  
Kh[lid, with the active support of  Damascus, succeeded in quelling the conflict. However, these 
tribal disturbances re-appeared with the emergence of other ideological movements in Iraq and 
Khur[s[n, where the Khaw[rij and the H[shimids-<Abb[sids both mobilised the followers of their 
movements. In this situation, Hish[m took Kh[lid’s advice, and deputised his brother Asad al-
Qasr\ to suppress the unrest in Khur[s[n. Asad was able to restore peace in the problematic areas.  
Kh[lid al-Qasr\ administered Iraq judiciously, and is credited with ensuring  peace and justice in 
the region. However, his long rule in Iraq and his policy of tolerance gained him enemies, among 
whom was Hish[m who dismissed him from the governorship. Al-^abar\ reports many events that 
indicate the changes in Hish[m’s policies while he was governing Iraq and Khur[s[n during the 
last years of his rule. He appointed a Mu#ar\ as minister in place of a Yemen\ and a Rab\<\. Asad 
b. <Abd Allah, the deputy governor of Khur[s[n died in 120 AH while his brother Kh[lid b. <Abd 
Allah was dismissed from the governorship of Iraq in the same year, contemporaneous with 
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Mu+ammad b. <Al\’s dispatching of Bakayr b. H[m[n to his followers in Khur[s[n and the 
organisation of the <Abbasid preachers and representatives (nuqab[>).340 
Al-^abar\, like al-Ya<q]b\, records the same reason for Kh[lid’s dismissal from the governorship 
of Iraq, i.e., the accusation of providing financial aid to the H[shimids. However, al-^abar\ 
considers that Hish[m was not convinced of these allegations, even though he still removed him 
from office in 120 AH.  It is likely that he sought to embody a more aggressive policy at this stage, 
and therefore appointed Y]suf b. <Umar as governor of Iraq. Y]suf was a Mu#ar\ who abhorred 
the Yemen\s, particularly Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\. He proceeded to capture and torture the 
deposed governor with the intention of killing him, but Hish[m's orders saved Kh[lid’s life. 
Meanwhile, Y]suf continued to persecute the H[shimids. He suppressed the uprising of Zayd b. 
<Al\ b. |ussayn by assassinating him and burning his corpse.341 
The policy of repression re-invigorated the <Abb[sid movement in Khur[s[n. Mu+ammad b. <Abd 
Allah b. <Abb[s, propagandist for the movement, refused to accept Umayyad sovereignty and 
initiated a movement to install the H[shimids. He died in 125 AH, having nominated his eldest 
son Ibr[h\m to continue his movement. Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ was a vigorous adherent. 
Genealogically an Arab, and a native of I~fah[n, he successfully constructed the <Abb[sid 
propaganda to fit the H[shimid cause. With the death of Hish[m in 125 AH¦743 AD, Ab] Muslim 
accelerated this programme in Khur[s[n. Meanwhile, following the death of his father, Ya+y[ b. 
Zayd went underground and started a movement in Khur[s[n. He, too, was later hunted down and 
killed during the rule of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d.342 
Ya+y[’s death further galvanized the <Abbasid movement. After the death of Zayd b. <Al\ and his 
son Ya+y[, the supremacy of <Abb[s’s descendants was established and the <Abb[sid movement 
advanced under the slogan “Avenger of the House «of the Prophet»”. Al-^abar\ gives a detailed 
elaboration of the conflicts between Y]suf b. <Umar and Kh[lid al-Qasr\, and between al-Kirm[n\ 
and Na~r b. Sayy[r, as well as commenting on how Yemen\-Mu#ar\ relations influenced these 
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conflicts. In his view, the advantage was gained by Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ and the <Abbasids, a 
narrative that is more or less analogous to that of al-Ya<q]b\, who narrates the dismissal of Kh[lid 
al-Qasr\ and the appointment of Y]suf b. <Umar. The administrative change resulted not from 
tribal conflict between Qays and Mu#ar, but from a change in the state policy regarding the 
H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement. 
4.3.1.3 Al-Mas<]d\ and the H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement  
Al-Mas<]d\, too, records the development of the H[shimids from a historical perspective, 
presenting various socio-political and religious dimensions of the movement. 343  He gives a 
comprehensive account of Zayd b. <Al\ b. |ussayn’s death, recording how Hish[m b. <Abd al-
Malik killed him in 121 or 122 AH, and relating in great detail the conversation between Zayd and 
Hish[m on the issue of khil[fah.  He notes that Zayd came to Hish[m in Ru~[fah, sat in a corner 
of the room and said, “O leader of the believers! No one can be enhanced without God’s blessing 
nor can the status of someone be reduced with it.” Hish[m replied, “Be silent! You do not have a 
‘free’ mother and you are a son of a slave. I do not know why you have argued that you have a 
right to the caliphate.” To which Zayd responded: “Mothers do not prevent their children from 
attaining high positions. There was no doubt that the mother of Ism[<\l was a slave woman. She 
was a slave of Is+[q’s mother. And was not Ism[<\l a Prophet of Allah and considered to be a father 
of Arabs, while Mu+ammad, the most noble man of all human beings, was born of him?” Zayd 
rejected Hish[m’s allegations, claiming that he was a son of Fa%ima b. Mu+ammad and <Al\ b. Ab\ 
^[lib. Even so, he argued, if someone was a son of a slave woman, this would not degrade his 
religious position.344  Al-Mas<]d\ reports that Zayd left for Kufa in the company of many scholars 
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and nobles, and that Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqf\ fought with him.  Zayd’s followers were defeated 
and he was killed in a cruel manner. Y]suf dispatched his head to Hish[m who ordered to the 
naked body to be crucified. Hish[m later sent a letter and advised Y]suf to burn his body.345 
Al-Mas<]d\’s treatment of Islamic history is well-organised and systematic in its presentation. He 
introduces each Caliph and offers details of significant events in their chronology, and claims that 
he has recorded brief reports containing important information.346 Tarif Khalidi comments, “in 
reality, however, the stories recorded are often strong indictments of a particular ruler’s character 
or deeds. This is especially in evidence in al-Mas<]d\’s treatment of the Umayyads.”347 Thus, 
authorial judgments on people and events are arguably implied through the manner of their 
inclusion and narration within his account.   
Indeed, al-Mas<]d\ constructs the Umayyad-H[shimid conflict as momentous. However he depicts 
the H[shimids as comparatively placid and moderate, reporting that they killed the Umayyads 
ruthlessly but treated their women gently. He describes how Marw[n’s daughters were brought to 
@[li+ b. <Al\. Marw[n’s eldest daughter asked him for forgiveness but @[li+ reminded her of the 
violent chronicle of hostilities between the Umayyad and  H[shimid royal families. Her father, 
Marw[n, had killed Ibr[h\m b. Mu+ammad b.<Al\ b. <Abd Allah b. al-<Abb[s in the prison of 
Harr[n; Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik had hanged Zayd b. <Al\ b. al-|ussayn b. <Al\ in K]fa while his 
wife was killed in |ira by Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqf\; al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d had killed Ya+y[ b. Zayd 
and hanged him Khur[s[n; <Ubayd All[h b. Ziy[d had killed <Aq\l b. <Ab\ ^[lib in Kufa; and 
Yaz\d b. Mu<[w\ya had killed al-|ussayn b. <Al\ along with his family. Moreover, the ladies of 
the Prophet’s family were disgraced and humiliated in front of the Syrians. Al-Mas<]d\ reports 
that @[li+ reiterated his enmity towards the Umayyads and then not only forgave her but also 
offered to marry her and her sister to his sons al-Fa#l and <Abd Allah if they wished, later sending 
them to |arr[n upon their request.348  
                                                 
345 ibid., 407-410¦2.  
346 ibid., 126¦2. 
347 Tarif Khalidi, Islamic Historiography: The Histories of Mas<]d\, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1975), 128.  
348 al-Mas<]d\, Mur]j, 441-442¦2. 
123 
 
It may thus be inferred from al-Mas<]d\’s account that he considered the H[shimid-<Abb[sid 
movement a critical factor in the fall of the Umayyads. Nonetheless, in relation to the removal of 
Kh[lid al-Qasr\, al-Mas<]d\’s reports reinforce the narrative of this event as having been caused 
not by tribal hostility or a change in the expansionist policy but rather by the fact that it occurred 
as an attempt to curb the expanding movement of the H[shimids. Y]s]f b. <Umar undertook to 
crush the H[shimid’s strength by ruthlessly killing Zayd b. <Al\ and his adherents. Meanwhile 
Kh[lid, being less hostile to the H[shimids, was blamed by Y]suf b. <Umar for providing financial 
assistance to the H[shimids. Al-Mas<]d\’s illustration of the late Umayyads reinforces the 
H[shimid movement’s central role in the collapse of their Umayyad foes.   
4.3.1.4 Ibn Ath\r and the H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement  
Ibn Ath\r’s historiography is both comprehensive and thematically analogous to that of al-^abar\.  
He also reports that Kh[lid served for fifteen years as governor of Iraq and Khur[s[n during the 
period of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik,349 and was accused of assisting Zayd b. <Al\ b. al-|ussayn 
both financially and morally in his actions against Damascus.350 Because of these allegations 
Hish[m dismissed him from the governorship of Iraq and appointed Yus]f b. <Umar in his place. 
Y]suf b. <Umar was a Mu#ar\ who hated Kh[lid and his Yemen\ fellows. He arrested Kh[lid and 
his family and brutally tortured them, also obtaining authorisation to arrest and torture Kh[lid.351 
Hish[m’s subsequent investigation of the matter yielded contradictory reports. It was proved that 
Zayd and D[w]d b. <Al\ b. <Abd Allah b. <Abb[s and Mu+ammad b. <Umar b. <Al\ b. <Ab\ ^[lib 
had gone to see Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah in Iraq. Kh[lid presented them with gifts and they returned 
to Medina. The deputy of Medina confirmed the story up to this point but both parties denied the 
accusations regarding financial and moral support. When Zayd was asked about Kh[lid’s help, he 
questioned in what capacity and to what extent Kh[lid could have helped him and his fellows, 
having previously and very openly cursed them. Similarly Kh[lid denied giving any assistance to 
Zayd.352 
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Kh[lid remained in the custody of Y]suf b. <Umar. Hish[m did not permit Y]suf to kill Kh[lid 
and warned him that if Kh[lid was killed while in his custody then he himself would kill Y]suf. 
Thus, Kh[lid remained under arrest in prison for eighteen months, after which time Hish[m 
ordered his release. Ibn Ath\r notes that Hish[m not only released Kh[lid but also condemned 
Y]suf b. <Umar for accusing Kh[lid of financially supporting the H[shimids. Y]suf wrote to 
Hish[m, explaining that before receiving Kh[lid’s financial aid the H[shimids had been starving, 
and that having received this support, they had initiated their movement. Y]suf further maintained 
that Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah had supported  Zayd’s revolt, a claim staunchly denied by Hish[m, who 
vigorously denied this and punished the messenger who had carried the letter from Y]suf,  
declaring, “Y]suf told a lie. And we should not accuse Kh[lid of disloyalty.”353 Kh[lid eventually 
returned to Damascus to reside with his tribe. Ibn Ath\r discusses reports detailing Kh[lid’s 
suffering in his captivity. Further, many members of his family in Damascus, having subsequently 
been taken prisoner by the governor Kalth]m b. <Ayy[# al-Qushayr\. They were accused of looting 
the Damascene treasury, but after an investigation were exonerated. Hish[m personally 
condemned Kalth]m and ordered him to release Kh[lid and his fellow captives. Thus, Kh[lid 
clearly lived in Damascus during Hish[m’s rule.  
Unlike the earlier historians al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\, and al-Mas<]d\, Ibn Ath\r focuseds on tribal 
matters, whereas the early historians presented such considerations in the context of other 
prevailing factors. The H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement and the role of the Khur[s[n feature 
consistently as the central narrative in histories written prior to Ibn Ath\r. Meanwhile modern 
scholars, such as Zaydan, consult Ibn Ath\r for the interpretation of the Umayyad collapse and the 
role of tribal conflict in it.  
4.3.1.5 Ibn Khald]n and the H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement  
Ibn Khald]n, who offers a consistent narrative of Umayyad history in historical perspective, 
considers both tribal and religious aspects of the H[shimid movement when presenting the 
background to H[shimid-Umayyad relations, and identifies <Abd Mun[f’s family as the most noble 
and supreme in the Quraysh due to its size. Both Umayya and H[shim were sons of <Abd Mun[f; 
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however, the older son was superior to the younger due to the older one’s affiliation to a larger 
group, since in the tribal system the prominence and supremacy of a tribe depends on its greater 
size. The authority of the Umayyads had been consolidated in pre-Islamic history when |arb b. 
Umayya had led the battle of Fijj[r. 354  
Ibn Khald]n presents the people of this time as having been significantly and radically influenced 
by Islam.  With its coming, he argues, they forgot tribal vanities, instead affirming the equality of 
human beings irrespective of their tribal and ethnic divisions or identity. Ibn Khald]n cites the 
event of the valley of Ab] ^[lib, where the H[shimids were compelled to take refuge. This was a 
social boycott between the Quraysh and the H[shimids and of great significance, not least for its 
reported potential to generate considerable inter-tribal hostility.  However, influenced by Islam, 
pre-Islamic tribal preoccupations were cast aside, being weakened still further during the migration 
to Medina and the beginning of the jih[d. Nonetheless, it was impossible to eradicate a residual 
tribal sentiment completely, nor indeed was it prohibited in Islam; rather it was invoked as 
recommended and even beneficial to jih[d.355 
Ibn Khald]n emphasises Umayyad supremacy in pre-Islamic Mecca. The Umayyads had 
consolidated their power particularly after the death of Ab] ^[lib and the migration of the 
Hashimids to Medina in the company of the Prophet. Now in Mecca, they attained exclusive 
authority without any competition. The leadership of the Umayyads came to Ab] Sufy[n after the 
battle of Badr where all prominent leaders of the Umayyad house were killed.356 Ab] Sufy[n led 
the Umayyads in all subsequent battles such as U+d, I+z[b, and other conflicts. After the conquest 
of Mecca, the Umayyads accepted Islam. Ab] Bakr utilized their strength in the wars of apostasy, 
while <Umar deployed them against the Roman forces in Syria and on the Roman frontiers. He 
appointed Yaz\d b. Ab\ Sufy[n as governor of Syria and his brother, Mu<[w\ya b. Ab\ Sufy[n 
replaced him after his death in the year 18 AH. Mu<[w\ya continued in the role as governor of 
Syria during <Uthm[n’s rule. During this period, according to Ibn Khald]n, the Umayyads’ pre-
Islamic authority joined together with the existing Muslim authority, while the the H[shimid 
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remained busy in prayer and religious affairs because of their close relation to the Prophet. 
Consequently, political authority fell into Umayyad hands.  
Ibn Khald]n states that on the basis of this authority, and after the assassination of <Uthm[n, 
Mu<[w\ya refused to accept <Al\ as caliph. <Al\ gathered the support of all the tribes of Rab\<a, 
Yemen, and others while Mu<aw\ya had the support of the Syrian army and some prominent 
members of Quraysh who had been previously deployed on the frontiers during the early period 
of conquest. Mu<aw\ya sustained his authority with the support of his allies, who were strongly 
affiliated with tribalism, before successfully defeating a section of <Al\’s force. Conflict between 
the Khaw[rij and <Alid forces resulted. Ultimately, Mu<[w\ya wielded absolute authority in the 
Muslim caliphate when al-|asan withdrew in his favour in 41 AH.  Ibn Khald]n presents this as 
a time when people forgot the message of prophecy and returned to power struggles on the basis 
of <asab\ya. Furthermore, the domination of the Umayyads over Mu#ar and all the Arab tribes was 
established under the leadership of Mu<[w\ya.357 
Ibn Khald]n also emphasizes Mu<[w\ya’s remarkable quality of +ilm (gentleness, forbearance and 
understanding), which afforded him wisdom in financial matters and forbearance in adversity, in 
order to achieve his political gains. He therefore spent money lavishly in order to win the 
confidence of the F[%imids, H[shimids, Zubayrids and other powerful tribes, thereby successfully 
consolidating Umayyad authority.358 
Ibn Khald]n also documents al-^abar\’s authority, describing the important political steps 
suggested by Mu<[w\ya for Yaz\d. The main points in the policy statement were: (i) to treat the 
people of |ij[z gently and respect them as family or clan members;  (ii) to change the governor of 
Iraq according to the people’s demands, even if they demanded a daily change; (iii) to rely on the 
people of Syria who constituted the real power base, while postponing their deployment for as 
long as possible, repatriating them immediately in the event of their unavoidable active service, 
which had in any case to be for as short a period as possible; and  (iv) to beware of three people: 
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(a) <Abd Allah b. <Umar, who was understood to be immersed in performing religious and 
devotional rituals but who, in the absence of any other contender for the caliphate, was to swear 
allegiance to Yaz\d; (b) |ussayn b. <Al\, who was to be treated gently, forgiven and not put to 
death; and (c) <Abd All[h b. Zubayr, who was not to be spared if he came into conflict with 
Yaz\d.359 However, Yaz\d ignored Mu<[w\ya’s advice, choosing instead to follow that of Marw[n 
b. al-|akam.   
Al-Wal\d b. <Utbba b. Ab\ Sufy[n was the <[mil of Medina when Mu<[w\ya died. He received the 
message from Damascus that Yaz\d had taken the caliph’s oath and that he was to arrange to take 
the oath of allegiance for Yaz\d from <Abd Allah b. <Umar, |ussayn b. <Al\, and <Abd All[h b. 
Zubayr.  Al-Wal\d consulted Marw[n b. al-|akam, who was in Medina at that time. Marw[n 
suggested that they should be invited to take the oath of allegiance to Yaz\d, and if they did not 
agree then they should be killed. Al-Wal\d disgreed with Marw[n’s suggestion and when Yaz\d 
came to know al-Wal\d’s response, he dismissed him and appointed <Amr b. Sa<\d al-Ashdaq as 
<[mil of Medina.360 
Ibn Khald]n depicts the Marw[nid branch of the Umayyads as successfully establishing their 
authority by utilising their family ties and blood relationships. Many of their relatives were 
appointed to high positions in order to integrate them into the power structure and share authority 
among all members of the royal family. Their supremacy was further established through 
maintaining strong ties with the Syrian Kalb tribes and harmonising the balance of power between 
the Yemen and Mu#ar in the rest of the state. The <a~ab\ya became weak during the later Umayyad 
period and tribal conflict emerged.  Ibn Khald]n records the prominence of the conflict between 
the Mu#ar and Yemen, which became stronger and more evident, and in addition, many 
ideologically-oriented movements emerged, capitalizing on the tribal hostilities to organise their 
movements more actively.  
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Y]suf b. <Umar accused Kh[lid al-Qasr\ of giving financial support to Zayd b. <Al\ in Kufa. It was 
proved that Zayd, in the company of Mu+ammad b. <Umar b. <Al\ b. <Ab\ ^[lib and D[w]d b. <Al\ 
b. <Abd Allah b. <Abb[s, had come to Kh[lid in Iraq who presented them with gifts before they 
returned to Medina. On Hish[m’s investigation, they confessed to accepting the gifts but denied 
any other wrongdoing.  Zayd hid himself in Kufa, initiating a secret mission calling the people to 
take the oath of allegiance to him in Kufa; approximately fifteen thousand people followed his 
call. Y]suf b. <Umar subsequently attacked Zayd and after a furious fight Zayd was killed on the 
orders of Hish[m. Later, when al-Wal\d became caliph, he demanded the burning of Zayd’s 
corpse,361 an act which angered the people of Khur[s[n who were already expressing rebellion 
against the central authority of the Umayyads. Na~r, the Umayyad governor, failed to be reconciled 
with al-Kirm[n\ and Shayb[n. Meanwhile Ab] Muslim successfully gathered strength in order to 
establish his authority in Khur[s[n, which he then extended and consolidated in Iraq; this in turn 
led to the ascendancy of the <Abb[sids. 
4.3.2 Concluding Note  
The detailed elaboration of the pre-modern historical sources on the role of the H[shimid-<Abb[sid 
movement presented above provides an excellent basis for examining the views of the early 
historians. Al-Ya<q]b\’s emphasis on the decisive role of  the H[shimid and <Abb[sid movements 
in the Umayyads’ decline contrasts, for example, with Al-^abar\’s broad explanation of Umayyad 
rule and the identification of several elements leading to their fall.  In al-^abar\’s view, tribal 
rivalries did play a role but were not considered the most important factor. For al-^abar\ the 
Khur[s[nian factor is of key significance in the weakening of this caliphate, a view closely 
mirrored in accounts offered by both al-Mas<]d\ and Ibn Ath\r. However, on the issue of <a~ab\ya, 
Ibn Ath\r’s elaboration appears the most all-inclusive and comprehensive.  
Ibn Khald]n gives adequate space to the development of the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement that 
contributed to the Marw[nid demise. Viewing <Abb[sid success in bringing an end to the  absolute 
domination of the Arabs, he argues that unity of Arab<a~ab\ya was fundamental to establishing the 
rule of Islam under one state (dawla) from the period of the earliest four caliphs to the end of 
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Umayyad rule. Then, as he suggests, with the fragility of the Arab<a~ab\ya, non-Arab Shi<\s 
appeared, demanding the caliphate for the people of the Prophetic House (ahl al-bayt). The Sh\<\ 
movement ultimately brought the <Abb[sids to power, but the <Abb[sids were unable to maintain 
the unity of the Arab state because Andalusia remained under Umayyad control, having been 
established by the latter as an intended parallel to Baghd[d. Thus, the unity of the Arab caliphate 
had gone and the division led them to the foundation of two separate states under the rule of Islam.  
Ibn Khald]n argues further that the division of the Muslim states was based on the division of the 
Arab <a~ab\ya, a division that intensified further with the weakening of the <Abbasid state. Shi<\ 
movements emerged across the Muslim lands, including the Idr\s\s in the Maghreb al-Aq~a 
(Morocco), and the Ubaydiy\n in Qayr[w[n and Egypt, the Qar[mi%a in Ba+rayn, together with 
other Shi<\ movements in ^ibrist[n and Daylam, while the A%r]sh succeeded in establishing their 
separate states. Thus, the unity of the rule of Islam was ended and many separate states came to 
existence.362 
The earlier discussion demonstrates Ibn Khald]n’s privileging of  the <asab\ya and tribal conflict 
as key forces leading to the disintegration of the Umayyad caliphate.  Moreover both he and Ibn 
Ath\r give more consideration to the role of the <a~ab\ya in the same dynastic decline, whereas the 
H[shimid movement and the Khur[s[nian factor feature more prominently as the supposed 
contributory causes according to the historiographies of  al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\ and al-Mas<]d\.  
4.4 Pre-Modern Historiographers on the Role of the Khaw[rij   
Pre-modern sources provide substantial information on religio-political movements. Having 
already discussed the early development of the Khaw[rij in historical perspective, the study 
considers the Khaw[rij role during the last eight years of Umayyad rule. The Khaw[rij tradition is 
consistently recorded but not considered in great detail in the pre-modern and modern sources. In 
contrast to the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement, the Khaw[rij movement failed to achieve its 
objectives. Pre-modern historiographers, too, appear less than flattering towards the Khaw[rij. 
This section seeks to identify ways in which the Khaw[rij and their role were depicted in the pre-
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modem sources, as well as to discover the reasons cited in these sources for the eventual failure of 
this group.   
4.4.1 Al-Ya<q]b\ and the Khaw[rij Movement  
Presenting the historical status of the Khaw[rij, al-Ya<q]b\ noted that the Khaw[rij and Hish[m b. 
<Abd al-Malik had, by the end of his rule, signed an agreement for peace. Bahl]l b. <Umar al-
Shayb[n\, along with his followers, took the oath of allegiance to Hish[m, and that agreement 
provided a strong sense of mutual trust between Hish[m and Bahl]l.363  The agreement remained 
intact until Hish[m’s death, after which Bahl]l rebelled against the Umayyads.364 With this brief 
overview, al-Ya<q]b\ convincingly demonstrates the acknowledged role of the Khaw[rij during 
the later Umayyad era, since his work points to a Khaw[rij reorganisation when they had 
ascertained the weakness in the Umayyad administration after Hish[m’s death. During the period 
of al-Wal\d and Yaz\d they gradually gathered strength, with their power becoming more evident 
following the arrival of Marw[n b. Muhammad, when all the anti-Marw[n forces gathered under 
the Khaw[rij umbrella. Al-Ya<q]b\ recorded that al-$a++[k b. Qays al-|ar]r\ took control of the 
Iraq\ peripheries, battling against <Abd Allah b. <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, whom he defeated, before 
heading towards M]~il and encircling Na~\bayn which was under the control of <Abd Allah b. 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. Al-$a++[k also appointed Mus[fir as governor of Armenia, where the 
Umayyad deputy (<amil), <A~im b. <Abd Allah b. Yaz\d al-Hil[l\, was killed by the Armenians. 
Observing the deteriorating situation, Marw[n b. Mu+ammad planned to thwart the increasing 
power of the Khaw[rij, and after heavy fighting on both sides, al-$a++ak was killed in 127 AH. 
Al-Ya<q]b\ argues that after al-$a++[k’s death the Khaw[rij lost their strength and split into 
various factions. However, they became stronger when Sulaym[n b. Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik 
joined them after he had been defeated while en route to Syria, by Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, at 
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Khass[f.  The alliance between Sulaym[n b. Hish[m and al-Khaybar\, the Khaw[rij leader, 
emerged as a great force against Marw[n, Sulaym[n having accepted the leadership of al-
Khaybar\. Al-Ya<q]b\ records in his historical account that Marw[n then crushed the strength of 
the alliance between the Khaw[rij and Sulaym[n with a series of battles between Marw[n and the 
Khaw[rij.  
According to this version, Marw[n’s commander <{mir b. $ub[rah al-Murr\ eliminated the 
influence of the Khaw[rij, while all the key leaders of the alliance were either killed or fled to far-
flung areas. Al-Ya<q]b\ appears not to have considered the role of the Khaw[rij in contributing 
directly to the collapse of Umayyad rule. Marw[n successfully stabilised the situation and 
eliminated the strength of Khaw[rij and the rival princes. Close textual examination of al-
Ya<q]b\’s history suggests that the conflict between Na~r b. Sayy[r and Kirm[n\ weakened the 
crumbling state. However, the repercussions of that deteriorating situation, and the consequences 
of Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\’s increasing force could not have been envisaged by Marw[n while still 
engaged in fighting with the Khaw[rij.  
4.4.2 Al-^abar\ and the Khaw[rij Movement  
In contrast to al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\’s historiography presents a consistent narrative of the 
Umayyad period. Later historians based their works on al-^abar\’s historiography, and while it is 
not possible to note all the events he recorded, the study tries to identify and analyse the most 
significant turning-points recorded in his work. Al-^abar\ notes how the political activities of the 
Khaw[rij expanded in the provinces of Iraq, al-Jaz\ra and Azerbaijan after the murder of al-Wal\d 
II.365 Around two hundred warriors gathered under the leadership of Bahdal al-Shayb[n\ and 
declared war against Umayyad rule in Kafartuth, a city approximately fifty miles away in the north 
of Na~\bayn. Another Kh[rij\ group of thirty warriors was organised under the guidance of Bis%[m 
al-Shayb[n\ in Azerbaijan, where they killed the governor (w[l\) of Azerbaijan before marching 
towards Mu~il where they killed eighty civilians in the marketplace. Many members of the Rabi<a 
                                                 
365 Shaban has a different view regarding the Khaw[rij movements. He argues that during that period they were not 
actually based on the early movements of the Khaw[rij, which were basically tribal movements that linked 
themselves to the Khaw[rij for the sake of common interest and mutual political benefits. Thus, the movements of 
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tribe joined the group, marching to Mad[>in and killing its deputy (w[l\). Both the Khaw[rij groups 
confronted each other and conflict ensued, lasting from the summer of 744 CE until the spring of 
745 CE when Bist[m was killed, along with many of his followers. Meanwhile Bahdal had died 
of plague. Thus, all the Khaw[rij accepted the charismatic leadership of al-$a++[k b. Qays al-
Kh[rij\, with large numbers of people gathering to receive him with an unprecedented fervour and 
enthusiasm.  
This version shows the Khaw[rij benefiting from the internal conflict between members of the 
royal family and tribal conflict within the army. The Khaw[rij organised themselves under the 
leadership of al-$a++[k in order to take advantage of internal instability and attack Kufa. In this 
context, both <Abd Allah b. <Umar and al-Na&r, governor of Marw[n, agreed to cease hostilities 
until the Khaw[rij movement should decline. However, their alliance was based more on 
convenience than on mutual trust and understanding, and as a result they faced unexpected defeats 
by the Khaw[rij. Na&r had to leave K]fa in 745 CE and met <Abd Allah b. <Umar in W[si% to 
devise a strategy against al-$a++[k. Together they made several unsuccessful attempts to evacuate 
K]fa from the Khaw[rij from Rama#[n to Shaww[l 745 CE.  Marw[n II was engaged in pressing 
the rebellions in Him~ and was not in a position to support Na&ar against the Khaw[rij. A 
significant shift can thus be observed in Marw[n’s policy on Iraq. Given that he asked Na&r to 
leave Iraq for Jaz\ra with all his Mu#ar\ adherents, there was only <Abd Allah b. <Umar with his 
Yemen\ army left in Iraq to fight against the Khaw[rij. <Abd Allah b. <Umar assessed the strength 
of his army and finally in 745 CE accepted the authority of al-$a++[k, who welcomed him and 
restored  his authority as governor of Iraq.366  
The above was a political strategy devised by Man~]r b. Jamh]r who had advised Ibn <Umar to 
accept the Khaw[rij authority in order to engineer an opportunity to confront Marw[n b. 
Mu+ammad. Man~]r asserted that if the Khaw[rij succeeded against Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, then 
Ibn <Umar would be in a safe position under the Khaw[rij; on the other hand if they were defeated 
by Marw[n, then Ibn <Umar would at least have secured some time to prepare against Marw[n. In 
either case, Ibn <Umar was to accept the authority of the Khaw[rij. Ibn <Umar did secure his 
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position under the Khaw[rij, a tactical move which proved detrimental to the image of Umayyad 
supremacy and authority, and which fractured further when Sulaym[n b. Hish[m joined Ibn <Umar 
and took the oath of allegiance to al-$a++[k in 745 CE after his defeat by Marw[n II in |im~. The 
strength of the Khaw[rij meanwhile was emerging as multifaceted.  
This version recounts how Marw[n observed the situation and devised a policy to demonstrate his 
determination against the Khaw[rij. He participated personally in many battles against them and 
finally succeeded in killing al-$a++ak in the battle of Na~\bayn. Marw[n’s son <Abd Allah, his 
governor of Ir[q, Ibn Hubayra, and his commander <{mir b. $ub[rah, also played a vital role 
against the Khaw[rij. After the death of al-$a++[k, the Khaw[rij selected al-Khaybar\ as the new 
leader but his leadership was not sustainable. The Khaw[rij then appointed Shayb[n b. <Abd al-
<Az\z al-Yashkur\ as their leader; and he prepared the Khaw[rij for battle in alliance with 
Sulaym[n b. Hish[m but was defeated. Both al-Yashkur\ and Sulaym[n fled towards I~%akhar in 
Persia and accepted the authority of <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya. On the other hand, Marw[n also 
defeated Ibn <Umar, imprisoning him in |arr[n, whereas Man~]r b. Jamh]r escaped to Persia 
where he met <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya. Thus, most of Marw[n’s opponents gathered around <Abd 
Allah b. Mu<[w\ya, who was perceived as being the most powerful leader against Marw[n II. All 
anti-Marw[n forces such as the Khaw[rij, the Yemen\s, the Shi<\s, and members of the Umayyad 
family agreed to put aside their personal differences and unite against Marw[n.  
Al-^abar\ records in detail how Marw[n’s commander crushed the strength of this alliance, and 
how Shayb[n fled to Sijist[n while Man~]r b. Jamh]r and Sulaym[n b. Hish[m fled to India and 
<Abd Allah b. Mu<aw\ya took political refuge with Ab] Muslim al-Khur[s[n. He went to Hir[t but 
was later killed by Ab] Muslim al-Khur[s[n\.367 Al-^abar\, as has been shown, considers the tribal 
conflict, particularly between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ in Khur[s[n, to be a key cause of Umayyad 
decline.368  Indeed, this conflict created a vacuum which the <Abb[sid movement was able to 
occupy and thereby expand its strength.369 Although the Khaw[rij were unable to achieve their 
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ultimate objectives, they nevertheless succeeding in diverting Marw[n’s attention from the affairs 
of Khur[s[n, which in turn both weakened and fragmented his power.  
4.4.3 Al-Mas<]d\ and the Khaw[rij Movement  
Al-Mas<]d\’s historiography appears generally unsympathetic towards the Umayyads.370 He was 
both critical of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik for his parsimony and jealousy, revealing many stories 
of Hish[m’s cruelty,371 as well as admiring of his political prudence. He cites al-Haytham b. <Ad\ 
and al-Mad[>in\’s views on leading Umayyad politicians who valued the prudence and good 
character of three great politicians among the Umayyads: Mu<[w\ya, <Abd al-Malik and Hish[m. 
Al-Mas<]d\ recorded that Ab] Ja<far al-Man~]r adopted Hish[m’s governmental model to resolve 
the state’s internal affairs. Al-Mas<]d\ also gathered a great amount of information regarding 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s life, 372  all of which suggests that Hish[m was highly skilled in 
diplomacy. However, al-Mas<]d\ did not record Hish[m’s religious ideas and policies, perhaps 
indicating his own view that such elements held less significance during this rule.   
Al-Mas<]d\ notes Marw[n II’s successful defeat of the Khaw[rij, during which he killed $a++[k 
b. Qays al-|ar]r\ and other Khawarij\ leaders such as al-Hirr\ and Shayb[n al-Shayb[n\ and Ab] 
Hamz[, achieving this feat despite the Khaw[rij’s relative strength after Sulaym[n b. Hish[m had 
joined them. Similarly, Marw[n killed his other enemies including Na<\m b. Th[bit al-Jaz[m\. Al-
Mas<]d\ celebrates  Marw[n’s quelling of all uprisings,373 while his presentation of the Khaw[rij 
seems almost analogous with that of al-^abar\. Al-Mas<]d\’s historiography portrays the Khaw[rij 
as a relatively insignificant cause in the fall of the Umayyads, although, like al-^abar\, he depicts 
the role of Khur[s[n and the <Abb[sid movement as the real causes of their  decline.  
  
                                                 
370 According to Mas<]d\’s presentation of Umayyad rule, this was not based on legitimate grounds. He used the 
word khal\fa only for Mu>[w\ya b. Ab\ Sufy[n and <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, referring to the remaining Umayyad 
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legitimate authority. Al-Ya<q]b\ likewise refers to the reigns of the Umayyads as ‘days’ and used the verb ‘to reign’ 
(malaka) in regard to their rule.” C.f. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, f. n., 129.  
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4.4.4 Ibn Ath\r and the Khaw[rij Movement  
Many medieval historians based their work on al-^abar\’s monumental history, including Ibn Ath\r 
who similarly paints a less than flattering picture of al-Wal\d II.  Portraying him as a heretic 
involved in anti-religious acts, Ibn Ath\r argues that Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d enjoyed greater popularity 
because of his perceived religious appearance.374 Ibn Ath\r also provides information regarding 
the Khaw[rij but notes that Marw[n b. Mu+ammad suppressed their rebellions which in turn seems 
to indicate that he ascribes a marginal role to the Khaw[rij with regard to Umayyad decline. Indeed, 
in Ibn Ath\r’s view, the Khaw[rij acquired importance only because of the conflict between other 
competing forces.  
4.4.5 Ibn Khald]n and the Khaw[rij Movement 
 Ibn Khald]n attempted to compile his historiography in the light of the principles set out in his 
famous prolegomena of history. Specifically, he explained events in the light of his theory of 
<a~ab\ya, and like earlier Muslim historiographers, also focused to a greater degree on the socio-
political events of the Khur[s[n and the role of tribalism in Umayyad decline. Ibn Khald]n 
recorded the role of Khaw[rij with significant elaboration in a historical context, documenting 
their religious and political thinking and movements from the time of their emergence, during the 
rule of <Al\ b. Ab] ^[lib, the fourth caliph of Islam, until the fall of the Umayyad caliphate and 
the early <Abb[sid era.375 His depiction of the Khaw[rij and their unswerving rebellions against 
the Umayyad rulers bolsters their image as key influencers of Muslim religious and political 
culture. Yet he also considers this group as a secondary factor in both the fall of the Umayyads 
and the rise of the <Abb[sids. 
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4.4.6 Summary Note  
The sources considered illustrate the role of the Khaw[rij in the fall of the Umayyads, displaying 
remarkable similarity across all five pre-modern accounts. All portray the Khaw[rij as reorganising 
themselves to establish their political power during the last eight years of Umayyad rule, 
particularly after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. They gained a central position when they 
successfully gathered the support of all the forces that had been against Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, 
and when <Abd Allah b. <Umar accepted their authority. Thus, the Khaw[rij, as recorded in the 
sources, emerged as a dominant power in Iraq and other parts of the Umayyad caliphate. The 
sources also record their strict organisation and brutal behaviour, key to their formidable strength. 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad’s exceptional ability to crush the Khaw[rij is  consistently noted, as is his 
successful elimination of this group. Nevertheless, they also all agree on a certain degree of 
Khaw[rij importance in the fall of the Umayyads, in that Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, remaining 
engaged in fighting with the Khaw[rij, could not take proper measures to stop the development of 
the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement in Khur[s[n.  Thus, the Khaw[rij may be considered a remote 
yet confirmed factor in Umayyad decline as narrated by pre-Modern sources. The sources also 
agree that the Khaw[rij could not sustain themselves due to weak ideology, poor reception among 
the masses and insurmountable internal conflicts.   
4.5 The Qadar\ya in Pre-Modern Sources 
This section assesses the role of the Qadar\ya in the light of pre-modern sources, specifically the 
manner in which the Qadar\ya emerged in a historical perspective and the nature of their 
contribution to the fall of Umayyad rule. It also attempts to discover whether the Qadar\ya was an 
intellectual religious fraternity or a socio-political movement, and further evaluates the last eight 
years of the Umayyad rule. In examining the movement’s ideology, organisation and strategy, the 
study considers its development and role in the fall of the Umayyads as recorded in pre-modern 
chronicles.   
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4.5.1 Al-Ya<q]b\ and the Qadar\ya Movement  
Ya<q]b\ does not provide extensive information about the religious ideas of the later Umayyad 
rulers except for commenting on al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d’s lack of piety. Al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, the reader 
is told, immersed himself in heretical and unethical matters as well as prohibited behaviour. 
Cursory reference is also made to Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s Qadar\ identity, indicating its possible 
significance:376 however Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s religious beliefs are not mentioned in detail by Al-
Ya<q]b\, who draws no correlation between this ruler’s spiritual views (or lack thereof) and 
political reforms that were implemented. Moreover, al-Ya<q]b\’s account has no record of Ibr[h\m 
b. Wal\d’s religious beliefs either, all of which suggests that in his opinion the Qadar\-dervied 
views of Yaz\d and Ibr[h\m were of negligible importance. Also noteworthy is the fact that al-
Ya<q]b\ did not record the religious views of Marw[n b. Muhammad, which in turn suggests al-
Ya<q]b\’s own unwillingness to recognise the Qadar\s as having played any major role in the 
disintegration of an empire.  
4.5.2 Al-^abar\ and the Qadar\ya Movement  
Unlike al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\ provides a detailed elaboration of the Qadar\ya. He describes how 
the unity of the Marw[nids disintegrated after the murder of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, and the consequent 
conflict that occurred.377 Al-^abar\ records al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d’s nonchalant approach to the role of 
religion in his life, and how this attitude continued even after he had become a caliph, since he 
persisted with his drinking and heretical activities, dismaying both the public and the army with 
his behaviour.378 Al-^abar\ sheds light on many reports, through which it can be inferred that 
people were not happy with al-Wal\d’s religious practices; whereas, Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d was famous 
because of his religiosity.  
Al-^abar\ records Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s first caliphal speech in which he eulogised the Qadar\ 
ideology, asserting that: “there is no obedience of the created in case of disobedience of the 
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Creator.” (l[ %a<ata li-makhl]q f\ ma<~\yah al-kh[liq).379  This sentence clearly shows Yaz\d’s 
allegiance to the Qadar\ doctrine. Similarly, al-^abar\ notes Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s appointment of a 
governor associated with Qadar\ doctrine, namely Man~]r b. Jamh]r, who replaced Yus]f b. 
<Umar in Iraq.380 He also documents the letter sent to Iraq by Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d which contains 
several references to Qadar\ ideas,381 and reveals many reports to illustrate the heresies of al-Wal\d 
and the piety of al-Yaz\d. On the basis of his exposition, it can be concluded that al-^abar\ views 
the role of the Qadar\ya as an important factor only as it relates to the episode of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d 
and not in relation to the decline of the Umayyads.   
4.5.3 Al-Mas<ud\ and the Qadar\ya Movement  
Al-Wal\d came to power after he death of Hish[m. Al-Mas<]d\’s portrayal of Hish[m’s successor 
is negative to the point of vilification. The reader learns that Wal\d II had frivolous elements to his 
character since he drank constantly and kept the company of singing girls. A lover of poetry, and 
himself a poet, he was always accompanied by other poets, singers and story tellers. His preferred 
poetic genre was apparently heretical in content, and Mas<]d\ reports, on the authority of Is+[q b. 
Ibr[h\m al-M]sl\ and Ibr[h\m b. Mahd\, that al-Wal\d was the most immoral of all Umayyad rulers. 
Al-Mas<]d\ derives most of his information, particularly with regard to Wal\d’s poetry, from al-
Mubarrad who, perhaps not surprisingly, is famed for his enmity towards the Umayyads.  
In al-Mas<]d\’s view, the period of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and his brother Ibr[h\m was insignificant, 
given their brief rule which lasted for only nine months. Al-Mas<]d\ describes this period as being 
an absence of the rule of law. He also depicts Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d as an adherent of Mu<tazal\ 
thought, illustrating the basic principles of the Mu<tazila and presenting Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d as 
impressed by these ideas. Furthermore, he records that the Mu<tazila of Damascus having spoken 
against al-Wal\d II and his heresies, refused to accept his authority because of his evident 
transgressions and expelled him from rule,382 which suggests that Mas<]d\ viewed Mu<tazil\’s 
beliefs as playing a significant role during the period of Yaz\d and Ibr[h\m. In addition, he asserts 
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that the Mu<tazila gave Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d preference over <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z.383 Thus, in al-
Mas<]d\’s opinion, the role of the Qadar\ya was central to the success of the rebellion by Yaz\d III 
which brought the latter to power after the killing of al-Wal\d II.  
Qadar\ya religious thought is also linked in this narrative to the overthrow of al-Wal\d II, while 
the decline of Marw[n is shown not as a consequence of Mu<tazil\ confrontation, but rather as the 
result of Marw[n’s documented predisposition towards Qadar\ thinking. Indeed, even al-Mas<]d\ 
gave him the title of Ja<d\ because of his close association with the well-known Qadar\ scholar 
Ja<d b. Dirham.384 
4.5.4 Ibn Ath\r and the Qadar\ya Movement  
The narrative and presentation of IbnAth\r is analogous with that presented by al-^abar\. Ibn 
Ath\r’s appraisal of al-Wal\d II is negative in the extreme and states that he was killed because of 
the strong reactions provoked by his indulgence and immoral lifestyle. As a consequence of such 
habits, and despite having significantly increased the stipends of the army and government 
servants, al-Wal\d II failed to win over his subjects since the people and the army alike regarded 
his behaviour as abhorrent.  
Ibn Ath\r also records al-Wal\d’s family connections as far from exemplary, describing how many 
of his relatives were persecuted without significant reason, which in his opinion was a fatal 
mistake, and states, in addition, that Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d was particularly furious with al-Wal\d II, 
and that people favoured him more because of his religious appearance and faithfulness. According 
to this assessment, the role of the Qadar\ya was insignificant, and while he briefly mentions 
Yaz\d’s Qadar\ status in his biography of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d,385 his omission of any details of his 
Qadar\-derived views appears to indicate their negligible influence on the socio-political life of 
that period.  
Ibn Ath\r details the case of Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ who was living peacefully in Damascus 
and was not politically involved when Hish[m died. When al-Wal\d came to power, Kh[lid 
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accepted his authority, but refused to accept the appointment of the less wordly-wise sons of al-
Wal\d II as his successors. Infuriated by this attitude, al-Wal\d handed him over to Y]suf who 
killed him. Ibn Ath\r claims this action fatally influenced the course of Umayyad rule. When tribal 
conflict ensued between the Yemen and Mu#ar, the former, despite their earlier resentment, 
extended their support to Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, having been somewhat mollified by Kh[lid who had 
stopped them from rebelling against al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d.  Al-<Abb[s b. al-Wal\d had also warned 
Yaz\d III about a conspiracy against al-Wal\d II.386  However, on Kh[lid’s death the Yemen vowed 
allegiance to Yaz\d III who refused to accept any advice from his elders. The alliance of Yaz\d III 
and the Yemen duly solidified into a rebellion movement waged against al-Wal\d on religious 
grounds. It would seem that Yaz\d exploited religion to achieve his targets.  
4.5.5 Ibn Khald]n and the Qadar\ya Movement  
The role of the Qadar\ya in the rebellion of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d does not figure significantly in Ibn 
Khald]n’s historiography. He briefly mentions Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s Qadar\ affiliation, and refers 
fleetingly to the Qadar\ya themselves and their influence in the appointment of Ibr[h\m and <Abd 
al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j as his successors.387 Ibn Khald]n also acknowledges Man~]r b. Jamh]r’s 
extending of favour to Yaz\d on the basis of their common belief in the Ghayl[n\ya doctrine,388 as 
well as his personal and tribal enmity towards Y]suf b. <Umar, who had killed Kh[lid al-Qasr\.389 
Beyond these few succinct remarks, Ibn Khald]n’s narration of Umayyad history makes no 
substantial textual reference to the involvement of the Qadar\ya movement during Yaz\d’s era.   
4.5.6 Concluding Note  
The textual study of the pre-modern sources of historiography provides us with significant 
information about the Qadar\ya. There appears to be a broad tendency among pre-modern 
historiographers to express an anti-Umayyad bias. The perceived level of this bias appears 
particularly pronounced towards later Umayyad rulers. All the earlier historians studied agree 
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about the failure of the later Umayyad caliphs to maintain control of state affairs, and Hish[m b. 
<Abd al-Malik is commonly identified as the last strong ruler to have maintained the balance 
between different sections of the community. In addition, they all agree on the unsuitability of al-
Wal\d II for the role. His immaturity and his personal likes and dislikes created inter-personal and 
inter-tribal rifts, and he is portrayed as a heretic and a self-indulgent character whose enemies were 
able to exploit him because of these commonly-acknowledged transgressions.  The conflict 
initiated in this way then escalated under Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and Marw[n b. Mu+ammad.  
One of the most striking points in these historical sources is that the opponents of al-Wal\d II used 
religion as a weapon against him. They criticised him on religious and moral grounds and accused 
him of transgression, heresy and, most controversially, of non-belief.390 They also wrote letters 
about his character to a hundred of the most important mosques. The angry letter from Yaz\d b. 
al-Wal\d documents his open rebellion against al-Wal\d II, and clearly states his unwillingness to 
be subjected to such authority. Based on popular regard for his piety and religious appearance, 
Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d successfully united all the forces opposed to al-Wal\d II. 
The sources vividly illustrate the role of Qadar\ doctrines and the conflicts that characterised the 
period preceding the decline of the Umayyads. Pre-modern historiographers do concur that the 
Umayyads’ inability to stabilise the situation in Khur[s[n provided an opportunity for Ab] Muslim 
Khur[s[n\ to initiate a successful campaign for <Abbasid rule. Their accounts focus on this 
inability, which they identify and link to the origins of the pro-<Abb[sid campaign as being the 
central factor in the weakening of the Umayyads. However, due consideration must also be given 
to the role of internal family conflicts among the Umayyads in precipitating, albeit indirectly, their 
own decline through lack of corporate and family unity. Al-Ya<q]b\ devotes more space to the 
H[shmid-<Abb[sid movement, while downplaying the contribution of tribal factionalism, the royal 
family’s internal conflict, and the Khaw[rij movement to the eventual decline of the Umayyads. 
He is similarly dismissive of the role of the Qadar\ya in this regard, whereas al-Mas<]d\ devotes 
much time to considering the Qadar\ya and their contribution to political change, particularly in 
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Damascus. Finally, neither Al-^abar\ nor Ibn Ath\r views the Qadar\ya as a significant factor in 
the fall of the Umayyads. 
4.6 Religious Movements, the Umayyads, and the Theory of Cultural Hegemony  
There are various social science theories pertinent to the examination of the role of religion in 
social construction. Religion is a multi-dimensional phenomenon based not only on metaphysical 
ideas but also on fulfilling the needs of a society. Its social implications have been extensively 
studied in the area of cultural theory, with particular focus on political legitimisation and culture. 
In his seminal work The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim sets out a methodology 
for the study of religion as a means of understanding and elaborating processes of social 
integration. If religion is to be constructed as a sui generis phenomenon, it must therefore be 
interpreted and explained on its own terms, such as sacred and profane. Religious beliefs create 
ideals for a society, and in Durkheim’s view, religion creates social solidarity by providing a 
unique and coherent worldview, a particular identity, and moral grounds on which to base an ideal 
society. Durkheim also sees religion as “[not] merely a system of practices, but also a system of 
ideas whose object is to explain the world.”391 Following Durkheim’s foundational analysis, it is 
essential to the present study to examine the development of religious thinking and religiously-
inspired political action during the late Umayyad period. 
4.6.1 The Role of Religion in Gramscian Perspective  
The application of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to the study of religious movements and their 
role in the decline of the Umayyads is both innovative in its approach and apposite in achieving a 
more nuanced understanding the events of the final seven years of the Umayyad caliphate. This 
dynasty was finally overthrown by the <Abb[sids, in an event widely recognised as a form of 
revolution. Gramsci asserts that revolution cannot be achieved except by creating a revolutionary 
movement, and maintains that such a movement can achieve its targets only when it fulfils three 
basic conditions: (i) a coherent ideology; (ii) unified organization; and (iii) a long-term strategy.392 
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This section tries to show how this framework might be applied to the study of oppositional 
religious movements of the Umayyad period, and how, through its application, it may be possible 
to understand the role of religious movements in the fall of the Umayyads. This Gramscian 
approach offers a method of evaluation that may enable a finer degree of analysis with regard to 
the religious phenomenon of the Umayyad period.   
As Gramsci demonstrates, the counter-hegemonic forces challenge the authority of the hegemon, 
shattering the structure of the ruling class upon which their authority is based. Although Gramsci’s 
knowledge of Islamic history and this period in particular cannot be presupposed, this thesis argues 
that the relevance of his framework to questions such as the degree to which politico-religious 
movements contributed to a regime change is indisputable.     
4.6.2 Gramscian Perspectives on the H[shimid-<Abb[sid Movement 
The H[shmid-<Abb[sid movement was a political movement, initiated on religious grounds which 
acted to challenge the authority of the Umayyads. Sources describe how the <Abb[sids’ vigorously  
political campaign was led on a religious basis against the ruling Umayyads. The <Abb[sids not 
only established a vanguard party to achieve their target, but also devised and represented an 
alternative and feasible ideology with which to challenge Umayyad rule. Successfully mobilising 
civil society against the state, particularly in Iraq, Khur[s[n and Hij[z, the <Abb[sids can be said 
to have initiated from their inception the real decline of the Umayyads. In this process, and within 
their movement, the role of <Abb[sid d[<\s (intellectuals) was fundamental. This section analyses 
and evaluates the <Abb[sid  movement, and the strategy by which they successfully brought about 
a lasting and effective revolution. 
Gramsci suggests that counter-hegemonic forces succeed in their objectives when they have 
established three viable alternatives: alternative ideology, clear organisation and strategy, and a 
vanguard party. Certainly, pre-modern historical sources clearly illustrate the <Abb[sid 
movement’s development of a viable alternative ideology. Specifically, the movement 
successfully incorporated the religious identity and sanctity of the Quraysh into their ideology, and 
called for the rule of Prophet Muhammad’s family. Historically this was not a new slogan; it was 
rooted in the conflict between <Al\ and Mu<[w\ya and even in the pre-Islamic rivalries of 
H[shimids and Umayyads as has been noted above.   
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From the beginning of <Al\’s rule to the end of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s rule, the H[shimid 
movement had been unable to achieve its targets.  The most important reason for their failure was 
probably their inability to introduce a viable ideology and a suitable strategy through which to 
legitimise their goals and actions. While a vanguard party or group of sympathisers had often 
characterised the H[shimid movement, this group had previously been unable to fulfil its 
objectives due to unsuitable ideology and weak strategy. Of central importance to this thesis, 
therefore, is the question of the nature of the ideological and strategic changes they adopted as a 
result, in order to gain popular support while under the authority of the Umayyads. Ideologically, 
they appear to have remained consistent throughout the existence of their movement, and did not 
undergo any major changes in this regard.  Their claim was always to support the religious and 
political authority of the Prophetic family (ahl al-bayt), even though their ideology was not highly 
received among the masses during the course of Umayyad rule.  
The socio-political changes that occurred during the Umayyad period might have helped 
substantially to increase the viability of H[shimid ideology. In the early Umayyad period, this 
ideology had proved less feasible to implement, due to the major Umayyad support base among 
the Syrian tribes. It seems these tribes favoured the Umayyads, first because of their close 
relationships, which involved both blood relations and socio-political affiliations. Secondly, they 
extended their allegiance to the Umayyads in order to achieve a more centralized authority vis-à-
vis the Ir[q\s. H[shimid ideology was therefore unattractive to the Syrians, and proved similarly 
unappealing for other newly-conquered provinces of the empire, since the H[shimid ideology 
failed to attract the masses even in Iraq and Hij[z. Many of the Arab tribes in the Arabian 
peninsula, and even in Iraq, who attached themselves to the Khaw[rij refused to accept the 
H[shimid’s claim to religo-political authority, and rejected any form of Quraysh claim to tribal 
supremacy. Thus it would appear that the H[shimid movement remained dormant and weak during 
the course of the first century of Islam.  
During the second hijri century, a significant change can be observed in the socio-political 
environment of the Umayyad empire, which had expanded considerably and which was now 
characterised by a multi-faith and multi-ethnic society. However, the central position and authority 
remained in the hands of the Umayyad aristocracy, supported by the prevailing social dynamics of 
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an era in which Arab patrons were supported by non-Arab clients. The increasing dissatisfaction 
with the ruling hegemon among the non-Arab clients created an environment in which the 
H[shimid movement could flourish and mobilise its adherents. Their agenda was one of installing 
an alternative ruling authority that could ensure peace and justice for all sections of the society 
while limiting the ruling class to functioning in subordination to the leadership of the Prophetic 
family.  
The Ir[q\s and Khur[s[n\s were dissatisfied with the perpetual and consistent ascendancy of the 
Syrians under Umayyad patronage. The Ir[q\s had made several unsuccessful attempts under the 
leadership of various tribal and religious groups to win over the Syrian hegemony, having also 
extended their allegiance to the H[shimids, but without any tangible results due to the strength of 
Umayyad rule. The Umayyads remained stable until the end of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s rule, at 
which point a conflict emerged between the members of the ruling Umayyad family and ruling 
tribal elites which was damaging to Umayyad authority. The Syrians, too, lost their power over 
affairs of state, and this situation created an opportunity to stand against the Syrians under the 
leadership of the H[shimids. In this scenario, H[shimid ideology provided the potential means to 
challenge Umayyad authority.  
There was another reason for the growth of the H[shimid movement in Khur[s[n and Iran. Just as 
the Umayyads had blood ties with the Syrians, so too the H[shimids had  blood ties with the 
Iranians that dated from the early period of <Al\ and Mu<[w\ya. The Iranians were therefore more 
favourably disposed towards H[shimid ideology, and when the Umayyads’ political integrity 
dissolved, the Iranians and Khur[s[nin stood against them under the leadership of the H[shimids. 
A Gramscian view emphasizes that an ideology must be viable to challenge the authority of the 
hegemon, and to attract the masses to maintain a counter-hegemonic position.393 Turning to the 
H[shimid-<Abb[sid ideology, one can observe that this was not innovative but in fact was 
historically grounded, and had previously and persistently failed to serve the purpose of the early 
H[shimids. In effect, the socio-political environment of that time rendered this ideology suitable 
for the purposes of its adherents. A Gramscian interpretation might suggest that the viability of 
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this ideology appeared only when the authority of the hegemon became fragile and weak. This in 
turn suggests that, although the H[shimid-<Abb[sid’s ideology was neither new nor innovative, 
the socio-political environment of that precise moment gave it the potential to challenge the 
authority of the Umayyads.  
In addition to ideological factors, the success of counter-hegemonic forces, in Gramsci’s 
understanding, is based on the strategy of the organisation and on a vanguard party possessing the 
ability to mobilise the people to stand against the ruling hegemon. Moreover, when it comes into 
power the vanguard party must have the capacity to implement the agenda by force. 394  The 
historical sources considered earlier record the successful strategy of the H[shimid-<Abb[sid 
movement. In these narratives, the H[shimid propagandists influenced the opinion of the 
oppressed towards favouring the <Abb[sid revolution, and the <Abb[sid propagandists convinced 
the people that only they, the <Abb[sids, could fulfil their demands. This <Abb[sid strategy was 
ultimately successful.  
Their secret movement was organized by the intellectuals of Iraq and Khur[s[n. Working covertly 
in Iraq and Khur[san without being at odds with other political forces, they observed the political 
deterioration of the Umayyads but did not participate in the conflict until they had gathered 
sufficient strength to initiate their own armed struggle. One incident illustrates how Ab] Muslim 
Khur[s[n\ kept a close watch on the conflict between Na~r b. Sayy[r and al-Kirm[n\. He did not 
supported either of them but when they had destroyed each other’s power, he launched the 
<Abb[sids’ armed struggle against them. In Gramscian terms, <Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ had 
successfully organized a vanguard party in Iraq and Khur[s[n to establish <Abb[sid rule by force. 
In fact the survival of the later Umayyads was based on Hish[m’s ability to construct a religiously 
and morally coherent image in the eyes of people across the Empire, as well as on his capacity to 
maintain tribal equilibrium in local power politics, an achievement that was never matched by his 
successor, al-Wal\d  b. Yaz\d, or by any of the  later Umayyad rulers.   
<Abb[sid propagandists took particular advantage of this situation to criticise the Umayyads and 
their policies. They highlighted the Umayyads’ cruelty and injustice, denigrating their heretical 
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practices in particular. Pre-modern sources on Umayyad history record the criticism of Umayyad 
rulers by the religious movement; Al-Wal\d and Marw[n b. Mu+ammad in particular were 
criticised and blamed for heretical ideas, and their authority was challenged on both religious and 
moral grounds. Meanwhile the propagandists of the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement painted the 
members of the prophetic family as pious and deserving of the right to rule. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad 
was a strong ruler, but even he could no longer revive the religious and legal authority of the 
Umayyads. He remained in conflict with the Khaw[rij and other contenders for the caliphate, and 
ultimately was unable to establish his rule satisfactorily in Khur[s[n where the <Abbasid 
movement was flourishing.  
The above events show that the <Abb[sid movement comfortably fulfils the criteria for counter-
hegemonic force according to a Gramscian view. <Abb[sid ideology was based on the 
amalgamation of religious doctrine, Quraysh\ tribal supremacy, and in particular support for the 
Prophetic family, which was perhaps the most suitable ideology in the prevailing circumstances. 
First, this ideology was propagated by the intellectuals and remained valid until the fall of Baghd[d 
in 1256 AD. Secondly, <Abb[sid  strategy and organisation provided the potential to achieve their 
political goals.   
On the other hand, neither the Khaw[rij nor the Qadar\ya fulfil the criteria for Gramsci’s counter-
hegemonic movement theory. Historically the Khaw[rij had a long tradition as a counter-
hegemonic force, having first rejected the religious authority of Quraysh on both a tribal and a 
racial basis, and subsequently initiated their resistance movement during the rule of <Uthm[n and 
<Al\. They argued for the equal status of all people irrespective of tribal affiliation or ethnic 
identity, but while this ideology attracted the non-Quraysh\ Arabs and non-Arab maw[l\, the 
central socio-political and religious position of the Quraysh in the Arabian peninsula still gave the 
Umayyads tremendous capacity to rule. Their intellectuals had established the moral and religious 
authority of the Umayyads by preparing the minds of the masses to accept the authority and 
hegemony of the Quraysh; similarly, the +ad\th scholars and jurists validated their supremacy. In 
short, the Umayyads consolidated their power due to their strong Arab-based affiliation.    
The Khaw[rij  had to face strong opposition from the Quraysh since they presented their ideology 
after the battle of @iff\n after they had left <Al\ b. Ab\ ^[lib’s party. The chronicles record, as 
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already discussed, how the Khaw[rij rejected the authority of both <Al\ and Mu<[w\ya, who in turn 
were both resolved to fight against the Khaw[rij.  The Khaw[rij movement persisted during the 
long period of Umayyad rule, having been organised after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. 
The political deterioration of the Umayyads, the awareness of deprivation among the non-Arabs 
and maw[l\, and conflict within the ruling aristocracy were the main reasons for the rise of the 
oppositional forces, and the Khaw[rij ideology motivated many of the oppressed people to rise 
against the ruling hegemon. Historical sources, including those considered earlier in this study, 
frequently identify the Khaw[rij as the greatest challenge and threat to Umayyad rule. Therefore 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad focused on eliminating them from the political scene and successfully 
crushed them.  
From a Gramscian perspective, the Khaw[rij ideology was a potential challenge to the ruling 
hegemon. However, the ideology of the H[shimids-<Abb[sids wielded far wider influence because 
of its synthesis of both religious and tribal identities. Meanwhile the Khaw[rij failed to devise a 
viable strategy to implement their resistance movement successfully, and were unable to divert the 
attention of Marw[n b. Mu+ammad as the H[shimids-<Abb[sids had done. The Khaw[rij were 
undoubtedly resilient but the eventual emergence of conflict within their organisation made their 
struggle unsuccessful.   
In contrast to the H[shimid-<Abb[sids and the Khaw[rij, the role of the Qadar\ya is perhaps 
insignificant, although their contribution was of considerable importance in the case of Yaz\d b. 
al-Wal\d, who initiated his rebellion movement on the basis of their doctrine, and because the 
Qadar\ ideology also attracted the masses due to its ideals of equality and justice for all. Yaz\d b. 
al-Wal\d criticised al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d on religious grounds. According to Hakim, “the impact of 
the Qadarite doctrine started to show its indomitable force and effect in the intellectual and political 
activities as Umayyad rule neared its conclusion.”395  
It is possible that, in his attempt to win the support of a religious class, particularly the Qadar\ya 
and Khaw[rij, Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d actually used the Qadar\ ideology to initiate his resistance 
movement and then consolidate his authority. His reputed assertion that whosoever was the most 
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pious among the Muslims was the most suited to be caliph is almost identical to the tenets of 
Khaw[rij ideology.396 The role of the Qadar\ya is therefore of importance in relation to Yaz\d b. 
al-Wal\d, who utilised its doctrine to validate his rebellion and authority.397  
In contrast to the <Abb[sids and the Khaw[rij, the Qadar\ya attempted to bring revolution within 
the ruling structure of the hegemon class. In Gramscian terms, this constitutes a form of passive 
revolution.398 The Qadar\ya organisation was not strong, given its large number of intellectual 
supporters and its relatively few leading commanders. Therefore, it did not initiate the resistance 
movement; rather it sought to attract influential people among the ruling class who could enforce 
Qadar\ ideology. While the Qadar\ya’s strategy was theoretically suitable and achieved their 
targets within a short period of time, in practice it was unsustainable because of their weak internal 
organisation. The early death of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d signalled the end of the Qadar\ya political 
ideology; however, as an intellectual movement, the Qadar\ya remained alive even during 
<Abb[sid rule. 
The above analysis suggests that the religio-political H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement fulfils the 
Gramscian criteria for a counter-hegemonic force. This group provided a suitable ideology with 
which to challenge hegemonic authority, as well as a viable strategy to achieve their targets and a 
well-organised vanguard party to implement their policies and maintain their authority. In contrast 
to the H[shimids-Abb[sids, the Khaw[rij could not devise an adequate strategy to achieve their 
goal. Moreover, their organisational structure could not remain impervious to Marw[n’s attack. 
The Qadar\ya organisational structure, too, was weak, although their strategy was excellent, and 
they achieved their targets without being drawn into a major conflict. However, their frail 
organisational configuration meant that long term rule would never be possible.  
The ideology of these movements was devised in order to address the needs of the social changes 
that occurred during the Umayyad period. Umayyad rule was typified by Arab hegemony over the 
subject peoples. The Arabs were a privileged class while the maw[l\ were a deprived class that 
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struggled for equal rights. The following chapter evaluates the nature of the relations between 
Arabs and the maw[l\.  
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5 Chapter Five: Arab versus non-Arab, and Perceptions of the Maw[l\ 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the social changes during the Umayyad period that contributed to the 
development and decline of Umayyad rule, and suggests that a kind of multi-cultural society 
emerged during this era from Arab interaction with people of different regions and ethnicities. 
Some scholars argue that the Umayyad rule was typified by Arab hegemony and domination over 
the subject peoples across the Umayyad caliphate, and that the socio-economic policies of the 
Umayyads resulted in the triumph of feudal relations among the Arabs and maw[l\. Economically, 
the Arab elites appeared to be a privileged class enjoying a high social status not permitted to the 
maw[l\ who, as a deprived class, struggled for equal rights and bore a heavy burden of taxes. Thus 
further analysis of Arab¦non-Arab interaction and perception of maw[l\ is required for a better 
understanding of the extent to which the Umayyad policies were justified, together with an 
evaluation of the impact of these policies on society. More specifically the chapter scrutinises the 
nature of the relations between Arabs and the maw[l\: how the maw[l\ social group emerged, how 
this phenomenon influenced society and contributed to the decline of Umayyad rule, and how these 
issues were presented in the pre-modern sources and interpreted in the modern sources.  
Modern scholarly findings regarding the maw[l\ as well as the manner in which such opinions 
were derived from Muslim historical sources are looked at initially. Modern scholarship can be 
broadly categorised into two groups. The first offers a classical interpretation, argues for the 
Revolution’s predominantly Iranian identity, and is expressed by scholars such as Wellhausen, and 
van Vloten,399 while the second is a revisionist school that emerged during the course of the 
twentieth century, the leading members of which are Dennett, Shaban, Sharon, Crone and Agha.400 
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A wide range of literature was consulted, with the goal of providing fresh insight into previous 
investigations in this field. 
Modern historiographers interpret pre-modern narratives on the role of maw[l\ and draw divergent 
conclusions. In order to ascertain the strength of the argument and interpretation of such scholars, 
significant historical chronicles are examined, including those of al-Ya<q]b\, al-Mas<]d\, al-
^abar\, Ibn Ath\r, and Ibn Khald]n. Arabic literature is also extensively consulted in order to 
identify the socio-political role of the maw[l\ during the last decade of Umayyad rule and their 
contribution to its disintegration.  
Finally, Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony is applied in order to examine the role of maw[l\ 
in socio-political spheres during Umayyad rule and how they contributed to its  rise and fall, as 
well as to investigate the manner in which the dominant class successfully maintained its authority 
through coercive measures and through presenting values acceptable to the maw[l\.  This study 
finds that many leading members from the maw[l\ played the role of ‘deputies’ of the ruling class, 
according to a Gramscian perspective, and analyses the ways in which class and identity 
consciousness gradually developed among the maw[l\, together with a sense of deprivation and a 
desire for equal rights. Since maw[l\ participation in anti-Umayyad resistance movements was a 
significant aspect of their political consciousness, oppositional movements devised their 
alternative ideology and presented moral values to attract the maw[l\. The study will therefore 
consider the role of maw[l\ in the <Abb[sid revolution and in the fall of Umayyads, applying 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.  
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5.2 The Maw[l\ of the Umayyad Period   
The maw[l\ are those non-Arabs who entered Arab society by attaching themselves to an Arab 
tribe. They played a vital role in the socio-religious movement of the Umayyad period. Hamd\ 
Sh[h\n notes that the Muslim historiographers employ the word maw[l\ for the non-Arab Muslims 
of Iraq, F[ras, Khur[s[n and M[war[ al-Nahr, while the non-Arab Muslims of North Africa and 
Andalusia were called Berbers because of their original name. The Barbar joined Muslim society 
as equal partners, contributed in all sections of Muslim society, and, unlike the maw[l\, were not 
treated as inferior.401  
The maw[l\ can be variously categorised based on the nature of their work and social status. Al-
Sal[b\ notes that the maw[l\ participated actively in socio-political and intellectual activities, and 
were appointed as military leaders, and officials in governmental institutions. Similarly, many of 
them gained a central religious position and produced copious scholarly works. This study 
categorises them broadly as follows:  
A. Those maw[l\ who had been slaves and were later freed by their Arab lords, after which they 
allied themselves to various Arab tribes or associated themselves with one of the leading Arab 
tribes. This type of maw[l\  played a central role in the political establishment. Sarj]n b. 
Man~]r al-R]m\ worked as a k[tib (secretary) to Mu<[w\ya in the finance ministry. Similarly, 
Mird[s and Zadh[n Furr]kh, maw[l\ of Ziy[d worked as k[tibs. Ab] Za<\za<ah was mawla of 
<Abd al-Malik and also his k[tib, while Shu<ayb al-@[b\ and Y[f\< b. Zawayb were maw[l\ of 
Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik and worked for him as k[tibs. Similarly, several leading Muslim 
warriors and conquerors were also maw[l\. These include  ^[riq b. Ziy[d, a mawla of Barbar 
origin,402 M]s[ b. Nu#ayr’s  father, a mawla from <Ayn al-Tamar, Ab] Muh[jir D\n[r, a mawla 
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of An~[r of Afriqiya,  and Yaz\d b. Mu+ammad b. Yaz\d were all  maw[l\ and governors of 
Afr\iq\ya. They played a vital role in the Muslim conquest and the expansion of the empire.  
B. Those maw[l\ who were leading Islamic scholars and who had  gained wide acceptance and 
prestige in the Muslim community. They contributed to all disciplines, including Qur[nic 
studies, +ad\th, and Arab literature, and included  Rab\<a, N[fi<,  a mawl[ attached to <Umar in 
Medina, Muj[hid b. Jabar, a mawl[ attached to  Qays al-Makhz]m\, <Ikrama, a mawl[  attached 
to Ibn<Abb[s and <A%[ b. <Ab\ Rub[+ in Mecca,  and al-|assan al-Ba~r\ in Basra whose father 
was a mawl[ of Zayd b. Th[bit.  Similarly Mak+]l and Yaz\d b. |ab\b were maw[l\ and leading 
scholars in Syria and Egypt.403 
C. Those maw[l\ who accepted Islam without affiliating themselves to any particular tribe. They 
joined the socio-political movements according to their regional context, for example, actively 
participating in the socio-political life of the Umayyad era.  From the early Umayyad era 
onwards, their participation in rebellions is evident, and includes the rebellions of al-Mukht[r 
and <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. al-Ash<ath. The role of maw[l\ in the army of Ibn<Ash<ath is 
considered to be one of the earliest and best examples of maw[l\ (i.e. non-Arab) reaction 
against a tyrannical Umayyad administration. The following sections study in more detail the 
modern sources on the role of maw[l\ in Ibn Ash<ath movement. 
5.2.1 Modern Sources on the Maw[l\  Role in Ibn Ash<ath’s Movement: Non-Arab Awakening 
Ibn Ash<ath’s movement is one of the earliest movements to feature significant maw[l\ 
participation, and has been the subject of much scholarly investigation. Kremer, Mullur and van 
Volten stress the non-Arab, maw[l\ component of these rebellion movements, which  were 
initiated to obtain equal socio-political rights.404 However many other modern scholars, such as 
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Wellhausen, Shaban and Hawting, argue that the Ibn Ash<th movement was not essentially a 
maw[l\ phenomenon, suggesting instead that while the maw[l\ had participated, their role was 
secondary; for example, they participated in the battle but the central role was played by the Yemen 
tribes of Kinda, Hamadan and Madhij in Kufa, who supported Ibn Ash<ath as their own 
representative This conflict appears to have been a war of supremacy between two provinces of 
the Arab Empire. The Syrian and Ir[q\ Arabs were struggling for greater authority while the 
maw[l\ troops supported each group.405  
Wellhausen analyses Kremer’s argument comprehensively, and finds it to be established on the 
basis of J[+iz’s account, reported in al-<Iqd al-Far\d. Moreover, he rebuffs Kremer’s interpretation 
as one based on the account of al-<Iqd, a literary work but not a reliable historical source.406 
Historical sources, Wellhausen argues, do not support Kremer’s arguments. A great number of 
maw[l\s  took part in the rebellion “but even there, there is nothing to show that the event was 
instigated by them.”407 In fact, it was the Arab aristocracy who opposed the arrogant conduct of 
al-|ajj[j. Wellhausen further maintains that  “Ibn Ash<ath had no religious motives. It was rather 
a renewed and desperately powerful attempt of the Iraqites to shake off the Syrian yoke… The 
nature of the struggle, was not a contest of maw[l\ against the Arab, but the Iraq\s against the 
Syrian Arabs.”408  
Sa<d\ also validates Wellhausen’s opinion, maintaining the role of the maw[l\ in Ibn Ash<ath’s 
movement was marginal. In fact, there had been a personal clash between Ibn Ash<ath and al-
|ajj[j even before the departure of the peacock army under the leadership of Ash<ath. Al-|ajj[j 
organised this army to attack Sijist[n in 80 AH and appointed as its leader  Ash<ath, who brought 
it to victory.409 Being a governor of the Eastern part of the caliphate, al-|ajj[j ordered him to 
continue fighting. Ibn Ash<ath however refused, and halted fighting until the following year. He 
challenged al-|ajj[j without challenging the authority of <Abd al-Malik,410 so it would seem that 
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the basic source of Ibn Ash<ath’s rebellion was his conflict with al-|ajj[j. Ibn Ash<ath’s army 
consisted not only of thousands of non-Arabs but was also supported by thousands of Arabs. As 
al-^abar\ records:  
The people of K]fa, Ba~ra, and frontier regions of Dayr al-Jam[jim and leading scholars of both 
cites of K]fa and Ba~ra gathered in the battle against al-|ajj[j. Their unity was based on their 
abhorrence and hatred of al-|ajj[j. They were more than one hundred thousand fighters including 
the maw[l\ under the commandership of Ibn Ash<ath. They demanded to sack al-|ajj[j from his 
position.411 
On the basis of al-^abar\’s account, Sa<d\ views the maw[l\s’ role is marginal in  the Ibn Ash<ath 
movement. In this context, it is pertinent to revisit the argument of Von Kremer, A. Mullur and G. 
Van Volten that the maw[l\ were  being marginalised and therefore made an alliance with Ibn 
Ash<ath to participate in the assault against the Umayyad rule.412 It is important to assess the extent 
to which early historical sources support such a verdict. In order to understand affairs more 
realistically, a careful study of the early sources is pertinent and will assist in identifying the 
narratives of pre-modern historiographers on the role of non-Arabs in the Ibn Ash<ath movement.  
5.2.2 The Role of Maw[l\  in Ibn Ash<ath’s Movement in Pre-Modern Sources 
Pre-modern narratives on the maw[l\s’ role in Ibn Ash<ath movement are notably consistent. Al-
^abar\ gives a detailed account of the Ibn Ash<ath movement, recording that al-|ajj[j appointed 
al-Muhallab in Khur[s[n and <Ubayd Allah b. Ab\ Bakra in Sajist[n in 79 AH. The latter remained 
there for the rest of the year and attacked Rutb\l (or Zanbil), a king of Zabulistan, whose rule 
extended from Kabul to Qandahar and Zaranj, or Zabulistan. He was in an agreement with the 
Arab government but refused to pay the tribute during the civil war. <Ubayd Allah initiated a 
military campaign against Rutb\l by the orders of al-|ajj[j b. Y]suf. However, his campaign failed 
to achieve the required targets.413 According to al-|ajj[j a magnificent army of forty thousand 
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troops was prepared: twenty thousand from K]fa and twenty thousand from Ba~ra under the 
command of <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Mu+ammad b. al-Ash<ath. The troops were well equipped with 
the best horses and ammunition, prompting <Ubb[d b. al-Hu~ayn al-|ab%\ to observe that he had 
not seen that kind of arrangement for any previous battle. Al-|ajj[j also gave them a sum of fifty-
five thousand dirham as additional money. These meticulous arrangements for the troops inspired 
the name ‘Peacock Army’. 414  
The hostile relations between al-|ajjaj and Ibn Ash<ath are well documented and the subject of 
several anecdotes. The question remains: if there was unfriendliness and lack of trust between 
them, why then did al-|ajj[j appoint Ibn Ash<th as the commander of the forces for such a 
significant battle? Al-^abar\ records some reports on the topic, stating that Ibn Ash<ath was the 
most hated person in the eyes of al-|ajj[j who used to say, “Whenever I saw him, I planned for 
his murder.” Similarly, when Shu<b\, one of Ibn Ash<ath’s associates, informed him of al-|ajjaj’s 
evil intentions, he  in turn confirmed his ambition of ending the former’s authority.415 Al-^abar\ 
reports that Ism[<\l b. al-Ash<ath, uncle of Ibn Ash<ath, went to al-|ajj[j and asked him not to 
appoint Ibn Ash<ath as commander of troops because of his rebellious tendencies. Al-|ajj[j replied 
that he wanted Ibn Ash<ath to disobey him.416 
Ibn Ash<ath attacked Rutb\l, capturing many of his cities and castles and gathering a large sum of 
bounty from the lands of Rutb\l. He appointed administrators (<[mil) in the captured cities and 
made peace agreements with them. Furthermore, his forces were forbidden to roam around and 
plunder the region of Rutb\l. Ibn Ash<ath advanced cautiously, claiming a reasonable success for 
that year and promising a further campaign in the following year, 81 AH. He informed al-|ajj[j 
of these plans and his successes.417 Upon receiving the information, al-|ajj[j criticised Ibn Ash<ath 
and sent him letters telling him to initiate battle immediately without wasting any time, otherwise 
he would appoint Is+[q b. Mu+ammad as the commander of troops. Ibn Ash<ath’s reputation 
amongst the army was high. He summoned the troops and delivered a speech, informing them that 
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he had stopped the fighting for that year, due to on-the-ground requirements for careful and 
cautious advancement in the lands of Rutb\l. However, al-|ajj[j condemned this decision and 
urged him to advance. Ibn Ash<ath again delivered a sermon to the troops, telling them that if they 
were ready for further advancement then he would accompany them, otherwise he was reluctant 
to advance. Consequently, the Peacock Army turned against al-|ajj[j, declining his decision and 
challenging his authority. Ultimately, they took the oath of allegiance to Ibn Ash<ath.418 
Under Ibn Ash<ath’s command, the Peacock Army started to march against al-|ajj[j towards 
Iraq.419 Encountering serious confrontations with al-|ajjaj’s army near Tustar, they nevertheless 
captured Tustar. Then they marched towards Basra and Kufa, rejecting the authority of <Abd al-
Malik and al-|ajj[j.420  Many pious and rich people in Kufa and Basra supported Ibn Ash<ath, and 
were consequently furious at the continued fighting between Ibn Ash<ath and predominantly 
between the Iraq\ army and the Syrian army of al-|ajj[j.  However, the battle of Dayr al-Jam[jim 
played a decisive role in the decline of the Ibn Ash<ath movement. Al-^abar\ reports negotiation 
proceedings between the Syrian authorities and Ibn Ash<ath. <Abd al-Malik sent his son <Abd Allah 
and brother Mu+ammad b. Marw[n to Dayr al-Jamajim, who offered  to remove |ajj[j b. Y]suf 
from the governorship of Iraq and to appoint Ibn Ash<ath as w[l\ for his lifetime in any city he 
desired. They further promised the Iraq\ troops would receive the same pay as the Syrians.  Ibn 
Ash<ath’s leaders gathered around him to consider the offers, which he nevertheless rejected, 
recalling the victory of Tustar; and then he called his army to fight against the losing Syrian power. 
The negotiation had failed and a battle began, culminating in the victory of al-|ajj[j’s Syrian 
Army.421 Ibn Ash<th fled to Sijist[n but was later captured and killed by al-|ajj[j.422  
Significant information is obtained from al-^abar\’s description of the Ibn Ash<ath movement. 
However, Dayr Jam[jim’s reports also contained important information, particularly in that the 
negotiations reflect the nature of grievances within Ibn Ash<ath’s army, grievances essentially held 
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against al-|ajj[j’s policies and uncompromising stance. For example, the Iraq\ troops were not 
paid the same as the Syrians. <Abd al-Malik attempted to resolve these issues according to the 
Iraq\s’ wishes in order to prevent them from the battle. As far as the issue of the maw[l\s is 
concerned, there is not sufficient evidence in al-^abar\’s reporting to prove their central role in the 
rebellion movement. Al-^abar\ mentions only one instance in which the maw[l\ of Kufa, Basra 
and the Frontier regions participated in the battle of Dayr al-Jam[jim with their masters.423 Textual 
reading of al-^abar\’s history validates the argument that the participation of the maw[l\ in the 
battle was of a secondary nature, and that they merely supported the tribes with whom they were 
associated in their subordination. They might have held reservations against the Umayyads at this 
stage but did not have sufficient strength to initiate a movement for rebellion, nor were they able 
to gain a significant position in any independent rebellion movement. Assertions of their supposed 
central role in the Ibn Ash<ath movement are not supported by historical documentary evidence. 
While the Ibn Ash<ath movement was indeed a significant protest against the unjust policies of al-
Hajj[j in Iraq, the movement’s failure further cemented the Umayyads’ hold in the region. Kufa 
lost its central position when al-|ajj[j built the city of W[si% to control the region. The Umayyads 
did not change their military strategy.  
Al-Ya<q]b\’s account also contains important information about the rebellion of Ibn Ash<ath. Most 
coincides with what was reported by al-^abar\. It does, however, differ from al-^abar\’s narration 
on several significant points. Al-Ya<q]b\ notes that the Peacock Army numbered one hundred 
thousand troops, but does not mention that <Abd al-Malik sent his son <Abd Allah with Mu+ammad 
b. Marw[n to initiate peace talks with Ibn Ash<ath.  Moreover, he does not record the number of 
Ibn Ash<ath’s troops. He reports that after the defeat in Dayr al-Jam[jim, Ibn Ash<ath went to 
Sijistan and when the local administration refused him refuge he went to Rutb\l and claimed 
sanctuary, according to their earlier agreement. However, Rutb\l handed him over to al-|ajj[j, 
taking  some concessions in return. On the way to |ajj[j, Ibn Ash<ath jumped from the roof of a 
house at Rukhj, an act which killed him. Al-Ya<q]b\ records that a group of scholars supported 
Ibn Ash<ath. These were highly eminent and pious people such as |asan Ba~r\, <{mir b. Shara+b\l 
                                                 
423 ibid., 630¦3. 
160 
 
al-Shu<b\, Sa<\d b. Jubayr and Ibr[h\m al-Nakh<\.  Al-Ya<q]b\ mentioned neither the role of the 
maw[l\ in the movement nor any hostility between Ibn Ash<ath and al-|ajj[j or between the Iraq\s 
and Syrians. He simply shows that conflict emerged only when Ibn Ash<ath refused to accept the 
orders of al-|ajj[j and discontinued the attacks in the region of Rutb\l.424 
Al-Mas<]d\ also describes these events. His description, in contrast to al-^abar\’s, is concise. He 
does not illustrate the event in all its details; however, he states that al-|ajj[j appointed him as 
<[mil in Sajistan, Bust and Rukhj, where Turks resided. He explains that the king of this region, 
attached to Hind (the Indian Subcontinent), was called Rutbil. Al-Mas<]d\ does not mention the 
Peacock Army, but does note that Ibn Ash<ath rebelled against al-|ajj[j and went to Kirm[n and 
then to Basra to fight against al-|ajj[j. Al-Ma<s]d\ briefly records that there were more battles 
fought between al-|ajj[j and Ibn Ash<ath and that al-|ajj[j finally crushed the strength of Ibn 
Ash<ath. He fled to Rutb\l but was killed, and his head brought to al-|ajj[j.  
Al-Mas<]d\ records the speech al-|ajj[j delivered on that occasion, in which he shows his anger 
against the people of Iraq, condemning them for their conspiracy and hypocrisy, and accusing them 
of cowardliness in frontier wars and insincerity in peaceful times. However, he praised the Syrians 
for their determination in the war and sincerity in the state of peace.425 This speech in particular 
shows that the people of Iraq played a decisive role in Ibn Ash<ath’s rebellion. Al-Mas<]d\ does 
not refer to the maw[l\ or their participation in the rebellion. On the basis of his depiction, the role 
of the maw[l\ appears so unimportant to  the rebellion movement that it does not warrant a mention.  
Al-^abar\’s history influenced almost all later historians, including Ibn Ath\r and Ibn Khald]n. 
Both of these historians reproduced almost all the information given in al-^abar\’s monumental 
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work.426 According to their view, the maw[l\s’ role was secondary in Ibn Ash<ath’s rebellion, and 
derived from the conflict between the authority of al-|ajj[j b. Y]suf and Ibn <Ash<ath. The pre-
Modern sources of the period do not support modern scholars’ standpoint that a great number of 
the maw[l\ participated in the rebellion movement of Ibn Ash<ath because they were not given 
equal rights. Instead, pre-Modern chronicles confirm the participation of the maw[l\ in the 
rebellion but construct this as the result of their affiliation to those Arabs who were fighting against 
al-|ajj[j’s autocratic behaviour. In other words, while they confirm  the views, for example, of 
Wellhausen,  they provide little evidence to correlate with the thesis of Kremer who, in fact, derives 
much of his argument from the Shu<]b\ literature sources containing anti-Umayyad elements and 
presenting the role of maw[l\ in a manner contrary to what is illustrated in historical sources. It is 
thus useful to consider how Shu<]b\ literature depicts the maw[l\s  and to identify  the social 
significance of this movement for the present study.  
5.3 The Social Significance of the Shu<]b\ya Movement in Modern Sources  
The maw[l\s’ quest for equal rights was neither purely economic nor political, since it took place 
during a cultural struggle between the Arabs and non-Arabs, particularly between Arab and Persian 
cultures. Gibb has analysed the social significance of the Shu<]b\ya movement, arguing that it was 
not simply a conflict between Arabs and non-Arabs on the basis of political nationalism but rather 
represented a struggle between two variant schools of literature, each seeking to define the destiny 
of Islamic culture. Gibb highlights the economic conflict between the Arabs and non-Arab maw[l\s  
in Iraq and Khur[s[n. However, it would be misleading and an over-generalization to conclude, 
on the basis of such conflict, that serious rivalry existed between the Persians and Arabs. The most 
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important factor contributing to state disintegration was a division among the Arab conquerors. 
This division was not based on the tribal factionalism that existed between the northern and 
southern Arabs; rather, it emerged from tensions between the Arab army (muq[tila) who were 
actively-engaged military forces, and those who, having settled in Iraq and Khur[s[n, had ceased 
to be soldiers. The latter may broadly be categorised as the Arabs of Iraq while the muq[tila mostly 
consisted of the Syrian Arabs or active military. 
The early endeavour to understand and harmonise cultural differences gradually weakened the 
Arabs, resulting in non-Arab criticism (particularly from the secretaries) of the Arab tradition and 
its values.  Gibb suggests that such anti-Arab sentiment on their part became evident in the first 
half of the third century, and that, due to their particular behaviour they were given the title 
‘Shu<]bi’. Consequently, a Shu<]b\ movement came into existence in the beginning of the third 
century. These non-Arab maw[l\ secretaries of the Shu<]b\ya, unlike their predecessors, argued 
for the superiority of the Persians and other non-Arabs over the Arabs, a claim not based on the 
putative superiority of religion, but rather on the pre-eminence of non-Arab socio-cultural and 
civilisational elements. However the works of the early non-Arab secretaries of the second century 
of hijra, such as <Abd al-Hamid and Ibn al-Muqaffa, do not display such overt Shu<]b\ 
tendencies.427 
Gibb also analyses Arabic literature written in the second higra century ¦ 8th century CE. He argues 
that the compilation of Arabic literature had begun in Iraq through the study of the Arabic language 
and culture of the Arabian Peninsula. In Syria, too, similar work was initiated, this time focusing 
on the study of the Syrian tradition. The Umayyad caliph Hish[m employed secretaries for 
translation and compilation of literary, historical and philosophical works of the Persian and 
Roman civilizations. His chief Secretary, the mawla Sal\m, a non-Arab, translated Aristotle’s 
epistles to Alexander. Al-Mas<]d\ also records that a book of Persian history was translated for 
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Hish[m.428 Gibb emphasises the key role played by these secretaries in translating and recording 
the history of the Arabs. They continued working under the subsequent <Abb[sid rulers, 
particularly those serving under the Iraq\ administration, such as Ab] Ayy]b al-Muriy[n\, 
chancellor of al-Man~]r and Rozbih Ibn Muqaffa, one of the most celebrated translators of Persian 
works into Arabic. These secretaries played a major role in knowledge transmission, since they 
compiled an amalgamation of Arab and Persian traditions and values. No documentary evidence 
exists in the early works to support the view that the non-Arab secretaries attacked the Arabs under 
a Persian nationalist agenda. Gibb nevertheless asserts: 
During the second half of the second (eighth) century, Persian resistance (if nationalism is too 
strong or misleading a term) had repeatedly displayed itself in Khurasan and the northern provinces 
of Iran in risings which were not only anti-Arab but also anti-Islamic. There is nothing to suggest 
that the secretaries as a class were sympathetic towards these movements; all the presumptions, 
indeed, are to the contrary. Their aim was not to destroy the Islamic empire, but to remould its 
political and social institutions and the inner spirit of Islamic culture on the model of the Sasanian 
institutions and values, which represented in their eyes the highest political wisdom.429 
Gibb describes a Persian resistance movement which influenced the people of Khur[s[n and the 
northern provinces of Iran during the second half of the second century and invoked anti-Arab 
sentiment. The argument is plausible, due to literary evidence in the works of Ab] Ayy]b al-
Muriy[n\ and Ibn Muqaffa in particular. However such sources, unlike the historical ones, contain 
most of the anti-Arab material. Secondly the Shu<]b\ movement lacked strength during the first 
half of the eighth century CE. A comprehensive study of such literature appears relevant to the 
task of ascertaining the exact position of the Shu<]b\ya. 
5.3.1 The Foundation of the Shu<]b\ya in Literary Sources  
Among the leading Shu<]b\ scholars are Ibn<Abd Rabbih and Mubarrad, each of whom 
demonstrated their hatred of the non-Arabs or maw[l\s. Ibn<Abd Rabbih, for instance, wrote a 
chapter on the <a~ab\ya for Arabs in his book, al-<Iqd al-Far\d. Similarly, al-Mubarrad in al-K[mil 
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and al-I~fah[n\ in his book al-Agh[n\ recorded many examples that illustrated the hatred and 
repulsion the Arabs felt for the maw[l\.  Ibn <Abd Rabbih noted the habit among some Arabs of 
calling the maw[l\ by their first names and titles (because the use of the surname would have 
afforded them honour and respect), and their refusal to walk behind the maw[l\. N[fi< b. Jubayr b. 
Mu%<am, one of the Arab nobles, prayed behind a mawl[. When questioned he replied that he 
intended to show humility to God by performing obligatory prayers behind a mawl[. Moreover, 
whenever someone died, N[fi< is reported to have asked about the deceased person, and expressed 
his sorrow, regardless of who the deceased might have been (see also below). However, on learning 
of the death of a mawl[, he would declare his own submission to the authority of God, “who takes  
whomsoever He wants and leaves whomsoever He wants.”430 
The Shu<]b\ya group was a reaction against the Arab aristocracy and arrogance. Many intellectuals 
and scholars appeared among the maw[l\. They focused particularly on highlighting issues 
concerning the state and their Arab masters’ marginalisation of the subject class. The most 
important writings on this topic are those of J[+i& and Ibn <Abd Rabbih, selected for this study for 
their appeal to many non-Arabs. The discourse of equality between the Arabs and non-Arabs 
became popular among the masses, while misunderstandings between Arabs and neo-Muslims 
gradually increased, causing continuous insurgency and uprisings against the Umayyad 
government, particularly in Iraq and Khur[s[n. The Arab conquerors and their descendants did not 
in practice accept these non-Arabs’ claim of conversion to Islam and did not exempt them from 
the payment of the poll tax levied against all non-Muslims. Because of these discriminatory 
policies the maw[l\s opposed the Arab rule of the Umayyads.  Hakim argues that the distrust 
between the Arab aristocracy and the maw[l\s was mutual; in particular the Arabs rejected the 
position of the Persian maw[l\ and continued to suppress them, calling them the enemies of Islam 
despite their conversion. On the other hand, the maw[l\s’ struggle for equal rights continued 
without interruption, while the pious Arab Muslim scholars incited the maw[l\ to initiate a 
revolutionary campaign against the ruling Umayyads. In this way, the “Shu<ub\yah quietly sowed 
dissident seeds of strategy in the fertile soil of oppression, producing a perennial harvest of 
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disloyalty against the Umayyad until at last the Abbasids had gathered sufficient strength to claim 
the crown.”431 
The maw[l\ played a vital role in Muslim socio-educational institutions. Arab scholars accepted 
the abilities of the maw[l\s, conferring on them prestigious positions. However, some Arabs 
exhibited certain fanatical behaviours towards them. Ibn <Abd Rabbih records events suggesting 
the Arabs’ hatred of the maw[l\, for example, in his account of  a dialogue between Ibn Ab\ Layla 
and <Is[ b. M]s[ who used to criticize the maw[l\ ruthlessly. M]s[ b. <Is[ asked Ibn Ab\ Layl[ 
about the leading jurists of central cities of Muslims. Ibn Ab\ Layl[  gave the names of |asan b. 
Ab\ |asan al-Ba~r\ and Mu+ammad b. Sir\n in Ba~ra;  <A%[> b. Ab\ Rubb[+, Muj[hid, Sa<\d b. 
Jubayr, and Sulaym[n b. Yas[r in Macca; Rab\<a al-R[yy and Ibn Ab\ Zan[d in Qub[; ^[w]s, his 
son and Ibn Munabbah in Yemen, <A%[> b. <Abd Allah al-Khur[s[n\ in Khur[s[n; and Ibn Ab\ 
Layl[ Mak+ul in Syria, and commented that all of these were maw[l\s. M]s[ became furious at 
this answer and asked about the leading jurists of K]f[. Ibn Ab\ Layl[  named Ibr[h\m and Shu<b\, 
both Arabs. Then M]s[ b. <Is[ praised God. Ibn Ab\ Layl[ observed a sense of tranquillity in his 
face at this response, and reported that in his view al-|akam b. <Utaybah and <Amm[r b. Ab\ 
Sulaym[n were the great jurists of K]f[, both of them maw[l\s. However, he noticed that M]s[ 
was again very annoyed, and therefore he named Ibr[h\m and Shu<b\.432 
The sources that contain this report with a minor change are attributed to three different persons: 
(1) It was a dialogue between Ibn Ab\ Layl[ and <Is[ b. M]s[ as presented above; (2) it was a 
dialogue between Mu+ammad b. Muslim b. Shih[b al-Zuhr\ and <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n:433 and 
(3) it was a dialogue between Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik and one of his associates.434  However, the 
historical evidence does not support these three reports since, for example, almost identical 
dialogues appear in each, throwing doubt on their accuracy. The first report is between Ibn Ab\ 
Layl[ and M]s[ b. <Is[. The date of the dialogue is not clear. Ibn Ab\ Layl[ lived a long life, 
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approximately seventy-four years from 74AH to 148AH.435 Apparently, the dialogue took place 
when they were both mature and had established positions as jurists and scholars. It is therefore 
assumed that the dialogue took place when Ibn Ab\ Layl[ was about forty years old, that is, around 
114AH. The personalities outlined in the dialogue were Ibr[h\m al-Nakh<\, a jurist of Kuf[ who 
died in 96 AH, and S<id b. Jubayr, a jurist of Mecca who died in 95AH. At the time of this dialogue 
Ibn Ab\ Layl[ was about 22 or 24 years old, and thus not yet an established scholar.  Secondly, 
Ibn <Abd Rabbih cited Ibn Ab\ Zan[d, a jurist of Qub[, as a contemporary of Ibr[h\m al-Nakh<\ 
and Sa<\d b. Jubayr, whereas he was born in 100AH, almost five years after the death of both. 
Thus, the report contains contradictory information and would thus appear to be a fabrication.436 
The second and third reports both contain some similar and some conflicting points. The second 
report assumes that the dialogue was between Mu+ammad b. Muslim b. Shih[b al-Zuhr\ and <Abd 
al-Malik b. Marw[n,  while the third report tells us that the conversation was between Hish[m b. 
<Abd al-Malik and an anonymous scholar. Both reports agree on the names of leading jurists of 
Mecca, Yemen, Syria, Jazira, Basra and K]fa. However, there is a difference in the names of some 
other jurists of the cities.  
According to the second report, the conversation was between <Abd al-Malik and Zuhr\ (51-124 
AH). The latter, only fourteen years old at the beginning of <Abd al-Malik’s rule, could not have 
been a mature scholar at the time. Secondly, he was not popular among Syrians during his life.437 
Thirdly, Wal\d b. Mu+ammad al-M]qar\ (d. 181 or 182 AH) revealed this report to be from Zuhr\. 
The historians and traditionalists (mu+addith\n) are critics of al-Muqar\, questioning his reliability 
and painting him both as a weak reporter and a liar. Therefore, his reports ought to be rejected, 
particularly since his reports concerning al-Zuhr\ were baseless.438 The third report suggests that 
the dialogue took place at the beginning of the second century of higra during the reign of Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik i.e. from 105-125 AH. In this dialogue, Hish[m is told by one of his anonymous 
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companions that Ibr[h\m al-Nakh<\ is an eminent jurist of K]fa and an Arab. On learning this last 
fact, Hish[m feels some relief.  This story, too, is apparently a fabrication because Ibr[h\m al-
Nakh<\ died in 96 AH about ten years before the beginning of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s rule.439 
The third report is drawn from different sources. Al-Dhahab\ reveals that the dialogue was between 
a son of <Abd al-Malik (r. 65-86AH). He mentions that the conversation was between any one of 
<Abd al-Malik’s sons, however, the report does not specify the names of these sons. Four sons of 
<Abd Malik ruled during the Umayyad caliphate: al-Wal\d (r. 86-96AH), Sulaym[n (r. 96-99 AH), 
Yaz\d (r. 101-105AH)  and Hish[m (r. 105-125AH). The time, place and the reporters are all 
anonymous in this report, a fact which calls into question its authenticity. Al-Mar<ash\ (d. 1471 
AH) also relates this story without any solid chain of reporters.   
All three reports share some commonalities, but their considerable contradictions validate the view 
that they are baseless and fabricated. Not only is their reliability questionable, but also their 
historicity and historical consistency is problematic. Furthermore, <Abd al-Malik and Hish[m b. 
<Abd al-Malik are commonly considered to be the most judicious and prudent among the Umayyad 
rulers.440 This being the case, it would seem implausible openly to display hatred toward the 
maw[l\s. This would overlook their significant positions in government institutions and in the 
population. Significantly, <Abd al-Malik married ladies of maw[l\ and had seven children by them. 
He also arranged the marriage of his son Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik with the daughter of Shah Farad 
b. Fayr]z. Al-Wal\d had two sons with her: Yaz\d and Ibr[h\m. The latter was very proud to be 
the son of a maw[l\ mother, and was given to declaring:  “I am son of Kisra and my father is 
Marw[n; Both Qay~ar and Kh[q[n are my grandfathers.”441 
It is hard to believe that the Umayyads became hostile towards the maw[l\ and non-Arabs, 
particularly when it is proved that they respected non-Arab maw[l\ scholars. For instance, they 
revered <A%[> b. Ab\ Rabb[+ more than any other Arab scholar. It was officially announced during 
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the |ajj that no one except <A%[> b. Ab\ Rubba+ ought to be consulted on religious matters.442 Arab 
poets such as Farazdaq routinely criticised and degraded the non-Arabs. Whenever Farazdaq 
disparaged any of the prestigious men, he explained that he belonged to the maw[l\ and his Arab 
genealogy had not been proved. Farazdaq suggested that al-Muhallab b. Ab\ @ufra was not Arab 
and that he belonged to a nab%\ tribe.443 
When <Al\ b. Ab\ ^[lib ascended to the caliphate he treated the maw[l\s  and Arabs equally, 
granting the maw[l\ an equal share in the salaries. He recruited thousands of soldiers from maw[l\ 
in his army, attracting criticism from nobles of Quraysh, who tried to persuade him to perpetuate 
the privileging of the Arabs over the maw[l\s, which <Al\ b. Ab\ ^[lib refused to do. He argued 
that success could not be achieved with injustice, but this view was not widely accepted. Al-
Ash<ath b. Qays rebuked <Al\’s idea and accused him of establishing the authority of non-Arabs 
over his own (Arab) relatives.444 
|amd\ Sh[h\n argues that there were certain Arab groups who were involved in discriminatory 
behaviour towards the maw[l\s, but these did not include the Umayyad government or its 
institutions.445 For instance, Shuraykh, one of the Persian maw[l\, remained a judge in K]fa from 
the time of <Umar b. al-Kha%%[b until <Abd al-Malik’s reign in 75AH while |ajj[j b. Y]suf was 
the governor of K]fa.446  Similarly Sa<\d b. Jubayr, a mawl[ was appointed as Im[m of obligatory 
prayers in K]fa during the governorship of |[jj[j b. Y]suf. Later, al-|ajj[j killed him because of 
his involvement in the rebellion of Ibn Ash<ath. |ajj[j killed many Arabs and non-Arabs for this 
reason but he faced strong protest and criticism when he killed Sa<\d because of the latter’s  
knowledge and piety.447 Similarly, he was criticised for killing <A%[> b. Ab\ Rubb[+, the mawla  
Im[m of Mecca whom people consulted for religious guidance, as noted above. Ibn Khallak[n 
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recorded that it was officially announced during the +ajj that people should consult <A%[> for their 
religious matters because his  opinion was appreciated. The respect given by the Umayyad 
authorities to <A%[ b. Ab\ Rubb[+ shows that the maw[l\ acquired high positions during the era 
and that Arabs could accept the eminence of the maw[l\ based on their knowledge and piety.448 
The authenticity traditions suggesting maw[l\ inferiority seem fragile. Such traditions may be 
classified into three categories: firstly, a lucid elaboration of maw[l\ marginal status during the 
Umayyad period. Most of these traditions are incorrect and baseless. The second category consists 
of those traditions not actually related to the Umayyad period although correlated by many scholars 
to the era; most of these were compiled during the R[shid]n or <Abb[sid periods. The weakness 
of the first two traditions is evident; however the third category consists of inaccurate, ambiguous 
and vague traditions wrongly attributed to the Umayyad period. Traditions that concern anti-
maw[l\ discrimination during the Umayyad period can generally be found in Arabic literature 
rather than in historical books. Some important sources are as follows:  
1. Al-Biy[n wa-al-Taby\n by J[+i&, <Umar b. Ba+r (d. 255AH) 
2. Al-K[mil by Mu+ammad b. Yaz\d al-Mubarrad (d. 286AH)  
3. Al-<Iqd al-Far\d by Ibn<Abd Rabbih al-Andlus\, A+mad b. Mu+ammad (d. 328AH) 
4.  Al-Agh[n\ by Ab] al-Faraj al-I~bah[n\ (d. 356AH) 
5. Mu+[#r[t al-Udab[> by I~bah[n\ (d. 502AH)449 
These are well-known books of Arabic literature but the authenticity of their accounts and the 
soundness of historical events have not been confirmed. As such, they are unreliable and should 
be evaluated critically. Secondly, their authenticity is also uncertain and the narrative is 
inconsistent because these books were compiled under the <Abb[sids long after the Umayyad 
period. Al-R[ghib al-I~bah[n\ copied from Ibn <Abd Rabbih’s al-<Iqd al-Far\d and failed to make 
any additions or offer any explanations of the work. Thirdly, most of these kinds of narrations 
consist of a single report and therefore their veracity cannot be regarded as sound. Furthermore, 
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these traditions were compiled during the anti-Umayyad Abbasid rule that was very hostile 
towards the Arabs; they depicted the Umayyads as the enemy of the maw[l\. Such sources contain 
reports which indicate that the maw[l\ were suppressed and treated unjustly during the Umayyad 
period. Some of these reports are analysed below to show their fabrication and to identify the level 
of hostility to the Umayyads.   
For example, N[fi< b. Jubayr was one of the family members of the tribe of Nawfal b. <Abd Mun[f. 
As noted above, whenever someone died, he used to ask about him. If he was told that the deceased 
was a Quraysh\, he used to say: “it is a great loss for his tribe”. And if the deceased person was an 
Arab, he used to say: “it is a great loss for his city. And if he was told that the deceased person was 
a mawl[ or a non-Arab. He used to say: “O God, they are your servants; you may take whosoever 
you want and leave whosoever you desire.”450 Mubarrad reported the account.  Further, Ibn <Abd 
Rabbih (d. 328 AH) narrated this tradition in his al-<Iqd al-Far\d and al-R[ghibal-I~bah[n\ (d. 502 
AH) in his Mu+[#r[t al-Udab[>.451 Nevertheless, some key points are missing from this report. For 
example, neither the time and nor the place are mentioned. N[fi<a b. Jubayr is the only identifiable 
person in the text since, according to the historical sources, he died in 99AH.452 Therefore, he lived 
during the Umayyad period until the end of Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik’s rule but it is not clear 
when and where this event took place, although N[fi< had travelled during his life in Mecca, 
Medina, Syria and Ir[q.453 Secondly, the maw[l\ considered N[fi< a pious and religious person 
who was regularly consulted for his opinion on religious matters.454 On the topic of respect for a 
deceased person, he is reported to have said: “Whosoever participates in a funeral not for the 
respect of the deceased person, rather to show his presence for the relatives of the deceased person, 
he should not join the funeral ceremony.”455 This suggests that he was humane. Inherently, the 
report has many flaws, given its lack of historical consistency as well as its non-historian narrator.  
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Ibn <Abd Rabbih who wrote literary works and was inclined towards the Kh[rij\ doctrine informed 
us of this report. The Khaw[rij were known to be hostile towards the Umayyad.456 
In addition, Ziy[d b. Ab\h reveals that Mu<[w\ya discussed the issue of the maw[l\ with al-A+naf 
b. Qays and Samurah b. Jundub. Mu<[w\ya highlighted his concern at the alarming increase in the 
number of non-Arabs, and his fear that they would attack the king and the Arabs. Mu<[w\ya 
contemplated killing half of them and leaving the other half for trade and other duties. He then 
asked al-A+naf and Samurah for their opinion. Al-A+naf replied that it did not please him to kill 
his own mother, uncle and the maw[l\ since the non-Arabs were now their relatives and part of 
their family. Then Samurah b. Jundub responded that he would have proposed a better solution. 
Mu<[w\ya then concluded the meeting, asking for time to think about the matter. Al-A+naf reports 
that he left the meeting with a heart full of worry and tension. However, the next day Mu<aw\ya 
was resolved to accept al-A+naf’s opinion, and rejected Samurah b. Jundub’s suggestion. This 
report is cited only by Ibn <Abd Rabbih.457 Al-R[ghib al-I~bah[n\ also documented this report with 
some modification.458 Analysis of this report requires consideration from several angles. The event 
took place during Mu<[w\ya’s rule but the exact date is not mentioned. The event shows that the 
maw[l\ had gained such importance during Umayyad rule that the Arab rulers were pressed to 
consider a policy to limit their numbers. There is a significant difference between Ibn <Abd 
Rabbih’s and I~bah[n\’s reports. According to the former the dialogue was between Mu<[w\ya, al-
A+naf and Samurah b. Jundub, while the latter narrates the dialogue as having occurred between 
Ziy[d b. Ab\h and al-A+naf; but again, the report does not mention the date of the dialogue.  
Furthermore, the report lacks many primary elements that would give the document status. It 
appears only in Arabic literature, which does not guarantee its historical consistency. Additionally, 
the number of the maw[l\ was not high enough to make them a threat to Arabs. Given these facts, 
it can be argued that the report is baseless and full of exaggeration. The number of maw[l\ were 
not more than twenty thousand during the reign of Mu<[w\ya as al-Dayn]r\ claimed.459 In addition 
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al-Dayn]r\ is criticised because his information is based on Persian sources that had a tendency to 
overplay the importance of the maw[l\s in their writings.460 Their number had increased during 
the rule of al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik (r. 86-96) but many maw[l\ were appointed to key positions 
during Umayyad rule.461 This kind of report, lacking any logical or historical consistency and 
reliability, may thus confidently be taken as fabricated, having appeared in the literature long after 
Mu<[w\ya’s rule and lacking a reliable chain of transmitters.  
Finally, Arabic literature features some traditions that demonstrate hatred of the maw[l\. Mostly, 
these apply to the Umayyad rule. However, careful reading may reveal these reports to have been 
wrongly attributed to the Umayyad era. In fact, they belong to the pre-Umayyad or post-Umayyad 
period. For instance, Mubarrad, reporting on the authority of al-A~ma<\, said that he had listened 
to an Arab talking with another Arab: “Do you think that these non-Arabs will get married with 
the Arab ladies in paradise?” The second one replied: “I think so because Allah may reward them 
because of their good deeds,” The first one then asserted: “before such reward we wish to be 
killed.”462 Al-R[ghib al-I~bah[n\ also reports this event.463 However, neither al-R[ghib nor al-
Mubarrad mention the date of the event nor describe the person whose exchange they discussed. 
Only al-A~ma<\ who listened to the dialogue is identifiable. It is proved that al-A~ma<\ was born 
in 122AH and died circa 215AH,464 and that consequently al-A~ma<\ was only ten years old when 
the Umayyad dynasty disintegrated. This means that the report appeared during the overtly anti-
Umayyad <Abb[sid period. Furthermore the report notably lacks a chain of reporters. As such, the 
report may be considered unreliable and inauthentic.  Similarly, Bad\< Shar\f’s location of this 
episode during Umayyad rule can also be considered inaccurate.465 It seems such reports mostly 
consist of individual opinion, and that in some cases the transmitters and reporters are anonymous 
and the time and place omitted. Therefore, any conclusion drawn from these reports is misleading. 
Ibn <Abd Rabbih for example devotes an entire chapter to the reports containing anti-maw[l\ 
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prejudices.466 In fact the maw[l\s’ situation was not the same in all the provinces of the Umayyad 
caliphate. For instance there is no evidence that Syrian maw[l\ were maltreated or considered to 
be second-class citizens of the state. Similarly, the maw[l\ from Andalusia enjoyed their position 
in society, since they owned a great deal of  property and vast tracts of land and remained very 
powerful.467 The Umayyads were hostile towards their H[shimid relatives rather than the Arabs. 
However, the tribal conflict between the Qays and Yemens contributed hugely to the caliphate’s 
eventual disintegration.   
Most Orientalists and other scholars accept reports about the maw[l\ without the necessary critical 
analysis, and in many cases also ignore the historical significance of the sources. Most of the 
reports have been extracted from literature for which historical reliability cannot be confirmed, 
and are also weak in terms of logic and objectivity. Documents that reflect prejudice against the 
maw[l\ mostly take the form of poetry; this genre is very modest in comparison with the amount 
of poetry produced by Arabs who railed against their fellow Arabs. Similarly, there is not a single 
exclusive qa~\da written against the maw[l\ during the Umayyad period.468 In addition, sources 
document the existence of twenty-one maw[l\ poets in that period, with not one  composing  poetry 
that opposed the Arabs.469  
On the other hand, Arab poets produced many qa~[>id against their contemporary Arab fellows. 
The reports that discriminate against the maw[l\ during the Umayyad era are, as mentioned above, 
found in literary works of the time and are narrated by prominent writers; all of them have been 
collected and analysed by Al-Badr[w\, the main sources of these kinds of reports, in the following 
percentages: approximately 20‰ by al-Mubarrad; 13‰ by al-R[ghib al-I~bah[n\ (who extracted 
20‰ of Mubarrad’s reports in his books: apart from these reports his contribution is 13‰, so 
cumulatively al-R[ghib al-I~bah[n\’s share is 33‰); 33‰  by Ibn <Abd Rabbih; and 20‰ by Ab] 
al-Farj al-I~fah[n\.470  The above discussion recounts the portrayal of non-Arab or maw[l\ in the 
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pre-modern sources of Arabic literature. The pre-Modern historical sources feature less hostile 
maw[l\-related traditions. However, some modern scholars, perhaps overly influenced by Arabic 
literary sources, have presented the maw[l\ as a marginalized segment of early Muslim society 
particularly during the Umayyad rule.  
5.4 The Role of the Maw[l\ in the <Abb[sid Revolution  
This section analyses divergent narratives in modern and pre-modern sources on the maw[l\s’ role 
in the collapse of the Umayyads. Modern scholarship analyses the ethnic identity of the 
Revolution. The leading scholars analysing the maw[l\s’ role fall broadly into two clear groups: 
the traditionalists and the revisionists, although a variety of opinions exists within each group. The 
traditionalist interpretation gained wider acceptance during the first half of the twentieth century, 
while the revisionists tended to dominate the second half. Traditionalists highlight the significant 
role of the maw[l\s in the fall of the Umayyads, whereas the revisionists see the maw[l\ as playing 
a marginal and secondary role under the Arabs. Notable among the traditionalist-leaning scholars 
are Kremer, van Vloten, Goldziher and Wellhausen, while the revisionist school includes Dennett, 
Gibb, Shaban, Zakeri, Crone, and Agha. A comparative study of the respective narratives of the 
modern scholars will help in determining whether, how, and to what degree the maw[l\ were 
instrumental in the Umayyads’ downfall.  
5.4.1 Modern Sources on the Role of Maw[l\ in the Fall of the Umayyads  
5.4.1.1 Traditionalist Interpretations  
Kremer leads the traditional school of thought. He has written extensively on the relationship of 
the various strata of Muslim society after the expansion of the Muslim empire to non-Arab areas. 
Goldziher admires Kremer’s contribution, while admitting the comparatively small contribution 
of his own work to Kremer’s already extensively-researched material.471  In Goldziher’s view, “the 
Muslim teaching of equality of all men in Islam remained a dead letter for a long time, never 
realized in the consciousness of Arabs, and roundly denied in their day to day behaviour.”472 He 
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maintains that the Arab notion of non-Arabs contradicted Islam’s teachings, and that Arab hostility 
to non-Arabs did not occur in the pre-Islamic period.  Such sentiment emerged and fomented in 
the later era when Arabs started wars against the Persians. Aristocratic Arab prejudice forced their 
acceptance of the equality of the non-Arab maw[l\. Goldziher observes that a non-Arab counter-
reaction appeared when their established noble families, known in Muslim chronicle sources as 
dihq[ns, became part of the Muslim society. Rejecting the putative supremacy of the Arabs, they 
affirmed their own collective pride. 473  Their intellectual contributions to Muslim society 
meanwhile uplifted the social status of the non-Arabs. 
These proud Persian and non-Arab intellectuals and skilful workers acquired high positions only 
when the <Abb[sids came into power. Kremer suggests that scientific studies of the Qur>[n, 
exegesis, +ad\th and fiqh were mainly carried out by maw[l\ during the first two centuries,474 
which in turn indicates the maw[l\s’ significance in the development of Islam’s role.  Goldziher 
cites many literary references, such as al-Agh[n\ and al-<Iqd al-Far\d in order to explain the social 
relationship of the Arabs and maw[l\.  He maintains that al-|ajj[j was a fanatical enemy of the 
maw[l\.  Only with great difficulty could the maw[l\ change their patron, and in the case of any 
violation, they were disciplined by customary law.475 In this context, both Kremer and Goldziher 
maintain that the Khaw[rij attracted the maw[l\ because of their protest against the rigid tribal 
affiliation and rejection of the Quraysh’s claim over the legitimacy of leadership. Goldziher, 
following Kremer’s lead, notes that the maw[l\  joined the Khaw[rij because they called for their 
basic human rights, while the link he draws between the Shu<]b\ya and the struggle for equal rights  
is also worth noting.  Qur[nic teaching clearly affirms the equality of all qab[>il (tribes) and shu<]b 
(people),476 and the Shu<]b\ya gradually reached its pinnacle in the second and third century of 
higra when the non-Arabs condemned the racial arrogance of Arabs and demanded complete 
equality. Goldziher observes:  
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the favour which outstanding Persian families enjoyed at the <Abb[sid court, and 
the great influence which they had in the government of Islam, encouraged the 
Persians and their friends to express openly their long-suppressed resentment of 
Arab racial arrogance…A good observer characterized (and he was possibly not the 
first to do so) the relation of the Umayyad and the <Abb[sid dynasties by calling the 
first an Arab and the latter an <Ajam\ or Khur[s[nian empire.477 
Van Vloten extends Kremer’s argument further, presenting a cultural-economic interpretation of 
Umayyad decline. He maintains that the Arabs did not treat their conquered subjects (converted 
non-Arabs) as equals, a situation which pushed the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n to support the Shi<\ agents 
calling for the equality of all Muslims. Van Vloten argues that the Shi<\ successfully achieved their 
goal with the assistance of non-Arabs who desired equal socio-political and military rights.478 He 
further asserts that the hatred nursed by oppressed Persians and Shi<\s and the anticipation of a 
Messiah provided elements crucial to a Revolution.479 
Wellhausen meanwhile agrees with Van Vloten that the maw[l\ were not properly recognised by 
the Arabs, and highlights their secondary position in both military and social life. For instance they 
were appointed only as rank and file in the army, receiving pay and a share in the spoils but no 
formal recognition, while their names were omitted from the diw[n, the military pension-list. They 
were not exempt from the subject-tax even if they converted to Islam. He argues that the converted 
Iranians were not treated as equals, which provoked their resentment. Here Islam’s doctrine of 
racial and tribal equality provided them with a foundation for resistance. He notes: “Islam itself 
was the ground upon which they began the struggle against the Umayyads. It was Islam that united 
them with those Arabs who, following theocratic principles, opposed the Umayyid government. It 
was Arabs who first roused and organised the Maw[l\.”480  Wellhausen extensively analyses the 
reforms of <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z regarding the maw[l\ who were not exempted from paying tax. 
He states that a great number of converted non-Arabs of Kufa and Basra started a struggle for 
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equal rights and that “Islam made them alive to their claims, and they sought to obtain full equal 
rights.”481 Gathering under the leadership of Mukht[r, they continued struggling for their rights.  
Wellhausen also observes that the Arab character of army and government towns was significantly 
changed and that the non-Arabs gained significant positions until the rule of <Umar b. <Abd al-
<Az\z.482 The increasing Islamisation of the conquered compelled <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z to 
address the grievances of maw[l\ by conferring equal rights on them. By devising a policy of 
reconciliation, he attempted to eliminate the animosity between the Ir[q\s and Syrians and between 
Arabs and maw[l\.483 He also attempted to satisfy the Khaw[rij and <Alids by entering into their 
argument and the Alids by restoring their confiscated property to them and prohibiting the curse 
upon <Al\.484 According to Wellhausen’s assessment, Umayyad decline occurred as a result of the 
Khur[s[n Shi<\s’s growing might.485 The majority of Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\’s adherents were 
Iranians from the peasant class and the maw[l\ of the villages of Marv. Wellhausen further 
identifies the importance of Arab settlers in the revolutionary army.486  
This appreciation of Arab settlers’ role in resistance stands in marked contrast to Van Vloten’s 
view. Wellhausen argues that, “there were Arabs among them also who mostly occupied leading 
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positions.”487  In fact Wellhausen revises Van Vloten’s purely racial interpretation, extending 
consideration to this previously neglected group. However in relation to the role of Shi<\s and the 
predominance of Persian agents in the Revolution, his position more closely resembles that of Van 
Vloten. Thus, the whole story of the revolution is depicted as a struggle to overthrow Umayyad 
rule in favour of a cosmopolitan Islamic state. Dennett also notes the influence of Wellhausen’s 
interpretation, noting that it “became the standard interpretation of early Islamic history” for more 
than half of the twentieth century.488  
5.4.1.2 The Revisionist School 
In contrast to the traditionalists, the revisionists present various narratives regarding the role of 
maw[l\ in the fall of the Umayyads. The leading scholars of this school of thought include Dennett, 
Gibb, Shaban, Zakeri, Crone and Agha. Foremost among this group is Dennett who, in 1939, 
disagreed with many of the assertions and claims of Van Vloten and Wellhausen regarding the 
ethnic identity of groups struggling against Umayyad rule.489 Dennett considers that the successful 
overthrow of the Arab Kingdom would have been inconceivable without the active opposition of 
the Arabs. Rejecting Van Vloten’s emphasis on the non-Arabs’ crucial contribution to Umayyad 
decline, he instead suggests that Arab internal conflicts played a greater role. His argument is based 
on the fact that only Arabs possessed the requisite military strength to overthrow this empire.490 
He considers that Van Vloten and Wellhausen exaggerated the social and religious factors in their 
assertions, proposing instead that such socio-religious factors were “certainly the occasion, but not 
the cause, for the final victory of the Abbasids.”491 
Also prominent in the revisionist school is Gibb, who argues that the role of the maw[l\ in the 
revolution was limited. He records that “the tradition of enthusiasm of the Iranian for Ab] Muslim 
is true only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass 
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movement such as has so often been portrayed.”492 Gibb mainly analyses the role of maw[l\ in the 
context of the Shu<]b\ya movement. However, Shaban extends Dennett’s thesis in his magnum 
opus, <Abb[sid Revolution, arguing that the Arab settlers were the most important element 
involved in attempts to overthrow Umayyad rule. Through analysis of the socio-economic position 
of the ‘Arab settlers’ in Khur[s[n, Shaban attempts to establish the decisive role of the Arab settlers 
in the military movement of the Revolution.493 
Shaban reassesses the issue in more detail, finding that although there were some maw[l\ in 
Khur[s[n among Ab] Muslim’s followers, his main support came from the Arab quarters in Marv, 
that is, from the Arab settlers. As this thesis has shown, this was the section of Marv’s population 
that was opposed to the Umayyad policies which showed no concern with their interests. Thus 
they were not only deprived of the advantages of the Arab-born, but were also left under the 
authority of the dihq[ns and were treated even worse than the conquered people.494 Shaban argues 
that Na~r b. Sayy[r put some effort into addressing their grievances, but it was too late to reconcile 
them to Umayyad rule. This prompted a complete change, not only in Khur[s[n but throughout 
the whole empire. Ab] Muslim’s call to empower the House of the Prophet for the sake of justice 
inspired them to revolt against the Umayyad regime. The martyrdom of the Sh\<ite Im[m Ya+y[ 
ibn Zayd in Khur[s[n in 125¦743 at the hands of Na~r b. Sayy[r prepared the Arab settlers to stand 
against the ‘old regime’. Shaban maintains that “it was towards these Settlers that the H[shm\ya 
propaganda campaign was directed. The H[shm\ya missionaries to Merv must have realized that 
they provided the most fertile ground for recruiting supporters for the revolutionary movement.”495 
The maw[l\, it would seem, gradually assumed ever greater importance during this period and their 
role can be observed in the movements of the Dhakw[niyya, the Maq[mi~a and <Abd Allah b. 
Mu<[w\ya. The reception of <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya among the maw[l\ and non-Arabs is 
significant since it provided elements necessary for the Khur[s[nian revolution. All three elements 
(the Dhakw[niyya, the Maq[mi~a, and <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya) combined to create the conditions 
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under which the maw[l\ gained prominence. Sulaym[n b. Hish[m’s army, the Dhakw[n\ya, 
consisted of maw[l\ who played a vital role in convincing some of the jund of |im~ and Palestine 
who considered that the coup d’état against Wal\d II was illegal.496  
Meanwhile, the maq[mi~a, the Egyptian naval forces, were enlisted in the d\w[n of Egypt and 
were referred to in the sources as maq[mi~a and maw[l\.497 The Syrians had a small navy but 
always relied upon Egyptian naval forces, especially during the sieges of Constantinople. Although 
the Egyptian naval forces were Christians they worked for the Arabs to ensure a share in the 
booty. 498  Generally, the Egyptian maq[mi~a and the maw[l\ served Arab interests, with the 
exception of a minor unrest during the reign of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. Since the non-Arab and 
non-Muslim forces promoted their interests, the Umayyads utilised and paid them a handsome 
share in the spoils. Shaban remarks that “It is the only clear case in this period of a very large 
number of non-Muslims and non-Arabs being allowed to perform a task of paramount importance 
in the empire’s defence, and they performed it very well.”499  
Yaz\d III’s new policies attracted the Egyptian maq[mi~a and maw[l\ and about 30,000 Egyptians 
were granted stipends from the d\w[n.  Yaz\d III also enlisted the Egyptian maw[l\ and maq[mi~a 
into the armed and naval forces on a permanent basis on condition that they accepted Islam. In so 
doing, Yaz\d relieved the pressure on the Syrian army engaged in North Africa and Andalusia. On 
the other hand, the maw[l\ and maq[mi~a gained a significant position in Egypt’s Arab army. 
However, the situation was more complex in Iraq and Khur[s[n where the maw[l\, given their 
diverse affiliations, played divergent roles.  Some of them were linked with the Khaw[rij while 
others were close allies of the Umayyads, such as the Dhakw[n\ya. The non-Arabs of Iraq and 
Khur[s[n were closely associated with the Shi’\ movements, and it seems that the role of the 
maw[l\ became more coherent after Marw[n b. Mu+ammad ascended to the throne in 744¦127.500 
Under the leadership of Sulaym[n b. Hish[m, the Dhakw[n\ya gathered against Marw[n b. 
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Mu+ammad. However, they could not resist his forces and fled to K]fa where they joined the 
Khaw[rij.501 At that time the governor of Kufa was <Abd Allah b. <Umar, appointed by Yaz\d III. 
Since <Abd Allah refused to accept Marw[n b. Mu+ammad’s authority he made successful 
alliances with other dissident elements and enlisted a sizable army with the help of the treasury in 
Kufa. 
Observing the internal conflict in the Umayyad royal family, the anti-Umayyad Shi<\s mobilised 
around <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya, a grandson of a brother of <Al\.502 However, he was defeated by 
<Abd Allah b. <Umar’s army. <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya fled to Mad[>\n, where he successfully 
organized his army of maw[l\.  Shaban argues that although the maw[l\ supported <Abd Allah b. 
Mu<[w\ya, their support should not be overestimated, particularly when it lost its strength during 
the first encounter with Marw[n’s army. 503  On the other hand, the situation in Kufa was 
challenging in that <Abd Allah b. <Umar consolidated his strength by forming an alliance with the 
Khaw[rij under the leadership of $a++[k, and the Dhakw[n\ya under the leadership of Sulaym[n 
b. Hish[m.504 These tribal and maw[l\ alliances were the most evident features of the joint forces 
that together attacked and captured Maw~il. Marw[n II retaliated, defeating them, while their 
leader $a++[k was killed in the battle in 746¦128.505 
The dispersed army again asembled in Khur[s[n where <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya was gathering 
more momentum with the support of the Iranian maw[l\. Sulaym[n b. Hish[m with his maw[l\, 
Man~]r b. Jamh]r with his Syrian army, and Ab] Ja<far al-Man~]r with his supporters joined <Abd 
Allah b. Mu<[w\ya in Khur[s[n.506 This was the beginning of a well-organized struggle against 
Marw[n II. Shab[n argues that “the pseudo-Sh\<ite movement of <Abd Allah b. Mu<[w\ya had 
come to be a Sh\<ite-Kh[rijite-Marw[nid-<Abb[sid movement.”507  These various forces were 
united against Marw[n II but could not devise a common ideology upon which to stage a successful 
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struggle. Their struggle against Marw[n’s forces lasted about two years but the latter destroyed 
their power. The leaders were killed or fled to the remote corners of the empire; <Abd Allah b. 
Mu<[w\ya was murdered in 746¦129; Man~]r b. Jamh]r fled to India, and the Abbasid Ab] Ja<far 
al-Man~]r returned with his two uncles to Palestine. The movement had apparently failed to 
achieve its targets but it inspired the people of Khur[s[n and the maw[l\ to challenge Umayyad 
authority.508 
Sharon extends Shaban’s argument, supporting many of his claims while refuting those of Van 
Vloten and Wellhausen.509 Employing new sources, particularly the Akhb[r al-Dawlah, he argues 
that the Arab settlers in Khur[s[n formed a very active class that joined the muq[tila (fighting 
army) to overthrow Umayyad rule. However, Sharon classifies the Khur[s[nian Arabs into settlers 
and muq[tila.510 Similarly, Zakeri claims that {z[d[n (small independent landlords and warriors 
who had a lower position in the S[s[nid Empire) played a significant role in the disintegration of 
the Umayyad caliphate. He argues:  
The Arab tribal-military-class replaced the S[s[nid warriors, although the latter maintained 
cohesiveness long after the establishment of Islam. Survival of these warriors and the problems 
involved in adjusting to the new circumstances were constant sources of disorder and 
destabilization for the Umayyad administration. …many of «the maw[l\ were» Iranian armed forces 
who were partially disarmed in <Ir[q, but in Khur[s[n remained intact… the underprivileged 
among them swelled the ranks of the Shi<\ and Kh[rij\ rebels. As the <Abb[sid propaganda spread 
in Khur[s[n, the local Persian nobility with its armed militia gave support to them and regained 
some of its lost privileges.511 
Crone studies the role of the maw[l\ extensively, tracing them from their emergence in the early 
period of conquest to the formation of maml]k institutions in the <Abb[sid period. Her work is an 
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attempt to understand the role of the maw[l\ as a military institution. She identifies three stages in 
the development of the Muslim army. The Arab military aristocracy lasted until the <Abb[sid 
revolution, led by an army recruited from Khur[s[n and Transoxania which served during the first 
hundred years of <Abb[sid rule, while in the third stage, al-Mu<ta~im delegated military power to 
men recruited as slaves. Crone’s work seeks to identify the ways in which the Arab settlement 
outside the Arabian Peninsula affected the tribal organisation in the process of conquest, as well 
as the nature of relations between Arabs and non-Arabs.  She argues that tribalism or <a~ab\ya was 
the most prominent feature during the Umayyad period, and that non-Arabs were attached to Arab 
tribes with both playing active as well as passive roles in the conflicts with the Arabs themselves.512 
Crone attempts to identify the role and identity of the maw[l\ in Arab factionalism, constructing 
the role of the maw[l\ as auxiliary during the Umayyad period, while their identity as clients was 
closely interlinked with that of their  Arab masters. Her dismissal of traditional interpretations is 
evident in her work; she suggests the number of maw[l\ is exaggerated in the modern sources and 
their role is depicted as one of the significant factors in the fall of the Umayyads.  
Agha also evaluates the elements contributing to the fall of the Umayyads. By using quantitative 
and source critical methodologies, he revisits all post-Wellhausen works, criticising prominent 
scholars of the revisionist school. He further argues that while sources not accessible to 
Wellhausen did provide some extra information on an event, their significance is minimal. 
Consequently, he considers the information on the subject provided by al-^abar\ as still valid, 
while Wellhausen is viewed as ever-vibrant, even for those who disagree with him. Agha moreover 
acknowledges the distinct Wellhausen influence on his own work.  
Agha identifies three types of non-Arab Iranians during the Umayyad period: (i) Maw[l\, the 
converts who accepted Islam, and affiliated themselves to Arab tribes within the tribal structure;  
(ii) Converts, non-Arab Muslims  neither associated with any tribe nor belonging to any tribal 
structure; and (iii) non-Arabs, who did not accept Islam and consistently remained followers of 
their indigenous religions. Agha draws attention to the previously-discounted third category, 
largely ignored as the movement unfolded and culminated in the widespread adoption of Islam. 
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However, the role of maw[l\ was central in the Revolution whereas the converts provided a base 
for mass mobilization in the Revolution. Also noteworthy is the fact that a significant number of 
non-Arabs, rather than being poor artisans, were wealthy, possessed properties, and engaged in 
business. Thus, economic deprivation did not constitute a driving factor in the revolution. The 
maw[l\ were integrated with Arab tribes and had enjoyed economic benefits because of their 
attachment to the Arab Establishment. However, their adherence to proto-Shi<\ ideology was a 
factor that played a vital role in the revolution. Furthermore, the majority of non-Arab converts 
had not yet attained economic prosperity, nor had they been assimilated like the maw[l\s. Their 
revolutionary participation thus occurred at later stages. 513  But this does not mean that the 
revolutionary forces consisted of non-Arab Persians. Scholars such as Wellhausen and Dennett 
allude to a mass, non-Arab, conversion to Islam.514  Sharon also confirms a “great influx of 
converts to Islam”, although he rejects the concept of an overwhelming Iranian participation in the 
Revolution.515  
Shaban’s position meanwhile is contrary to that of the scholars mentioned above. He argues that 
“Islam was not yet widespread even in Marv itself” when the Revolution broke out in 129¦747.516 
Furthermore, on the basis of his quantitative study of conversion, Bulliet rejects the assertion made 
by Sharon and affirms Shaban’s view, commenting:  
[They] support the conclusions of recent investigations of the Abbasid revolution who have seen 
it as primarily an Arab movement, despite its origin in eastern Iran. The earlier idea that it 
represents a massive intrusion of Iranian influence into Muslim politics is impossible to sustain 
when it is realized that the population of Iran was only about 8 percent Muslim in 750 when the 
Abbasids came to power.517 
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A careful consideration of the roles of converts and maw[l\ in the revolution is therefore required. 
Historiographical sources contain many accounts of maw[l\ grievances. Both maw[l\ and converts 
are consistently shown protesting and complaining about Umayyad maltreatment. Na~r b. Sayy[r, 
one of the last strong commanders in Khur[s[n, attempted to minimise such concerns. 
Implementing his fiscal reforms in Khur[s[n in 121¦738-739 when he returned from his first 
Transoxanian campaign, he exempted all the non-Arabs who had accepted Islam from jizya (poll 
tax). According to al-Mad[>\n\’s reports, about thirty thousand non-Arab Muslims benefited from 
this reform only in Marv, whereas around eighty thousand non-Muslims benefited, albeit illegally. 
Na~r redressed the situation, modified the rules and adopted measures for the proper and accurate 
implementation of fiscal reforms.518 
While such data may not supply the exact number of non-Arab Muslims, it does convincingly 
suggest that a great number of converts and maw[l\ were in Khur[s[n during the last decade of the 
Umayyads. Agha warns against over-reliance on al-Mad[>in\’s historical accounts, noting that any 
conclusions from his accounts regarding the conversion must be limited to the demographic 
situation of Marv, rather than extrapolated to a wider provincial context. Agha further states that 
“the only fact in this regard extractable from Mad[>in\’s text remains as plain as the author of the 
text intended it to be … there did exist a large number of converts whose grievances Na~r 
addressed.”519 
Such reforms were introduced during the reign of <Umar II in the spirit of Islamisation rather than 
in the interests of fiscal reform. In the footsteps of <Umar II, Ashras also attempted to pacify the 
anger of the agitated converts of Soghd.520 Shaban argues that Ashras had to face the threat of 
Turgesh, and that consequently, he treated the Soghd gently, bestowing grants upon them in order 
to secure his position with them. 521  Al-Bal[dhur\ also provides important information about 
Ashras’s actions, which included increasing the tributes demanded from Transoxania, summoning 
them to Islam and exempting the converts from paying jizya. This policy attracted many to Islam, 
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and since they were exempted from jizya the revenues went into deficit. The policy was effective 
in calming down the dissatisfied people of Transoxania.522 
Agha argues that,  
the establishment, in the periods of intervention between <Umar II’s re-scripts and Ashras’ delusive 
gesture, and between the latter and Na~r’s reforms, had inadvertently and unwittingly ceded the 
turf to these two competitors. And all three reformist attempts represent but two brief and 
ineffective awakenings, and a third which arrived too late.523  
These three reforms were carried out during the Umayyad period to appease the anger of the 
converts and the maw[l\. Agha’s assessment of Van Vloten and Wellhausen seems plausible: he 
argues that these scholars composed their work at a time when national ideologies were emerging 
in Europe, and that they depicted the Iranian element in the Revolution under such modern 
nationalistic approaches. Sharon also highlights Wellhausen’s application of a modern model of 
national identity and a European political system to the study and analysis of the socio-political 
situation of the Islamic medieval society.524 
As discussed, the matter of maw[l\ formation and evolution is not as simple as is generally 
perceived. Socio-political evolution played a significant role in this formation, particularly during 
the last decade of Umayyad rule. The internal conflict between the Umayyad family, the 
emergence of the Khaw[rij and Shi<\ movements, and the qadar\ doctrine gave impetus to the 
maw[l\ movement. As mentioned earlier, Wal\d II was deposed in 744¦126 and Yaz\d III 
succeeded him, supported not only by the Yemeni Syrian army but also by the Qadar\s.525 Under 
the influence of the Qadar\ doctrine, Yaz\d devised his polices on justice and equality. Among 
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those were (a) that the revenues of each region would be spent on the inhabitants of that region, 
with only the surplus to be sent to the central government; (b) the tax should be imposed fairly on 
the subject people, so that they could live in their lands peacefully; and (c) all Muslims, Arabs and 
maw[l\, would be fairly and equitably treated and that non-Arabs would receive stipends on an 
equal basis.526 
5.4.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
Scholars holding a traditionalist view and who value the role of the maw[l\ in the <Abb[sid 
revolution derive their evidence from Arabic literature, whereas the role of the maw[l\ in the 
<Abb[sid revolution is not given significance in the pre-Modern sources of Umayyad history. As 
we have seen in the case of Ibn Ash<ath, the role of the maw[l\ was at this point  inconsequential 
in the political struggle against the Umayyad. They remained part of all Umayyad and anti-
Umayyad forces in the early chronicles, which validates the view that the maw[l\ are not 
considered to be an independent factor against the Umayyads. By contrast, Arab factionalism is 
given more space in the historical sources. Arab tribalism was strong during the Umayyad period; 
however, with the arrival of the <Abb[sids, Arab factionalism gradually weakened and lost its 
power. Thus, we can see how the role of the maw[l\ increased in the <Abb[sid military 
establishment and how finally a maml]k military establishment came into existence. However, no 
textual historical evidence exists to prove the centrality of the maw[l\ to Umayyad decline.     
This study confirms the over-emphasis on the maw[l\s’ role, particularly in traditionalist modern 
sources. There was dissatisfaction among the increasing numbers of maw[l\ who, having converted 
to Islam, still had to pay taxes in a  manner almost identical  to those who did not accept Islam. 
There was also a significant increase in the number of non-Arab Muslims during the reign of 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. These maw[l\ were not allowed to serve in the army with payment 
except in the frontier regions. Due to the social interaction between the maw[l\ and the descendants 
of the Arabs in the frontier region, a new social integration was engendered between the 
descendants of the old Arab muq[tila and non-Arabs. They assisted each other on all socio-political 
grounds. Non-Arab Muslims participated in the political and resistance movements in their own 
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interest, rebelling against the rulers in North Africa and joining the <Abb[sid revolutionary forces 
for their rights. However, as has been discussed above, given that they belonged to different tribes 
and nations, the maw[l\ were not united against the discriminatory behaviour of the rulers. The 
decisive part in the revolution was played by former Arab warriors residing in the region of 
Khur[s[n. The Shu<]b\ya meanwhile appears during the <Abb[sid period when the process of 
Islamisation. This study’s assessment of the historical sources suggests that the maw[l\s’ role in 
the downfall of the Umayyad was marginal and that most Arabic literary anecdotes purporting to 
feature maw[l\ are fabricated, given the  significant divergence between these and  the accounts 
found in Muslim historiography.  
5.5 A Gramscian Analysis of the Role of the Maw[l\ during Umayyad Rule           
This section analyses the maw[l\s’ role through the lens of Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony. 
In the earlier parts of this chapter, the maw[l\s’ role in anti-Umayyad rebellion movements was 
presented as illustrated in the modern and pre-Modern sources. The division of the pre-modern 
sources into two categories – historiographical and literary – has been noted. Each presents the 
role of the maw[l\s differently. Modern sources also interpret the maw[l\s’ role in various ways. 
Examining the viewpoints of pre-modern and modern scholars on the maw[l\’s role helps to 
construct a more nuanced picture of the maw[l\s’ situation.  It further enable us to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the maw[l\’s socio-political role during the Umayyad period, which in 
turn facilitates a Gramscian-style analysis, employing the theory of cultural hegemony.   
Specifically it asks: how a Gramsican view locates the maw[l\s within a subordinate class; how 
this assists understandings of the maw[l\s’ developing class consciousness; how the Ibn Ash<ath 
movement provides context for an analysis of this class consciousness, and how <Umar b. <Abd  
<Az\z’s reforms for elevating the status of the maw[l\ and addressing their resentments are 
interpreted according to a Gramscian understanding? Were these reforms introduced to bring 
change in the political structure or to pacify the anger and bitterness of the anti-Umayyad forces?  
This study also considers whether it is possible to say that <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z’s reforms 
represent, in Gramscian term, an attempt to stage passive revolution? It further considers how the 
reforms introduced by Ashras and Na~r b. Sayy[r in his last days may be interpreted in the light of 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony. The presence of maw[l\ in all anti- and pro-Umayyad 
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socio-political movements displays all the characteristics of what Grasmci termed contradictory 
‘common sense’. The role of Shu<]b\ya is also evaluated with reference to Gramsci’s concept of 
folklore. Finally this section assesses the maw[l\s’ role in the Umayyad decline through 
application of Gramsci’s cultural hegemony theory, since this highly influential social theory can 
shed light on the reality of maw[l\  contributions to the dynasty’s eventual decline.   
5.5.1 Maw[l\ as a Subordinate Class and Gramsci 
Modern and pre-modern sources alike portray the maw[l\ as a class subordinate to the Arab rulers. 
The early Umayyads successfully established their authority over the non-Arab maw[l\ without 
conferring equal rights on them; the maw[l\ in turn accepted Arab hegemony without significant 
protest. The question as to why the maw[l\ extended their consent and willingness to the 
Umayyads and Arab aristocracy remains to be answered, as does that of the nature of the socio-
political conditions which compelled them to accept the Arab hegemony. In Gramscian theory, 
certain conditions are necessary for one class to acquire hegemony over the other. Gramsci 
identifies three conditions as necessary for the establishment of hegemony. First, the hegemonic 
class must have the potential to transform the economic base. Change at the level of production, 
the point at which hegemony first develops, brings a new development which shapes future 
developments in a particular direction. Secondly, the hegemonic class attempts to acquire control 
over the institutions of the state. In so doing, the hegemonic class uses the state apparatuses to 
extend its control over the society. These shape the political structure in the manner best suited to 
their own interests. At this stage the hegemonic class acquires authority by maintaining 
“equilibrium between its own fundamental interests which must prevail, and that of secondary 
social groups which must not be sacrificed”,527  and the political structure in the existing economic 
conditions unites the subordinate groups under the rule of the dominant class or group.  
Thirdly, the hegemonic class presents its ideology through intellectuals who present the ideology 
and worldview of the dominant class in a manner acceptable to the subordinate class. Scholars 
diffuse the ‘dominant class’ ideology throughout society, developing an ideological organic link 
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through which to integrate the various sections of society. Woolcock asserts that, in Gramscian 
understanding, a class is able to reinforce its authority over society by virtue of its capacity to 
control the society’s economic activities. At this point, the ideas of a ruling class become the ruling 
ideas and by virtue of these dominant ideas, the ruled class extends its active consent to the ruling 
class.528  
The chief economic resources were in the hands of the Arabs, who fulfilled all of these conditions 
during the Umayyad period and consequently had the potential to transform the economic base to 
their desired direction. Meanwhile, the position of the maw[l\ was secondary, since they were 
workers under their Arab masters and lacked the authority to move the economic base in a 
particular direction. Only Arabs had the capacity to shape people’s future in a specific direction. 
The ruling party of the Umayyads was Arab, as were all leading oppositional parties who claimed 
Arab supremacy. In theory, the Khaw[rij argued for the equality of all Muslims but in practice 
they were also centred around the Arab identity. This too put the Arabs in a position to assert their 
authority over the maw[l\ who undertook to work as a subordinate class. Further, the Umayyads 
were the dominant hegemon among the Arabs because of their successful control over the 
institutions of the state. The early Umayyads, in contrast to their oppositional forces, controlled 
the state apparatuses in order to extend control over society. They successfully maintained an 
equilibrium between their own fundamental interests and those of the maw[l\, and while the non-
Arabs might not have been satisfied with their subordinate status, the existing economic conditions 
forced them to accept Umayyad hegemony. 
The Umayyads also fulfilled Gramsci’s third condition, according to which the dominant class 
mobilises the intellectual to present the ideology of the dominant class in a manner acceptable to 
the subordinate class. The intellectuals disseminated an Umayyad worldview and developed an 
ideological organic link for uniting various social strata. By obtaining the consent of the maw[l\, 
the early Umayyads became the hegemonic class. As Gramsci explains, hegemony is “the 
spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed 
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on social life by the dominant fundamental group.” 529  As previously mentioned, al-@al[b\ 
classified maw[l\ into three categories: (i) the maw[l\ who had been slaves and later freed by their 
Arab lords; (ii) the maw[l\ who were leading Islamic scholars; and (iii) the maw[l\ who accepted 
Islam without associating themselves with any Arab tribe.530  
The first two categories accepted Arab hegemony. Those maw[l\ who were religious scholars 
occupied the role of  intellectuals and ‘deputies’ of the ruling class. For instance, when <Umar b. 
<Abd al-<Az\z offered Mak+]l the office of judge, the latter refused to accept, remarking: “The 
Prophet said: ‘only a man respected by his own people is to judge men’ but I am a mawl[.”531 This 
clearly demonstrates the non-Arab intellectuals’ acceptance of Arab authority. This study does not 
claim that both of these categories accepted Umayyad hegemony. Rather, it suggests that they 
accepted Arab hegemony and extended their consent to accept Arab authority. In the early 
Marw[nid period, the maw[l\ worked under the authority of different Arab groups to whom they 
were affiliated. The third category of maw[l\ meanwhile was characterised by class consciousness 
and social dissatisfaction over the issue of equal rights and assimilation into Muslim society. They 
stood for their rights throughout Umayyad rule, participating in several anti-Umayyad Arab 
movements. Perhaps because they realised that Arab authority was well established, they did not 
separately initiate any resistance movement; consequently they worked as a class that was 
subordinate to the Arabs during the entire period. The emergence of the Shu<]b\ya movement 
occurred later, during the <Abb[sid era.  
5.5.2 Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural Hegemony and the Maw[l\s’ Role in Ibn Ash<ath’s 
Movement  
Arab hegemony was primarily established during the early Umayyad period. It seems that the non-
Arabs accepted their position as a subordinate class, and remained untroubled by class 
consciousness or struggle. The maw[l\, as  common men, did not have any coherent thinking about 
their identity and social status, and this too is consistent with Gramsci’s elaboration. To Gramsci, 
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common men often hold a contradictory position on a particular topic, due to what he terms their 
‘disjointed and episodic’ consciousness. Contradiction is one of the most important characteristics 
of common sense.532 In Gramscian terms, the maw[l\ possessed common sense. Therefore, they 
joined various socio-political movements during the Umayyad period without realising their own 
identity. Their participation in Ibn Ash<ath’s movement also reveals their contradictory thinking.  
Why did the maw[l\ support Ibn Ash<ath particularly when they knew that both Ibn Ash<ath and 
|ajj[j b. Y]suf were Arabs? Ibn Ash<ath did not initiate his movement for the maw[l\ cause. 
Similarly, there is no reference in historical sources to Ibn Ash<ath’s criticism of the Umayyads 
for their discriminatory policies regarding the maw[l\. Ibn Ash<ath’s movement, as discussed 
above, was not initiated in response to hostilities between the maw[l\ of Iraq and the Syrian regime.  
Rather, it responded to the conflict that emerged between Ibn Ash<ath and Hajj[j b. Y]suf, when 
the latter appointed the former as leader of the Peacock Army, directing him towards Sijist[n in 
80AH. The army was successful but Ibn Ash<ath later rejected |ajj[j’s orders. Al-^abar\ noted 
that Ibn Ash<ath’s army consisted of one hundred thousand soldiers, gathered from Kufa, Basra, 
the frontier regions of the state and Dayr Jam[jim. They were not only maw[l\  but also Arabs, 
and all demanded |ajj[j b. Y]suf’s dismissal from power.533 
Maw[l\ participation in the Ibn Ash<ath movement reveals their contradictory position. They 
supported an Arab against an Arab without realising that neither had any agenda to strengthen or 
elevate the maw[l\s’ position. The absence of coherence in their thinking gave the anti-Umayyad 
resistance movement the chance to use them for their own gain. Moreover, their struggle was 
disjointed and episodic, due to the lack of class consciousness and coherent identity. Thus, both 
Umayyad and anti-Umayyad groups utilised the force of maw[l\  for their own ends.  
5.5.3. The Maw[l\ and Umayyad Reforms- A Passive Revolution  
The third category of the maw[l\, as noted above, is that of the non-Arabs who accepted Islam. 
Class consciousness emerged primarily from within this category of non-Arabs and in particular 
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among the people of Khur[s[n. These converted non-Arabs included both poor artisans and the 
landlords and aristocrats of previous regimes. Furthermore, the Arab settlers were in a close 
relationship with these converted non-Arabs. Another element of their class consciousness was the 
active work of anti-Umayyad groups in the region. Such groups initiated their political movements 
on the slogan of equality for all Muslims, and advocated the assimilation of Arabs with non-Arabs 
while condemning discriminatory socio-economic policies. All these elements contributed to the 
development of class consciousness among the people of Khur[s[n. In a Gramscian perspective, a 
society characterised by strong class consciousness is a society that is difficult to control. 
Therefore, the ruling class has to devise suitable and acceptable policies in order to maintain its 
hegemony. Without such measures, great leeway exists for flourishing rebellious movements to 
end the authority of the ruling class. In order to pacify people’s rebellious tendencies the ruling 
class has to introduce reforms in the existing system.      
Historical sources give great importance to the rule of <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z for his socio-
economic and political reforms. He presented a worldview different from his predecessors, for  
instance exempting converted non-Arabs from the poll-tax and introducing a policy of agreements 
and reconciliation with anti-Umayyad Khaw[rij and <Alids. A Gramscian view would interpret all 
such reforms as attempts to appease the oppositional forces without changing the original structure 
of the ruling class.  Gramsci considers that the ruling class introduces such steps as a way through 
which an organic crisis may be diffused. They reorganise the structure and pattern of the 
government without changing the dominance of the ruling class. These reforms are launched to 
delay the organic crisis and to prevent “the development of a revolutionary adversary by 
‘decapitating’ its revolutionary potential.”534 As Fatton explains, “Society had to change if it were 
to preserve its most fundamental structures”,535 and a passive revolution represents the pre-emptive 
response of the ruling class to a dissatisfied and disorganised subordinate class containing the 
potential and threat eventually to challenge their authority. In this situation, Gramsci notes: “the 
traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes men and programmes and 
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with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, re-absorbs the control that was 
slipping from its grip.”536   
Muslim historians and Islamists tend to eulogise <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z for his reforms, which 
were focused towards organic crisis and its potential to challenge the authority of the ruling class. 
His reforms were an attempt to restore the hegemony of the ruling class. While he initiated 
dialogue with the Khaw[rij, he did not accept their real demands. Meanwhile the Khaw[rij 
accepted his authority and demanded changes in the criteria for caliphal selection. They asked him 
to change the will of Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik, according to which Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik 
would be the ruler after <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z. They realised him that Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik 
was not a pious person and that consequently he was ineligible for this post. <Umar b. <Abd al-
<Az\z accepted their notion in theory but in practice did not change the will of Sulaym[n regarding 
Yaz\d  b. <Abd al-Malik. In fact, <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z’s reformation was a successful attempt 
to bring about passive revolution. He successfully restored the hegemony of the ruling class by re-
arranging and re-deploying political forms of governance and representation. As noted earlier, a 
passive revolution is a peaceful survival of a ruling class in conditions of organic crisis.537  
Passive revolution thus signifies revolution without revolution. It constitutes a peaceful restoration 
of ruling class power, characterised by a constrained type of hegemony which touches only the 
cadres and leaders of the subaltern classes, but not the subaltern classes themselves. The result, 
concludes Gramsci, is “the formation of an ever more extensive ruling class.” 538  In this 
perspective, the organic crisis is resolved almost exclusively “from above”.539 The reformative 
movement of <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z indeed constitutes an effort to resolve the crisis ‘from above’, 
since he mobilised the leading religious scholars and intellectuals (who in Gramscian terms occupy 
the role of civil society) to present the state’s world-view adequately. Gramsci asserts that civil 
society and political society “correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the 
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dominant group exercises throughout society, and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ 
or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical government’.”540  
In hegemony, according to Gramscian thought, a certain way of life and thought is dominant, and 
is diffused throughout society to inform norms, values and tastes, political practices, and social 
relations. This diffusion is based on a specific organisation of consent, which has, but is not limited 
to, an economic base, and results from a combination of such coercion and consent, the latter 
achieved through the hegemonic cooptation of groups in civil society, resulting in “coercive 
orthodoxy”. 541   Elements of civil society are co-opted by the state and used to secure the 
acquiescence of the dominated classes and to ensure their identification with the hegemonic world 
order. In this state of affairs, civil society becomes part of an extended state, utilised by the ruling 
class to form and maintain its hegemony by cooptation, through which the ruling class assimilates 
ideas that it sees as potentially dangerous, and creates cultural and political consensus. This process 
becomes an instrument of passive revolution, through which hegemonic forces allow limited (and 
to an extent false) freedom of self-expression for hegemonic groups, thereby maintaining the 
continued consent to the current relations of force.542  
The intellectuals of a given society present the ruling class’s worldview in a manner acceptable to 
the ruled class. This process may be seen as their creation of a space in which the ruled class feels 
inspired to offer its consent to the ruling class, who determine and define the law and order of the 
land. The extent to which intellectuals fail in securing the free consent of the subordinate class is 
the extent to which the state has to use ‘coercive apparatus’543 to discipline those who do not accept 
hegemony by consent. In the case of failure, an organic crisis develops, jeopardising the state’s 
future. Perhaps the reforms of <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z prolonged Umayyad hegemony because he 
successfully mobilised the intellectuals of his era to diffuse the state’s worldview among the 
masses. The above discussion endorses the suggestion by this thesis that the reformative movement 
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of <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z was actually a successful effort for passive revolution. However, the 
crux of the problem between subordinate and ruling classes remained unresolved and reappeared 
during the last eight years of Umayyad rule. While Na~r b. Sayy[r also attempted in his last days 
to eliminate the grievances of the people of Khur[s[n, it was too late to appease them in a long 
term and appropriate manner. Moreover, Na~r could not successfully mobilise civil society to 
acquire the consent of the common people.  
5.5.3 A Critical Study of the Shu<]b\ya in the Context of Class Consciousness and Identity in 
Gramscian Perspective  
As the earlier part of this chapter has shown, the Shu<]b\ya movement emerged to blunt the sharp 
boundaries of the racial legacy that had segregated the Muslim community into Arabs and non-
Arabs. Their approach was more holistically based and focused on the elements of Muslim 
nationalistic identity. The Shu<]b\ya movement, which  had attracted many maw[l\, took their 
name from the words in the Qur[nic verses, which reveal that Allah created male and female and 
made the people into shu<]b (races) and qab[>il (tribes) for mutual recognition, and continue to 
declare that the person who is most pious amongst the people is the most noble.544  The qab[<il 
were taken to signify the Arab tribes while the shu<]b denoted the non-Arab maw[l\. These non-
Arab maw[l\ were of different categories, e.g., those who were under the Sassanid Kingdom, and 
can be divided into two groups. The dihq[ns or feudal lords owned property and interests under 
Sassanid rule and functioned as a bridge between the King and the masses. Most of these nobles 
saved their prestige by accepting Islam and retaining their previous position while the masses, 
treated as slaves, only managed, after their acceptance of Islam to secure their freedom by attaching 
themselves to some Arab tribe. Thus they gained the status of maw[l\ or client to their masters.  
While the second group maw[l\ were from the lower classes, they were inspired by Islamic ideas 
of equality, justice and Muslim identity.545 However, in practice, they could not secure equal 
positions to those occupied by Arabs.  
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Various factors were involved in the development of class consciousness and identity among the 
people of Khur[s[n. Consequently such class consciousness appeared to differing degrees among 
the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n. Gramsci suggests that there are three different levels of consciousness of 
various social groups: (i) the class consciousness of the masses of a class; (ii) the ideology of 
‘organic party intellectuals’; and (iii) the science of the philosophers. Socio-economic aspirations 
are expressed in the class consciousness of the masses by developing a ‘common sense’ 
understanding of the class situation, while the ideology of ‘organic party intellectuals’ attempts to 
mobilise the masses and present an ideology based on popular aspirations; whereas the science of 
the philosophers or the specialised workers attempts to understand a social reality. Class 
consciousness, ideology and science therefore all hold hegemonic significance. In the case of 
Khur[s[n, the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n by virtue of their high socio-economic position, argued for 
equal rights. Secondly, because of their distinctive socio-economic position, the realisation of class 
identity appeared among the masses. Thirdly, the intellectuals of the Shu<]b\ya worked actively to 
inspire class consciousness among the people. Fourthly, the <Abb[sid movement helped them to 
develop class consciousness among the masses because this, too, was a group oriented towards the 
equality and assimilation of all human beings on the basis of religious ideology. Lastly, the 
Shu<]b\ya movement flourished not only in Khur[s[n but across the <Abb[sid caliphate when the 
non-Arabs successfully acquired a central position in the <Abb[sid court.  
As discussed earlier, the development of Shu<b\ya reached its climax during the <Abb[sid period, 
while the Umayyad period provided the starting point for the development of class-consciousness 
among the non-Arabs. According to Gramsci’s theory, common sense philosophy provides fertile 
ground for the development of class consciousness and the reinforcement of ethnic identity. He 
identifies sources of the common sense philosophy or ‘spontaneous philosophy’ of the masses, 
theorising that the former may be found in language, as it may be found  “in popular religion and 
therefore, also in the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and of 
acting, which are collectively bundled together under the name of ‘folklore’.”546 The stories of al-
Agh[n\ and al-<Iqd al-Far\d, as some of them revealed above, in the context of the Umayyad era 
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are by far the best example of ‘spontaneous philosophy’ and ‘folklore’. Many of the stories of al-
Agh[n\ and al-<Iqd  are not considered authentic and are usually criticised for their fabrications, 
even though these stories had greatly assisted the construction of class consciousness and ethnic 
identity.        
The maw[l\ slowly gathered enough strength to take opportunities to elevate themselves to the 
Arabs’ level. According to tradition, the Arabs incorporated the maw[l\  into the Arabian tribal 
system and the maw[l\  fought side by side with the Arabs. However, the Arabs did not accept the 
non-Arab Muslims as equal members of their socio-religious life. The maw[l\ gradually grew in 
number and their importance increased, particularly the Persian and Christian maw[l\ who were 
well-read and highly-educated. Because of their increasing importance, they gained a higher 
position in Muslim society. Furthermore, the Muslim identity of the maw[l\s became evident when 
the state compelled the distinguishing of non-Muslims from Muslims. Hakim argues that, “both 
became merged in the term ‘Muslim’ which even to this day represents for many people, their 
nationality. The politico-religious movement then swept away the dominion of the Umayyad and 
thereby the International Empire of the Abbasids supplemented nationalistic Islam.” 547  Arab 
hegemony came to end and a mixed official aristocracy came into being. Thus the element of 
Persian civilisation became a permanent feature of Muslim society. Similarly, the infiltration of 
Hellenism and the Greek norm became evident with the conquest of Syria, Mesopotamia, and 
Egypt.  
The traditional authority patterns of the early Umayyad were challenged. Both the Arab settlers in 
Khur[s[n and their subjects posed many questions concerning the rationality of the traditional state 
of affairs. The Khaw[rij, <Abb[sids, and Qadar\s were the most important intellectual movements 
to question the established authority of the Umayyads. Attracting the masses in large numbers, 
their teachings played a vital role in the shaping of Arab political history. Gramsci views this “faith 
in a certain rationality of history” as mixed with superstitious and religious elements, giving the 
masses reliance in time of defeat, but leading to passivity if not subjected to critical pedagogy.548 
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Even if the dominant hegemony attempts to bring about homogeneity in religious belief, in 
practice, even within a single religion, there are number of contradictory religions that are 
practised. Common sense is “influenced by the crudest and least elaborated forms” of these 
religions and even previous religions.549 In this context, it may plausibly be argued that pre-Islamic 
Persian vanity helped the people of Khur[s[n to construct their distinctive identity in the changing 
milieu of Arab domination.     
The socio-religious movements of the late Umayyad period were agreed on one point, namely that 
they rejected all kinds of discrimination, particularly on a racial basis. They were critical of any 
distinction between Muslims. For this reason, they rejected the Umayyad policies that centred on 
the superiority of Arabs and the inferiority of non-Arabs. Consequently, a significant number of 
the maw[l\ were present in these movements and participated in the rebellions against Umayyad 
rule. Similarly the Shi<\s gathered great support from the maw[l\s of Marv.  Documentary evidence 
indicates that the maw[l\ joined all movements that validated their privileges. This situation, 
according to Gramscian theory, indicates that class consciousness was not established among the 
maw[l\. Accordingly, their role in the revolutionary process may be viewed with some confidence 
as secondary and marginal. Furthermore, since they did not have a coherent ideology which could 
help them to secure their rights, they joined different oppositional forces who assured their 
wellbeing.   
Belyaev, as a modern revisionist scholar, applies the Marxist approach to interpreting Umayyad 
history. 550  The Marxist approach observes how society evolves through the relationship of 
different classes in social stages, from primitive to communal, to slave, to feudal society. Belyaev 
asserts that the Byzantine society was a slave society moving towards the formation of a proto-
feudal society, while the Arabs were at the primitive communal stage moving to a slave society 
when Islam appeared in the Arabian Peninsula. He studies early Islamic history from the 
perspective of social development and observes a shift in the social order of the tribal Arab 
aristocracy that emerged as a class of feudal landlords. The Umayyads are presented as tyrants 
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whereas the Khaw[rij were the militant working class, dissatisfied with their social and economic 
status. Belyaev criticises Hish[m’s fiscal policies, including his imposition of heavy taxes which 
lost society’s support and engendered widespread unrest and in turn resulted in the emergence of 
factionalism which Hish[m’s successors could not manage. As Belyaev notes:  
the active discontent of the working masses in all the lands of the Caliphate resulted 
in the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty for it had lost all social support. The vast 
resources accumulated by Hish[m in the state treasury were dissipated under his 
politically inept and inactive successors, and his fiscal administration, consider 
excellent and his well-organised army were soon out of order.551 
Belyaev considers Marw[n b. Mu+ammad an excellent military leader who nevertheless failed to 
restore Umayyad political authority due to factionalism and to conflict within the royal family. 
From this perspective, the Khaw[rij mobilised the dissatisfied masses in Iraq while the <Abb[sids 
attracted the local dihq[n and peasant working class of Khur[s[n and Transoxiana. Their rebellion 
against the Umayyads is categorically viewed as the struggle of a deprived working class which 
resulted in the fall of a regime.552  Belyaev clearly saw the maw[l\ as working class. All socio-
political and religious parties took advantage of the social unrest in order to motivate the working 
classes to eventually terminating Umayyad rule. Analysing the causes of the Umayyads’ decline 
through the application of Marxist theory is undoubtedly a novel approach. However, the 
construction of the Kh[w[rij and the maw[l\ as working class seems somewhat misleading. 
Belyaev argues that increasing fiscal exploitation, harsh punishment, and executions of defaulters 
generated unrest and hostility against the rule of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, until the masses rose 
up against the rule in almost all of the provinces of the caliphate.  
Contrary to Marx’s historical materialism, Gramsci focused on analysis of the impact of the socio-
cultural and ideological in the formation of hegemony. His hegemony concept refreshed Marxist 
approaches to the analysis of revolutionary process. As Femia explains: 
Gramsci’s description of popular consciousness in modern bourgeois society is, in 
principle, empirically testable; and it is also evaluated in the light of recent survey 
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studies. The major premise of Gramsci’s theory of revolution is that objective 
material interests are not automatically or inevitably translated into class 
consciousness.553  
In the light of Gramscian understandings of the modern bourgeoisie, the present study finds that 
class consciousness did not emerge among the people of Khur[s[n on the basis of objective 
material interests; rather, it was the <Abb[sid ideology that inspired and encouraged its 
development. Different sections of society united themselves against the Umayyads under the 
<Abb[sids who presented a solid alternative and counter-hegemonic ideology. Thus, the maw[l\ 
and Arab settlers supported the <Abb[sids to overthrow the Umayyads. However, given their lack 
of clear corporate identity as well as of critical self-awareness, the role of the maw[l\ in achieving 
this dramatic and lasting change was in all likelihood quite marginal.      
In addition to the growing role of religious movements and the changing socio-economic relations 
of Arabs with non-Arabs, a significant change also occurred in Arab tribal structure. The ruling 
Arabs could not maintain their <a~ab\ya in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. Consequently, 
the <Abb[sids, with assistance from the non-Arabs of Khur[s[n, brought revolution. The role of 
<a~ab\ya in the Umayyads’ decline is analysed in the following chapter.  
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6 Chapter Six: <A~ab\ya, Tribalism and the Decline of the Umayyads  
6.1 Introduction   
In evaluating the early sources on the issue of <a~ab\ya (group feeling) and its role in the fall of the 
Umayyads, it is assumed that the later Umayyads were unable to maintain their <a~ab\ya, since it 
is observed that a conflict arose among members of the Umayyad family. Similarly, at a national 
level, the Arabs could not preserve their <a~ab\ya and conflict broke out among the Arab tribes. 
Consequently, the <Abb[sids took advantage of the Umayyads’ weak <a~ab\ya and tribal discord 
and, with the support of Arab settlers and the non-Arabs of Khur[s[n, replaced the Arab kingdom 
of Umayyad. To understand the tribal conflict in a historical perspective, the theme of <a~ab\ya is 
presented through three competing groups: (i) The internal conflict within the Umayyad family; 
(ii) Yemen\s¦Kalb\s versus Mu#ar\s¦Qays\s; and (iii) the H[shimids-Abbasids versus the 
Umayyads. The latter theme contains both tribal and religious elements. The Hashimid-Umayyad 
conflict does have historical tribal roots but because the H[shimid movement was initiated on 
religious grounds, it did not promote a tribal identity. However, the movement did take advantage 
of tribal rivalries, which is one of two important themes already touched on for discussion. The 
question is, how did the modern and pre-modern historiographers interpret and present in their 
works the <a~ab\ya and its role in the decline of the Umayyads? To answer this, Gramsci’s theory 
of cultural hegemony will be applied to the analysis of tribal conflict and its role in the fall of the 
Umayyads. In order to present this systematically, this chapter is divided into three sections.   
The first section defines the concept of <a~ab\ya and how it is theorised by Ibn Khald]n. A 
meticulous effort was made to understand how pre-modern scholars recorded the role of <a~ab\ya 
in the Umayyads’ decline by analysing the works of five pre-modern historiographers: 
1. Al-Ya<q]b\, A+mad b. Ya<q]b (d. 284¦897): T[r\kh al-Ya<q]b\ 
2. Al-^abar\, Ab] Ja<far Mu+ammad b. Jar\r (d. 310¦923): T[r\kh al-Rus]l wa-al-Mul]k  
3. Al-Mas<]d\, Ab] al-|asan <Al\ b. Husayn (d. 345¦956): Mur]j al-Dhahab 
4. Ibn Ath\r, <Al\ b. Mu+ammad (d. 630 A.H.): al-K[mil f\ al-T[r\kh 
5. Ibn Khald]n, Ab] Zayd <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Mu+ammad b. Mu+ammad (808¦1406): 
Kit[b al-<Ibar wa-D\w[n al-Mubtad[> wa-al-Khabar 
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Through the application of Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya, the research found that a careful 
study of each source enabled an understanding of the downfall of the Umayyads, with special 
reference to the <a~ab\ya. Examining the sources showed how much <a~ab\ya contributed to the 
disintegration of the Umayyads and how much importance was given to this particular theme by 
these five historiographers.  
The second section is devoted to the study of the modern sources in order to determine how they 
interpret the role of <asab\ya in the disintegration of the Umayyad dynasty, while the third section 
focuses on an analysis of the role of tribalism in the fall of the Umayyads in the light of Gramsci’s 
theory of cultural hegemony.  
6.2 Ibn Khald]n’s Theory of the <A~ab\ya   
All five pre-modern sources contain significant reports regarding tribal conflict. However, Ibn 
Khald]n has formulated his own systematic theory of <a~ab\ya in the study of the evolution and 
development of human society. Thus, it is necessary at this point to explain Ibn Khald]n’s concept 
of <a~ab\ya. Ibn Khald]n is regarded as the originator of the<a~ab\ya (group feeling) theory and the 
founder of Muslim positivist theory.554 He based his ideas on observation and speculation rather 
than on traditional concepts,555  and attempted to study a society through its social progress. 
According to his theory, <a~ab\ya is the vibrant element that plays a central role in the acquisition 
of power, the formation of state, and the rise and fall of civilisations based on the rise and fall of 
‘the state’. Therefore,<a~ab\ya is given high priority in Ibn Khald]n’s theory of the rise and fall of 
civilisations. However, modern scholars interpret the concept of <a~ab\ya in different ways. For 
example, the Egyptian scholar, Abdullah Enan explains that the <a~ab\ya constitutes the very life 
of a state or dynasty;556 and Aziz al-Azmeh sees <a~ab\ya as armour or a weapon; that is, a strong 
element of a Sovereign Group.557 M. G. Rasul explains the idea of Ibn Khald]n’s concept of 
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<a~ab\ya. Ibn Khald]n considers that in the formation of a state, one of the factors is the sense of 
oneness or group-mind, which he termed <a~ab\ya’; and this group mind and religion are two of 
the most important factors at the root of its evolution.558 
Ibn Khald]n illustrated different types of Bedouin society in the prolegomena of his History, and 
pronounced new theories, one of which was <a~ab\ya, to explain this social phenomenon.  He 
suggested that the <a~ab\ya was a source of power and authority in a nomadic and tribal society 
based on a common family lineage and within which every member enjoyed and shared the same 
power and nobility. He maintained that it was necessary for the defence of a hamlet in a Bedouin 
set-up to establish a tribal militia of noble youths of that tribe. They could succeed only if they 
were a closely-knit group. Respect for <a~ab\ya was instinctive and based on a blood relationship 
or similar, such as through marriage.559  The direct relationship provided a strong group feeling, 
which would weaken with the generations. Therefore, the power of <a~ab\ya tended to last for four 
generations before beginning to decline. It might extend through six generations but would be in 
a state of decadence.560 The vitality of the tribe and its nobility would become increasingly weaker 
until finally the unity of the tribe would disintegrate and its power would end with the dissolution 
of its noble lineage. Consequently, power shifted from one tribe to another, that is, to a tribe that 
proved to have superiority in terms of number and force.561 
Ibn Khald]n attempted to make his theory more coherent in the third chapter of his prolegomena. 
He asserted that the major object of <a~ab\ya was to acquire sovereignty.562 No state or dynasty 
could come into existence without the vital force of <a~ab\ya. However, when a tribe attained 
power in a state then the leading members of the tribe did not bestow authority on all its members. 
However, this attitude was considered to be detrimental to the unity of the tribe. The dynamics of 
<a~ab\ya are thus contrary to that of state sovereignty. This is because on the basis of <a~ab\ya, all 
members of a tribe attempt to share their power and resources while the state aims to monopolize 
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glory, fame, and comfort for the monarch or royal family. The monarch or members of the royal 
family cannot satisfy all the members of the tribe. Eventually, they begin to disagree with the royal 
family, there is conflict and <a~ab\ya or tribal solidarity becomes weak which culminates in the 
downfall of the state.563 
Ibn Khald]n claimed that the state, like men, had a ‘natural’ age. According to his assessment, a 
state generally lasted from its emergence to its rise and fall throughout three generations. One 
generation was estimated to last about forty years. Thus, a natural age for the state was about one 
hundred and twenty years.564 He considered religion to be an important factor in the extent of the 
authority of the state but, according to him, religious doctrines could not be upheld without 
<a~ab\ya. Ibn Khald]n felt that royal authority could be achieved only with the benefit of a group 
or group feeling. Religion injected a new vigour into a tribe at the beginning of an era, along with 
its power to generate group feeling. However, religious propaganda could only be successful when 
it was accompanied by group feeling.565 He took the view that when group feeling disappeared 
from a tribe, royal authority would pass to another branch until the whole tribe ceased to exist. 
With the advent of Islam the pre-Islamic authority of the Umayyads passed to the H[shimids. The 
Umayyads restored it when Mu<[w\ya came into power and <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n 
consolidated the authority of the Umayyads on the basis of Arab identity. Then again, authority 
passed to the <Abb[sids who initiated their movement on a religious basis by combining the force 
of both Arabs and non-Arabs.  The early Muslim historical sources are examined to see the extent 
to which this theory is applicable to Umayyad history.   
6.3 Inter-tribal Conflict and Conflict within the House of Umayyads in pre-Modern 
Sources  
During the Umayyad period the pre-modern historians generally recorded historical events without 
identifying the driving force, whereas the modern scholars present various paradigms for the 
interpretation of the events of the Umayyad period. According to Judd, three of them are 
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particularly significant: “conflict within the Umayyad ruling family, tribal feuds and differences 
over imperial policy.”566 This section aims to understand how the pre-modern sources recorded 
the first two themes in their chronicles and will help us to understand the value of the interpretation 
of modern scholars who have selected one of these themes to elaborate the causes of the 
Umayyads’ decline.  
6.3.1 The Tribal Conflict of Yemen versus Mu#ar in Pre-modern Sources  
The pre-Modern sources of the Umayyad period present various narratives on the issue of tribal 
conflict between the Yemen and Mu#ar, based on the pre-Islamic rivalry between them. For a 
period of time Islam overrode the tribal rivalries, as the early Muslim caliphs successfully united 
the hostile tribes and created harmony among them. The caliphs also used Arab unity to expand 
their rule against their non-Arab and non-Muslim opponents. The early Umayyads remained 
successful in managing Arab unity and consequently were able to establish an Arab empire, with 
the Yemen\ Syrian tribes providing a strong base for Umayyad rule. The early Umayyads, 
however, extended their power by maintaining equilibrium between the conflicting tribes. It is 
argued that the later Umayyads could not unite the Arabs and conflict arose between them on a 
tribal basis which led them to collapse.  The pre-Modern sources illustrated this conflict mainly in 
the context of socio-political development in Iraq and Khur[s[n. Most of the events of tribal 
conflicts revolve around a pair of characters: Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf b. <Umar in Iraq and Na~r 
and al-Kirm[n\ in Khur[s[n. A study of the nature of conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf 
b. <Umar is contained in a separate appendix in this thesis. This section aims to analyse the pre-
Modern sources in order to understand the nature of tribal conflict, i.e., whether the tribal conflict 
between the Yemen and Mu#ar had its roots in pre-Islamic history or whether there was conflict 
between various personalities and interest groups and how much importance has been given to 
tribal conflict in the pre-Modern historiographies.  
Al-Ya<q]b\ considers that the conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf b. <Umar was not on a 
tribal basis. He records that Hish[m removed Kh[lid from the governorship of Iraq because he 
wanted to take strict measures against the H[shimid movement. Kh[lid was not suitable for this 
                                                 
566 Steven C. Judd, The Third Fitna,  2.  
207 
 
job since he had been accused of providing financial assistance to the H[shimid leaders, whereas 
Y]suf b. <Umar had the ability to achieve the required objectives. Y]suf b. <Umar crushed the 
rebellion and killed Zayd b. <Al\ and his supporters. Thus, according to al-Ya<q]b\, it was the 
H[shmid movement that played a central role in the fall of the Umayyads whereas the tribal 
conflict between Qays and Yemen was not real and the rivalry between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf 
b. <Umar was on a personal basis only.  
Al-Ya<q]b\ briefly notes that the deaths of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Ibr[h\m and Mu+ammad, sons of 
Hish[m, created an uncomfortable atmosphere for al-Wal\d. Kh[lid al-Qasr\’s tribe and a group 
from the Yemen took the oath of allegiance to Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, who then took authority into his 
own hands by deposing and finally killing al-Wal\d in Jam[d\ II, 126 AH.567 Al-Ya<q]b\ does not 
explicitly mention this tribal conflict  during the reign of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and Ibr[h\m b. al-
Wal\d until the end of the latter’s rule in @afar, 127.568 Al-Ya<q]b\ gives a brief comment on the 
tribal conflict that emerged between the Yemen and Mu#ar in Khur[s[n, noting a conflict between 
the governor of Khur[s[n Na~r b. Sayy[r and al-Kirm[n\. Na~r supported the Mu#ar against the 
Yemen.  Jad\< b. <Al\ al-Kirm[n\ was the leader of the Azad tribe, and the Yemen and Rab\<a 
extended their loyalty to al-Kirm[n\. When Na~r imprisoned al-Kirm[n\, the Yemen and Rab\<a 
attacked the prison in order to free him. Al-Ya<q]b\ believed that the Yemen and Rab\<a upheld 
al-Kirm[n\ against Na~r. Therefore, al-Kirm[n\’s position was superior to that of Na~r. Al-Ya<q]b\ 
also records that Ab] Muslim favoured al-Kirm[n\.569  
Despite this, Al-Ya<q]b\ mentions that the power of the last Umayyad caliph, Marw[n b. 
Mu+ammad, was based in the army of al-Jaz\ra and Armenia, while Sulaym[n b. Hish[m retaliated 
against him with the help of the Syrian army. Even so, al-Ya<q]b\ does not attempt to show that 
tribal conflict was a significant factor in regime change.570 On the other hand, he considers that the 
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Khaw[rij struggle against the Umayyads and the conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ for tribal 
reasons strengthened the position of the H[shimid-<Abbasid movement. After a careful reading of 
al-Ya<q]b\’s History, it can be concluded that tribal conflict was not a primary cause in the decline 
of the Umayyads; rather it was the H[shimid-Abbasid movement in Khur[s[n that brought 
Umayyad rule to an end. Although the tribal conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ was observed 
and recorded, it seems that this was to show that it was due to  individual issues.  
Al-^abar\ also illustrates a more systematic and coherent picture of the Umayyads in that he 
devotes more space to the tribal conflict and gives more importance to Khur[s[n and the tribal 
conflict between the Mu#ar and the Yemen. Al-^abar\ records that the tribal conflict emerged in 
Khur[s[n when Asad b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ was deputy in Khur[s[n and fell into conflict with 
Na~r b. Sayy[r and his Mu#ar\ fellows. He punished them with lashings, and warned them that 
Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah was his brother and was supported by twelve thousand Yemen\ soldiers.571 
Hish[m dismissed Asad because of his involvement in the tribal conflict. Like al-Ya<q]b\, Al-
^abar\ also confirms that the dismissal of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and the appointment of Y]suf b. <Umar 
was an administrative change and that their conflict was not on a  tribal basis but involved more 
personal reasons. Al-Mas<]d\’s reports about the removal of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ strengthen the 
narrative that it was not due to tribal hostility or a change in the expansionist policy; rather it was 
an attempt to curb the expanding movement of the H[shimids. Y]suf b. <Umar undertook the task 
of crushing the H[shimids’ strength by ruthlessly killing Zayd b. <Al\ and his followers. On the 
other hand, though Kh[lid was not so hostile towards the H[shimids, he was blamed for assisting 
them financially.572 
In contrast to al-Ya<q]b\ and al-^abar\, al-Mas<]d\ presents a different narrative on the tribal 
conflict, asserting that Muslim rule needed to be analysed in the context of pre-Islamic Arabia. In 
this view, the social construction of pre-Islamic Arab history is a process of preparation for the 
advent of Muhammad. According to him, there were three distinctive tribal groups: the extinct 
Arabs, the Yemen\ Arabs and the Niz[r\ Arabs. All of these were the descendants of S[m, a son 
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of N]+, and migrated to the Arabian Peninsula from Babylon. Al-Mas<]d\ finds it difficult to 
decide which of these three Arab groups was the first to speak Arabic. Little was known about the 
extinct Arabs while both the Yemen\ and Niz[r\ Arabs claimed this credit. The Niz[r\s believed 
that God had bestowed Arabic to Ism[<\l, son of Ibr[h\m. However, the Yemen\s asserted that 
Ism[<\l had learned this language from the Yemen\ tribes living in Mecca. This conflict 
demonstrates the deep socio-political hostility of both tribal groups. In Al-Mas<]d\’s opinion the 
Ya<rub b. Qa+%[n, the ancestor of the Yemen\s, was the originator of the Arabic language while 
Ism[<\l had also learned Arabic independently when he was living with the Yemen\s.573 
According to al-Mas<]d\, the tribal conflict and rivalry between the Yemen\s and Niz[r\s had been 
strong since the pre-Islamic period, and usually emerged at critical times. For instance, after the 
defeat of Marw[n b. Mu+ammad in the battle of Z[b, when <Abd All[h b. <Al\ surrounded 
Damascus, al-Wal\d b. Mu<[w\ya b. <Abd al-Malik came to the city with fifty thousand soldiers. 
This was a sufficient force to retaliate against the opposing troops; however, tribal conflict broke 
out between the Yemen\s and Niz[r\s and  this conflict, in al-Mas<]d\’s view, was so perilous that 
it led to the complete destruction of the Umayyad family. Ab] al-<Abb[s al-Saff[+ hanged many 
Umayyad family members and Syrians in Damascus. Marw[n b. Muhammad was captured in 
Egypt and killed, and Sulaym[n b. Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik was killed in al-Balq[>.Arriving at Nahr 
Ab\ Fa%ras, <Abd Allah b. <Al\ killed more than eighty men of the Umayyad royal family on 
Wednesday, 15th of Dh\ al-Qa<dah , 132 AH.¦750 CE.574 On the basis of the above it can be 
deduced that al-Mas<]d\ considered the tribal conflict and fragility of the Arab a~ab\ya as a factor 
in the fall of the Umayyads. His illustration of the later Umayyads validates the narrative that the 
tribal conflict helped the H[shimid-<Abb[sid movement to flourish in Khur[s[n and Ir[q, with 
both playing a decisive role in the collapse of the Umayyad regime.   
Ibn Ath\r, another pre-Modern historian, evaluated the decline of the Umayyads by devoting a 
reasonable portion of his work to the tribal conflict. Most of his reports are derived from al-^abar\. 
He argues that the strength of the Umayyads was based on the Yemen\s and Syrian army.575 The 
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early Umayyad rulers, including Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, had established their authority on the 
basis of the Yemen but also appointed the governors and other important administrative officers 
from the Mu#ar, thereby maintaining equilibrium between the Yemen and Mu#ar. Ibn Ath\r 
describes the case of Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\, a Yemen\, and his rivalry with Y]suf b. <Umar, 
a Mu#ar\, and its impact in the subsequent history and decline of the Umayyads. 
Ibn Ath\r also reports that Kh[lid served for fifteen years as governor of Iraq and Khur[s[n, during 
the period of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik.576 He was accused of assisting Zayd b. <Al\ b. al-|ussayn 
both financially and morally in his actions against Damascus, and was therefore dismissed and 
replaced by Y]suf b. <Umar.577 Ibn Ath\r also confirms the rivalry between Kh[lid and Y]suf b. 
<Umar. However, Hish[m did not permit Y]suf to harm Kh[lid.578 Kh[lid returned to Damascus 
where he lived peacefully during Hish[m’s rule. His relations with al-Wal\d were disturbed when 
he refused to take an oath of allegiance to his young sons. It was a critical moment; the prominent 
leaders of the Yemen and Qu#[<a, including |urayth, Shab\b b. Ab\ M[lik al-Ghass[n\, Man~]r 
b. Jamh]r al-Kalb\ |ib[l b. <Amr, Ya<q]b b. <Abd al-Ra+m[n, |umayd b. Man~]r al-Lakhm\, al-
A~bagh b. Zuw[la, al-^ufayl b. |[ritha, and al-Sarr\ Ziy[d, gathered around Kh[lid urging him to 
go against the infidel caliph’s proposal. He refused and argued that the caliph’s infidelity and 
heresy were rumours.579 When al-Wal\d asked Kh[lid about the details of the meeting, he refused 
to disclose the discussion. Thus, relations between al-Wal\d and Kh[lid deteriorated.  
Y]suf b. <Umar, the governor of Iraq and Kh[lid’s worst enemy observed the situation. He came 
to al-Wal\d with money and Iraqi assets. He imprisoned Kh[lid, then tortured and finally killed 
him.580 This act infuriated the Yemen and Kh[lid’s tribe. Ibn Ath\r records the expressive anger of 
the Yemen\ poets.581 Hish[m’s policy to maintain a balance of power between the Yemen and 
Mu#ar was completely shattered. Hish[m had always attempted to minimize the intensity of the 
hostilities between the Mu#ar and Yemen, whereas al-Wal\d became a collaborator of the Mu#ar. 
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Thus, the Yemenis gathered around Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and extended their allegiance to him.582 On 
the basis of their support, he finally killed al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d and overthrew the caliph. 
 Many of the senior members of the royal family expressed their concern about the tribal 
factionalism and the way through which Yaz\d had come to power. His brother al-<Abb[s warned 
Yaz\d not to go against a legal caliph. He also alarmed his second brother Bishr b. al-Wal\d by 
saying that God had permitted the demise of the Umayyads.583 Yaz\d’s ascendancy to power was 
based on the support of the Yemen. He dismissed Y]suf b. <Umar from the governorship of Iraq 
and appointed Man~]r b. Jamh]r. Man~]r supported Yaz\d because of the latter’s attachment to 
Ghayl[n’s ideas; secondly, he wanted to take revenge for Kh[lid.584  Observing the changing 
scenario, Y]suf b. <Umar  then fled from Iraq but the Syrian army caught him and imprisoned him 
in Damascus. Finally, Yaz\d, son of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ killed him there when Ibr[h\m’s forces were 
defeated by Marw[n b. Mu+ammad.585 
According to Ibn Ath\r the conflict between the Yemen and Niz[r escalated during this period, and 
he illustrates the conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ in great detail. The changing political 
situation in the central government of Syria extended its influence to the provinces. The province 
of Khur[s[n was the most important as it was the centre of the Shi<\ and Kh[rij\ movements. Under 
Hish[m there were congenial relations between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ during the time of Asad, but 
their relations deteriorated with the decline of Hish[m’s policy of tolerance and the tribal balance 
of power. Ibn Ath\r notes that when Na~r’s deputyship in Khur[s[n was restored by <Abd All[h b. 
<Umar during the period of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, the Mu#ar came to Na~r and urged him to beware 
al-Kirm[n\ who intended to upset Khur[s[n’s political affairs. They demanded that Na~r kill al-
Kirm[n\, or at least put him in prison, but Na~r, observing the rising power of the <Abb[sids in the 
region, was sufficiently aware not to take any serious step against al-Kirm[n\. However, when the 
Mu#ar strengthened their demans, he summoned al-Kirm[n\ and reminded him of previous grants 
and rewards given to him. Na~r reminded him that he had not killed him despite having received 
                                                 
582 ibid., 301-302¦4. 
583 ibid., 302¦4. 
584 ibid., 211¦4. 
585 ibid., 212¦4. 
212 
 
orders to do so from Y]suf b. <Umar, the governor of Iraq and Khur[s[n. He also reminded him 
that it was Na~r who had asked Y]suf to modify the orders to assassinate him. Na~r further insisted 
that he was indebted to him. Al-Kirm[n\ expressed his gratitude to Na~r and agreed with him. 
After that, Na~r asked him why he intended to disturb peace in the region, but al-Kirm[n\ denied 
any such intention.  
Na~r’s advisers had a different opinion regarding al-Kirm[n\. S[lim b. A+war proposed without 
any hesitation that Na~r should kill al-Kirm[n\, while <I~mah b. <Abd Allah al-Asad\ rebuffed 
S[lim and argued that there was a possibility of provoking a conflict, should al-Kirm[n\ be killed. 
In Rama#[n 126 AH, Na~r ordered them to imprison al-Kirm[n\. Ibn Ath\r reported that al-
Kirm[n\ escaped from the prison and gathered three thousand soldiers from his tribe, the al-Azad, 
which had already taken the oath of allegiance to <Abd al-Malik b. |armala, on the authority of 
Kit[b and of Sunnah His Prophet. While the conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ was resolved 
following the intervention of prominent people on both sides, it re-emerged, according to Ibn Ath\r, 
when <Abd Allah b. <Umar confirmed the deputyship of Na~r in Khur[s[n.586 
Ibn Ath\r reported interesting stories about the alliances and conflicts between Na~r, al-Kirm[n\ 
and Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\. It seems that the tribal conflict between the Yemen and Mu#ar played 
a significant role in the fall of the Umayyads and the rise of the <Abb[sids. The <Abb[sids utilized 
the tribal conflict sensibly, in their favour. For instance, when Ab] Muslim planned to enter Marw, 
he had to face the alliance between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\. Ab] Muslim initially designed a rift 
between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ by asking al-Kirm[n\ why he was in alliance with Na~r who had 
killed his father. This argument swayed al-Kirm[n\ and he broke the alliance with Na~r.587 At this 
moment, al-Kirm[n\ asked Ab] Muslim to form an alliance with the Yemen and Rab\<a.  
On the other hand, Na~r also extended the same proposal to Ab] Muslim and persuaded him to 
sign a treaty to establish a coalition force with Mudar against the Yemen. Ab] Muslim evaluated 
the proposals of both Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ and then joined the Yemen and Rab\<a party. He asserted 
that the devil was in the Mu#ar as they were adherents of Marw[n and his deputies and they had 
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killed Ya+y[ b. Zayd.588 Marthid b. Shaq\q al-Sulam\, one of the prominent members of Ab] 
Muslim, argued that the Mu#ar had killed the Prophet’s family and his progeny. They supported 
the Umayyad Marw[n al-Ja<d\ and his deputies, and were responsible for all bloodshed, plunder 
and instability in the region. Na~r b. Sayy[r was Marw[n’s deputy, and he called for his allegiance 
in his speeches. Thus the choice was that <Al\ b. al-Kirm[n\  formed an alliance with him against 
Na~r.589 Ab] Muslim therefore dispatched L[hiz b. Qurayz to Na~r to invite him to accept his 
authority and undertakings. Realising that he was not in a position to face the alliance of the 
Yemen, Rab\<a and <Ajam (non-Arabs), Na~r then ran away from Marw. Ab] Muslim entered 
Marw accompanied by al-Kirm[n\, and taking advantage of the tribal conflict formed an alliance 
with the Yemen and Rab\<a. In this way he gradually unseated Na~r from Khur[s[n. Furthermore, 
he also shattered the authority of Yemen and Rab\<a by killing Shayb[n al-|ar]r\ and both brothers 
<Al\ b. al-Kirm[n\ and <Uthm[n b. al-Kirm[n\.590 In this way, Ab] Muslim cleared the way for the 
rule of the Abbasids.  
Ibn Ath\r’s narrative on the conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ is similar to that of al-^abar\. 
Al-^abar\ records that both of these leaders organised themselves on a tribal basis. Na~r established 
his strength on the Mu#ar while the Yemen were gathered around al-Kirm[n\.591 On the other 
hand, the <Abb[sid movement flourished during this time: they organised themselves 
systematically and their message (da<wa) was accepted everywhere.592 Al-^abar\ records that the 
conflict between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ reached its zenith in 130 AH. Their internal conflict 
benefited Ab] Muslim al-Khur[s[n\ and he extended his authority to such a level that when Na~r 
died in 131 AH. there was no competent person who could stop the arrival of Ab] Muslim’s black 
banners. 
The change in the pattern of authority was another aspect of the Umayyads’ decline. Marw[n’s 
ascendancy over Damascus was a major change in authority patterns. He owed his strength to al-
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Jaz\ra’s army, whereas Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and his brother were supported by the Syrian army. Ibn 
Ath\r reported that Marw[n marched with the al-Jaz\ra army towards Damascus. On reaching 
Qinisr\n, he met Bishr b. al-Wal\d and Masr]r b. al-Wal\d – deputies of Qinisr\n. They both 
extended their loyalty to Marw[n. Moreover, it was a matter of great importance that the leader of 
Mu#ar¦Qays Yaz\d b. <Umar b. Hubayra took the oath of allegiance to Marw[n’s mission.593 On 
the other hand, Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d and Sulaym[n b. Hish[m organized the Syrian army which 
was predominantly Yemen\¦Kalb\ while the al-Jaz\ra army was predominately a Mu#ar\¦Qays\ 
army.594 They fought against each other at <Ayn al-Jar. The Yemen\s were defeated, hunted and 
killed by the rising power of Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. The defeat of Ibr[h\m meant the defeat of 
the Yemen from the political horizon of Damascus. In this scenario, the Yemen attempted to 
exterminate the Mu#ar\s. For instance, Y]suf b <Umar was killed in prison with the sons of al-
Wal\d b. Yaz\d by the servant of Yaz\d b. Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\.595 
Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\ fled from Damascus to Ghaw%a and the people of Ghow%a made him w[l\ 
of the city. They gathered around him and prepared, under the leadership of Z[mil b. Amr, to attack 
Damascus. Marw[n  b. Mu+ammad had been in |am~ when this uprising took place. He 
dispatched <Umar b. al-Wa##[+ with ten thousand soldiers and  destroyed the houses and villages 
of the Yemen. He killed Yaz\d b. Kh[lid, defeated the army of Z[mil and  killed him and sent his 
head to Marw[n b. Mu+ammad in |am~.596 This battle also demonstrated tribal hostility, since 
Marw[n’s Mu#ar\ followers ruthlessly slaughtered the Yemen and demolished their villages.597 
According to Ibn Ath\r’s narratives, the religious forces also benefited from this tribal conflict and 
organised themselves on these lines; Ab] Muslim and the Kharijis similarly took advantage. The 
situation in Iraq also reveals an analogous story. For instance there was the case of $a++[k al-
Kh[rij\ at the time when the Yemen gathered under the leadership of $a++[k to fight the Mu#ar. 
Ibn Ath\r records the details of this alliance. When Marw[n came to power, he dismissed Yaz\d b. 
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al-Wal\d’s governor of Iraq, <Abd Allah b. <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z, and appointed al-Na#r b. Sa<\d 
al-|arsh\ in his place. Al-Na#r had earlier been a deputy of <Abd Allah b. <Umar in Ir[q, and the 
latter did not accept al-Na#r’s governorship . Marw[n dispatched an army to support al-Na#r under 
the leadership of al-Ghuzayyal. The Mu#ar gathered around al-Na#r because of the tribal 
connection, and in order to strengthen Marw[n because he demanded the taking of revenge on 
behalf of the deposed caliph al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d since al-Wal\d’s mother was from the Qays¦Mu#ar. 
On the other hand, the Yemen supported <Abd Allah b. <Umar because of their strong tribal 
relations with Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. They assisted Yaz\d in killing al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d because the 
latter had handed over Kh[lid al-Qasr\, the chief of Yemen, to Y]suf b. <Umar. Y]suf killed him 
brutally; therefore, the Yemen supported <Abd Allah b. <Umar while the Qays maintained their 
loyalty to Marw[n and his governor al-Na#r.598 
In Iraq, al-Na#r contested <Abd Allah b. <Umar on the one hand, while Yaz\d b <Umar b. H]bayra 
fought on the other with al-$a++[k al-Kh[rij\. Meanwhile, Marw[n himself fought Sulaym[n b. 
Hish[m who gathered the Yemen around him to depose Marw[n and to take revenge from Mu#ar. 
Sulaym[n successfully won the support of the Syrian army, the Dakw[n\ya and other Yemen 
tribes. Sulaym[n’s army consisted of about seventy thousand soldiers in Qinisr\n. Marw[n 
attacked Qinisr\n and defeated Sulaym[n’s army after a furious battle. About thirty thousand 
soldiers of Sulaym[n’s army, along with his eldest son Ibr[h\m and Kh[lid b. Hish[m al-
Makhz]m\, uncle of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, were killed in the battle. Sulaym[n b. Yaz\d fled to 
|im~ to establish a new alliance against Marw[n. On the other hand, Ibn Hubayra crushed the 
force of the Kh[rijis and killed the leading commanders of al-$a++[k, such as al-Muthann[ b. 
<Imr[n at <Ayn al-Tamar. However, the conflict between al-Na#r and <Abd Allah b. <Umar 
continued. Al-$a++[k observed the conflict and marched to Kufa. In this situation, <Abd Allah b. 
<Umar asked al-Na#r to stop fighting with each other and to form an alliance against the Kh[rij\s. 
Al-Na#r refused to make any alliance unless <Abd Allah b. <Umar accepted his governorship of 
Iraq. Al-$a++[k fought with <Abd Allah b.<Umar and defeated his army.  
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<Abd Allah fled to W[si% where furious clashes took place between them until al-$a++[k 
established his authority in Kufa. In this situation, they stopped fighting and prepared themselves 
to form an alliance against al-$a++[k. However, at this stage, the defeated prominent Yemen\ 
leaders such as Man~[r b. Jamh]r, urged <Abd Allah b. <Umar to change his war policy. He insisted 
on forming an alliance with al-$a++[k to end Marw[n’s rule. Meanwhile, Sulaym[n b. Hish[m 
was also defeated in the battle of Khus[f and came to Iraq with some of his Yemen\ followers. 
Having discussed the issue with their followers, both <Abd Allah b. <Umar and Sulaym[n b. 
Hish[m then went to al-$a++[k to extend their oath of allegiance to him, also agreeing to work 
together against Marw[n and his Mu#ar\ fellows.599 The alliance of <Abd Allah b. <Umar, Sulym[n 
b. Hish[m and al-$a++[k al-Kh[rij\ was established in Shaww[l, 127 AH.600 
Ibn Ath\r’s reports show that he considers the <a~ab\ya as one of the most important factors in the 
fall of the Umayyads; however, his elaboration is comparatively more comprehensive. He also 
elaborates how the religious movements took advantage of the tribal conflict. Compared to al-
Ya<q]b\ and al-Mas<]d\, Ibn Ath\r seems sympathetic to the Umayyads, since in contrast to the 
earlier historians al-Ya<q]b\, al-^abar\ and al-Mas<]d\, he devoted more space to elaborating on 
the tribal factor; although the basic framework of his historiography is based on al-^abar\’s work. 
Ibn Khald]n applied his theory of <asab\ya to the study of the Umayyads. He asserts that the 
Marw[nid branch of the Umayyad managed successfully to establish their authority by utilising 
their family ties and blood relationships. They appointed many of their relatives to high positions 
to integrate them and to share the authority among all members of the royal family. Through 
maintaining strong ties with the Syrian Kalb tribes and harmonizing the balance of power between 
the Yemen and Mu#ar in the rest of the state, they established their supremacy over the other 
competitors. The <a~ab\ya became weak during the later Umayyad period and conflict emerged on 
a tribal basis. Ibn Khald]n records that the conflict between the Mu#ar and Yemen became stronger 
and more evident. Besides these tribal conflicts, many ideologically-based movements emerged. 
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They took advantage of these tribal hostilities and organized their movements more actively. 
Khur[s[n is the best example for this kind of study. Ibn Khald]n collected most of the material for 
his historiography from al-^abar\ but presented the history in the light of his theory of <a~ab\ya.  
Hish[m failed to appoint a suitable governor of Khur[s[n who could work to minimise tribal 
rivalries and stabilise the region. He dismissed Asad’s administration in 109 AH,601 and appointed 
al-|akam b. <Aw[na al-Kalb\. Al-|akam was then replaced by Ashras b. <Abd Allah al-Sulam\ 
and ordered to run affairs in consultation with Kh[lid, the governor of Iraq. Hish[m then replaced 
Ashras with al-Junayd b. <Abd al-Ra+m[n al-Murr\ in 111 AH, 602 but dismissed al-Junayd when 
he discovered that Al-Junayd had married the daughter of Yaz\d b. al-Muhallab in 116 AH, and 
replaced him with <A~im b. <Abd Allah b. Yaz\d al-Hil[l\. There was great rivalry between <A~im 
and al-Junayd.603 All these events show that Hish[m was unable to find a suitable person who 
could meet the challenges of that period.604 This was the time when the <Abb[sid movement 
flourished in Khur[s[n while <A~im punished all those who were part of al-Junayd’s 
administration. |[rith b. Shuray+ rebelled against the Umayyad rule in Khur[s[n. He called the 
people to the Book of God and Sunnah of his Prophet and allegiance to the H[shimids. Although 
al-|[rith was killed, peace and harmony was not achieved. In 117 AH, <A~im informed the central 
government of Damascus about the weakened state of affairs in Khur[s[n. Hish[m attached 
Khur[s[n with Iraq and asked Kh[lid to appoint his brother Asad to maintain law and order in the 
region.605 Asad, contrary to his previous experience, prepared a team who not only suppressed the 
rebel movement but also initiated a campaign of conquest in the frontiers of Khur[s[n, with Na~r 
b. Sayy[r and al-Kirm[n\ b. <Al\ contributing actively to this campaign.606 Asad died in Rab\< al-
Awwal 120 AH. Ja<far b. |an&ala al-Nahraw[n\ replaced him and served for a period of four 
months after which Na~r b. Sayy[r was appointed as governor of Khur[s[n in Rajab.  
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Ibn Khald]n admired the administrative abilities of Na~r b. Sayy[r, who, however, in contrast to 
Asad, was unable to maintain a balance of power in the tribes. He consolidated the domination of 
Mu#ar in the province by he appointing Mu#ar\s throughout the area – for instance, Muslim b. 
<Abd al-Ra+m[n in Balkh; Wish[+ b. Bukayr b. Wish[+ in Marw; al-|[rith b. <Abd Allah b. al-
|ashraj in Hir[t; Ziy[d b. <Abd al-Ra+m[n al-Qasr\  in Nish[p]r; Ab] |af~ <Al\ b. |aqna in 
Khaw[rzam and Qa%an b. Qutayba in al-@aghad. Ibn Khald]n also notes that a unique Mu#ar\ force 
was established in Khur[s[n.607 Similarly, tribal conflict emerged in Iraq where the Mu#ar\s 
extended their power after the removal of Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ from his office. Y]suf b. 
<Umar al-Thaqf\ was appointed governor of Iraq and Y]suf assembled Mu#ar\s around him, 
imprisoned Kh[lid and his administrators, and punished them severely. 
When al-Wal\d became caliph, he confirmed the governorship of Na~r b. Sayy[r in Khur[s[n. This 
was the period during which the <Abb[sid movement thrived in Khur[s[n. With the arrival of al-
Wal\d, many leading members of the old regime were replaced, and more Mu#ar\s were installed 
along with Na~r b. Sayy[r and Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqf\. The Mu#ar\s gained such strength that 
al-Wal\d handed Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ over to Y]suf, who killed him. This was the 
moment when the hostilities between the Mu#ar\s and Yemen\s intensified. The Umayyads’ power 
was based on their Yemen\ nobles and the Syrian army, since it consisted predominantly of the 
Yemen\ and Qu#[<a tribes. They were marginalized during al-Wal\d’s period and were infuriated 
by the assassination of Kh[lid al-Qasr\. They therefore assembled around Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d to take 
the oath of allegiance.  
Ibn Khald]n considers that Yaz\d took advantage of the situation. With the assistance of Yemen\s 
and Qu#[<\s, Yaz\d attacked Damascus. <Abd <Az\z b. al-|ajj[j b. <Abd al-Malik and Man~]r b. 
Jamh]r also accompanied him in the assault. With the ascendancy of Yaz\d, the tribal conflict 
continued in a variety of ways. The Yemen\s came to power along with the qadar\s. Y]suf b. <Umar 
was dismissed from  Iraq and Man~]r b. Jamh]r was appointed as governor. Man~]r supported 
Yaz\d because of the latter’s affinity to the Ghayl[n\ya. 608  Furthermore, Man~]r had great 
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antipathy towards Y]suf b. <Umar because he had killed Kh[lid al-Qasr\. Man~]r’s ambition was 
to take revenge on Y]suf and his <umm[l (administrators). He ordered the Syrian troops to arrest 
<Umar and his <umm[l when he reached |ira. He then arrested Y]suf and sent him to Syria, and 
also dismissed Na~r b. Sayy[r from Khur[s[n and appointed his brother in Khur[s[n. A conflict 
began to arise between the Mu#ar\s and Yemen\s. Y]suf b. <Umar was put in prison with the sons 
of al-Wal\d, and Na~r was dismissed from Khur[s[n but refused to hand over authority. Yaz\d 
observed the situation and in order to maintain the equilibrium between the Mu#ar and Yemen, 
appointed <Abd Allah b. <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z as governor of Iraq. <Abd Allah then appointed 
Na~r b. Sayy[r in Khur[s[n.609 
Similarly, a conflict emerged between Na~r and Jad\< b. <Al\ al-Kirm[n\ although they had worked 
adequately together under Asad’s governorship. However, when Na~r was appointed as w[l\ in 
Khur[s[n, he expelled al-Kirm[n\. Therefore, al-Kirm[n\ came into conflict when <Abd Allah b. 
<Umar appointed Na~r in Khur[s[n. Na~r arrested al-Kirm[n\ and put him in prison in 126 A.H. 
Al-Kirm[n\ fled from prison and gathered three thousand soldiers of his Azad tribe around him. 
The Azad tribe had already taken an oath of allegiance to <Abd al-Malik b. |armala on the Book 
of God and the Sunnah of His Prophet. Therefore, <Abd al-Malik welcomed al-Kirm[n\. Observing 
Khur[s[n’s critical situation, the central government of Damascus extended a reconciliation 
policy. S[lim b. A+war, as a representative of Na~r, intervened and urged al-Kirm[n\ to leave 
Khur[s[n and prepared him to leave for Jurj[n. The conflict was still unresolved and negotiations 
for peace were in process. At this critical moment, Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d died at the end of 126 A.H.  
Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d succeeded him, but according to Ibn Khald]n, he was weak. Marw[n b. 
Mu+ammad, governor of Armenia, organized a movement against the ruling party in Damascus 
for killing a legitimate caliph, al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, and was well supported by the Mu#ar\s. Ibr[h\m 
dispatched an army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers. under the leadership of 
Sulaym[n b. Hish[m. against Marw[n’s army of eighty thousand. Sulaym[n asked him to be 
reconciled and to begin peace negotiations as well as to withdraw his ambition to seek revenge  for 
al-Wal\d, and demanded the release of al-|akam and <Uthm[n in order to restore their position as 
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successors of al-Wal\d. The negotiations failed and a battle began between them, which was 
enthusiastically fought and won by Marw[n. The prominent leaders, such as Yaz\d b. al-<Aqq[r 
and al-Wal\d b. Ma~[d, were captured and killed in prison. Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\ observed the 
defeat and fled to Damascus to discuss the matter with Ibr[h\m and <Abd al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j. 
They decided to kill both brothers al-|akam and <Uthm[n, and it is assumed that when Marw[n 
was taking the oath of allegiance to al-|akam and <Uthm[n, they were being killed in the prison. 
Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\ also killed Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqf\ in the prison. Marw[n was shocked 
to see the dead bodies of both brothers upon his arrival in Damascus. Ab] Mu+ammad al-Sufy[n\ 
was released from prison and told the people that al-|akam had nominated Marw[n as successor 
in his will. He stepped forward and took an oath of allegiance to Marw[n and the people then 
followed him.  
The tribal conflict reached its zenith during Marw[n’s time. Marw[n, with all of his extraordinary 
qualities could not minimize the tribal hostilities. The dynamics of Khur[s[n’s politics revolved 
heavily around tribal conflict. Marw[n appointed Yaz\d b. <Umar b. Hubayra as governor of Iraq. 
Yaz\d confirmed the post of Na~r as w[l\ of Khur[s[n, which meant that the Mu#ar\s would have 
authority in new regime. Consequently, the Yemen\ devised an alternative policy. Al-|[rith b. 
Shuray+ formed an alliance with al-Kirm[n\ against Na~r b. Sayy[r. Na~r assured al-|[rith b. 
Shuray+ that his amnesty had been granted but that he did not believe it. Na~r attacked Marw and 
defeated al-Kirm[n\; and on his return, a rumour spread that Na~r b. Sayy[r had been killed. Ibn 
Khald]n notes that a man called to the people, “O group of  Rab\<a and Yemen! Ab] Sayy[r is 
killed and Mu#ar is defeated.”610 The forces of al-Kirm[n\ and al-|[rith retaliated and defeated 
Na~r, and Al-Kirm[n\ established his authority in Marw and plundered the people. The adherents 
of al-|[rith criticized al-Kirm[n\’s policy of looting and discrimination. They argued that they 
had fought to restore justice, not to adhere to <a~ab\ya and tribalism. Al-|[rith asked Al-Kirm[n\ 
to resolve the issue through dialogue and negotiation, but al-Kirm[n\ did not accept this. Thus, 
conflict arose amongst them and al-Kirm[n\ finally killed al-|[rith and defeated his army.611 
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After al-|[rith’s death, a multi-dimensional conflict emerged in the region and Na~r intended to 
take advantage of the situation. Al-Kirm[n\ desired to consolidate his power while Ya+ya b. Na<\m 
al-Shayb[n\ in Rab\<a, Mu+ammad b. Muthann[ in al-Azad, and al-|arb\ al-Sughd\ contested 
power on tribal and ideological bases. They fought each other continuously but while they were 
busy with internal conflicts, Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ was building his strength to dominate the 
<Abb[sid movement. He took advantage of the situation and attempted to ensure that the conflict 
started. He sent his preachers to Mu#ar who condemned the Yemen, and dispatched some others 
to the Yemen who denounced the Mu#ar. Neither al-Kirm[n\ or Shayb[n al-Kh[rij\ hated Ab] 
Muslim because he had called for the removal of Marw[n from the throne. 612  Thus, in Ibn 
Khald]n’s opinion, the tribal conflict prepared the stage for the <Abb[sid movement and led the 
Umayyads to their decline.  
6.3.2 Concluding Note  
It seems that al-Ya<q]b\ did not consider the tribal conflict as a crucial factor in the demise of the 
Umayyads; rather it was the advent of the <Abb[sid movement that led the Umayyad regime to 
collapse. Al-Ya<q]b\ briefly mentioned the tribal conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf al-
Thaqf\, and between al-Kirm[n\ and Na~r. However, it was the murder and martyrdom of Zayd b. 
<Al\ and his son Ya+y[ b. Zayd that provided the foundations for the <Abb[sid revolution in 
Khur[s[n that eventually caused the fall of the Umayyads. It was Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ who 
took advantage of their internal conflict, which became tribal only during the third civil war. On 
the issue of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ it seems that al-^abar\’s account is a replica of al-Ya<q]b\’s version. 
Al-^abar\ also considered the Shi<\ movement in Khur[s[n to be a key factor in the demise of the 
Umayyads, rather than the tribal factor. In a way, the conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and Y]suf 
al-Thaqf\ and between Na~r and al-Kirm[n\ was central since their internal conflict provided 
grounds for the reception of the Shi<\ propaganda of Ab] Muslim and the Abbasid movement.  
As far as al-Mas<]d\ is concerned, he did not mention any tribal hostility between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ 
and Y]suf al-Thaqf\. He gave accounts of the deaths of Zayd and Ya+y[ and mentioned that Zayd 
was killed by Y]suf, and Ya+ya was killed by Na~r, without relating this to the other events. He 
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argued that Na~r’s governship of Khur[s[n was remarkable. Na~r b. Sayy[r cautioned Marw[n II 
that Ab] Muslim’s movement was flourishing in Khur[s[n and that this had the potential to destroy 
the rule.613 Thus, it can be deduced from the presentation of al-Mas<]d\ that the <a~ab\ya factor 
was not central to the demise of the Umayyads. It seems that his opinion is also identical to that of 
his predecessor historians.  
Ibn Ath\r’s al-K[mil is also a significant source for Umayyad history. His illustration of the later 
Umayyads is comparatively more inclusive and comprehensive. He derived most of his reports 
from al-Ya<q]b\ and al-^abar\, and attempted to construct a complete representation of the events 
that led to the fall of the Umayyads. He also elaborated the conflict between Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and 
Y]suf al-Thaqf\, and Na~r b. Sayy[r and al-Kirm[n\. Following al-Ya<q]b\ and al-^abar\, he 
argued that Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ took advantage of the tribal conflict between the Mu#ar and 
Yemen and accelerated the pace of the work for the Abbasid movement. 
Ibn Khald]n considers that the Umayyads consolidated their authority by making alliances with 
the Syrian Yemen¦Kalb tribes and extending favours to various hostile tribes. Ibn Khald]n clearly 
demonstrates that Umayyad power was based in the Yemen\ tribes that shifted towards the Mu#ar 
during the later Hish[m era when Kh[lid al-Qasr\ was removed from the governorship of Iraq and 
Y]suf b. <Umar was appointed in his place. It was a crucial policy decision that changed the course 
of Muslim history. The Yemen\ leader, Kh[lid al-Qasr\, and his brother Asad al-Qasr\, 
endeavoured to maintain equilibrium and a balance of power between the Yemen and Mu#ar tribes. 
Both al-Kirm[n\ b. <Al\, a Yemen\ and Na~r b. Sayy[r worked vigorously with Y]suf without any 
tribal reference. However, when Kh[lid al-Qasr\ was dismissed from service and Y]suf b. <Umar 
was appointed in his place, his maltreatment of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ was, according to Ibn Khald]n, 
the starting point for tribal conflict. This was the time when both Y]suf b. <Umar and Na~r b. 
Sayy[r attempted to extend the domination of the Mu#ar in Iraq and Khur[s[n.614 Ibn Khald]n 
relied mostly upon al-Ya<q]b\ and al-^abar\’s traditions but through the application of the theory 
of a~ab\ya, presented a more logical exposition of the Umayyad fall. However, all the historical 
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sources noted above share one thing in that they are based on the Iraq\ and Khur[s[nian narrative 
of Umayyad history. Thus all of them anticipated the fall of the Umayyads under the Ir[q\ and 
Khur[s[nian traditions. 
Medieval sources offer a narrative of the fall of al-Wal\d’s rule that is consistent; and the 
consistency lies in its unity. Most of the early medieval historians based their works on his reports 
of al-Mad[>in\. Al-^abar\ is the main source for al-Mad[>in\, while later historians have drawn the 
events from al-^abar\.615 According to all of these sources, Kh[lid’s death and the conflict between 
the Qays and Yemen were not leading factors in the fall of al-Wal\d. The most significant factor 
was al-Wal\d’s failure to construct a plausible religious persona.  In short, his fall was not because 
of his policies or his mal-treatment of certain people; rather it was his moral deficit that contributed 
to his demise. Yaz\d III attempted to bridge the moral gap by his religiosity. However, he could 
not maintain the tribal balance as he was backed by the Yemen. Consequently, tribal conflict 
influenced all socio-political and religious spheres of life.  
The <Abb[sid movement took advantage of the internal conflict and came into power with the 
assistance of their Khur[s[nian fellows. Moreover, the <Abb[sids fused a religious spirit into their 
political agenda. In this context, Ibn Khald]n’s<a~ab\ya theory seems logical. The Umayyads lost 
control when the conflict emerged among members of the royal family. They were replaced by the 
H[shmids who came into power with the help of non-Arabs and had thus to share authority with 
their non-Arabs supporters. Therefore, in contrast to the Umayyads, the <Abb[sids could not enjoy 
absolute authority. Ibn Khald]n argues that Muslim rule remained intact under the first four caliphs 
and under the Umayyads because of the unity of the Arab <a~ab\ya. However, the Sh\<\s called for 
the rule of the Prophetic family and the Abbasids successfully managed to establish their rule.   
Ibn Khald]n maintains that the universal concept of the caliphate vanished when the Umayyads 
established their rule in Andalusia; it happened because the unity of the Arab <a~ab\ya was 
fractured. Thus, two states came into being because of the disarray among the Arabs. It can be 
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observed that the rule of Islam, as Ibn Khald]n argues, gradually became fragile and the Muslim 
state fractured into many small states, such as the Umayyads in Andalusia, Ad[risa in the far west 
of North Africa, <Ubayd\ya in Qayr[w[n and Egypt, Qar[mi%a in Ba+r\n, and so on. Ibn Khald]n 
begins with a description of the role of Sh\<\ in the establishment of Abbasid rule. This suggests 
that he considered a~ab\ya as one of the most important factors in the fall of the Umayyads by 
providing a space where the Sh\<\s could play a role in bringing the Abbasids into power.616  It can 
be concluded that Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya is viable in understanding the causes of the 
Umayyads’ decline.  
6.4 Internal Family Conflict in the pre-Modern Sources  
Conflict among the members of the Umayyad family is a phenomenon of weak <a~ab\ya. 
According to Ibn Khald]n, the <a~ab\ya is a source of power and authority in Bedouin and tribal 
society. Every member of the tribe enjoys and shares nobility because of his common family 
lineage.617 As noted, <a~ab\ya gradually becomes weaker, tends to last for four generations, and 
then declines.618 The monarch or the chief cannot please all members of the tribe, so eventually 
they begin to oppose and ultimately to revolt against their own royal family. When there is loss of 
<a~ab\ya or there is tribal conflict, solidarity becomes weak, thereby ending their authority.619 We 
tend to study the pre-Modern sources to understand how they understood the role of conflict among 
the Umayyad family members in the disintegration of the Umayyads.  
However there are conflicting references in the pre-Modern sources regarding the internal conflict 
among the Umayyad family members. The internal conflict of the Umayyads provoked the tribal 
conflict of Yemen and Mu#ar. Al-Ya<q]b\ examines Hish[m’s unfriendly relations with his would-
be successor al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, and how Y]suf won the confidence of al-Wal\d after the death of 
Hish[m.620 There were serious disagreements between Hish[m and al-Wal\d and therefore when 
al-Wal\d came to power, he dismissed all Hish[m’s governors and deputies and punished them 
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mercilessly, with the exception of the governor of Iraq, Y]suf b. <Umar.  Al-Wal\d actually found 
in the official record letters from the governors regarding Hish[m in which they agreed to prevent 
al-Wal\d’s succession. However, Y]suf b.<Umar advised Hish[m to keep the will of succession as 
it was.621 
Al-Ya<q]b\’s text indicates that al-Wal\d’s hatred towards his predecessor Hish[m b. <Abd al-
Malik led him to fight against all governors and Hish[m’s supporters. His personal feuds gradually 
converted into a tribally-based factionalism, particularly in the conflict that emerged between the 
Yaman\s and Mu#ar\s. Al-Ya<q]b\ regards the bad governance of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d as a remote 
cause of the disintegration of the empire. Al-Wal\d alienated the Yemen\s from the mainstream 
policy-making authorities. Ultimately the Yaman\s extended their strength to Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d 
who brought al-Wal\d’s rule to an end.622 Similarly, al-^abar\ portrayed al-Wal\d II as vindictive 
and malicious and as a man occupied with his own desires. Relations were not ideal between 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik and al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, since Hish[m did not consider al-Wal\d a suitable 
successor and wished to nominate his own son Maslama. He attempted to present Maslama as a 
religious and pious candidate for the caliphate; and appointed him to perform hajj  in 119 AH.623 
Consequently, relations became complicated between them.  
Hish[m could not change the will of his late brother Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik because he failed to 
convince the leading members of his family on this issue. However, he treated al-Wal\d harshly 
which made him angry. Al-^abar\ recorded the reaction of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d on the death of 
Hish[m, noting that al-Wal\d hurried to the capital and delegated his cousin al-<Abb[s b. al-Wal\d 
to control treasury matters. He incarcerated the officials of the previous regime, and also 
imprisoned the sons and close relatives of Hish[m although he exempted Maslama b. Hish[m 
because he had previously defended him in front of his father.624 Al-Wal\d was particularly harsh 
with Mu+ammad and Ibr[h\m, sons of Hish[m b. Ism[<\l al-Makhz]m\ and the maternal uncles of 
Maslama b. Hish[m. He tortured them and then handed them over to Y]suf b. <Umar who killed 
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them ruthlessly. Al-Wal\d II was angry with them because they had agreed with Hish[m’s proposal 
regarding the nomination of Maslama b. Hish[m as his successor. 625  Al-Wal\d also abused 
Sulaym[n b. Hish[m physically by shaving his beard and head, then sent him to <Amm[n where 
he remained in prison until al-Wal\d’s death.626 He also imprisoned Yaz\d b. Hish[m.627  
His appointment and dismissal of administrators was mostly based on his personal likes and 
dislikes. He dismissed Ibrah\m b. Hish[m b. Ism[<\l and his brother Muhammad, and appointed 
his own maternal uncles Y]suf b. Mu+ammad al-Thaqf\ and <Abd al-Malik b. Mu+ammad b. al-
|ajj[j al-Thaqf\ in Damascus. The fact is that al-Wal\d’s personal revenges lasted too long and he 
alienated and annoyed some important political figures. Al-Tabar\ noted that the intensity of 
conflict gradually increased between the members of the royal family during the reign of al-Wal\d 
II, and he records an important event that showed this. Al-Wal\d II took a slave girl of the progeny 
of al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik into his custody. <Umar b. al-Wal\d threatened al-Wal\d II and asked 
him to return her to her owners, otherwise his army would have to face reprisals against his 
army.628 The dialogue clearly indicates that the conflict was serious among the royal family and 
they did not tolerate even trivial issues. Contrary to tradition, it had become easy to challenge the 
authority of the caliph.  
It appears that a campaign had been initiated by a cousin of al-Wal\d II and in particular, by the 
sons of al-Wal\d I and Hish[m and the dismissed elite of the previous regime. They questioned al-
Wal\d II’s authority on political, military and religious grounds. One of the most striking 
references can be found in historical sources that indicate that the opponents of al-Wal\d II were 
instrumental. They used religion as a weapon against al-Wal\d II by criticising him on religious 
and moral grounds and accusing him of transgression, heresy and even non-belief.629 They had 
also written letters to the hundred main mosques regarding al-Wal\d II’s character. Yaz\d b. al-
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Wal\d’s letter described his anger. He clearly rebelled against al-Wal\d II, writing that he would 
not be willing to accept his authority. The people had high regard for Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d because 
of his piety and religious appearance. Thus, Yaz\d successfully united all the forces that were 
against al-Wal\d II. All the reports mentioned above regarding the conflict between the members 
of the royal family and the use of religion show that the conflict between family members was one 
of the important factors in the decline of the Umayyads since it provided a platform from which 
the anti-Umayyad forces were able to make a vigorous stand against them. 
Moreover, this was the time when Marw[n came to power on the basis of his al-Jazir\an-based 
Qays\ army. The previous Syrian army had been based predominantly on the Yemen tribes and 
gathered around the key members of the previous regime. When Marw[n appointed al-Na&r b. 
Sa<\d al-Khurash\ as governor of Iraq the Yemen gathered around <Abd Allah b. <Umar II. The 
Yemen army of K]fa refused to accept the governorship of Al-Na&r b. Sa<\d and joined <Abd Allah 
b. <Umar in |\ra. They instigated the Ibn <Umar-led rebellion against the new governor. The anti-
Marw[n forces gradually assembled around Ibn <Umar, particularly the leading members of the 
Kalb tribe and followers of the previous regime, such as Ism[<\l b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ with his 
tribe, Man~]r b. Jamh]r, and al-A~bagh b. Daw[lah with his tribe. This disagreement between the 
leading members of the Umayyad house, and the division of the Umayyad army on a tribal basis, 
developed into a devastating conflict between them. The poets of these tribes played a significant 
role in spreading the antagonism and enraging them before the confrontation took place on the 
battle field. 
In contrast to al-^abar\, al-Mas<]d\ blamed Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. He argued that Marw[n II 
killed Ibr[h\m and all of his adherents, such as <Abd al-<Az\z b. |ajj[j, and Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-
Qasr\. Consequently, a weakness appeared in the Umayyad rule.630 It seems, in Mas<]d\’s view, 
that the religious factor played an important part in the removal of al-Wal\d from his rule. It also 
brought Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d into power. However, al-Mas[d\ asserted that Umayyad rule began to 
crumble when Marw[n killed the leading members of the Umayyads and their allies, the Syrian 
elites. He further based his strength on the army of al-Jaz\ra that consisted of the Mu#ar tribes, 
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while the traditional Syrian army was based on Yemen\ tribes. This was the policy shift in the 
history of Umayyad rule and politics. The Syrian army was fractured and joined the anti-Marw[n 
forces. Thus, a tribal conflict emerged between the Yemen and Niz[r that, in Mas<]d\’s opinion, 
was an important factor in the decline of the Umayyads.631 According to his assessment, the 
Yemen were marginalised during Marw[n’s rule. One of the reasons for this was Marw[n’s close 
association with Mu#ar as he was based in Harr[n, the centre of Mu#ar\s.  
Al-Mas<]d\ also revealed the impact of tribalism on Arabic literature and how it contributed to the 
decline of the Umayyads. He argues that the work of the leading Arab poets such as Kumayat and 
Di<bal Khuz[<\  played a vital role in tribal factionalism. The tribal conflict between the Niz[r and 
Yemen appeared as a popular tradition that attracted the masses on a large scale during the period 
of Marw[n. Al-Mas<]d\ asserted that Marw[n’s rule and its Niz[r-based army forced the Yemen 
towards the <Abb[sid movement. As the Yemen switched their loyalty and began to support the 
<Abb[sids, the government consequently shifted to them as well. However, factionalism became a 
permanent feature of politics in the later centuries. All this debate confirms that al-Mas<]d\ 
considered tribal factionalism as an important factor in the fall of the Umayyads.  
The weakness of the Umayyad family was criticised particularly in Khur[s[n where the Umayyads 
were vulnerable because of the rapid growth of the <Abb[sid movement. Al-Mas<]d\ asserted that 
Marw[n II could not understand how to assist Na~r b. Sayy[r, or how to respond to the rebellions 
in Khur[s[n. Al-Mas<]d\ reported a long conversation between Na~r b. Sayy[r and Marw[n on the 
issue of Khur[s[n and concluded that Marw[n’s inability to cope with the situation in Khur[s[n 
became the immediate cause of the fall of the Umayyads. Thus, according to al-Mas<]d\’s 
assessment, the Khaw[rij and the internal conflict in the royal family and tribal factionalism were 
the remote causes of the disintegration of Umayyad rule while the most significant immediate 
factor was the successful movement of Khur[s[n under the dynamic leadership of Ab] Muslim 
Khur[s[n\.  
Ibn Ath\r notes that conflict arose between the members of the Umayyad royal family, particularly 
between Marw[n b. Mu+ammad and Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. When the former came to know about al-
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Wal\d b. Yaz\d’s death, Marw[n declared that he would take revenge for the murdered caliph. He 
organized his forces, with the assistance of his son <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n, from Armenia, al-
Jaz\ra, Mosel and Azerbaijan. However, when he reached |arr[n, he received a letter from Yaz\d 
b. al-Wal\d who confirmed the governorship of Marw[n in Armenia, al-Jaz\ra, Mosel and 
Azerbaijan. Observing the situation Marw[n took the oath of allegiance to maintain the unity of 
the Umayyads.632 However, after the death of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, Marw[n challenged the authority 
of Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d and revolted against him, finally deposing him from his rule.633  
Ibn Ath\r’s narrative is analogous to that recorded by al-^abar\. Ibn Khald]n also derives most of 
his historical account regarding al-Wal\d II from al-^abar\. That is to say, his description of al-
Wal\d b. Yaz\d is analogous to that of al-^abar\. He asserted that al-Wal\d was not a suitable 
person to rule the caliphate. He was a dissipated and self-indulgent person who always remained 
occupied with drinking and keeping the company of immoral people. 634  Like al-^abar\, Ibn 
Khald]n also asserts that Hish[m had intended to dismiss al-Wal\d from the position of his 
successor but could not do so because of his respect for the Umayyad tradition of succession and 
the nomination of a ruler. Ibn Khald]n, however, reveals some traditions that, as mentioned above, 
depict a different picture of al-Wal\d. Ibn Khald]n argues that al-Wal\d II did not stop his unethical 
and unscrupulous activities even after he became w[l\ (ruler) of the Umayyad rule. He asserts that 
many reports of immorality were attributed to him but a great number of people denied these 
accusations.635  
Ibn Khald]n issued two reports, one on the authority of al-Mad[>in\ and the second on the authority 
of Shab\b b. Shabbah. The first suggests that al-Rash\d praised al-Wal\d while he blamed Yaz\d b. 
al-Wal\d. The second shows that al-Mahd\ rejected the notion that al-Wal\d was an immoral 
person. Al-Mahd\ asserted that because of the jealousy of the members of the Umayyad family 
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and the envy of al-Wal\d’s cousins, his personality was painted as corrupt.636  Ibn Khald]n further 
stated that al-Wal\d II was charged with infidelity and heresy by sons of al-Wal\d I because al-
Wal\d II had arrested many of the sons of al-Wal\d I. Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d was the most important 
member of al-Wal\d’s family and was famed for his piety and faithfulness. Therefore, people were 
inclined to believe him. Secondly they criticised al-Wal\d II because he had nominated his 
immature sons, al-|akam and <Uthm[n as his successors. Ibn Khald]n suggests that the most 
important factor was the Yemen’s dissatisfaction because of what had happened with Kh[lid al-
Qasr\.  
Similarly, the Qa#a<ah tribe was also dissatisfied with al-Wal\d because of his maltreatment of the 
Yemen tribes.637 The Syrian army consisted mainly of troops of the Yemen and Qu#a<ah tribes. 
They gathered around Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and urged him to lead them against the government. Ibn 
Khald]n recorded that Yaz\d took the advice of the members of his family but they advised him 
not to rebel against a legitimate ruler. It seems, in Ibn Khald]n’s view, that the conflict among the 
members of the Umayyad family was a significant factor. The leading members of the royal family 
such as al-<Abb[s b. al-Wal\d, elder brother of Yaz\d III, and Marw[n b. Mu+ammad, did not 
favour rebellion against al-Wal\d. <Abb[s b. al-Wal\d warned Yaz\d to stop planning a rebellion 
against al-Wal\d. Similarly, when Marw[n b. Mu+ammad came to know that Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d 
was secretly planning a rebellion against al-Wal\d, he wrote a letter to Sa<\d b. <Abd al-Malik and 
expressed his concerns on the issue, pointing out that Yaz\d III’s plan to rebel against al-Wal\d II 
was indeed a dangerous act that might create great chaos and controversy. The latter agreed with 
Marw[n and wrote to <Abb[s, the elder brother of Yaz\d III. <Abb[s asked Yaz\d about the matter 
but he declined to accept any such allegation. Ibn Khald]n described all this episode with detailed 
elaboration which suggests that the leading figures of the Umayyad house were not in favour of 
rebellion; but only Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and some leading members of the Yemen tribe such as <Abd 
al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j, Man~]r b. Jamh]r and Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\. However, it can be observed 
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that the conflict between the members of the Umayyad family generated the conflict between the 
Yemen and Mu#ar. This conflict became a permanent feature of the late Umayyad rule.638  
Ibn Khald]n asserted that the <Abbasids took advantage of the situation. Ab] Muslim attempted 
to create a situation where both parties continued fighting each other. It can be observed that Ab] 
Muslim achieved his target successfully, when Na~r killed al-Kirm[n\ and defeated his army. Al-
Kirm[n\’s death gave Ab] Muslim a high position. The defeated army of al-Kirm[n\ finally joined 
Ab] Muslim, who then emerged as the most powerful leader of Khur[s[n. The textual study of Ibn 
Khald]n’s historiography suggests that Marw[n successfully eliminated all rebellions of the 
Khaw[rij, the opposition of members of the Umayyad family, such as Sulaym[n b. Hish[m, <Abd 
Allah b. <Umar and the union of anti-Mu#ar, Yemen\ elites, and the Sh\<\ movement of <Abd Allah 
b. Mu<[w\ya. However, he was unable to devise an appropriate policy to deal with the <Abb[sid 
movement. Furthermore, the death of Na~r in Rab\< al-Awwal 131 AH and the defeat and death of 
Ibn $ub[rah in Rajab 131 AH damaged Marw[n’s strength in Khur[s[n.639 Ab] Muslim and 
Qa+%abah mounted successful campaigns against Yaz\d b. Hubayra and Marw[n and defeated 
them. On the basis of the textual study of Ibn Khald]n, it can be inferred that the <Abb[sid 
movement in Khur[s[n was the immediate cause in the fall of the Umayyad while the internal 
family conflict and the tribal conflict were considered to be the actual cause of the fall of the 
Umayyads.  
It can be concluded that Ibn Khald]n based his historiography on the foundation of al-^abar\’s 
reports. Moreover, the pre-Modern historiographers focus mainly on the socio-political situation 
of Khur[s[n where the <Abb[sid movement played a central role in the disintegration of Umayyad 
rule. However, it can be observed that the pre-Modern sources validate the <a~ab\ya theory of Ibn 
Khald]n. The conflict among the members of the Umayyad family generated tribal conflict among 
the Arabs which resulted in the decline of the Arab kingdom of the Umayyads. Thus, the internal 
conflict within the royal family was perhaps one of the important causes in the fall of Umayyad 
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rule. The following section studies and analyses the various narratives of modern scholars on tribal 
conflict and its role in the fall of the Umayyads.  
6.5 The Tribal Conflict and Internal Family Conflict in Modern Sources 
Modern scholars have presented many theories in an attempt to identify the driving force of 
Umayyad history. As far as the <a~ab\ya is concerned, they generally offered two exemplars: the 
tribal conflict paradigm and the ruling family paradigm. The tribal conflict paradigm basically 
concerns the conflict between the northern Arabs of Qays and the southern tribes of Yemen, while 
the ruling family conflict paradigm illustrates the conflicts among leading members of the ruling 
family that disrupted the existing system. The struggle between the princes and the way in which 
they exploited tribal discord to strengthen their power against one another was the central element 
in framing the course of history.640 The internal struggles among members of the royal family in 
the later Umayyad period are seen as contributing to the fall of the dynasty. There was rivalry 
between the different branches of the Umayyad family; competition for power was evident 
between brothers and cousins and each of them contested the leadership. It can thus be observed 
that the division among members of the royal family led to the division of the ruling elites. A series 
of clashes occurred between them which ultimately fractured the Empire completely. The 
Umayyads lost their tribal vigour and were consequently unable to maintain their rule and were 
replaced by a rival tribal group. Some modern scholars, for example Wellhausen, Hugh Kennedy, 
and Hawting argue that the internal family conflict and the tribal conflict were intertwined. They 
also agree that the role of various members of the Umayyad royal family was decisive in shaping 
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events in a particular direction but that most of the tribal conflicts emerged because of the backing 
of some important Umayyad family figures.641  
The tribal conflict paradigm traces the roots of tribal conflict in the ancient history of the Arabs 
where the northern Arabs of Qays and Southern Arabs of Yemen were the competing forces. The 
modern scholars illustrate their theory by explaining the historic tribal rivalries revealed in the 
chronicles especially in the history of al-^abar\. These tribal conflicts played a central role in the 
decline of the Umayyad. The early Umayyad rulers successfully maintained the tribal balance and 
used their power to strengthen the rule. However, the latter rulers after of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik 
(r. 105¦724-125¦743) failed to keep the balance of power among these tribal forces which 
ultimately led them to collapse.  
The roots of tribal conflict between the Qays and Yemen are found in pre-Islamic history. The 
genealogists divide the Arabs into two groups: (i) the descendants of Ism[<\l or the northern Arabs, 
and (ii) the descendants of Qa+%[n or the Southern Arabs. The historical sources labelled the 
southern Arabs, the descendants of Qa+%[n, as ahl al-Yemen or al-Yam[n\ya; while the northern 
Arabs and the descendants of Ism[<\l are recorded in the historical sources by different titles, such 
as <Adn[n\ya, Niz[r\ya, Mu#ar\ya or Qays\ya. These titles are based on the genealogical roots of 
Ism[<\l’s descendants. <Adn[n was the son of Ism[<\l, Niz[r the son of <Adn[n,  Mu#ar the son of 
Niz[r, and Qays was the son of Mu#ar. This pre-Islamic division of Arabs was of great significance 
in the tribal hostilities that occurred during the Umayyad period. As Patricia Crone argues, “this 
division was of acute importance in the later Umayyad period in which the two descent groups 
would behave as rivals and engage in <a~abiyya ‘partisan behaviour’.”642 Contemporary scholars 
evaluated the tribal conflicts of the Northern and Southern tribes. In 1861 R. Dozy assessed the 
tribal feuds of the Arabs, arguing that the early Muslim Arabs had inherited the legacy and hostility 
of their predecessors from pagan times and therefore continued feuding even after they had 
                                                 
641 See for details, Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall; Kennedy, The Prophet; Hawting, The First Dynasty 
of Islam. For this approach particularly, see Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall; Crone, Slaves on Horses; 
also Riy[d <Is[, al-Naz[<.   
642 Crone, Patricia, “Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyads Period Political Parties?”, Islam, 71 (1994) , 1.   
234 
 
adopted Islam.643 However, Wellhausen argues that there was no tradition of hostility between the 
southern and northern Arabs in the pre-Islamic period; the starting point of the tribal antagonism 
was the conflict between the Kalb (a Yemen\ tribe) and Qays, during the Civil War of Marj R[hi% 
in 684 CE.644  
As an exponent of the tribal conflict paradigm, Jurj\ Zaydan evaluates a~ab\ya and its role during 
the Umayyad period. According to his accounts, the Yemen\-Mu#ar\ conflict was not a dominant 
feature during the R[shid]n period, arguing that <Al\’s strength was based on the An~[r and his 
Yemen\ supporters, whereas Mu<[w\ya gathered his vigour from his Quraysh\ adherents and his 
Yemen\ relatives. This meant that Yemen\s could be found in both parties. However, Mu<[w\ya 
had calculated his army and attempted to win the support of the Yemen\s with gifts and by 
encouraging relations with them. He also married within the tribe of Kalb, a branch of Yemen\ 
tribes. Thus, when he came to power, he enjoyed the allegiance of both the Mu#ar and Yemen 
tribes. After the death of Mu<[w\ya, the Yemen\s supported Yaz\d because he was their nephew 
on his mother’s side. However, the tribal conflict became evident after Yaz\d’s death. The Yemen\s 
supported the Umayyads while Ibn Zubayr’s strength was based on his Qays ancestry, which was 
a branch of Mu#ar.  
The battle of Marj Rahi%, according to Zaydan, was an excellent example of the Yemen-Mudar 
conflict. The Mu#ar supported Ibn Zubayr while Yemen fought for Marw[n in the battle. After 
this battle, the tribal conflict remained a dominant feature of the Umayyad period. The Yemen\s 
remained loyal to <Abd al-Malik while the Mu#ar continued their hostility towards the Umayyads. 
When <Abd al-Malik consolidated his rule, then the Mu#ar also accepted his authority but 
remained consistently hostile across the Arab Empire. Zaydan notes that 
everywhere the two factions were represented, and each got the upper hand alternatively, with the 
changes in Caliphs, governors, and lieutenants. The Mudarite governor would promote Mudarites, 
the Yemen\te Yemenites. The balance was perpetually shifting. This distinction was of great 
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importance in every branch of the administration, and even affected the appointment and dismissal 
of Caliphs, governors.645  
In Zaydan’s view, the Yemen remained the vital force in Umayyad rule and the Qays always 
played a marginal role. Power shifted to the Qays during the time of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, and 
the Qays became partisans of the Umayyad. After his death, when al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, whose 
mother was a Qays\, acceded to power, they gathered more strength.  
Zaydan considers that the tribal conflict reached its zenith in this period. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad 
organized the Mu#ar\ forces to avenge the death of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. The Mu#ar\s supported 
Marw[n while the Yemen\s assisted the <Abbasids. Zaydan argues that the dignity of the Quraysh 
remained established during the Umayyad period. They were mainly divided between the 
Umayyad and H[shimid families. It seems that Zaydan divided the Quraysh on a tribal basis. The 
H[shimids were powerful in |ij[z while the Umayyads were strong in Syria. Thus, the H[shimid 
and Umayyad families both had a prestigious position among the rest of the Arabs. As illustrated 
above, the Arabs were chiefly divided between the Yemen and Mu#ar, and within these two 
factions were further divided into sub-sections. Zayd[n argues that whenever a conflict arose 
between the Yemen and Mu#ar  in a province, the central government in Damascus used to appoint 
a Quraysh\ to resolve the issue. Zayd[n considers that this reflects the eminence of the Quraysh\s 
over other tribes.646  
Zayd[n believes that clan-feeling was one of the foundations of Umayyad politics, arguing that 
the Umayyad came to power through “the clan-feeling of the Kurashites, and pressing into their 
service the other clan-feelings.”647 Umayyad rule was based on the clan-patriotism of the Quraysh 
and on winning partisans. With the expansion of the state, this policy could not deliver the required 
results and it caused the fragmentation of society which ultimately led to its disintegration and 
revolts,648 and tribal rivalries appeared this context. The Qays favoured Marw[n b. Mu+ammad 
while the Yemen\s supported the cAbbāsids in their struggle against the Umayyads. Thus 
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factionalism, according to Zaydan, was the most important factor in the demise of the Umayyads. 
The later Umayyad rulers failed to maintain the equilibrium between the power structure of the 
Qays\s and Yemen\s. The Yemen\s, who had once been the primary military strength of the 
Umayyads disassociated themselves from Umayyad rule and supported the opponents of the 
Umayyads.649   
Wellhausen also regards tribal factionalism as one of the most important factors in the fall of the 
Umayyads, and his book, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, is one of the most substantial works in 
the field and has had a considerable impact on subsequent studies. According to Wellhausen’s 
investigations, pre-Islamic conflict between the Qays and Kalb incited the rebellions that occurred 
during the early history of the Muslims, and he traces the origin of such conflicts and rebellions 
from the historic conflict of Marj R[hi% in the <Abd al-Malik period.650 He also asserts that the 
Umayyads’ inability to present a substitute for the pre-Islamic <asab\ya meant that the Arab tribes 
weakened their strength by fighting each other. This continuous tribal strife weakened the unity of 
the Arabs and the Arab cause was badly damaged. On the other hand, the conquerors attempted to 
unite among themselves by forging alliances with those who were in opposition to the Umayyads.  
G. R. Hawting attempts to justify Wellhausen’s thesis, asserting that his own work “is certainly 
not intended to supersede The Arab Kingdom”.651 However, he argues that it was not only tribal 
conflict but also conflict within the royal family that led to the Umayyads’ decline. Hish[m’s 
successors could not resolve the conflict of the third fitna. The tribal conflict emerged initially 
because of the conflict within the royal family, but once it started it could not be stopped, even 
after the establishment of Marw[n’s rule. Hawting claims that the Kalb tribe of Yemen\ origin 
supported Sulaym[n against Marw[n, but even when Sulaym[n was defeated, the Kalb did not 
cease to struggle against the pro-Qays\ government of Marw[n and instead joined the cAbbāsids.652 
Hawting asserts that the conflict among members of the royal family weakened the state and its 
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opponents; in other words the Kh[warij and Shi<\s combined their forces against the Umayyads. 
He confirms the central role of conflict in the royal family in the demise of the Umayyad rule.653 
Gabrieli considers that al-Wal\d II harboured personal animosity against Kh[lid al-Qasr\. 
However, the Umayyad princes and Yaman\ elites considered this kind of treatment as part of a 
pro-Qays\ political agenda. Thus, the major divisions of the Syrian army declined to accept the 
authority of al-Wal\d and gathered around other members of the royal family who were considered 
to be suitable as rulers. The Yemeni factor was therefore decisive in that it helped Yaz\d III to 
present himself as an alternative candidate for the position of caliph. Gabrieli held al-Wal\d 
responsible for the decline of the Umayyad rule since he failed to calculate the political and tribal 
implication of his actions against his personal enemies.654 
Dennett also criticises Hish[m because of his inability to nominate his own son for his succession 
in place of al-Wal\d II who was not suitable for the caliphate.655 Dennett asserts that Yaz\d III was 
responsible for the fall of the Umayyads because he undermined the legal authority of the caliphate 
institution. He took the oath of allegiance to al-Wal\d II and then violated it without any legal 
justification. Yaz\d III actually rejected the traditional authority patterns and presented his own 
political programme which was “almost pure Kh[rijism”.656 His rebellion suggested that the oath 
of allegiance to a legitimate ruler was an insignificant act. This was clearly a violation of the 
fundamental principle of Umayyad rule. Furthermore, Yaz\d III’s reform policy restricted the 
caliph in the exercise of his absolute authority to resolve issues.657 
Dennett argues further that the internal conflict between the members of the royal family tore down 
the unity of the Syrian army, which was the primary source of Umayyad rule. The Umayyad 
government was decentralised and the provinces were semi-autonomous, and in this context, the 
Syrian troops had provided them with cohesion and harmony; however, the internal family conflict 
shattered the unity and superior authority of the Syrian army. Yaz\d’s rebellion provided the 
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platform for such activities, and when Marw[n b. Muhammad came to power the exhausted and 
crumbling consensus of the Syrian army was replaced by the Jazirian army. Dennett praised 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad for his military and political wisdom. He successfully shifted the power 
from Damascus to Jaz\ra with the help of his Jaz\rian-based troops.658 In this way, the long-
established military and political strength of Umayyad rule changed. Dennett argues that the 
breakdown of the traditional Syrian army authority was the real cause of the destruction of 
Umayyad rule and that the role of the <Abb[sid movement did no more than fill the vacuum.659 
Moreover, he identifies the decentralised structure of the Umayyad administration as one of the 
significant factors in the demise of the Umayyads. The central government of Damascus was 
dependent on the financial share given to it by the semi-autonomous provinces, and the central 
government had, moreover, to rely upon the Syrian army which had lost its strength after the death 
of al-Wal\d II.660 Dennett concludes that the <Abb[sid movement was not the real cause of the 
Umayyad fall; rather, it was the destruction of the traditional Syrian army that gave the cAbbāsids 
the opportunity to destroy Umayyad rule.661 
Like Dennett, Shaban also criticises some of Wellhausen’s assertions, arguing that Wellhausen 
interpreted all the important events of the Umayyad period in the context of pre-Islamic tribal 
conflicts, whereas socio-economic interests were the driving force behind the events. He further 
asserts that it is illogical to explain all events on the basis of Arab tribal jealousies without 
considering their ability to adjust to new socio-political conditions.662 Shaban believes that these 
socio-economic interests played an important role in shaping events, from the tribal conflict to the 
conflict among members of royal family,663 and claims that Marw[n II curtailed his opponents, 
particularly Sulaym[n b. Hish[m who joined the Khaw[rij, his private maw[l\s army, and <Abd 
Allah b. Mu<[wiya with his Shi<\ followers.664 However, the maw[l\s’ demand for equal rights and 
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their dissatisfaction with the Arab settlers over the war policy of the later Umayyads created the 
opportunity for the people of Khur[s[n to rebel.  
Shaban notes that the tribal rivalries were in fact based on the policy of war. The Qays\s were in 
favour of expansion, while the Yemen\s were against the expansionist policy and demanded the 
conferring of equal rights for the maw[l\ and assimilation with the local population. The Yemen\s’ 
policy of assimilation was fascinating to the Arab settlers as it secured their economic interests. 
Thus, the opponents of Umayyad rule, particularly the <Abb[sids, initiated their movement on the 
issue of equal rights and the assimilation of non-Arabs into the Muslim community.  Shaban argues 
that the socio-economic interest of various tribes played a significant role in the fall of the 
Umayyads, and that “it is absurd to interpret this conflict as simply a tribal squabble”665 rather the 
tribes of Qays¦Mu#ar and Yemen standing for political parties of the Marw[n\d period (684-
750CE). The Mu#ar\s were the adherents of an expansionist policy of the state and were not in 
favour of the assimilation of non-Arabs. On the other hand, the Yemen\s were against the policy 
of expansion in favour of the assimilation of non-Arabs. Al-|ajj[j b. Y]suf al-Thaqf\, the governor 
of Iraq during the reign of <Abd al-Malik and Wal\d I, as well as the majority of the governors 
during the Marw[nid period, were from the Qays. Then Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik and <Umar b. 
<Abd al-<Az\z favoured the policies of the Yemen\s and won their support. Although the Yemen\s 
governed Iraq during Hish[m’s period they were finally marginalised and ousted from state affairs. 
These Yemen\s agitated against al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d and favoured Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. During the 
period of the 740s, Shaban argues, the <a~ab\ya between the Yemen\s and Mu#ar\s governors 
reached in its zenith. The Qays\s gathered around Marw[n II and upheld his authority and as a 
result, the Yemen\ joined the Abbasids to achieve their political objectives.666 
In Shaban’s view, both the tribal conflict and the ruling family conflict paradigms were artificial. 
In fact, the imperial policy paradigm played a central role in shaping events during that period. He 
focused particularly on the expansionist policy and the treatment of non-Muslims, and according 
to him, the Qays and Yemen were convenient labels for parties with different policies regarding 
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the rule of the empire. On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that Shaban disagrees with 
Wellhausen’s argument.667 
Patricia Crone, another expert on the Umayyad period, asserts that Shaban’s argument that the 
Mu#ar and Yemen were political parties is a fallacy and that they were basically tribal groups 
rather than political parties. She argues the following:  
practically all belonged to the parties to which their nisbas assigned them; 
membership to the supposed political parties was overwhelmingly determined by 
descent. What is more, exceptions are hard to come by before the Civil War: in 
<a~abiyya on behalf of, or between Qays¦Mu#ar and Yemen before 744, the 
protagonists seem always to have sided with the party to which they belonged by 
descent.668  
Crone presented detailed accounts of the governors of the Umayyad period. The data shows, 
contrary to Shaban’s argument, that the Qays¦Mu#ar and Yemen were not political parties on the 
basis of their differences of opinion regarding an expansionist policy or assimilation. The 
Marw[nids appointed governors from both tribes without any discrimination.669 Crone’s work is 
considered to be the best critique of Shaban’s thesis regarding the interest groups who based their 
argument on the tribal conflicts. She argues that Shaban’s thesis invalid. In this context, she also 
refers to Wellhausen who argued that there was no documentary evidence regarding the conflict 
between the northern and southern tribes prior to the battle of Marj R[hi% (684 CE).670 She further 
criticises Shaban’s argument that the rivalry between Qays¦Mu#ar and Yaman is unlikely to have 
remained a purely tribal episode during the Umayyad era.671 Shaban asserts that these tribal groups 
were basically political parties of the Marw[nid period (684-750 CE). The Qays supported the 
programme of military expansion and the segregation of Arabs and non-Arabs, whereas the Yemen 
were against the expansionist policy and demanded the assimilation of non-Arab converts to Islam 
in Muslim society. Shaban argues that the majority of the Marw[nid caliphs appointed Qays\ 
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governors for their expansionist policy except those who were not enthusiastic about expansion, 
like Sulaym[n and <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z. Shaban maintains that Hish[m also reduced the 
Yaman\ role in politics, particularly after the dismissal of Kh[lid al-Qasr\. Consequently, the 
Yemenis staged a coup against al-Wal\d II and installed Yaz\d III to the throne in 744. The 
Yemenis were defeated again by Marw[n II who came into power with the help of Qays\s. At this 
stage, the Yemenis supported the <Abb[sids, who were in favour of the policy of assimilation of 
Arab and non-Arab in Islam.672 
Crone criticises Shaban’s argument and, having collected data about all the governors appointed 
during the Umayyad period which suggested that there was no particular policy in that respect, 
asserts that the historical sources do not validate his analysis. Shaban’s argument seems valid only 
for the time of the third fitna,673 when Yaz\d III's power was exclusively based on Yemen while 
Marw[n was completely dependent on the Qays\ forces.674 Crone also rejects Shaban’s assertion 
regarding Sulaym[n’s non-expansionist approach, arguing that Sulaym[n continued the foreign 
and expansionist policies of his predecessors. Yaz\d b. Muhallab persisted in continuing to expand 
in the frontiers of Khur[s[n. Similarly, the policy of conquering western India was carried out 
without any change during the period of Sulaym[n.675 Contrary to Shaban’s opinion, Crone asserts 
that Yaz\d III’s reforms were basically “Qadarite convictions than his Yemen\ associations and 
this is the one and only occasion on which a convergence between Qadarism and Yemenism is 
attested.”676  
Blankinship, another revisionist, extends Shaban’s argument in a simplistic manner, arguing that 
in contrast to the tribal conflict paradigm, the change in imperial policy damaged the state which 
had been established as a Jih[d state since the early period of Islam. Military expansion against 
the unbeliever was not only a financial source for the state but also conferred authority and 
legitimacy to rule; thus the failure of jih[d\ expansionist policies on the external front gave rise to 
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the internal problems of the regime.677 Blankinship maintains that Hish[m’s successors attempted 
to reform the jih[d policy and introduced many programmes to overcome the losses but it was too 
late to save the caliphate. The Umayyad army had to face a series of military defeats by non-
Muslims during Hish[m’s reign which led the Umayyads into a serious financial crisis and a 
weakening of the Syrian army. Pre-existing tribal and provincial rivalries simply intensified the 
situation.678 Blankinship blames Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik for the fall of the caliphate because he 
continued his expansionist policies throughout his regime on almost all frontiers without observing 
the consequences, nor did the expansionist policy generated much to meet the military expenses. 
Consequently, the Umayyad caliphate became “a hollow shell, ruined by the expense its military 
excesses claimed in lives and wealth.”679 Blankinship mentions many unsuccessful campaigns 
which placed an enormous fiscal burden on the state and required the imposition of heavy taxes to 
meet the army’s requirements, and argues that continuous engagement in war weakened the Syrian 
army. The Mu#ar\ tribal forces of the Jaz\ra, who had been deprived of power around sixty years 
earlier in the battle of Marj R[hit in 684 AD, took the opportunity to assert its own power. Thus, 
the failure of the state to devise a suitable jih[d policy culminated in its destruction.680 
Riy[# <Is[m, an Arab revisionist scholar, argues that socio-political circumstance made Ibn 
Mu<[wiya the unifier of hostile groups under his leadership. The common fabric between them 
was hostility towards Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. There was no sincere intention in the slogan of 
establishing rule for the family of the Prophet. Riy[# gives a detailed account of socio-political 
movements of that period, noting that when Ibn Mu<[wiya came to Kufa to see <Abd Allah b. 
<Umar, he did not intend to confront Ibn <Umar. It was the Shi<\s of Kufa who called on him to 
revolt against the Umayyads when they heard about the death of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and the internal 
conflict in the Umayyad house. They advised him that the Ban] H[shim had the right to rule rather 
than the Umayyads. Riya# considers that Ibn Mu<[wiya’s rebellion against Ibn <Umar was due to 
the support of the Shi<\s of Kufa, and particularly the Shi<\ faction of the Zaydiya, who ousted the 
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<amil (deputy) of Ibn <Umar and took control of the citadel. They then marched to Hira where Ibn 
<Umar resided with his army. Ibn Mu<[wiya was defeated and forced to retreat into Persia.681 
Marw[n b.Mu+ammad was busy  eliminating the elements of unrest in Syria, Egypt and other 
central provinces. Knowing Marw[n’s situation, and with the help of Yemen\s in Kufa and Hira, 
and $a++[k b. Qays, and with the support of his Kh[rij\ fellows among the Ban] Shayb[n, Ibn 
<Umar consolidated his position in al-Jaz\ra and marched to Kufa where his forces confronted the 
Marw[nids army of al-Na#r b. Sa<\d al-Khurash\, which consisted of Mu#ar\s. Upon the arrival of 
$a++[k, the armies of Ibn <Umar and al-Khurash\ both stopped fighting and made a coalition to 
fight the Khaw[rij. However, the coalition forces were defeated. Ibn <Umar went to W[~i%, a   
centre of Kalb\s and Qays\s. Al-Khurash\, on the other hand,  fled to Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. Al-
$a++[k then pursued Ibn <Umar to W[si% and compelled him to accept his authority. Ibn <Umar 
agreed and duly pledged allegiance to him. Al-$a++[k then appointed him as w[l\ of al-Ahw[z 
and F[ris. Marw[n consistently fought against al-$a++[k and finally killed him in 129 AH. After 
his death, all the anti-Umayyad opposition forces united under Ibn Mu<[wiya, but within a year 
Marw[n II had defeated them all and by the end of 130 AH peace was restored.682 Riy[# <Is[m 
maintains that the tribal conflict between the Yemen\s and Mu#ar\s in Khur[s[n destabilised the 
government’s authority and enabled the rise of the <Abb[sid movement.683 
Kennedy, another renowned revisionist, argues that Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik had successfully 
suppressed the tribal rivalries that re-emerged after his death and destroyed the Umayyad rule,684 
and considers that that the removal of al-Wal\d by force had undermined the principles of 
succession: moreover, the Umayyads also lost their religious authority.685 He maintained that al-
Wal\d II’s death was the immediate cause of the demise of the Umayyads’ rule since the tribal 
feuds among the Qays and Yemen that had been suppressed during Hish[m’s reign re-emerged, 
which resulted in the destruction of the rule.686 Kennedy affirms the controversial personality of 
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Yaz\d III, who has been considered as either a virtuous reformer or a barefaced opportunist, and 
considers that tribal factionalism was one of the most important factors in the demise of Umayyad 
rule. He framed his discussion of the third civil war in terms of tribal animosities, with the Qays-
Yemen conflict as its prominent feature, since Marw[n suppressed the Yemen\s with the help of 
his Qays\ alliance.687 Kennedy also argued that the Umayyad dynasty declined and disintegrated 
because it lacked religious authority,688 and that good education played a central role in the rise 
and success of the Thaqafis under the Umayyads.689 Thus, Kennedy considers tribal conflict, 
economic crisis and the lack of religious authority of the late Umayyads as the significant factors 
in the fall of the Umayyads.  
The modern scholars are, as noted, divided into two groups: the modern classical and the 
revisionist scholars. The modern classical scholars, including Zaydan and Wellhausen, consider 
that the tribal conflict between the Yemen and Mu#ar played a central role in the decline of the 
Umayyads. The tribal conflict and breakdown of the traditional authority of the Syrian army 
provided an opportunity for the <Abb[sid revolution.  The revisionists on the other hand, including 
Dennett, Gabrieli, G.R. Hawting, Crone, Shaban and Kennedy, identify multiple factors that 
played a role in the decline of the Umayyads. They believe the paradigms of tribal conflict and 
conflict within the Umayyad house are intertwined and cannot be separated. Shaban and Crone 
present the tribal conflict and conflict within the house of the Umayyads in modern terms. Shaban 
argues that the Yemen and Mu#ar were political parties and had their distinctive political agendas, 
whereas Crone’s work is an attempt to reject Shaban’s thesis. However, both agree that the tribal 
conflict played an important role in the decline of the Umayyads.  
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6.6 The Role of <A~ab\ya  in the Umayyad Fall and Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural 
Hegemony  
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony was constructed in the context of modern Western Europe. He 
argues that the hegemony of one group over society is based on consent; while coercion is applied 
occasionally on a small group of people at the time of rebellion. Gramsci’s theory of cultural 
hegemony is also applicable to an analysis of the phenomenon of tribalism during the Umayyad 
period. It would be helpful to determine the role of tribalism in undermining the authority of the 
Umayyads, and Gramsci’s theory is highly relevant to an analysis of the tribal context of the 
Umayyads. They established their authority on the basis of their tribal strength and their capacity 
to make agreements and coalitions with their opponents. They extended their rule because of their 
strategy of coalition-building with coercion. The Yemen tribes of Syria were their traditional 
power base among the masses as well as in the armed forces. However, the early Umayyads had 
been careful to root their power amongst conflicting tribes in different parts of the dynasty and as 
such, they attracted interest groups of tribes and religious elites from all provinces into their 
political structure. In the Umayyads’ historical perspective, the agreement between Mu<[wiya and 
|asan was an attempt to unify the Arab Kingdom under one hegemon. Through this reconciliation, 
the Syrian political elite came to dominate the united dynasty.  
Thus, it can be observed that Mu<[wiya’s project of reconciliation was a hegemonic strategy. He 
consolidated his authority by combining consent with coercion. In a tribal society, he attempted to 
respect tribal norms in order to win over the masses. He maintained equilibrium between the 
conflicting and hostile tribes without ignoring the centrality of Syrian political and military elites. 
Thus, he constructed a hegemonic bloc that was able to integrate divergent tribes and groups of 
diverse interest. The Marw[nids inherited this legacy from Mu<[wiya. They also came into power 
with the assistance of Syrian Yemen tribes and they also carried out Mu<[wiya’s strategy; hence, 
they achieved hegemony because of their successful strategy of reconciliation and agreements. 
Thus, the masses accepted their hegemony with consent; however, when required, they took 
coercive measures.  
Gramsci unfolds his concept of cultural hegemony by explaining the role of civil society. It is 
pertinent to understand the concept of civil society in order to explain how it is relevant to the 
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study of the Umayyads. Gramsci distils Marxist theory through devising his ideas of ‘hegemony’ 
and the ‘manufacture of consent’.690  He observes that society in capitalist states is divided into 
two sections: a political society which rules through force, and civil society which rules through 
consent. Gramsci’s concept of civil society differs from the modern concept of civil society 
according to which the public sector is voluntary and non-governmental organisations are 
considered to be civil society. Gramsci views civil society as a public sphere wherein political 
parties and trade unions acquire consciousness from the bourgeois state which serves as a vehicle 
to shape the ideas and beliefs for the public. The ideas of the bourgeoisie are propagated through 
media, universities, and religious institutions in order to ‘manufacture consent’. Thus the 
bourgeoisie maintain their hegemony when the civil society accepts their ideas as a norm of their 
cultural identities. Gramsci refers to hegemony as a form of control exercised by the dominant 
class. According to Marxist theory, the dominant class is a group which controls the means of 
production, and the subordinate class is a group of workers, the proletariat, who are compelled to 
sell their labour in order to survive. However, Gramsci argues that through moral and intellectual 
leadership, the dominant class has created a dominant culture which helps it to assert its authority 
over the subordinate class ethically, without coercion, while the subordinate class extends its 
consent and accepts an inferior position.    
The concept of civil society is difficult to understand in the tribal structure. Perhaps the poets, 
religious scholars, and tribal leaders are part of civil society, even in a tribal set-up. These religious 
and tribal leaders play the role of the intellectuals to convince the masses to support the ruling 
class. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is greatly relevant to the present study, particularly in the 
context of the relationship between civil society and the state. Gramsci recognizes the potential of 
the civil society to support or to threaten the state. He suggests that where there is a weak and 
divided civil society, ‘a war of movement’ is necessary to capture the state. A war of movement 
means a military struggle. In the absence of a strong civil society, the state cannot significantly 
maintain its control over matters; and the state has to use coercive apparatus to maintain its 
authority. However, where the civil society is strong and complex, and the ideology of the state is 
                                                 
690 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebook, 192. 
247 
 
deeply embedded in the institutions, the use of coercive power can be limited because the civil 
society convinces the majority of the people to extend their support to the ruling class with consent.  
The sharp division between the Yemen and Mu#ar tribes was a challenge for the ruling Umayyad 
elites. Both tribes attempted to have a maximum share in authority. The success of the early 
Umayyads was based on their strategy of a balance of power between the hostile tribes. In 
Gramscian terms, this is explained as the ‘national-popular’ dimension of hegemony, requiring 
“the unification of a variety of different social forces into a broad alliance expressing a national 
popular collective will.”691 Further, the state’s ideology is significant in establishing the hegemony 
of the ruling class. Gramsci asserts that ideology must be capable of serving the interests of the 
ruling class. The ruling class always attempts to mobilize and encourage the intellectuals to 
transmit the state’s ideology among the masses to win their support in its favour.3  
Gramsci believes that political movements devise various strategies to seize or maintain state 
power in different environments. He compares the success of Lenin in the Russian revolution with 
the possibilities of revolution in states in Western Europe. Socialist ideology and strategy were 
latent in the Russian context but remained unsuccessful in Western Europe where the capitalist 
ideology had a consensual basis combined with the state’s coercive apparatus. He asserts:  
In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in 
the West ... when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once 
revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful 
system of fortresses and earthworks.692 
Therefore, the civil society’s institutions helped the Western Europe states to maintain their 
hegemony against any direct revolutionary attack. The revolution in Western Europe was not 
possible without creating alternative ideological hegemony in civil society.693  
Thus, in Gramscian understanding, the role of civil society is vital to the formation of hegemony 
in modern states. It is necessary to analyse the dynamics of a pre-modern society such as the 
Muslim society during the period of the Umayyads. In pre-modern societies, tribal and religious 
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institutions formed complex and associational life. These tribal and religious movements played a 
significant role in threatening or bolstering the authority of the state.694 The Arab tribal system was 
intact during the Umayyad period and the tribes possessed strong military and economic resources. 
The early Umayyads attempted to consolidate their authority by creating an environment where 
the powerful tribes secured their socio-political and economic benefits. The Umayyads conferred 
their socio-political position to the Arab tribes over the non-Arabs. Therefore, the Arab hegemony 
over the non-Arabs was established. Perhaps the Arab tribes played a dual role in Gramscian 
understanding. The tribal allegiance meant military support as well as acceptance of authority with 
consent. Thus, power rested within society.  
At this point, Gramsci’s thinking is analogous with that of Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya when 
he argues that authority consists of two inter-related components in the Bedouin tribal society. 
Sul%ah or rule is established on the basis of a tribe’s <a~ab\ya. In other words, authority is based on 
tribal strength whose close-knit members have strong blood ties with common interests. Secondly, 
the rule of a tribe is only maintained when other tribes recognise the superiority of that <a~ab\ya. 
Thus, other tribal groups begin to acknowledge the pre-eminence and submit their political 
allegiance to that tribe. At that stage, the dominant tribe makes ilti+[m or builds a coalition with 
the leading tribes. Thus, the ruling tribe establishes its authority by forming the social integration 
of different tribes around its own ideology. Ibn Khald]n asserts that “A dynasty rarely establishes 
itself firmly in lands with many different tribes and groups. This is because of differences in 
opinions and desires. Behind each opinion and desire there is group feeling defending it.”695 
Therefore, the ruling tribe must possess a strong position to unify the conflicting tribes and 
convince them to extend their loyalty to the ruling elites. In the absence of such tribal authority, 
the religious authorities play a significant role and they initiate their movement on the basis of 
religion to unify the hostile interest groups.  
In this context, it can be observed that the Umayyads established authority over the other tribes of 
Quraysh. The pre-Islamic supremacy of the Umayyads also helped them to consolidate their 
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hegemony over the H[shimids. Both Mu<[wiya and <Abd al-Malik played a significant role in 
securing authority. Once they had established authority, they focused on creating harmony among 
different hostile tribes. They also attracted the religious scholars, as has been discussed in previous 
chapters, to consolidate their religious authority as well; thus they mobilized both elements of 
tribal society to convince the masses to extend their consent to the Umayyads. Both the Yemen 
and Mu#ar extended their socio-political allegiance to the Umayyads until the period of Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik. Looking at the early Umayyad period reveals that they used coercive and 
oppressive measures to suppress the rebellions and revolts against them, but at the same time they 
constructed a dominant culture with the assistance of the intellectual and religious leadership. With 
these measures, they not only maintained their authority but also created a space and culture where 
the subordinate or dominated class extended its consent to accept their hegemony without any 
significant opposition. However, the later Umayyads, because of their internal conflict, lost the 
support of civil society. Consequently, they did not have any alternative except to exercise coercive 
measures to stabilise the state.  
All the later Umayyads after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, used coercive means to 
establish the right of the government. Al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d significantly fractured the balance of 
tribal politics. The Mu#ar gained more power in his period; whereas, the Yemen came to power 
during al-Wal\d’s period. The Mu#ar supported Marw[n b. Mu+ammad in reaction. The competing 
tribal groups of Yemen and Mu#ar served the Umayyads but when the later Umayyads could not 
maintain the balance of power, they began to work for their own interests. The Yemen tribes of 
Syria lost their authority when Marw[n b. Mu+ammad came into power with the help of his Mu#ar\ 
army of al-Jaz\ra. Despite having great leadership abilities Marw[n b. Mu+ammad had to utilize 
coercive measures to consolidate his power but he failed because he could not convince the masses. 
Moreover, the divided and weak tribal society could not legitimise his authority.  
In evaluating the early sources on the issue of <a~ab\ya and its role in the fall of the Umayyad, it is 
assumed that the later Umayyads could not maintain their <a~ab\ya. Therefore, it is observed that 
a conflict emerged within the members of the Umayyad family. Similarly, on a national level, the 
Arabs could not preserve their <a~ab\ya and conflict broke out among the Arab tribes. 
Consequently, the Arab Umayyad kingdom was replaced by the <Abbasids who were mainly 
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supported by non-Arabs of Khurasan. The conflict within the Umayyad royal family provoked 
Yemen and Mu#ar tribal conflict. The pre-Modern historians examined Hish[m’s unfriendly 
relations with his would-be successor al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d. Therefore when al-Wal\d came to power, 
he dismissed all Hish[m’s governors and deputies and punished them mercilessly with the 
exception of the governor of Iraq, Y]suf b. <Umar. As a result, the tribal conflict influenced all 
socio-political and religious spheres of life. The <Abb[sid movement took advantage of the internal 
conflict and came into power with the assistance of their Khur[s[nian fellows. Moreover, the 
<Abb[sids utilised a religious sprit to achieve their political target. In this context, Ibn Khald]n’s 
<a~ab\ya theory seems logical. The Umayyads lost their control when the conflict emerged among 
members of the royal family. Further, the Umayyads could not understand the pace of socio-
political change. They consistently based their power on Arab culture which was in fact a culture 
of ruling through Arab tribalism, whereas the <Abb[sids devised an alternative ideology and 
founded their rule on Arab-Persian culture. They actually came into power with the help of non-
Arabs. Thus, they had to share authority with their non-Arab supporters. Therefore, in contrast to 
the Umayyads, the <Abbasids could not enjoy absolute authority.  
The anti-Umayyad forces remained unsuccessful against the Umayyads’ authority. However, 
when conflict appeared among the Umayyad family members, they began to lose the support of 
the tribes. The allegiance of tribes was divided among the leading members of the Umayyad 
family. Thus, in Gramscian terminology, ‘a war of movement’ broke out for the survival of the 
state. This can be observed in the episode of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and Marw[n b. Mu+ammad. 
Moreover, when the <Abb[sids observed the weak and fragile tribes that lacked the leadership of 
any strong hegemon, they started a ‘war of manoeuvre’ against the Umayyads on religious 
grounds. As noted above, Ibn Khald]n argues that in the absence of tribal unity, religion can play 
a role in social cohesion. Here we can see that the <Abb[sid presented an alternative ideology based 
on religious rhetoric. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad’s governor of Khur[s[n attempted to pacify the 
people of Khur[s[n by introducing the economic reforms. It was an unsuccessful attempt at ‘a war 
251 
 
of position’ or passive revolution.696 Earlier, <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z had attempted to revitalize 
the state through ‘a war of position’ but he also failed due to his brief period of rule, and opposition 
within the Umayyad royal family. As a result, it can be concluded that the Umayyads lost ‘a war 
of position’ in the episode involving <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z and Na~r b. Sayy[r. Further, they also 
lost ‘the war of movement’ and the ‘war of manoeuvre’ after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-
Malik. It was their failure to win the consent of tribal and religious authorities that led them to 
their decline.  
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7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Historically, the fall of the Umayyads was an event of great importance and has had a lasting 
impact on the subsequent socio-political, ethnic, and religious spheres of Muslim history and 
culture. In this thesis, we have attempted to identify the factors that contributed to the Umayyad 
decline. In an attempt to understand and interpret this complex phenomenon, modern scholars have 
devised several approaches. Reporting of events in pre-Modern historiographies is in many ways 
vague, conflicting, and quite ambiguous, since the historiographers usually revealed many 
contradictory reports without analysing them properly. The issue of presentation became more 
complicated since most of the sources composed during the <Abb[sid period are found to have 
been under the direct or indirect influence of an anti-Umayyad ruler. Thus, the possibility of hostile 
sources is evident. This study has analysed the pre-modern sources identifying their aims and 
objectives in the depiction of the later Umayyad period. The pre-Modern sources contain a variety 
of reports that consist of divergent themes involved in the decline of the Umayyads. The absence 
of analysis of events in pre-Modern historiographies gives modern scholars an opportunity to 
explain and interpret such events according to their own understanding. Consequently, modern 
historiographers have applied multiple methods to understand and interpret the fall of the 
Umayyads, and have used the pre-Modern chronicles to prove their argument. This research has 
attempted to analyse both pre-modern and modern historiographies to determine their perceptions 
and approaches regarding the Umayyad fall,  focusing entirely on the events of the last eight years 
of Umayyad rule.  
The intention was to determine the aims and objectives of traditional or pre-Modern 
historiographers in describing the fall of the Umayyads and to establish the nature of the Modern 
approaches to understanding the causes of that fall.  In addition, Gramci’s theory of cultural 
hegemony was applied as a way of analysing events through a particular perspective, an approach 
that has provided a unique framework for the study of Umayyad history. Moreover, the application 
of Gramscian theory has enabled the exploration of new dimensions in assessing Umayyad 
historiography, thereby increasing understanding of the existing state of knowledge. In order to 
evaluate the subject matter holistically, the work was divided into chapters. The two introductory 
chapters defined the subject matter and reviewed important pre-modern and modern 
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historiographies of the Umayyad period. By determining a potential hypothesis and research 
questions for the study, the limitations of the research were established.  
For a better understanding of the subject, the histories of five pre-modern historiographers were 
selected: i.e., al-Ya<q]b\ (d. 284¦897), al-^abar\ (d. 301¦922), al-Mas<\d\ (d. 346¦957), Ibn Ath\r 
(d. 630¦1232) and Ibn Khald]n. These historians, with the exception of Ibn Khald]n, present 
extensive information about the Umayyads’ fall but without properly analysing and identifying the 
real causes of their decline. Therefore, the early historiographies have no clear interpretation of 
the fall of the Umayyads. An attempt was made to ascertain the aims and objectives of these 
historiographers by analysing their writing style and their way of presentation, and by examining 
what they have expressed between the lines. A brief detail of these pre-Modern sources follows:  
1. Al-Ya<q]b\’s presentation of Umayyad history is considered biased because of his adherence to 
the Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet). He preferred their verdict and therefore accepted all 
the reports that came from that source. He criticised the Umayyads and was particularly with regard 
to al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d.697 He did not consider the rule of the Umayyads to be legitimate and therefore 
used the word ayy[m instead of dawah or khil[fa for their rule.698  On the basis of al-Ya<q]b\’s 
presentation, it can be concluded that the fall of the Umayyads was a natural process. They declined 
because they did not have the legitimacy to rule and they deserved such a fall.  
2. Al-^abar\ has long been established as the most important historiographer of early Islamic 
history and has had a tremendous impact on subsequent historiography. His presentation of 
historical accounts is usually considered comparatively authentic and balanced; as Duri asserts, al-
^abar\ is unbiased and impartial in his presentation of his sources. This does not mean that he had 
no agenda. In constructing Muslim historiography he endeavoured to illustrate the oneness of the 
prophetic mission and continuity of the umma, presenting history as the “expression of divine 
will”.699  Khalidi admits that al-^abar\ was involved in theological disputes with the Qadarites of 
his own time, but denies that his presentation of history reflected his views on such matters,700 
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while Franz Rosenthal also suggests that al-^abar\’s bias is reflected in his omission of certain 
anti-cAbbāsid materials.701 As far as the late Umayyads are concerned, al-^abar\ is not authentic 
in his presentation. Reflecting his regional bias and partiality, he relied almost exclusively on Iraq\ 
sources for his description of the Umayyad period, and depicted Damascus, the Umayyad capital, 
and Syria, the Umayyads’ centre of power, on the basis of Iraq\ reporters who had not personally 
witnessed the events. In criticising al-^abar\, Donner argues that about eighty percent of his 
narratives regarding Syria are derived from Iraq\ sources, and claims that al-^abar\ ignored the 
Syrian sources that were accessible to him.702  Similarly, Judd says that “the history of Umayyad 
Syria is presented almost exclusively through Iraq\ sources. While these sources may not have 
been overtly hostile to the Umayyad regime, they do offer a rather limited perspective.”703  
Regardless of all these deficiencies, al-^abar\ had a tremendous impact on the later as well as the 
more modern works on the late Umayyads. He compiled a detailed elaboration of the Umayyad 
period, applying the methodologies of both historians and traditionalists. Like other historians, 
however, he did not interpret the historical events that accompanied the fall of the Umayyads, but 
narrated events without expressing his own opinion. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain al-
^abar\’s own standpoint regarding the fall of the Umayyads, although we can assume his opinion 
by examining his method of presentation. Possibly the points to which more space was given in 
al-^abar\’s work are more important according to his understanding. He certainly devoted more 
space to the internal conflicts of the Umayyads, describing events during the last years of Umayyad 
rule and enlarging greatly on the internal conflicts among the Umayyad family. He narrated the 
events of the year 126¦743, calling them the events that upset the rule of the Marw[nids,704  and 
reported in detail how al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was criticized by Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. When the internal 
conflict in the house of Umayyad reached its height, the <Abb[sids took advantage of this 
disruption.     
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3. Al-Mas<]d\ was also criticized because of his inclination towards Shi<\sm. He disapproved of 
the Umayyads because of their immorality, and asserted that Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik was very 
tight-fisted. His criticism of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was harsh; in his work he devoted much space to 
criticising his morals, religion and conduct, and declared that he was a heretic, an atheist and a 
characterless person.705 Moreover, al-Mas<]d\ did not consider Umayyad rule to have Islamic 
legitimacy. Therefore, like al-Ya<q]b\, he use the word al-ayy[m for the rule of the Umayyads, 
whereas he used the word al-khil[fah for the rule of the Abbasids, which indicates that the 
Umayyads, according to him, had neither the legitimacy nor the ability to rule. Therefore, their 
rule disintegrated.706  
4. Ibn Ath\r took a clear stand on the Umayyads in his historiography. He also revealed prophetic 
traditions in order to validate his point of view. His historiography is considered the best defence 
of the Umayyads. He praised al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik for his achievements, conquests, and 
construction of mosques, and for extending Umayyad rule from Andalusia to Kashghar and the 
Indian sub-continent. He also refused to accept reports about al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d’s immoral 
behaviour.707  Ibn Ath\r believes that the Umayyads behaved badly but most of their misdeeds 
were attributed to them by their enemies, particularly the Shi<\s and the Khaw[rij who accused 
them of wrongdoings that they had not committed. The decline of the Umayyads was basically 
because of the internal conflict within the house of Umayyad after the death of Hish[m b. <Abd al-
Malik. There is considerable similarity between the views of al-^abar\ and Ibn Ath\r, perhaps 
because both were Sunnis.708  
5. The history of Ibn Khald]n is an exception in the pre-Modern sources. Ibn Khald]n was less 
hostile towards the Umayyads and even admired al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, rejecting most of the 
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accusations made against him. He reported that, in the opinion of the <Abb[sid caliph al-Mahd\,  
the negative depiction of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was because leading members of his family came into 
conflict with him out of jealousy.709 Ibn Khald]n, who is considered to be the founder of the 
philosophy of history, analysed the decline of the Umayyads from a philosophical angle, arguing 
that a kingdom is always based on two foundations: <a~ab\ya which provides a strong armed force, 
and money which is required to regulate the kingdom’s institutions. The Umayyads possessed both 
of these elements, possessing greater financial resources and stronger tribal <a~ab\ya since they 
belonged to the Ban] <Abd Mun[f, whose tribal eminence was established among all Arab 
tribes.710 The <a~ab\ya gradually became weak among the Umayyads and consequently their tribal 
unity was fractured and they could not maintain their rule.711 In addition to <a~ab\ya, Ibn Khald]n 
identifies other elements, such as internal family conflict, mismanagement, and the rise of the 
<Abb[sids, as significant factors in the disintegration of the Umayyad rule. Ibn Khald]n’s 
theoretical framework for the interpretation of Umayyad history was widely received by the 
modern historiographers of the Umayyad period.  
Assessment of the pre-Modern sources suggests that the pre-modern historians, with the exception 
of Ibn Khald]n, did not identify any particular cause for the decline of the Umayyads but merely 
reported all the events that led to the end of Umayyad rule. Moreover, their reporting of the 
Umayyads seems hostile and biased as their accounts were written under <Abbasid influence based 
on Iraqi traditions. However, in contrast to the historical sources, the literary sources are more 
hostile to the Umayyads. Modern anti-Umayyad scholars base their arguments more on the literary 
than the historical sources, and the availability of a varied collection of historical literature gives 
modern scholars an opportunity to interpret Umayyad history according to their own 
understanding. Most of the pre-Modern historiographies provide information without making any 
analysis or interpretation; however, most are hostile towards the Umayyads. Secondly, they mostly 
focused on the role of Khur[s[n in the fall of Umayyads. In contrast to the pre-Modern 
                                                 
709 Ibn Khald]n, T[r\kh, 132¦3.  
710 Ibn Khald]n, Muqdima, 132¦2. 
711 Ibn Khald]n, Muqdima, 763¦2. 
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historiographers, the modern scholars evaluate the phenomenon of the decline by applying 
different theories.  
It is well-known that historians are products of their own time. They evaluate history under the 
influence of their intellectual environments and then explain it through the lenses of their 
contemporary dominant paradigms in order to comprehend the past through present-day idioms. 
Modern scholars attempt to reconstruct history by reformulating various methods. During the last 
two centuries, many orientalists have endeavoured to examine the Umayyad period through the 
application of specific theories, aiming to evaluate the rise and fall of the Umayyads in order to 
construct a viable illustration of Umayyad rule. Most of these historiographers analysed the 
historical data with some prior suppositions and hypotheses. In the context of the conflicts of the 
emerging and established powers and the debate about nationalism in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Umayyad rule was also examined through the lens of nationalistic 
interpretations as a manifestation of conflict between Arabs and Persians. After the Socialist 
revolution in Russia,712 the socialist orientalists interpreted the historical events of Umayyad rule 
in economic terms, seeing the internal and external conflicts in the first and second centuries of 
Islam as a class struggle. Although the history of the Umayyads has been less prominent in the 
post-Second World War period, the problem of Israel and Palestine, as Hawting argued, “has 
fostered an interest in Umayyad policies in the region and especially in the importance of 
Jerusalem of the Umayyads.”713 Thus, it can be seen that the modern scholars focus on identifying 
the real cause of the decline, whereas the pre-Modern historiographies are mostly based on 
narration, leaving the reader room to interpret events according to his own ability to understand.  
Modern scholars of the Umayyad period, who have devised various approaches and methodologies 
for analysis and interpretation of the primary sources, can be divided into two distinctive groups: 
traditionalists and revisionists. Among the traditionalists, who devised a method of critical analysis 
for the study of pre-Modern sources, Wellhausen holds a central position. In contrast to the 
classical anti-Umayyad position, he admires the Umayyads’ administrative system, deriving most 
                                                 
712 For instance, the Russian scholar, E. A. Belyaev applied the Marxist approach to class and social relationships in 
order to evaluate the history of Islam in his book Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages.   
713 Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, 127. 
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of the material for his book from al-^abar\’s work, and also asserts that the role of the Persian 
maw[l\ of Khur[s[n was central in the Umayyad fall, arguing that Ab] Muslim’s army consisted 
basically of Iranian peasants and the maw[l\ of the village of Marv. He also affirms that the role 
of Arab settlers was also significant in the revolutionary army.714  It can be said that Wellhausen 
is a beacon of modern scholarship since all the traditionalists follow his footsteps in one way or 
other although they also criticise many of his assertions.  
The real criticism, however, came from the revisionists. For example, Dennett challenged 
Wellhausen’s views on financial policies, while Shaban reassessed the role of the maw[l\ of 
Khur[s[n and maintained that Ab] Muslim’s main support came from the Arab quarters in 
Marv.715 Furthermore, the tribal conflict of Yemen and Qays was not merely a tribally-based 
conflict – rather it was conflict of agendas between two political parties. The Yemen was in favour 
of assimilation, while the Qays stood for the expansionist policy. The failure of Marw[n II’s 
expansionist policy led to the end of him rule. The resentment of the maw[l\s  and the discontent 
of the Arab settlers over the war policy of the later Umayyads provoked the Khur[s[nians to revolt. 
Shaban argues that the economic interests of the Arab immigrants were also incompatible with the 
expansionist policy of the later Umayyads. Thus, socio-economic interests made the opponents of 
the rule more receptive to the Khurasanians.  
The H[shimid- cAbbāsid movement was principally initiated on the issue of the assimilation of all 
members of the Muslim community under an equal system, and Marw[nid rule was successfully 
overthrown on the basis of this idea. It is interesting that Shaban, compared with Wellhausen focus 
on Yemen-Qays rivalries, gives more importance to the socio-economic elements that played a 
decisive role in the fall of the Umayyads.716 Furthermore, Patricia Crone in her critique of Shaban’s 
work also challenged the secular image of the Umayyads and provided extensive textual evidence 
for their religiosity. A number of studies have been conducted by revisionists in an attempt to 
identify the real causes of the Umayyads’ decline, all of which revolve around three major themes: 
                                                 
714Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom, 532. 
715 Shaban, The Abbasid Revolution, 156. 
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the role of religion and religious movements, the role of non-Arabs, and <a~ab\ya. In an attempt to 
hear the echo of the Umayyads’ decline, pre-modern and modern sources have been analysed, and 
a variety of modern approaches and methodologies applied to the study of the Umayyads has been 
explored and analysed. Furthermore, Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, as mentioned above, 
has been employed to explain and interpret the causes of the Umayyads’ fall.  
The third chapter of this thesis presented a general historical background to the Umayyads. On the 
basis of pre-modern historical sources, it was found that the Umayyads established their authority 
because of their greater pre-Islamic tribal and financial supremacy. Mu<[w\ya successfully 
founded the Umayyad rule after the assassination of <Al\ with the help of the Syrian army. His son 
Yaz\d had to face strong opposition that became stronger after his death and the authority of the 
Umayyads was challenged. At this stage, the ruling power shifted from the Sufy[nid to the 
Marw[nid branch of the Umayyads. The historical sources record that <Abd al-Malik controlled 
all oppositional forces of the Zubayrid, the Khaw[rij and the Shi<\s, and selected pre-modern and 
modern historiographies were analysed to identify the factor that contributed to overall socio-
political and religious development. In addition, Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony was 
applied to the study of a historical perspective on the Umayyads. Gramsci declares that text cannot 
be understood without properly understanding the context. Thus it is of great importance to 
understand pre-Islamic tribal formation and Umayyad-H[shimid hostility in studying the 
Umayyad era.  
On the basis of their pre-Islamic pre-eminence, the Umayyads consolidated their authority when 
Mu<[wiya came to power. He constructed a plausible image among the masses by establishing a 
decentralised governmental structure and reforming administrative and economic systems. In 
Gramscian terms, he succeeded in presenting an acceptable structure (economic base) and 
superstructure (the ideology of the ruling class). Consequently, an ‘organic relationship’ emerged 
between the economic base and cultural ideas, and a ‘historic bloc’ came into existence, through 
which the Umayyads consolidated their hegemony over the masses. The Marw[nid carried on the 
legacy of the Sufy[nid. Having eliminated the main strength of the oppositional forces, they 
attached both religious and secular socio-political intellectuals to their court who presented a 
convincing image to the masses. Thus, the common people consented to accepting their hegemony, 
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while the shattered opposition was pacified either through agreements being reached or with the 
use of coercive means. It is concluded that the Umayyads devised a suitable strategy which was 
appropriately implemented with the assistance of the Syrian army who were represented as the 
vanguard of the Umayyads. This contextual study enabled an understanding and identification of 
the real factors involved in the Umayyads’ fall.   
The fourth chapter analysed the role of religion and religious movements in the fall of the 
Umayyads as manifested in five pre-Modern and modern historiographies. The religious 
movements analysed were the H[shimid-<Abb[sid, the Khaw[rij and the Qadar\ya, all of which 
opposed the ruling Umayyads. It was found that these religious movements were linked to other 
socio-political and tribal identities, and after examining various approaches to the role of religious 
movements, the Gramscian theory of hegemony was applied for the study of the religious 
movements of the later Umayyad period.  The viability of the ideology, organisation, and strategy 
of these oppositional religious movements as a counter-hegemonic force was examined, and the 
thesis confirmed that the <Abb[sid movement remained successful because of its superior 
ideology, strategy, and organisational structure whereas the Khaw[rij and Qadar\ya lacked the 
necessary elements required for a counter-hegemonic force.  
It has also been argued that although the H[shimid-<Abb[sid ideology was neither new nor 
innovative, the socio-political environment of that precise moment gave it the potential to 
challenge the authority of the Umayyads.  The secret H[shmid-<Abb[sid movement of Iraq\ and 
Khur[s[n\ intellectuals and propagandists convinced the oppressed to favour revolution. 
Moreover, Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ devised a viable strategy to weaken the strength of the ruling 
party and then successfully organized a vanguard party in Iraq and Khur[s[n to establish <Abb[sid 
rule by force. Thus, it was practicable to combine the strategic and organizational abilities of the 
<Abb[sids to act as a counter-hegemonic force.   
The role of the non-Arab maw[l\ in the development and demise of the Umayyads was evaluated 
in the fifth chapter. With the expansion of Muslim rule, a multi-cultural society came into being. 
Some Modern scholars assert that Umayyad rule was typified by Arab hegemony over the subject 
peoples and their socio-economic policies resulted in the triumph of feudal relations among the 
Arabs and maw[l\. The Arabs were a privileged class enjoying high social status whereas the 
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maw[l\ were a deprived class struggling for equal rights. It was observed that the narratives of 
historical sources are at variance with the accounts of literary Arabic sources. An anti-maw[l\ 
voice was heard in Arabic literature, whereas the historical sources revealed the active 
participation of the maw[l\ in different socio-political and religious movements. Therefore,  
historical chronicles and Arabic literature were both used for analysis of the maw[l\.  
It was found that the maw[l\s’ participation in Ibn Ash<ath’s movement is exaggerated in modern 
sources such as Von Kremer, Mullur and van Volten. However, Wellhausen, Shaban and Hawting 
assert that the central role in Ibn Ash<th’s movement was played by the Yemen tribes while the 
role of maw[l\ was secondary. We maintain that Kremer’s interpretation is based on the account 
of J[+iz’s al-<Iqd al-Far\d which is a literary work. On the other hand the pre-modern historians 
such as al-^abar\ report that Ibn Ash<ath’s rebellion was due to his conflict with al-|ajj[j and that 
his army consisted of thousands of Arabs and non-Arabs. Kremer’s thesis is actually based on 
Shu<]b\ literature, in which the maw[l\s have been depicted as a subordinate class. This chapter 
also evaluated the significance of the Shu<]b\ya as basically a reaction of non-Arabs against the 
Arab aristocracy. Perhaps overly influenced by Arabic literary sources, some modern scholars 
have depicted the maw[l\ as a marginalized class in the Umayyad era.  
The role of maw[l\ in the <Abb[sid revolution is also evaluated through the analysis of modern 
and pre-modern sources. Modern scholarship on the maw[l\s’ role is again divided between two 
groups: the traditionalists and revisionists. Traditionalists emphasise the maw[l\s’ role in the fall 
of the Umayyads, whereas the revisionists argue that the maw[l\ played a secondary role under the 
Arabs. Notable among the traditionalist-leaning scholars are Kremer, van Vloten, Goldziher and 
Wellhausen, while the revisionist school of thought includes Dennett, Gibb, Shaban, Zakeri, 
Crone, and Agha. A comparative study of modern scholarship concludes that the traditionalist 
modern sources over-emphasised the maw[l\s’ role in the oppositional forces of the Umayyad era, 
while the decisive part in the revolution was played by former Arab warriors residing in the region 
of Khur[s[n. Research suggests that the maw[l\s’ role in the downfall of the Umayyads was 
subsidiary and that most of the reports revealed in Arabic literary sources are fabricated.  
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony was applied to evaluate the role of maw[l\ in the rise and 
fall of the Umayyads and how the Umayyads, being a dominant class, maintained their authority 
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through coercive measures and through presenting values acceptable to the maw[l\. It has been 
noted that the Arabic literary sources are biased in the way they paint a negative image of the 
Umayyads. There were many well-known members of the maw[l\ who played the role of 
‘deputies’ of the ruling class, according to a Gramscian view; however, the ideology of the 
oppositional movements attracted the maw[l\.  Assessment of pre-modern and modern sources on 
the maw[l\’s role made it possible to locate the maw[l\s within a subordinate class, and from a 
Gramscian perspective, to observe how class consciousness developed among them. The role of 
maw[l\ in the Ibn Ash<ath movement shows their contradictory position. They assisted an Arab 
against an Arab without realising that neither had any agenda to strengthen or elevate the maw[l\s’ 
position. Thus, the maw[l\ struggle was ‘disjointed and episodic’ because they had no consistent 
class consciousness or coherent identity. Therefore, Umayyad and anti-Umayyad forces both 
utilised the strength of the maw[l\ for their own ends. It was also found that <Umar b. <Abd <Az\z’s 
reforms to elevate the status of the maw[l\ represented an attempt to stage passive revolution in 
Gramscian terms. Similar reforms were introduced by Ashras and Na~r b. Sayy[r in his final days.  
The Shu<]b\ya too were evaluated with reference to Gramsci’s concept of folklore. Shu<]b\ 
literature is a pre-eminent example of ‘spontaneous philosophy’ and ‘folklore’ in Gramsci’s 
understanding. Although it has been confirmed that most of the reports of Shu<]b\ literature are 
fabricated, these narrations, even then, played a significant role in the construction of ethnic 
identity and class consciousness. In addition, the ideology of anti-Umayyad oppositional forces 
claimed equal rights, which also created class consciousness among maw[l\ and in particular 
among the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n where they were in close relationship with Arab settlers. This 
research concludes that class consciousness emerged among the maw[l\ of Khur[s[n but they were 
not strong enough to fight for their rights individually. They therefore supported the <Abb[sid 
ideology which gave them equal rights, and worked under the strong counter-hegemonic force of 
the <Abb[sids. 
<A~ab\ya or the notion of tribalism is a highly celebrated phenomenon and has received great 
attention in both the modern and pre-modern historiographies. It is often argued that the Umayyads 
lost their authority when weakness appeared in their <a~ab\ya, since the conflict among members 
of the Umayyad family produced conflict between the Yaman\s and Qays\s. The conflict between 
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the H[shimids and Umayyads had its roots in the pre-Islamic period, at which stage, the <Abb[sids 
took advantage of the Umayyad family conflicts and Arab tribal conflicts, and with the support of 
the non-Arab people of Khur[s[n shattered the strength of the ruling party. The pre-modern 
sources devoted substantial space to the study of this theme. In contrast to other pre-modern 
historians, Ibn Khald]n focused largely on the role of tribalism in the Umayyad fall. <A~ab\ya was 
examined by illustrating three competing <a~ab\ya themes: (i) the internal conflict within the 
Umayyad family; (ii) Yemen\s¦Kalb\s versus Mu#ar\s¦Qays\s;  and (iii) the H[shimids-<Abbasids 
versus the Umayyads. Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya was defined and applied to five selected 
pre-modern histories to see how they interpreted the fall of the Umayyads in the light of this theory.  
The second part of the chapter evaluates the modern interpretation of <asab\ya’s role in the 
Umayyad fall. The role of tribalism in the fall of the Umayyads was examined in the light of 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, and Ibn Khald]n’s theory of <a~ab\ya, constructed for the 
study of tribal society, was compared with Gramcsi’s theory of cultural hegemony and its focus 
on  civil society. Ibn Khald]n holds that a fragile tribal leadership provides space for religious 
leadership. Therefore, the <Abb[sids came into power on the basis of religion and ideology when 
the Umayyads had lost their tribal strength. On the other hand, there have been attempts to analyse 
the role of <a~ab\ya through the application of Gramsci’s concepts of ‘war of movement’ and ‘war 
of manoeuvre’. The Umayyads had actually lost both their religious and their tribal authority by 
the end of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik’s rule. Our research confirms that conflict among the members 
of the Umayyad family shattered their tribal unity, which ultimately broke Arab tribal unity as 
well. In this context, the <Abb[sids came forward with a better ideology, strategy and organisation 
by making alliances with non-Arabs.  
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Appendix I 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad- the Last Umayyad Caliph 
A careful study of Marw[n’s role is necessary in order to understand the Umayyads’ collapse since 
he was the last Umayyad ruler. He had been appointed to key posts during the reign of Hish[m 
and later caliphs. Hish[m had assigned him the governorship of Armenia and Azerbaijan.717 Al-
Wal\d took radical actions against Hish[m’s administration. He dismissed almost all the governors 
except the governor of Iraq, Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqaf\.718 Marw[n observed the situation and 
accepted the authority of al-Wal\d.719 He sent him a long letter full of praise for the new caliph.720 
Thus, he successfully achieved his political ambitions. He not only secured his governorship of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan but also assigned the governorship of al-Jaz\ra. On the other hand, al-
Wal\d confirmed the governorship of Marw[n because he wanted to win his support for 
nominating his sons, al-|akam, and <Uthm[n for the succession.721 Al-Wal\d had already annoyed 
the traditional authorities in Damascus. Al-^abar\ notes that al-Wal\d made two great mistakes. 
He annoyed his family and secondly, he favoured the Qays and disregarded the Yemen that was 
the leading party of the Syrians.722 From this perspective, Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d started a rebellion 
with the assistance of aggrieved parties against al-Wal\d that ended up with the assassination of 
al-Wal\d.         
Marw[n, the governor of a predominantly Qays\ region, was against Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d’s rebellion. 
He protested against the assassination of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d and started a movement against Yaz\d 
b. al-Wal\d, but later took the oath of allegiance. Consequently, Damascus confirmed his 
                                                 
717 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 425¦5; however, according to the report of Ibn Ath\r, He was also governor of al-Jaz\ra during 
Hish[m’s rule. (al-K[mil, 215¦4). Ibn Ath\r’s report does not appear to be correct as Marw[n was appointed the 
governor of al-Jaz\ra during the reign of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d while <Abdah b. al-Riyy[+ was governor of al-Jaz\ra 
during al-Wal\d’s rule. Then <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n b. Muhammad attacked al-Jaz\ra and destroyed its marginal 
faction while Marw[n was in Armenia. (al-K[mil , 215¦4) There is no evidence that tells us when and why Marw[n 
was dismissed from the governorship of al-Jaz\ra.  
718 al-Ya<q[b\, T[r\kh, 331¦2. 
719 Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 258¦4. 
720 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 226¦4.  
721 ibid., 227¦4. 
722 ibid., 235¦4.  
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governorship of Armenia, Aljazeera, Mosul and Azerbaijan.723 There are different reports about 
the causes of his revolt. He rejected the legitimacy of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and rebelled against him 
and upon his arrival at Harr[n, he asked people to give the oath of allegiance to him and the people 
of Jaz\ra gave their allegiance secretly.724 On the other hand, Ibn <As[kir reported that Marw[n 
called the people to take the oath of allegiance to the person about whom the Muslim community 
had developed a consensus.725 However, in another report, Ibn <As[kir revealed that Marw[n asked 
the people of Homs to take the oath of allegiance to al-|akam and <Uthm[n, sons of al-Wal\d.726 
Ibn Ath\r reported that Marw[n revolted after the death of Yaz\d in Jaz\ra and asked the people of 
Qinisreen to take the oath. The people of Homs also took the oath of allegiance to him and 
accompanied him in his revolutionary movement.727 All these reports show that Marw[n was not 
satisfied with the aggressive act of Yaz\d but he did not know to how to resolve the issue amicably 
with minimum damage.  
Ibn <Abd Rabbih tells us that Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d wrote a letter to Marw[n b. Mu+ammad and asked 
him to clarify his position as to whether he accepted the authority of central government of Syria 
or not, since there were contradictory reports regarding Marw[n’s position. Yaz\d also decided to 
stop sending delegations to Marw[n without discontinuing financial assistance to him until there 
was clarification of Marw[n’s position. When Marw[n came to know Yaz\d’s suspicion, he sent a 
delegation to clarify his position. On the way, when the delegation arrived at Fur[t, they received 
the news regarding the death of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. Thus, they returned to Marw[n.728 All these 
reports validate the fact that Marw[n was cautious. He continuously asserted his efforts to put 
pressure on the emerging caliphs. He successfully manoeuvred the situation and saved his 
governorship and authority under Hish[m, al-Wal\d, and Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. 
After the death of Yaz\d, it was time for Marw[n to challenge the authority of a weak caliph 
Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d, the brother of the late Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d. He started a rebellion defying 
                                                 
723 ibid., 272¦4.  
724 al-Ya<qub\, T[r\kh, 337¦2.  
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Ibr[h\m’s legitimacy in the name of al-Wal\d II and his sons. He called the people of al-Jaz\ra, 
Mosel and Azerbaijan to take revenge for the murdered caliph al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, and to release 
both of al-Wal\d II’s sons, al-|akam and <Uthm[n. He moved his armies from al-Jaz\ra to 
Damascus. On the way he took an oath of allegiance from the people of Qinisreen and Homs.729 
Marw[n II  argued that al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d was an aggrieved caliph (khalifa al-ma&l]m). He further 
asserted that his position was comparable with Mu<[wiya b. Ab\ Sufy[n when he demanded that 
the murderers of <Uthm[n be given a fair trial.730 
Ibr[h\m and his fellows realised the danger. They organised an army of 21,000 under the leadership 
of Sulaym[n b. Hish[m. Ibr[h\m’s army marched towards the <Ayn al-Jarr where they met with 
Marw[n’s army.  The army consisted of almost 80,000 thousand soldiers and the battle took place 
on 7th of @afar, 127 AH. The battle ended with the defeat of Sulaym[n b. Hish[m.731 About 17 
thousand soldiers of the Syrian army were killed while Sulaym[n b. Hish[m fled from the 
battlefield to Damascus. The prisoners of the battle were released on condition they took the oath 
of allegiance to the two sons of al-Wal\d.732 
Ibr[h\m and his administration realised that their rule was now over. They had foreseen that al-
|akam, son of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, would become the caliph upon the arrival of Marw[n in 
Damascus and that Al-|akam might take fierce revenge for his father. Therefore, they killed al-
|akam, his brother and Y]suf b. <Umar al-Thaqf\ in prison.733 Luckily, Ab] Mu+ammad al-
Sufy[n\, one of the distinguished adherents of al-Wal\d from the Umayyad family, escaped from 
prison. Upon the arrival of Marw[n, he recited a qa~\da and claimed that it was composed by al-
|akam. The qa~\da was full of praise for Marw[n; and it also suggested  Marw[n’s succession, in 
case al-Hakam or his brother <Uthm[n were murdered; the last verse of the qa~\da reads:  
                                                 
729 al-Ya<q]b\, T[r\kh, 337¦2; al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 274¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 282¦4; Ibn <Abd Rabbih, al.<Iqd al-
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730 al-Bal[dhur\, Ans[b, 187¦5. 
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732 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 275¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 283¦4. Note: According to al-^abar\’s report, only two of the 
prisoners were killed: Yaz\d b. al-<Iq[r and al-Wal\d b. Ma~[d of Kalb because they had killed al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d.  
(al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 275¦4). 
733 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 275¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 283¦4 
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If my successor and I were murdered                                                                           
Then Marw[n would be the leader of the believers. 
After the recitation of the qas\da, Ab] Mu+ammad al-Sufy[n\ and all who were there took the oath 
of allegiance to Marw[n.734 According to Ya<q]b\’s report, the deposed caliph Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d 
also took oath to Marw[n. 735  According to a report, the members of the Umayyads family, 
including Sulaym[n b. Hish[m, also took the oath of allegiance to him.736 
Marw[n: His Life and Personality 
Marw[n b. Mu+ammad b. Marw[n b. al-|akam – the last Umayyad caliph – was born in 76 AH.737 
His father Mu+ammad was a w[l\ (governor) of al-Jaz\ra in 65 AH.738 He was a commander-in-
chief in the battle against Mus<ab b. Zubayr in Iraq in 71 AH.739 <Abd al-Malik also appointed him 
as governor of Armenia and al-Jaz\ra in 73 AH. There are differing reports regarding his 
governorship in the reign of al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik. According to Ibn Kath\r, al-Wal\d, 
discharged him from the governorship of Armenia and al-Jaz\ra against the will of his father <Abd 
al-Malik, and appointed as governor his own brother Maslama b. <Abd al-Malik, who worked there 
until <Umar b. Hubayra replaced him on the order of Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik in 102 AH.740 
However, according to al-^abar\, Mu+ammad b. Marw[n remained governor of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Jaz\ra until his death under the reign of Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik.741 
Marw[n’s maternal lineage is complex and obscure. Al-^abar\ reports on the authority of <Al\ b. 
Muj[hid and Ab\ Sin[n al-Juhn\ that Marw[n’s mother was a slave of Ibr[h\m b. al-Ashtar. She 
was pregnant when she was taken by Mu+ammad b. Marw[n after the death of Ibr[h\m b. al-
                                                 
734 al-Ya<q]b\, T[r\kh, 337¦2; al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 280¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 273¦4. 
735 al-Ya<q]b\, T[r\kh, 337¦3; al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 281¦4; al-Suy]%\, Jal[l al-D\n <Abd al-Ra+m[n b. Ab\ Bakr (d. 
911¦1505), T[r\kh al-Khulaf[>, (Cairo: 1350) 169.  
736 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 280-281¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 274¦4. 
737 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 577¦3; Ibn Kath\r,  al-Bid[ya, 15¦9; Ibn <As[kir, Tahdh\b, 197¦16.  
738 ibid., 557¦3.  
739 ibid., 519¦3. 
740 Ibn Kath\r, al-Bid[ya, 67¦9,  Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 118¦4. 
741 Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 167¦4; Ibn Khald]n, Kit[b al-Ibar, 165¦3. 
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Ashtar, and that she later gave birth to Marw[n “on the bed” of Mu+ammad b. Marw[n.742 On the 
other hand, Al-Bal[dhur\ and al-Mas<]d\ report that Marw[n’s mother was a Kurdish slave of 
Mu~<ab b. al-Zubayr and Mu+ammad b. Marw[n took her after the assassination of Mu~<ab; and 
her name was Rayy[ or ^ar]na.743 Similarly Ibn <Abd Rabbih reveals contradictory reports. He 
reports that Marw[n’s mother was the slave of a cook of Mu~<ab b. Al-Zubayr or Ibn Ashtar; and 
the name of the cook was Zarb[ who was also a slave of Muslim b. <Umar al-B[hil\. However, in 
another report, Ibn <Abd Rabbih reports that Marw[n’s mother was the daughter of Ibr[h\m b. al-
Ashtar.744 The historians did not reveal much about the life of Marw[n’s mother except a report 
that shows her nobility and goodness. Hijj[j b. Qutayba b. Muslim al-B[hil\ reported that when he 
left with Marw[n’s family for Africa after his assassination. Marw[n’s mother also accompanied 
them. Along the way, she did not cry, not even once, and they never heard her utter a word of 
fear.745 Nevertheless, even though she was a slave, Marw[n’s mother possessed noble qualities. It 
was a great challenge for Marw[n to establish his authority as a caliph against the convention of 
the Umayyad family, according to which the child of a slave woman could not become a caliph.  
Marw[n had to face two strong movements in the east. Firstly, the Khaw[rij who were active in 
Jaz\ra under the leadership of $a++ak b. Qays, a Shayb[n\ leader. Secondly there was the <Alid 
movement under the patronage of <Abd Allah b. Mu<[wiya. These movements had deep roots in 
the past but had always been suppressed by the collective efforts of the Umayyads. Contrary to 
precedent, this time the Umayyads were not united and these movements had gathered support 
from eminent members of the previous regime. For instance, Man~]r b. Jamh]r and <Abd Allah b. 
<Umar made an alliance with <Al\d leader <Abd Allah b. Mu<[wiya. Similarly, Sulaym[n b. 
Hish[m joined the Khaw[rij movements. Marw[n b. Mu+ammad took the situation seriously and 
ordered Yaz\d b. <Umar b. Hubayra to attack Kufa. 
Marw[n’s army was triumphant; the opposition was not united while Marw[n’s army was strong 
enough to defeat the opponents. Ibn $ub[ra, Marw[n’s general, restored peace by the spring of 
                                                 
742al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 356¦4; Ibn <As[kir, Tahdh\b, 191¦16.  
743 al-Bal[dhur\, Ans[b, 186¦5; al-Mas<]d\, Mur]j, 426¦2.  
744 Ibn <Abd Rabbih, al-<Iqd al-Far\d, 468¦4 
745 Ibn <As[kir, Tahdh\b, 47-48¦4 
269 
 
130¦748.746 But this peace was not sustainable since plague, famine and a terrible earthquake 
worsened the economy of Damascus. Meanwhile, black clouds appeared in the Khuras[nian 
horizon. Ab] Muslim Khur[s[n\ managed successfully to establish his authority in Khur[s[n by 
expelling the Umayyad governor, Na~r b. Sayy[r, from the capital city of Mrew in Jam[d\ II 
130¦February 748. Yaz\d Ibn Hubayra, the governor of Iraq, dispatched two armies under Nub[ta 
b. |an&ala al-Kalb\, the <amil (deputy) of Ibn Hubayra in Jurj[n,747 and <Amir b. $ub[ra al-Murr\, 
a commander of Ibn Hubayra sent to Na~r b. Sayy[r, to curtail the rebellion’s advance from the 
Kur[s[nian frontiers.748 Both commanders were seriously defeated by Qa+%abah b. Shab\b, a 
commander of Ab] Muslim’s army.749 There was already a joint opposition of Khaw[rij, <Alids, 
and Yemen\s in Iraq and alienated members of the Umayyad family. They prepared the ground for 
an <Abbasid revolution. Except for W[si%, where Ibn Hubayra was still in power, the whole of Iraq 
was under the control of the Abb[sids. Ab] al-<Abb[s al-Saffa+ took the oath of caliph in Kufa in 
Rab\< I, 132¦October 749. Marw[n, with his efficient Qays\ adherents, marched towards Kufa to 
end the instability and rebellion forever. On the other hand, the <Abb[sids were ready to retaliate 
against him. The battle was fought between two groups on the river Z[b in Jam[d\ II 132¦ February 
750 and Marw[n was defeated. The Umayyad caliphate came to an end when the Yamanies opened 
the doors of Damascus for the Abbasids.  Marw[n was killed in Egypt in Dh] al-|ajja 132¦ (August 
750).750 
Marw[n’s titles 
Marw[n’s rivals usually criticised him because of his maternal lineage. Similarly, they attempted 
to disparage his decency by calling him uncomplimentary names. He was given two nicknames: 
al-+im[r (The Ass of Mesopotamia) and al-Ja<d\. Al-+im[r is a famous nickname for Marw[n in 
common sources of Umayyad history.751 Ibn Khald]n also asserts that he was given this nickname 
                                                 
746 Kennedy, The Prophet,  115. 
747 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 326-367¦4. 
748 ibid., 334¦4. 
749 ibid., 325¦4. 
750 ibid., 350¦4. 
751 These titles are given to him by the later historians who are generally hostile towards the Umayyads. There are 
two main sources of the Umayyads’ history and both are hostile towards them: T[r\kh of al-Ya<q]b\ and T[r\kh al-
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because of his bravery and rigour in the battlefield.752 Ibn al-^aq%aq\ also opines that Marw[n was 
nicknamed because of his endurance in the battlefield.753 Al-Maqdis\ and al-Suy]%\ give the same 
accounts for Marw[n’s nickname al-|im[r754 and modern scholars have also evaluated the matter. 
Brockelmann asserts that the title of ‘donkey’ apparently seems to ridicule and degrade the status 
of Marw[n. In fact, it is praise, because the wild donkey is considered a noble animal. 755 
Muhammad Kurd <Al\ also gives a similar interpretation. He argues that Marw[n was called ‘ass’ 
because of his endurance in the battlefield.756 S<ad\ Ab] Jayb evaluated all these interpretations 
and concluded that Marw[n was nicknamed al-+im[r by his enemies. He argues that the word 
+im[r has not been used in either classical or Islamic literature for admiration or appreciation. 
Therefore, the interpretations of the historians are not valid.757 To endorse his opinion, Sa<d\ also 
gives al-^abar\’s historical reference which suggests that, when Ab] al-<Abb[s became caliph, 
<Abd All[h b. <Ayy[sh al-Muntawwif al-Hamd[n\ - one of the close associates of the <Abbasids758 
- came to him and said, “Thanks be to God who placed for us the son of the Prophet’s uncle and a 
man of <Abd al-Mu%lib’s progeny instead of the ass of al-Jaz\ra and child of a slave woman.”759 
This all suggests that his nickname al-+im[r was given to him by his enemies. 
As far as the title of al-Ja<d\ is concerned, this refers to al-Ja<d b. Dirham, a poet and scholar.760 
Al-Ja<d went to al-Jaz\ra where Marw[n was governor. Marw[n assigned him to teach his 
                                                 
Umam wa-al-Mul]k of al-^abar\. Al-Ya<q]b\ (d. 284¦898) was an <Alw\ and he could not hide his hostility to the 
Umayyad family. As far as the al-^abar\ (d. 310¦922) is concerned, he dealt mostly with the Umayyad through his 
Iraq\ and Iranian perspective. Therefore, it does not have a central position with regard to the reports about Syria and 
Egypt.          
752 Ibn Khald]n, Kit[b al-<Ibar, 282¦3. 
753 Ibn al-^aq%aq\, Mu+ammad b. <Al\ b. ^ab[%ab[, al-Fakhr\ f\ al-{d[b al-Sul%[n\ya wa-al-Duwl al-Isl[m\ya, (al-
Ma%ba<h al-Ra+m[n\yah, 1339AH),  97. 
754 al-Suy]%\, T[r\kh al-Khulaf[>, 169.   
755 Brockelmann, Carl, T[r\kh al-Shu<]b al-Isl[m\ya, (Beirut: D[r al-<Ilm lil-Mal[b\n, 1948), 196¦1.   
756 Kurd <Al\, Mu+ammad, Khi%a% al-Sh[m, (Damascus: al-Ma%ba<ah al-|ad\thah, 1925), 165¦1. 
757 Sa<d\, Marw[n bin Mu+ammad, 71.  
758 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 356, 483, 537, 545¦4. 
759ibid., 356¦4. 
760ibid., 82¦4. 
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children.761 Because of his heretical ideas al-Ja<d was killed by Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik when he 
was in the prison of Kh[lid b. <Abd Allah al-Qasr\ in 124AH.762 Al-Ja<d was one of the leading 
mu<tazil\ and qadar\ scholars of his time.763 Ibn Khald]n argues that Marw[n was given the title 
of al-Ja<d\ by his enemies.764 A+mad Zakk\ Pash[ also asserts that when the people of Khur[s[n 
observed his extraordinary knowledge, they nicknamed him al-Ja<d\ as his ideas were close to 
Ja<d’s understanding of Islam.765 On the other hand, the sources generally reveal that Yaz\d b. al-
Wal\d was a qadar\766 and the mu<tazil\s assisted him in deposing al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d and becoming 
a caliph.767 They also influenced him to nominate his brother Ibr[h\m and then <Abd al-<Az\z b. 
Al-|ajj[j for the succession because of their mu<tazil\ ideas.768 In this context, it is interesting that 
the sources relate both Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and his opponent Marw[n b. Mu+ammad with qadar\ 
thoughts. Perhaps, they were considered in this way because of their struggle for power against 
the established authority patterns. 
Marw[n was fond of travelling and expeditions.769 At the age of twenty-nine he fought for the first 
time in 105AH and conquered Nun\ya from the Kamakh Damascus side of the Roman Empire.770 
Marw[n attempted to show his command, valour and justice. When he left al-Jaz\ra for Damascus, 
he organised his forces and ordered the soldiers to purchase things with money and not to harm 
                                                 
761Ibn Ath\r, <Izz al-D\n,<Al\ b. Mu+ammad (d. 630∕1233), al-Lub[b f\ Tahdh\b al-Ans[b, (Cairo: Maktabat al-Quds\, 
1357AH), 230¦1. 
762 Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 255¦4; Ibn Kath\r, al-Bid[yah, 350¦9.   
763 The al-Qadar\ya and al-Mu<tazila are two schools of Muslim theology but they have significant areas of identical, 
shared beliefs. According to their understanding, God is the qad\m (one that exists beyond the limitation of time); 
the Qur[n is a created being, human beings have free will and they have complete authority to choose good or evil, 
the good and evil can be discerned by human intellect. cf. al-Sharist[n\, Ab] al-Fat+ Mu+ammad b. <Abd al-Kar\m 
(d. 548¦1153), al-Milal wa-al-Ni+al, (Cairo, 1951), 57-112; See Chapter, Five.       
Note: See al-Ja<d’s introduction and thoughts: al-Baghd[d\, Ab] al-Man~]r <Abd al-Q[dir b. ^[hir, (d. 429AH), al-
Farq bayn al-Firaq, ed. Mu+ammad Badr, (Cairo: 1910), 199-200; al-Sharist[n\, Ab] al-Fat+ Mu+ammad b. <Abd al-
Kar\m (d. 548¦1153), al-Milal wa-al-Ni+al, (Cairo, 1951), 113-115; al-J[+i&, <Amr b. Ba+r (d. 255¦868) al-T[j f\ 
Akhl[q al-Muml]k, ed. A+mad Zakk\ Pash[, (Cairo: al-Matba<ah al-Am\r\yah, 1914), 106.   
764 Ibn Khald]n, Kit[b al-<Ibar, 282¦3. 
765 al-J[hi&, al-T[j, 106. 
766al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 256, 270, 272¦4; Ibn <Abd Rabbih, al-<Iqd al-Far\d, 465¦4.  
767 al-Mas<]d\, T[r\kh, 239¦3 
768al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 270¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 277¦4; Ibn <Abd Rabbih, al-<Iqd al-Far\d, 466¦4.   
769 Ibn <As[kir, Tahdh\b, 194¦16.  
770 Ibn <As[kir, , T[r\kh Dimashq, 192¦16 (1). 
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anyone among the civilians. 771  Historians reveal that forgiveness was one Marw[n’s most 
impressive characteristics. In the battle of <Ayn al-Jar, there were about seventeen thousand 
prisoners from the battle. Marw[n not only released all of them (except two men who were 
assassins of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d), but he also gave one din[r to every prisoner.772 After the defeat of 
the Battle of Z[b, he set out to Egypt where he was traced near the village of al-Bau~\r. It is revealed 
that when the enemy surrounded him, he continued to fight alone against a group of soldiers, until 
his death.  
  
                                                 
771 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 272¦4.  
772 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 274-275¦4; Ibn Ath\r, al-K[mil, 283¦4. 
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Appendix II 
The Umayyad Principles of Succession  
Mu<[wiya is considered to be the founder of the Umayyad caliphate. Dennett argues that the matter 
of qualification and the appointment of the caliph was not settled when Mu<[w\ya’s position as a 
universal caliph was acknowledged. That only became possible due to |asan b. <Al\’s agreement 
with Mu<[w\ya.773 In order to establish a practical system for the appointment or nomination of a 
caliph, Mu<[w\ya amalgamated Arab cultural values with the established system of the Roman 
Empire. Dennett writes:  
Mu<[wiya provided for a successor in a way which was followed by the Umayyads. In pre-Islamic 
times, chieftainship of a tribe depended on the free birth of the chief with particular emphasis on 
the nobility of his mother, maturity of years, and acknowledged courage and judgement in affairs. 
A man fulfilling these requirements was chosen by acclaim. The principle of heredity where the 
eldest son succeeded his father did not exist. Mu<[wiya did not violate the basic theory that his 
successor should be of free birth, and elected, but he did introduce the principle of dynastic 
succession by causing his son to follow him.774 
Dennett notes that Mu<[w\ya summoned the leaders of the Syrian tribes to convince them to take 
an oath to Yaz\d as the next caliph. After gaining their solemn agreement, Mu<[w\ya dispatched 
deputations to the principal men of the empire to persuade them by means of threats and bribes to 
take an oath. After a careful assessment of the method of appointment introduced by Mu<[w\ya, 
Dennett argues that “the Umayyads continued this method adapted by Mu<[w\ya.” 775  Thus, 
according to Dennett’s analysis, free birth was an essential condition for the qualification of a 
caliph. For instance, Maslama, the son of <Abd al-Malik b. Marw[n, was deemed excellent among 
his fellows because of his courage and valour.776 Nevertheless, his name was not put forward for 
                                                 
773 Dennett, Marw[n ibn Mu+ammad, 163. 
774 ibid., 165. 
775 ibid., 166. 
776 Maslama b. <Abd al-Malik was a great warrior and administrator. He participated in many significant battles 
against the Byzantines. He defeated the Byzantines in 87 and 89 AH during the reign of Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik. 
(^abar\, T[r\kh, 673, 678¦3) Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik also appointed him as chief of the army sent to attack 
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the post of caliph because his mother was a slave. 777  Similarly, Zayd b. <Al\’s claim to the 
caliphship was rejected even by his own family and by the Quraysh simply because his mother 
was a slave. When Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik criticised Zayd b. <Al\ because of his maternal lineage, 
he retorted that God did not differentiate between people based on their lineage as the prophet 
Ism[>\l was the son of a slave.778 
Secondly, if we look at the Umayyads’ history, hereditary succession from father to son, was not 
necessary. Four sons of <Abd al-Malik, al-Wal\d, Sulaym[n, Yaz\d and Hish[m became caliph one 
by one; and their cousin <Umar b. <Abd al-<Az\z was nominated by Sulaym[n instead of his son 
or brother, Yaz\d. Before the movement of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d against his cousin al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d, 
it was the principle that if the reigning figure had selected anyone as his successor and his oath of 
allegiance had been taken, then its violation was considered to be a serious offence that might lead 
towards internal conflict and disorder. Actually the caliph’s nomination of a successor and 
affirmation of the principal men of the empire was considered an expression of the will of the 
community. For that reason, the defiance of this bond might harm the fabric of unity. Therefore, 
the Umayyad rulers were careful not to defy this principal rule of succession. For instance Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik was inclined to nominate his own son to succeed him but the oath had already 
been taken in favour of al-Wal\d b. Yaz\d during the reign of Yaz\d II. Yaz\d II designated first 
his brother Hish[m and then his own son Yaz\d to succeed, and Hish[m had to respect his 
predecessor caliph’s nomination.779 
The third indispensable principle for the qualification of a caliph’s succession was the maturity of 
the successor. We have observed that most of the Umayyad caliphs desired to nominate their own 
sons for succession but they failed to do so if their sons were not mature enough to hold the reign 
                                                 
Qus%un%unya in 92AH. (al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 48¦4) In 102 AH, he defeated Yaz\d b. al-Muhallab and restored peace in 
the Eastern Part of Caliphate. He was appointed governor of Kufa, Ba~ra and Khur[s[n by Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik. 
al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 90¦4.  
777 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 668¦3.   
778 ibid., 196¦4.   
779 ibid., 222¦4. 
 Note: al-^abar\ reports that al-Wal\d was eleven years old when Yaz\d II called for an act of succession for him. He 
was fifteen years old when Yaz\d died in 105 AH.   
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of the caliphate. Sulaym[n b. <Abd al-Malik and Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik were both interested in 
designating their own sons for succession but they could not, since their sons were too young to 
rule.780 
Besides these principles governing qualification for the role of caliph, every candidate for the 
caliphal position during the Umayyad period, had to show he was willing to follow Islamic 
principles. Secondly, he also had to seek acclamation from the Muslim community. The 
acclamation ceremony was held in the mosque and delegations (wuf]d) of nobles (ashr[f) gathered 
from all over the caliphate. By open acclamation, the delegations of nobles expressed the will of 
the community through which a candidate for the post of caliph sought legitimacy. For instance, a 
delegation of nobles gathered under the headship of $a++[k b. Qays781 to recognise Yaz\d I to 
succeed Mu<[wiya. Similarly, a delegation of nobles gathered in Damascus to affirm Marw[n I’s 
authority. Generally, the caliph’s successor was selected by open acclamation during the life of a 
sitting caliph. However, when Yaz\d III violated this principle and killed the sitting caliph, he 
called the delegations of nobles to justify his violent act and presented himself in front of them to 
be accepted as caliph.782 According to Dennett’s argument, there were two basic elements that 
obliterated the elective democratic basis of the caliphate. First, by virtue of their superior military 
and political authority, the Syrians asserted their opinion. They had the ability to abrogate the 
desires of the wuf]d of Iraq and |ij[z. Secondly, the community’s wishes were not conveyed 
properly during the interregnum. The reigning caliph had the authority to nominate his successor 
during his lifetime. Thus the nominee, by virtue of his position, could manage to manipulate the 
whole process of election in his favour.783 Although there is an opportunity in the procedure to 
manipulate the nomination of the future caliph, even then the Umayyad caliphs were at least 
theoretically bound to establish their government observing the basic principle of Islamic teaching 
and to seek the will of the community by open acclamation.  
                                                 
780 al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 49, 222¦4; Dennett, Marw[n ibn Mu+ammad, 166-7.  
781 al-$a++[k b. Qays al-Fihr\ was one of the most important commanders of Mu<[w\ya’s army. He participated in 
the battle of Siff\n in 37AH and fought against <Al\. ) al-^abar\, T[r\kh, 82¦3). 
782 Dennett, Marw[n ibn Mu+ammad, 167, 168.  
783 ibid., 168. 
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Appendix III.   
Kh[lid al-Qasr\ and the Fall of Umayyad Rule in Modern Umayyad Historiography 
One of the most important steps taken by Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik was the removal of a Qays\ 
governor, <Umar b. Hubayra, and the appointment of a Yemen\ governor, Kh[lid al-Qasr\, in his 
place, in the Eastern provinces of the kingdom in 105¦724. These steps reflect a radical change in 
tribal policy. Yaz\d b. <Abd al-Malik was inclined towards the pro-Qays policy; and contrary to 
his predecessor, Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik, formulated a pro-Yemen policy. Shaban argues that 
Hish[m wanted to change the harsh and inflexible policy of Ibn Hubayra towards a moderate and 
flexible pro-Yemen policy. 784  Al-^abar\ and Ibn Ath\r record that some of Hish[m’s Qays\ 
supporters criticized him when he appointed Kh[lid al-Qasr\ as governor of the East.785 In contrast 
to Shaban, Judd asserts that the tribal explanation for the appointment of Kh[lid seems 
inappropriate. Kh[lid belonged to the Bajila tribe that, “was only marginally identified with the 
Yemen\ bloc and often held an essentially neutral position in tribal struggle.”786  Secondly, Khalid 
was more associated with the Umayyad family than with Yemen power politics; he was a foster 
brother of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. Kh[lid was appointed because of his loyalty and 
administrative skills rather than his tribal concerns.787 Judd also rejects Shaban’s argument that 
Ibn Hubayra was replaced by Kh[lid because of the former’s harsh policies in Iraq. Judd asserts 
that “Kh[lid’s rule was hardly more ‘moderate and flexible’ than that of his Qays\ predecessors.” 
He was an ideal administrator like al-Hajjaj. He attempted to maintain peace and to implement 
Hish[m’s policies of infrastructural development. Because of his early training under the tutelage 
of al-|ajj[j, he skilfully attempted to restore peace and collect surplus. In order to attract the non-
Muslim community, he recruited them in administration and constructed a church for Christians. 
Judd argues that, “perhaps this is why M. A. Shaban characterized him as ‘lenient’.”788 
                                                 
784 Shaban, Islamic History, 155-157; Crone, Slaves on Horses, 47, 235, n. 338. 
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277 
 
There are many assumptions regarding the removal of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ from his post. Kh[lid was 
an efficient administrator and loyal to the central government of Damascus. One of the reasons 
noted in the historical sources is the jealousy of Farrukh Ab] Muthann[, a personal secretary of 
Hish[m who used to look after his personal estates in Syria. He convinced Hish[m that he misused 
the revenues of Iraq and he extended his power by appointing his brother Asad in Khur[s[n. The 
sources also reveal that Kh[lid and his son had collected a large amount of wealth789 and he became 
arrogant, offensive and insulted Hish[m. It was reported to Hish[m that he called him the son of a 
mentally deficient woman (Ibn al-+amqa). 790  Whether these reports are based on reality or 
fabricated by the opponents of Kh[lid is unclear since the sources do not support either of these 
interpretations. 
Kh[lid was also criticized because of his soft behaviour towards non-Muslims particularly, 
Christians. His mother was a Christian and she did not accept Islam.  Kh[lid’s critics accused him 
of not being a dedicated Muslim as he constructed a Church for Christians and a Synagogue for 
Jews. 791  Judd argues, “whether Kh[lid was unusually lenient toward religious minorities is 
difficult to determine, since descriptions of his generosity toward non-Muslims appear in the 
context of accusations from his enemies.”792 
Shaban argues that Kh[lid’s dismissal and his replacement by Y]suf b. <Umar shows that Hish[m 
b. <Abd al-Malik changed his tribal policy. He preferred to appoint a determined pro-Qays 
governor in place of a lenient pro-Yemen one. Y]suf b. <Umar, who was trained under the tutelage 
of |ajj[j b. Y]suf, was suitable for the expansionist policy of Hish[m. In contrast to Kh[lid’s 
lenient behaviour, Y]suf was considered to be more resolute and aggressive in extracting tax 
revenues from his subjects. The central government of Damascus collected extra money. Due to a 
treasury surplus, the state initiated its expansionist policy.793 Contrary to Shaban’s argument, Judd 
vindicates Wellhausen’s standpoint, according to which Kh[lid was not a lenient administrator and 
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“his subjects resented the heavy tax demands he placed on them and expenditures for irrigation 
projects.”794 Judd argues that Shaban did not correctly analyse the matter that land reforms and 
investment in agriculture contributed positively rather than draining the treasury.  
There was no substantial administrative policy change with the change of governorship, since 
Y]suf implemented the same financial policy as Kh[lid regarding tax collection and the extraction 
of surplus amounts of money to send payments to Damascus. In fact, <Umar b. Hubayra, Khalid 
al-Qasr\’s predecessor, had devised a financial policy through which substantial resources could 
be generated for the central government of Damascus. The same policy was adopted by his 
successor governors Kh[lid and Y]suf. Although they were apparently hostile to each other their 
administrative policy remained the same.795 There was no major policy change observed during 
the latter’s governorship. The sources do not clearly illustrate the exact motive behind the removal 
of Kh[lid and his replacement by Y]suf. The role of tribal power politics in the removal of Kh[lid 
does not seem to be central. Instead, Y]suf gained power against Kh[lid by highlighting his 
corruption in relation to state revenues. Kh[lid was dismissed and Y]suf was appointed to probe 
the matter.796 Thus the Qays-Yemen conflict is not a dominant feature in the dismissal of Kh[lid. 
However, tribal feuds played a more central role in the narrative of Kh[lid’s assassination.797 
Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik kept the balance between competing tribal, political and religious groups 
and he did not authorize his governors and officials beyond their limits. For instance, he appointed 
Y]suf b. <Umar as governor of the East but he did not give him control over Kh[lid. This was the 
key feature that was missing in the character of his successors. When al-Wal\d came to power in 
125¦743 after the death of Hish[m, he made a few changes in some of the posts. He jailed some 
sons of Hish[m and dismissed Ibr[h\m and Mu+mmad, the sons of Hish[m b. Ism[<\l, from their 
posts in |ij[z and appointed Y]suf b. Mu+ammad b. Y]suf in their place. On the basis of these 
changes, it is often argued that al-Wal\d made a substantial change in government policy on 
account of tribal concerns. It is said that he attempted to formulate a pro-Qays\ tribal policy that 
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focused on the expansion of the state, and particularly marginalized the Yemen\s who were 
traditionally the main power of the Syrian army. In contrast to these assertions it seems that the 
early historical sources present a different picture.  
The Portrayal of al-Wal\d in Modern Sources and the Conflict between al-Wal\d and Kh[lid al-
Qasr\ 
Most of al-Wal\d’s actions, as illustrated in the sources, were due to personal revenge. He treated 
Sulaym[n b. Hish[m harshly and put him in prison at <Amm[n because he had offended him during 
the reign of his father. Similarly he killed Ibr[h\m and Mu+ammad, sons of Hish[m b. Ism[<\l al-
Makhz]m\ who was a maternal uncle of Hish[m b. <Abd al-Malik. Al-Wal\d killed them because 
they had advised Hish[m to oust al-Wal\d in favour of Maslama.798 The sources reveal that al-
Wal\d did not treat all Hish[m’s sons in the same way. He treated Maslama with respect. Despite 
the fact that his name was floated as heir by Hish[m’s supporters, al-Wal\d respected him because 
Maslama used to respect him and attempted a reconciliation between Hish[m and al-Wal\d. The 
portrayal of al-Wal\d in both medieval and modern sources is not presented reverentially. The 
sources record his reprisals and the treatment of his enemies extensively, but the most important 
of these accounts are the imprisonment of Sulaym[n b. Hish[m, and the handing over of Kh[lid 
al-Qasr\ to his opponent, Y]suf b. <Umar. 
The question is, why would al-Wal\d sell Kh[lid to his opponent, Y]suf b. <Umar? There are many 
interpretations of this event recorded in the chronicles. Kh[lid al-Qasr\ objected to al-Wal\d when 
he nominated his immature sons, al-|akam and <Uthm[n as his successors, and this act angered 
al-Wal\d so he punished him by handing him over to his enemy.799 It is also narrated that al-Wal\d 
had to face financial shortfalls because he raised stipends and extra bonuses for the army. When 
Y]suf b. <Umar offered him money (between 5 to 50 million dirhams) in exchange for his enemy 
Kh[lid, he accepted the offer without realising its implications. Judd examines all these reports 
and argues that, on the basis of al-Wal\d’s treatment of Kh[lid al-Qasr\, several modern 
interpretations propose that al-Wal\d was motivated by his pro-Qays\ attitude; however, none of 
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these interpretations is satisfactory. Judd asserts that Kh[lid’s Yemen\ identity was not well known 
as he belonged to the Bajila tribe who were only loosely related to Yemen and he was not a leading 
figure in the Yemen, as Shaban argues.800 He further elaborates that Kh[lid was closely associated 
with Qay\s as he had been under the tutelage of al-|ajj[j b. Y]suf, a Qays\ leader. Judd criticizes 
Wellhausen’s labelling of Y]suf and his supporters as “|ajj[jids” ignoring the fact that Kh[lid 
was also the protégé of Y]suf. Judd also rejects Crone’s assertion and argues that she ignored 
Kh[lid’s connection to al-|ajj[j. 801  Judd concludes that, “These factors blur Kh[lid’s tribal 
identity, suggesting that tribal factors may be exaggerated and that divisions between tribal groups, 
whatever they signify, may not have been as rigid as most analyses of the period suggest.”802 
Modern scholars, particularly Wellhausen and Shaban, consider the death of Kh[lid al-Qasr\ (d. 
126¦734) to be a major factor in the demise of al-Wal\d. Wellhausen argues that Kh[lid’s death 
played a unifying role for the opponents of al-Wal\d; while Shaban suggests that the death of 
Kh[lid augmented and extended the rivalry between Qays and Yemen. Thus, according to this 
interpretation, Khalid’s death is illustrated as the basic reason for the fall of the al-Wal\d rule. Judd 
argues that according to the early sources, the principal narrative in al-Wal\d’s demise is neither 
the tribal rivalry between the Qays and Yemen, nor Kh[lid’s death. Thus, the interpretations made 
by modern scholars are not supported by the early historical sources. Judd also analyses the issue 
from this perspective arguing that:  
The narrative of al-Wal\d’s death focuses almost extensively on al-Wal\d’s personal failing and 
moral inadequacies, presenting essentially a morality tale in which the immoral actions of the 
central character ultimately have negative consequences. Its appearance in both al-Bal[dhur\ and 
al-^abar\, via al-Mad[>in\, suggests that this is relatively early account. Its preservation in later 
sources, particularly Ibn <As[kir, demonstrates that this account remained the most widely 
accepted narrative of al-Wal\d’s death and did not change substantially over the centuries.803 
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It seems that tribal conflict was not a dominant factor in the demise of al-Wal\d. The last dialogue 
between al-Wal\d and Yaz\d b. <Anbasa also confirms that al-Wal\d’s moral integrity and religious 
credibility had been challenged. As far as his policies are concerned, the rebels did not highlight 
the issue. The dialogue occurred when Damascus was captured by Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d, and al-
Wal\d’s reliable followers, such as his cousin al-<Abb[s b. Wal\d, deserted him while al-Wal\d 
was in the fortress at al-Bakhr[, near Tadmur. Al-Wal\d discussed the possible end of the rebellion 
with Yaz\d b. <Anbasa and asked him to negotiate with the rebels. He claimed that he had raised 
the army stipends, reformed the taxation system and introduced many reforms for the public good.  
Yaz\d b. <Anbasa told him that the rebels were not against his policies; rather they accused him of 
personal offences such as his drinking, debauchery, and contempt for Divine law. Al-Wal\d did 
not deny any of these allegations and asserted that they had exaggerated his faults.804 This dialogue 
also indicates that his enemies did not criticise his policies but his character. Similarly, Yaz\d b. 
<Anbasa did not point out that his mal-treatment of Kh[lid and the Yemen\s had provoked the 
rebellion movement. These accounts invalidate Shaban’s assertion that “the Syrians, disgruntled 
with policies which entailed constant campaigning in all parts of the empire turned against Wal\d 
II.”805 Shaban observes a shift from pro-Yemen\ to pro-Qays\ expansion in state policy during the 
reign of al-Wal\d. The fact is that al-Wal\d retained the majority of officials from the previous 
regime, and made very few changes in Hish[m’s administration. He punished or removed those 
officials who opposed him, and in the past he had advised Hish[m to oust al-Wal\d in favour of 
Maslama, as has been mentioned above. The change in the officials of Hij[z is irrelevant. Their 
replacement with Y]suf b. Mu+ammad does not reflect al-Wal\d’s pro-Qays\ policy; rather, he 
appointed him because he was his maternal uncle and loyal to him.806 As far as the expansionist 
policy is concerned and the appointment of the immature sons al-|akam and <Uthm[n as 
governors of |im~ and Damascus respectively, it is more symbolic and in fact the cities were run 
by the officials from the previous regime.807 In particular he retained all governors and officials 
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who had been appointed on the frontiers during the period of Hish[m.808 This suggests that al-
Wal\d did not change the expansionist policy of the previous rule. On the other hand, in order to 
win the hearts of the army, al-Wal\d increased the stipends of, and awarded an extra bonus to, the 
Syrian army.809  
On the basis of these accounts, Judd argues, “Al-Wal\d’s acts of revenge are portrayed in the 
sources in purely personal terms and any suggestion that these acts served either tribal or political 
agendas has no foundation in the accounts themselves.”810 Thus, it can be concluded that the 
rebellion movement initiated the struggle to oust al-Wal\d on moral grounds rather on policy 
issues. Therefore, the elements of conflict between Qays and Yemen and the death of Kh[lid al-
Qasr\ were not dominant narratives in the fall of the regime.  
The Rebellion of Yaz\d b. al-Wal\d and Tribal Conflict in Modern Historiography   
It is important here to understand the elements that motivated Yaz\d to rebel against al-Wal\d. Al-
Mad[<in\ illustrates many accounts which describe Yaz\d’s motives. According to most of these 
accounts, the conflict between Qays and Yemen is the prime theme. The Yemen\s were annoyed 
with al-Wal\d because of his ill-treatment of Kh[lid al-Qasr\. It is a matter of fact that Kh[lid’s 
Yemen\ identity is not central, since he was marginally related to the Yemen\ bloc. Judd argues 
that “it is possible that Yaman\ leaders were motivated by their hatred towards Y]suf b. <Umar 
and that Kh[lid was transformed into a true Yaman\ to serve their tribal agenda.”811 Yaz\d b. al-
Wal\d had observed the situation and he had perhaps taken advantage of tribal strife for his own 
purpose. 
The second most important theme presented in al-Mad[>in\’s accounts is conflict within the 
Umayyad family. Al-Wal\d offended them, particularly the sons of Hish[m and his close relatives. 
He further marginalized them when he nominated his young sons as his successors and 
incarcerated the son of al-Wal\d b. <Abd al-Malik.812 On the other hand, the sources depicted Yaz\d 
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b. al-Wal\d as virtuous, envious and austere, and a critic of al-Wal\d’s obsession with pleasure. 
Yaz\d’s elder brother, al-<Abb[s rejected his idea of carrying out a rebellion against a legitimate 
caliph. He warned him that this kind of action would ruin the dignity of the Umayyad family. 
Yaz\d did not pay attention to his advice and initiated a rebellion against al-Wal\d.813 Al-Bal[dhur\ 
notes that Yaz\d’s aggressive sermons against al-Wal\d played a central role in rebellion.814 
Because of his temperament, Wellhausen aptly comments that Yaz\d was the “most ambitious 
amongst his brothers.”815 Through this discussion, it can be asserted that Yaz\d was actually 
motivated by his own passion while he utilized all factions that were against al-Wal\d. That is, he 
manipulated internal family issues and the conflict between Qays and Yemen for his own 
advantages.  
In order to legitimize his revolt against a legitimate ruler, Yaz\d attempted to validate his action 
by employing religious themes. By doing this, he was successful in winning the support of the 
religious class, particularly the Qadr\ya and Khaw[rij. In his accession speech, he rejected the 
traditional rules for the appointment and accountability of a caliph. He promised that he would act 
upon the teaching of Islam and claimed that people had the right to reproach him if he repudiated 
the rules of justice according to the Qur[n and Sunna. He asserted that the most eligible and 
virtuous member of a Muslim community was the most suitable to be a caliph. This argument was 
indeed analogous to the Khaw[rij concept of leadership.816  
In his accession speech Yaz\d also declared that he would continue the construction projects 
initiated during the previous regimes. He declared that he would minimize the range of military 
campaigns and promised to spend the resources of each province on its own development. On the 
basis of these statements, some modern scholars, such as Shaban, argue that Yaz\d’s military and 
economic policy played a central role in the third fitna. There are serious questions about Shaban’s 
interpretation. The early sources do not offer any evidence that al-Wal\d was removed from his 
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post because of his economic and military policies or that the rebellion was initiated against him 
on these grounds. Judd criticizes Shaban’s point of view and notes: 
Shab[n’s thesis requires that economic concerns be so deeply encoded in the vocabulary of the 
Qays vs. Yaman feud that no indication of the parties’ true motives shows through the rhetoric. 
While this is not entirely impossible, it is surprising that authors of later accounts, writing in 
periods when these symbolic references would not have been universally known, did not explain 
the symbolic importance of Qays-Yaman feuds. Yaz\d’s policies may have redressed some of his 
supporters’ economic grievances, but they simultaneously exacerbated other grievances.817 
Further, it is worth noting that the Yaman\s supported Yaz\d in his rebellion movement. However, 
pro-Yemen policy was not a central priority during Yaz\d’s period. The Yemen\ support of Yaz\d 
was based on anger about Kh[lid al-Qasr\’s death. Yaz\d indeed removed Y]suf b. <Umar from 
governorship and put him in prison, but he did not kill him in revenge on behalf of Kh[lid. 
Moreover, Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\, who had worked under his father in Iraq and had profound 
experience of Iraq\ administration, was not appointed to his father’s post; rather, he was given a 
position in Damascus. Man~]r b. Jamh]r who was also a Yemen\ and a leading military leader of 
Yaz\d’s forces was appointed governor of Iraq. Al-^abar\ records that he was full of hatred for 
Y]suf b. <Umar and was determined to take revenge for Kh[lid al-Qasr\’s death.818 It is difficult 
to decide whether Man~]r was appointed Governor because of his Yemen\ identity or because of 
his military talent and religious affiliations. It is narrated that he was appointed not because of his 
tribal identity but because of his religious affinity with Yaz\d’s Ghayl[n\ connection.819  
However, when the people of Iraq complained about his behaviour, Yaz\d removed him from his 
post and appointed <Abd Allah b. <Umar, a member of the Umayyad family, in his place.  <Abd 
Allah b. <Umar’s appointment shows that Yaz\d was not anxious to promote pro-Yemen\ politics 
in Iraq, otherwise he could have appointed another Yemen\ after the dismal of Man~]r in his place. 
Judd aptly argues that “Yaz\d’s handling of the governorship of Iraq does not suggest the strongly 
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pro-Yaman policies which some modern scholars have ascribed to him.”820 He further asserts that 
the Yemen’s support of Yaz\d in the revolt is exaggerated in the sources. Yaz\d rewarded the 
Yemen\s for their support but he was more obliged to and inclined towards the members of the 
Umayyad family and, “to newly politically active Qadarites than to Yemen.”821 
Shortly after Yaz\d’s period his brother Ibr[h\m b. al-Wal\d came to power for a short time in 
126¦744. There is a lack of information regarding this in the sources.822 He was portrayed as a 
passive character who took directions from Sulaym[n b. Hish[m and <Abd al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j. 
The sources do not have substantial records to show that Ibr[h\m supported the Yemen or 
attempted to eliminate the Qays. The most important reference in this regard is often made 
regarding the assassination of al-Wal\d’s sons, al-|akam and <Uthm[n and Y]suf b. <Umar. The 
sources, such as those of al-Bal[dhur\, report that Ibr[h\m ordered the assassination of al-Wal\d’s 
sons but <Abd al-<Az\z b. al-|ajj[j and Yaz\d b. Kh[lid al-Qasr\ resolved to kill Y]suf b. <Umar 
as well.823 However, there is no documentary evidence to indicate that Ibr[h\m supported Yemen 
and pressed the Qays during his brief period of rule.  
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